


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

# THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION

By

CHARLES A. BEARD
& MARY R. BEARD

*Decorations by*
WILFRED JONES

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME II

*The Industrial Era*

1928

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# THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION

## THE INDUSTRIAL ERA

# THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION

## CHAPTER XVII

### *The Approach of the Irrepressible Conflict*

HAD the economic systems of the North and the South remained static or changed slowly without effecting immense dislocations in the social structure, the balance of power might have been maintained indefinitely by repeating the compensatory tactics of 1787, 1820, 1833, and 1850; keeping in this manner the inherent antagonisms within the bounds of diplomacy. But nothing was stable in the economy of the United States or in the moral sentiments associated with its diversities.

Within each section of the country, the necessities of the productive system were generating portentous results. The

periphery of the industrial vortex of the Northeast was daily enlarging, agriculture in the Northwest was being steadily supplemented by manufacturing, and the area of virgin soil open to exploitation by planters was diminishing with rhythmic regularity—shifting with mechanical precision the weights which statesmen had to adjust in their efforts to maintain the equilibrium of peace. Within each of the three sections also occurred an increasing intensity of social concentration as railways, the telegraph, and the press made travel and communication cheap and almost instantaneous, facilitating the centripetal process that was drawing people of similar economic status and parallel opinions into coöperative activities. Finally the intellectual energies released by accumulating wealth and growing leisure—stimulated by the expansion of the reading public and the literary market—developed with deepened accuracy the word-patterns of the current social persuasions, contributing with galvanic effect to the consolidation of identical groupings.

§

As the years passed, the planting leaders of Jefferson's agricultural party insisted with mounting fervor that the opposition, first of the Whigs and then of the Republicans, was at bottom an association of interests formed for the purpose of plundering productive management and labor on the land. And with steadfast insistence they declared that in the insatiable greed of their political foes lay the source of the dissensions which were tearing the country asunder.

"There is not a pursuit in which man is engaged (agriculture excepted)," exclaimed Reuben Davis of Mississippi in 1860, "which is not demanding legislative aid to enable it to enlarge its profits and all at the expense of the primary pursuit of man—agriculture. . . . Those interests, having a common purpose of plunder, have united and combined to use the government as the instrument of their operation and have thus virtually converted it into a con-

solidated empire. Now this combined host of interests stands arrayed against the agricultural states; and this is the reason of the conflict which like an earthquake is shaking our political fabric to its foundation." The furor over slavery is a mere subterfuge to cover other purposes. "Relentless avarice stands firm with its iron heel upon the Constitution." This creature, "incorporated avarice," has chained "the agricultural states to the northern rock" and lives like a vulture upon their prosperity. It is the effort of Prometheus to burst his manacles that provokes the assault on slavery. "These states struggle like a giant," continued Davis, "and alarm these incorporated interests, lest they may break the chain that binds them to usurpation; and therefore they are making this fierce onslaught upon the slave property of the southern states."

The fact that free-soil advocates waged war only on slavery in the territories was to Jefferson Davis conclusive proof of an underlying conspiracy against agriculture. He professed more respect for the abolitionist than for the free-soiler. The former, he said, is dominated by an honest conviction that slavery is wrong everywhere and that all men ought to be free; the latter does not assail slavery in the states—he merely wishes to abolish it in the territories that are in due course to be admitted to the Union.

With challenging directness, Davis turned upon his opponents in the Senate and charged them with using slavery as a blind to delude the unwary: "What do you propose, gentlemen of the Free-Soil party? Do you propose to better the condition of the slave? Not at all. What then do you propose? You say you are opposed to the expansion of slavery. . . . Is the slave to be benefited by it? Not at all. It is not humanity that influences you in the position which you now occupy before the country. . . . It is that you may have an opportunity of cheating us that you want to limit slave territory within circumscribed bounds. It is that you may have a majority in the Congress of the United States and convert the Government into an engine of north-

ern aggrandizement. It is that your section may grow in power and prosperity upon treasures unjustly taken from the South, like the vampire bloated and gorged with the blood which it has secretly sucked from its victim . . . You desire to weaken the political power of the southern states; and why? Because you want, by an unjust system of legislation, to promote the industry of the New England states, at the expense of the people of the South and their industry."

Such in the mind of Jefferson Davis, fated to be president of the Confederacy, was the real purpose of the party which sought to prohibit slavery in the territories; that party did not declare slavery to be a moral disease calling for the severe remedy of the surgeon; it merely sought to keep bondage out of the new states as they came into the Union —with one fundamental aim in view, namely, to gain political ascendancy in the government of the United States and fasten upon the country an economic policy that meant the exploitation of the South for the benefit of northern capitalism.

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But the planters were after all fighting against the census returns, as the phrase of the day ran current. The amazing growth of northern industries, the rapid extension of railways, the swift expansion of foreign trade to the ends of the earth, the attachment of the farming regions of the West to the centers of manufacture and finance through transportation and credit, the destruction of state consciousness by migration, the alien invasion, the erection of new commonwealths in the Valley of Democracy, the nationalistic drive of interstate commerce, the increase of population in the North, and the southward pressure of the capitalistic glacier all conspired to assure the ultimate triumph of what the orators were fond of calling "the free labor system." This was a dynamic thrust far too powerful for planters operating in a limited territory with incom-

petent labor on soil of diminishing fertility. Those who swept forward with it, exulting in the approaching triumph of machine industry, warned the planters of their ultimate subjection.

To statesmen of the invincible forces recorded in the census returns, the planting opposition was a huge, compact, and self-conscious economic association bent upon political objects—the possession of the government of the United States, the protection of its interests against adverse legislation, dominion over the territories, and enforcement of the national fugitive slave law throughout the length and breadth of the land. No phrase was more often on the lips of northern statesmen than "the slave power." The pages of the Congressional Globe bristled with references to "the slave system" and its influence over the government of the country. But it was left for William H. Seward of New York to describe it with a fullness of familiar knowledge that made his characterization a classic.

Seward knew from experience that a political party was no mere platonic society engaged in discussing abstractions. "A party," he said, "is in one sense a joint stock association, in which those who contribute most direct the action and management of the concern. The slaveholders contributing in an overwhelming proportion to the capital strength of the Democratic party, they necessarily dictate and prescribe its policy. The inevitable caucus system enables them to do this with a show of fairness and justice." This class of slaveholders, consisting of only three hundred and forty-seven thousand persons, Seward went on to say, was spread from the banks of the Delaware to the banks of the Rio Grande; it possessed nearly all the real estate in that section, owned more than three million other "persons" who were denied all civil and political rights, and inhibited "freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of the ballot box, freedom of education, freedom of literature, and freedom of popular assemblies. . . . The slaveholding class has become the governing power in each of

the slaveholding states and it practically chooses thirty of the sixty-two members of the Senate, ninety of the two hundred and thirty-three members of the House of Representatives, and one hundred and five of the two hundred and ninety-five electors of the President and Vice-President of the United States."

Becoming still more concrete, Seward accused the President of being "a confessed apologist of the slave-property class." Examining the composition of the Senate, he found the slave-owning group in possession of all the important committees. Peering into the House of Representatives he discovered no impregnable bulwark of freedom there. Nor did respect for judicial ermine compel him to spare the Supreme Court. With irony he exclaimed: "How fitting does the proclamation of its opening close with the invocation: 'God save the United States and this honorable court. . . . The court consists of a chief justice and eight associate justices. Of these five were called from slave states and four from free states. The opinions and bias of each of them were carefully considered by the President and Senate when he was appointed. Not one of them was found wanting in soundness of politics, according to the slaveholder's exposition of the Constitution, and those who were called from the free states were even more distinguished in that respect than their brethren from the slaveholding states."

Seward then analyzed the civil service of the national government and could descry not a single person among the thousands employed in the post office, the treasury, and other great departments who was "false to the slaveholding interest." Under the spoils system, the dominion of the slavocracy extended into all branches of the federal administration. "The customs-houses and the public lands pour forth two golden streams—one into the elections to procure votes for the slaveholding class; and the other into the treasury to be enjoyed by those whom it shall see fit to reward with places in the public service." Even in the

North, religion, learning, and the press were under the spell of this masterful class, frightened lest they incur its wrath.

Having described the gigantic operating structure of the slavocracy, Seward drew with equal power a picture of the opposing system founded on "free labor." He surveyed the course of economy in the North—the growth of industry, the spread of railways, the swelling tide of European immigration, and the westward roll of free farmers—rounding out the country, knitting it together, bringing "these antagonistic systems" continually into closer contact. Then he uttered those fateful words which startled conservative citizens from Maine to California—words of prophecy which proved to be brutally true—"the irrepressible conflict."

This inexorable clash, he said, was not "accidental, unnecessary, the work of interested or fanatical agitators and therefore ephemeral." No. "It is an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces." The hopes of those who sought peace by appealing to slave owners to reform themselves were as chaff in a storm. "How long and with what success have you waited already for that reformation? Did any property class ever so reform itself? Did the patricians in old Rome, the noblesse or clergy in France? The landholders in Ireland? The landed aristocracy in England? Does the slaveholding class even seek to beguile you with such a hope? Has it not become rapacious, arrogant, defiant?" All attempts at compromise were "vain and ephemeral." There was accordingly but one supreme task before the people of the United States—the task of confounding and overthrowing "by one decisive blow the betrayers of the Constitution and freedom forever." In uttering this indictment, this prophecy soon to be fulfilled with such appalling accuracy, Seward stepped beyond the bounds of cautious politics and read himself out of the little group of men who were eligible for the Republican nomination in 1860. Frantic

efforts to soften his words by explanations and additions could not appease his critics.

§

Given an irrepressible conflict which could be symbolized in such unmistakable patterns by competent interpreters of opposing factions, a transfer of the issues from the forum to the field, from the conciliation of diplomacy to the decision of arms was bound to come. Each side obdurately bent upon its designs and convinced of its rectitude, by the fulfillment of its wishes precipitated events and effected distributions of power that culminated finally in the tragedy foretold by Seward. Those Democrats who operated on historic knowledge rather than on prophetic insight, recalling how many times the party of Hamilton had been crushed at elections, remembering how the Whigs had never been able to carry the country on a cleancut Webster-Clay program, and counting upon the continued support of a huge array of farmers and mechanics marshaled behind the planters, imagined apparently that politics—viewed as the science of ballot enumeration—could resolve the problems of power raised by the maintenance of the Union.

And in this opinion they were confirmed by the outcome of the presidential campaign in 1852, when the Whigs, with General Winfield Scott, a hero of the Mexican war, at their head, were thoroughly routed by the Democratic candidate, General Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire. Indeed the verdict of the people was almost savage, for Pierce carried every state but four, receiving 254 out of 296 electoral votes. The Free-Soil party that branded slavery as a crime and called for its prohibition in the territories scarcely made a ripple, polling only 156,000 out of more than three million votes, a figure below the record set in the previous campaign.

With the Whigs beaten and the Free-Soilers evidently a dwindling handful of negligible critics, exultant Democrats

took possession of the Executive offices and Congress, inspired by a firm belief that their tenure was secure. Having won an overwhelming victory on a definite tariff for revenue and pro-slavery program, they acted as if the party of Hamilton was for all practical purposes as powerless as the little band of abolitionist agitators. At the succeeding election in 1856 they again swept the country—this time with James Buchanan of Pennsylvania as their candidate. Though his triumph was not as magisterial as that of Pierce it was great enough to warrant a conviction that the supremacy of the Democratic party could not be broken at the polls.

During these eight years of tenure, a series of events occurred under Democratic auspices, which clinched the grasp of the planting interest upon the country and produced a correlative consolidation of the opposition. One line of development indicated an indefinite extension of the slave area; another the positive withdrawal of all government support from industrial and commercial enterprise. The first evidence of the new course came in the year immediately following the inauguration of Pierce. In 1854, Congress defiantly repealed the Missouri Compromise and threw open to slavery the vast section of the Louisiana Purchase which had been closed to it by the covenant adopted more than three decades before. On the instant came a rush of slavery champions from Missouri into Kansas determined to bring it into the southern sphere of influence. Not content with the conquest of the forbidden West, filibustering parties under pro-slavery leaders attempted to seize Cuba and Nicaragua and three American ministers abroad flung out to the world a flaming proclamation, known as the "Ostend Manifesto," which declared that the United States would be justified in wresting Cuba from Spain by force—acts of imperial aggression which even the Democratic administration in Washington felt constrained to repudiate.

Crowning the repeal of the Missouri Compromise came

two decisions of the Supreme Court giving sanction to the expansion of slavery in America and assuring high protection for that peculiar institution even in the North. In the Dred Scott case decided in March, 1857, Chief Justice Taney declared in effect that the Missouri Compromise had been void from the beginning and that Congress had no power under the Constitution to prohibit slavery in the territories of the United States anywhere at any time. This legal triumph for the planting interest was followed in 1859 by another decision in which the Supreme Court upheld the fugitive slave law and all the drastic procedure provided for its enforcement. To the frightened abolitionists it seemed that only one more step was needed to make freedom unconstitutional throughout the country.

These extraordinary measures on behalf of slavery were accompanied by others that touched far more vitally economic interests in the North. In 1859, the last of the subsidies for trans-Atlantic steamship companies was ordered discontinued by Congress. In 1857, the tariff was again reduced, betraying an unmistakable drift of the nation toward free trade. In support of this action, the representatives of the South and Southwest were almost unanimous and they gathered into their fold a large number of New England congressmen on condition that no material reductions should be made in duties on cotton goods. On the other hand, the Middle States and the West offered a large majority against tariff reduction so that the division was symptomatic.

Immediately after the new revenue law went into effect an industrial panic burst upon the country, spreading distress among business men and free laborers. While that tempest was running high, the paper money anarchy let loose by the Democrats reached the acme of virulence as the notes of wildcat banks flooded the West and South and financial institutions crashed in every direction, fifty-one failing in Indiana alone within a period of five years. Since all hope of reviving Hamilton's system of finance had been buried, those who believed that a sound currency was essen-

tial to national prosperity were driven to the verge of desperation. On top of these economic calamities came Buchanan's veto of the Homestead bill which the impatient agrarians had succeeded in getting through Congress in a compromise form—an act of presidential independence which angered the farmers and mechanics who regarded the national domain as their own inheritance.

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Two incidents in this series of startling events deserve special consideration on account of their prominence in the forensics that decorated the struggle; namely, the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the Dred Scott decision. In connection with the organization of two new western territories, Kansas and Nebraska, in 1854, Congress provided that, when they were admitted to the Union, they could come in, with or without slavery, as their respective constitutions might provide. Since these territories lay north of the Missouri Compromise line, the provision in effect set aside the solemn understanding which had bound the two sections of the country for so many years. To clear up all doubts, Congress expressly declared that the Missouri covenant of 1820 was null and void as contrary to the principle of non-intervention with the institution of slavery in the territories.

The authorship of this program is generally ascribed to Stephen A. Douglas, a Democratic Senator from Illinois, and his action in the premises imputed to his overweening desire to become President of the United States. Though Douglas took upon himself both the onus and the honor of the repeal, Senator Atchison of Missouri, a spokesman of local slave owners eager to break over into the rich region to the west, claimed to have inspired the stroke. The nature of American politics lends plausibility to this latter view.

However, the point is not important. The significant

feature of the maneuver was the vote on the repeal in Congress. In the Senate fourteen southern Democrats, nine southern Whigs, and fourteen northern Democrats voted in favor of the bill; while four northern Democrats, six northern Whigs, two Free-Soilers, one southern Democrat, and one southern Whig voted against it. In short, two southern votes were recorded against the measure in the Upper Chamber. Of the hundred votes cast against it in the House of Representatives, only nine came from the slave states while forty-two Democrats from the North broke from their party and joined the dissenters. Considered in any light, the division was ominous: the repeal represented the demand of an almost solid South supported by a wing of the northern Democrats—effecting a triumph for the planters that fell only a little bit below Calhoun's extreme demand. True, the Kansas-Nebraska act did not absolutely force slavery upon the states to be admitted from the region in question but it made slavery lawful in the territories and permitted the residents to decide the ultimate question for themselves.

Just one more legal step was essential to win for the planting interest the whole territorial domain of the nation, and secure its weight in the balance of power apparently for all time. That step was a decision by the Supreme Court declaring that Congress had no authority under the Constitution to abolish or prohibit slavery in any of the territories. If the Constitution could be so interpreted, then either a reversal of the decision or an amendment would be necessary before Congress could undo the effect of the decree. Since the judges held for life and the approval of the Senate was necessary to new appointments, the possibility of getting a fresh reading of the auspices was remote. On the other hand, approval by three-fourths of the states being required for the adoption of an amendment, a reversal by that means was inconceivable. If the coveted interpretation could be obtained, the planting states would be safe forever. At least so it seemed to those wise in their

generation. But one point was overlooked in the calculations, namely, the likelihood of revolution.

Either by accident or intent the great issue was presented to the Supreme Court in 1856 by the celebrated Dred Scott case. Scott was a slave who had been taken by his master into the upper Louisiana territory in the days when, theoretically at least, the Missouri Compromise was still in force and slavery was forbidden in that region. After a term of residence there, the bondman had been returned to the state of Missouri where he sued for his liberty on the ground of having been in free territory. Was he then a free man or a slave? The whole affair could have been put under that simple rubric.

The Supreme Court could have answered the question in a few words without mentioning the Missouri Compromise or the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the territories owned by the United States. With perfect ease, the judges could have disposed of the case by saying: "Whatever was the status of Scott in the upper Louisiana region while he was there, he was restored to bondage on his return to slave soil and is now a slave." Indeed when the matter was first argued, a majority of the Court agreed among themselves that the issue should be decided without discussing the thorny question that was agitating the country. But after reaching this agreement, the majority for various reasons changed their minds and in the end Chief Justice Taney rendered an opinion not vital to the disposition of the case in which he declared that the act of Congress, known as the Missouri Compromise, was null and void; that Congress could not constitutionally abolish slavery in the territories. Thus he gave a stunning blow to the young Republican party whose cardinal doctrine was that Congress should establish freedom in all the territories; and evidently he had ignored all anti-slavery agitators of every sort and condition.

Thinking that the issue had now been settled by a decree of final authority, statesmen from the South called upon

their countrymen to show proper respect for the highest tribunal in the land, a counsel of loyalty natural enough in the circumstances. And yet in a reaction equally natural, the Republicans rejected the advice. Under their influence northern legislatures denounced the opinion of Chief Justice Taney as extra-judicial in character, as sheer usurpation, and without binding effect upon the people. In Congress and outside, Democrats were taunted with having once opposed the constitutionality of the United States Bank after Chief Justice Marshall had set his high seal of legal approval upon it. Into their teeth Republican leaders flung quotations from Jefferson's attacks upon the Supreme Court made long before on similar occasions when that tribunal had pretended to act as the final arbiter in constitutional conflicts.

Convinced that the decision was a political trick, Abraham Lincoln said that, while Republicans would accept the decree of the Court remanding Scott to servitude, they would frankly reject its opinion respecting the power of Congress over slavery itself. Elaborating this idea, he declared that the President and Congress ought to disregard Taney's opinion as a rule of law, that slavery ought to be abolished in the territories in spite of the doctrines announced by the Court, and that the opinion ought to be reversed by a peaceful method—meaning of course a reconstruction of the Court through an efficient use of the appointing power. It had been done by Jacksonian Democracy. It could be done again.

The more Lincoln thought about the Dred Scott case, the hotter became his resentment. Finally he broke out in a militant note: "Familiarize yourselves with the chains of bondage and you prepare your own limbs to wear them. Accustomed to trample on the rights of others, you have lost the genius of your own independence and become the fit subjects of the first cunning tyrant who rises among you. And let me tell you, that all these things are prepared for you by the teachings of history, if the elections shall promise

that the next Dred Scott decision and all future decisions will be quietly acquiesced in by the people."

Going beyond this view, some of his party colleagues openly denounced the action of the Court as a political conspiracy arranged by the President, certain members of Congress, and the pro-slavery judges of the Court for the purpose of fastening chattel bondage upon the territories forever. This extreme contention they rested on mere incidents. It so happened that Buchanan, in his inaugural address on March 4, 1857, a few days before the opinion of the Court in the Dred Scott case was made public, referred to the forthcoming decision and expressed his intention, in common with all other good citizens, to submit cheerfully to the ruling of the Court, "whatever this may be." To Senator Seward, Republican leader from New York, the President's declaration was sheer mockery. In a terrific indictment delivered in the Senate, he asserted that Buchanan "approached or was approached by the Supreme Court of the United States," arranged with that tribunal to hang the millstone of slavery on the neck of the people of Kansas, and knew very well when he blandly promised to abide by the will of the Court just what its decision would be.

Naturally this charge made a tremendous sensation, bringing down on the Senator's head the severest criticism from conservatives. On all sides he was accused of making assertions for which he had not the slightest proof. Indeed his attack was seemingly so rash and so unjustified that for more than half a century even northern historians agreed in condemning it. Professor John W. Burgess, for example, after looking over the evidence available in 1899, when he wrote on the middle period, declared that "both Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Taney were men of the highest personal and official character and possessed the most delicate sense of the requirements and proprieties of the great stations which they occupied. It is almost certain that the charge was an unfounded suspicion." James Ford Rhodes, in the first edition of his history, later modified, was still

more emphatic: collusion between Buchanan and the impeccable Taney was simply impossible.

There the matter rested until the publication of President Buchanan's papers in 1910 revealed a portion of the truth. Among those records was a note from Justice Catron of the Supreme Court, dated February 19, 1857, thirteen days before the inaugural address in question—a note in which the Justice informs Buchanan that the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise line will be decided by the Court shortly in the Dred Scott case and asks the President-elect to write to Justice Grier stating how necessary it is to "settle the agitation by an affirmative decision of the Supreme Court, the one way or the other." Acting on the suggestion Buchanan wrote to Justice Grier; just what we do not know for it seems the letter has been lost. Apparently he urged the Justice to fall in line; at all events a reply from Grier, dated February 23, 1857—nine days before the inauguration—acknowledges the receipt of a communication from Buchanan, gives a brief history of the Dred Scott case, discusses the forthcoming decision of the Court, states that the Missouri Compromise line will be declared invalid, and adds that the opinion will be rendered by March 6th. The Justice then concludes: "Though contrary to our usual practice, we have thought it due to you to state in candor and confidence the real state of the matter." So Senator Seward had a stronger foundation for his indictment than he himself imagined.

For a brief moment after the publication of the Buchanan papers, it looked as if the Dred Scott decision had really been framed by the President of the United States and certain Justices of the Supreme Court, but later revelations gave the matter still another aspect. Within a few years certain records belonging to Justice McLean of the Supreme Court were placed in the Library of Congress, opening to students a new chapter in the story of this crucial case.

In the light of this additional evidence, it appears that, when the majority of the judges decided at first to avoid

the vexatious issue of the Missouri Compromise, Justice McLean announced to them his intention to file a dissenting opinion in the nature of a stump speech maintaining the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the territories—sound doctrine according to the politics of the Republican party. Now Justice McLean, like so many others in his day, was consumed by the ambition to be President of the United States and was in fact a strenuous seeker for that high office during more than a decade. Beyond question, he attempted to wring the nomination from the Republicans in 1856 and he sent active agents to present his appeal in Chicago four years later. And the dissenting opinion which he finally filed in the Dred Scott case upheld the power of Congress to exclude slavery from the territories, thus in effect setting forth the very political principles which he authorized his workers to employ in the quest for the Republican prize.

Beyond doubt accordingly the stiff insistence of Justice McLean upon the promulgation of his views at all costs was a leading factor in forcing the pro-slavery judges to come out against the validity of the Missouri Compromise. They were also aided in arriving at this conclusion by the knowledge that Wayne, a southern Justice, would announce pro-slavery doctrines in a dissenting opinion if they did not squarely face the issue. So the ambitions and passions of both political parties were in reality responsible for the judicial opinion that rocked the country from one end to the other. At any rate the Dred Scott decision was not a deliberate conspiracy on the part of the slavocracy.

§

The amazing acts of mastery—legislative, executive, judicial—committed by the federal government in the decade between 1850 and 1860 changed the whole political climate of America. They betrayed a growing consolidation in the planting group, its increased dominance in the Democratic

party, and an evident determination to realize its economic interests and protect its labor system at all hazards. In a kind of doom, they seemed to mark the final supremacy of the political army which had swept into office with Andrew Jackson. During the thirty-two years between that event and the inauguration of Lincoln, the Democrats controlled the Presidency and the Senate for twenty-four years, the Supreme Court for twenty-six years, and the House of Representatives for twenty-two years. By the end of the period, the old farmer-labor party organized by Jackson had passed under the dominion of the planting interest and the farming wing of the North was confronted with the alternative of surrender or secession.

In this shift of power the Whigs of the South, discovering the tendencies of the popular balloting, moved steadily over into the Democratic camp. Though unavoidable, the transfer was painful; the planting Whigs, being rich and influential, had little affection for the white farmers who rallied around the Jacksonian banner. According to the estimate of a southern newspaper in 1850, the Whigs owned at least three-fourths of all the slaves in the country and it was a matter of common knowledge that leaders among them disliked wildcat banking as much as they hated high duties on the manufactured goods they bought. Indeed to a southern gentleman of the old school the radical agrarianism of Andrew Johnson was probably more odious than the tariff schedules devised by Daniel Webster. It was said that one of them, when asked whether a gentleman could be a Democrat, snapped back the tart reply: "Well, he is not apt to be; but if he is, he is in damned bad company."

But the rich planters were relatively few in numbers and virtue was subject to the law of necessity; the populace had the votes, northern manufacturers were demanding protection, abolitionists were agitating, and in the end all but the most conservative remnant of the southern Whigs had to go over to the party that professed the dangerous doctrines of

Jackson. The achievements of the years that lay between 1850 and 1860 seemed to justify the sacrifice.

Though the drift toward the irrepressible conflict was steady and strong, as events revealed, the politics of the decade had the outward semblances of dissolution. The abolitionists and free-soilers, while a mere minority as we have seen, were able to worry the politicians of both parties in the North. Largely deserted by their southern cohorts, the Whigs, whose organization had always been tenuous at best, could discover no way of mustering a majority of votes on the bare economic policies of Hamilton and Webster. Their two victories—in 1840 and 1848—had been dubious and their only hope for a triumph at the polls lay in a combination with other factors.

To this confusion in party affairs, the intellectual and religious ferment of the age added troublesome factional disputes. A temperance element, strong enough to carry prohibition in a few states, was giving the politicians anxiety in national campaigns. A still more formidable cabal, the Know Nothing, or American Party, sprang up in the current opposition to foreigners, the papacy, infidelity, and socialism. Combining the functions of a party and a fraternal order, it nominated candidates for office and adopted secret rites, dark mysteries, grips, and passwords which gave it an atmosphere of uncertain vitality. Members were admitted by solemn ceremony into full fellowship with "The Supreme Order of the Star-spangled Banner," whose "daily horror and nightly specter was the pope." When asked about their principles, they replied mysteriously: "I know nothing." Appealing to deep-seated emotions, this movement showed strength in many localities and was only dissolved by the smashing energy of more momentous issues.

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The signal for a general realignment of factions and parties was given by the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska

bill of 1854 repealing the Missouri Compromise. In fact, while that measure was pending in Congress a coalescing movement was to be observed: northern Whigs persuaded that their old party was moribund, Democrats weary of planting dominance, and free-soilers eager to exclude slavery from the territories began to draw together to resist the advance of the planting power. In February of that year, a number of Whigs and Democrats assembled at Ripon, Wisconsin, and resolved that a new party must be formed if the bill passed.

When the expected event occurred, the Ripon insurgents created a fusion committee and chose the name "Republican" as the title of their young political association. In July, a Michigan convention composed of kindred elements demanded the repeal of the Kansas-Nebraska act, the repeal of the fugitive slave law, and the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. This convention also agreed to postpone all differences "with regard to political economy or administrative policy" and stay in the field as a "Republican" party until the struggle against slavery extension was finished. All over the country similar meetings were mustered and the local cells of the new national party rose into being. Meanwhile the old Whigs who wanted peace and prosperity were floating about looking for any drifting wreckage that might hold them above the waves.

As the election of 1856 approached, the Republicans made ready to enter the national field. After a preliminary conference at Pittsburgh, they held a national convention at Philadelphia and nominated for the presidency, John C. Frémont, the Western explorer, a son-in-law of Benton, the faithful Jacksonian Democrat. In their platform they made the exclusion of slavery from the territories—and of necessity its economic and political implications—the paramount issue. So restricted, the platform offered no prizes to regular Whigs, no tariff, banking, or currency reforms; rather did it appeal to the farmers of the Jeffersonian school —men who were not slave owners and did not expect to

enter that class, men who were determined to keep slavery out of the territories and to make the federal domain an estate for free farmers.

Lest there be some misunderstanding, they made it clear throughout their campaign that they were not trying to revive the Federalist or the Whig party. They were conscious of the fact that the name "Republican" of which they boasted was the device chosen by Jefferson for his embattled farmers and used by his followers until they fell under the sway of Jackson. "There is not a plank in our platform," exclaimed one of the Republican orators from Wisconsin before the great accommodation of 1860, "which does not conform to the principles of Jefferson; the man who, of all others, has ever been regarded as the true representative of the Republican party of this country. He was its representative in the Congress of 1776. He was its leader and representative in 1800; he was its true representative in 1812; he is the true representative of the Republican party to-day. We stand, Sir, upon his doctrines and we fight for his principles. We stand upon no sectional platform; we present no sectional issues . . . and we are coming to take possession of this government, to administer it for the whole country, North and South; and suffer monopolists neither of the North or the South to control its administration and so shape its action as to subserve the interests of the aristocratic few." On this platform those who opposed the plutocracy of the East and the planting aristocracy of the South could easily unite.

Replying to the Republican challenge the Democratic organization granted to its pro-slavery wing almost every demand. In its platform of 1856 it reiterated as a matter of course its fixed agricultural creed: no protective tariffs, no national banks, no industrial subsidies, and no Hamiltonian devices. It then commended the bargain of 1850, endorsed slavery as an institution, approved the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and proposed that the new states to be admitted to the Union should come in with or without

slavery as their constitutions might provide. In exchange the northern wing received honorific compensation in the nomination of James Buchanan of Pennsylvania. The South thus got the platform; the North, the candidate.

Defied by the Democrats in front and menaced by the Republicans on the left, the old Whigs, who hated the bother of slavery agitation and merely wanted to get government support for business enterprise, were sorely perplexed. They saw their southern brethren drawn away by the Democratic gift of the Kansas-Nebraska bill and yet they could not find in the Republican platform a promise of protection for industry or a pledge of currency reform. On the face of things, a combination with either of these political associations was impossible and so the Whigs decided to tempt the fates again and alone. At a convention held in Baltimore, they condemned "geographical parties," expressed a reverence for the Constitution and the Union, and nominated Millard Fillmore, a man "eminent for his calm and pacific temperament." As Fillmore had already been blessed by the American, or Know Nothing, party, there was some prospect of effecting a formidable bloc under his leadership.

When the votes were counted in the autumn of 1856, it was clear that a great majority of the people were opposed to anti-slavery agitation in every form. Not only was Buchanan elected by a safe margin on a strong slavery program; he and Fillmore together polled nearly three million votes against less than half that figure cast for Frémont. In other words, Garrison had been at work for a quarter of a century when, by a decision of more than two to one, even the mildest plank in the anti-slavery platform was overwhelmingly repudiated by the country at large. Still Frémont's poll revealed an immense gain in the number of free-soilers as compared with their trivial strength at previous contests, demonstrating in a striking manner that the fight for the possession of the territories, with all it implied in terms of political and economic power at Washington, could

not be avoided. Especially did it show the Whigs that they would have to work out a new combination of forces if they expected to get business enterprise on an even keel again.

Fortunately for them, the way to the solution of their problem was pointed out by the election returns: Fillmore had received 874,000 votes, a number which, added to Frémont's total, would have elected a candidate. Given these figures, the question of how to unite free-soil farmers and timid apostles of prosperity became therefore the supreme issue before the political leaders who took their bearings after the storm of 1856 in the hope of finding some method of ousting the Democrats at the next tourney. Neither group could win without the other; the union of either with the planting aristocracy was impossible. Obviously an accommodation—a readjustment of the balance of power—and the right kind of candidate offered to Whigs and free-soil Republicans the only assurance of ultimate victory.

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"The Government has fallen into the hands of the Slave Power completely," wrote Wendell Phillips in 1854. "So far as national politics are concerned, we are beaten—there's no hope. We shall have Cuba in a year or two, Mexico in five, and I should not wonder if efforts were made to revive the slave trade, though perhaps unsuccessfully, as the northern slave states, which live by the export of slaves, would help us in opposing that. Events hurry forward with amazing rapidity; we live fast here. The future seems to unfold a vast slave empire united with Brazil and darkening the whole West. I hope I may be a false prophet, but the sky was never so dark."

Three years later, when the inauguration of Buchanan had turned discouragement into despair, the only strategic stroke that Phillips and his colleagues could invent was to hold an abolition convention in Massachusetts and adopt a

solemn slogan calling for the disruption of the Union with the slave states. And the events of the swiftly flowing months that followed, as we have already indicated, merely seemed to confirm the belief of Phillips in the supremacy of the Democratic party led by the indomitable planting interest; events such as the downward revision of the tariff, the withdrawal of the ship subsidies, and the Dred Scott decision opening the territories to slavery.

All the while the conflict was growing more furious. Advocates of protection, taking advantage of the panic which followed the tariff revision, organized a stirring campaign to wean workingmen from their allegiance to a free-trade Democracy. Advocates of a sound currency protested against the depreciated notes and the wildcat banks that spread ruin through all sections of the land. The abolitionists maintained their fusillade, Garrison and Phillips, despite their pessimism, resting neither day nor night. Going beyond the bounds of mere agitation, the slavery faction of Missouri in its grim determination to conquer Kansas for bondage and northern abolitionists in their equally firm resolve to seize it for freedom convulsed the country by bloody deeds and then by bloody reprisals. In a powerful oration, "The Crime against Kansas," done in classical style but bristling with abuse of the slavery party, Charles Sumner threw Congress into a tumult in 1856 and provided a text for the free-soilers laboring to wrest the government from the planting interest. Before the public excitement caused by this speech had died away, the attention of the nation was arrested by a series of debates between Lincoln and Douglas held in Illinois in 1858—debates which set forth in clear and logical form the program for excluding slavery from the territories and the squatter-sovereignty scheme for letting the inhabitants decide the issue for themselves.

Then came the appalling climax in 1859 when John Brown, after a stormy career in Kansas, tried to kindle a servile insurrection in the South. In the spring of that year,

Brown attended an anti-slavery convention from which he went away muttering: "These men are all talk; what we need is action—action!" Collecting a few daring comrades he made a raid into Harper's Ferry for the purpose of starting a slave rebellion. Though his efforts failed, though he was quickly executed as a "traitor to Virginia," the act of violence rocked the continent from sea to sea.

In vain did the Republicans try to treat it as the mere work of a fanatic and denounce it as "among the gravest of crimes." In vain did Lincoln attempt to minimize it as an absurd adventure that resulted in nothing noteworthy except the death of Brown. It resounded through the land with the clangor of an alarm bell, aggravating the jangling nerves of a people already excited by fears of a race war and continued disturbances over the seizure of slaves under the fugitive slave act—disorders which sometimes assumed the form of menacing riots.

The turmoil in the country naturally found sharp echoes in the halls of Congress. Buchanan's policy of aiding the slavery party in its efforts to get possession of Kansas and the taunting action of the free-soilers in their determination to save it for liberty, gave abundant occasions for debates that grew more and more acrimonious. Indeed the factions in Congress were now almost at swords' points, passion in argument and gesture becoming the commonplace of the day.

When Senator Sumner made a vehement verbal attack on Senator Butler of South Carolina in 1856, Preston Brooks, a Representative from the same state and a relative of the latter, replied in terms of physical force, catching Sumner unawares and beating his victim senseless with a heavy cane. Though the act was not strictly chivalrous—for Sumner, wedged in between his chair and his desk, could not defend himself—admiring South Carolinians gave Brooks a grand banquet and presented him with a new cane bearing the words: "Use knockdown arguments." On both sides of the Senate chamber all the arts of diplomacy were

discarded, and the meanest weapons of personal abuse brought into play. Douglas called Sumner a perjurer who spat forth malignity upon his colleagues. The prim, proud Senator from Massachusetts, conscious of possessing a mellow culture, replied by likening Douglas to a "noisome, squat and nameless animal" that filled the Senate with an offensive odor.

Things were even worse in the lower house. Again and again debate was on the verge of physical combat, for which members equipped themselves with knives and revolvers. A Representative from Pennsylvania and another from North Carolina had to be put under bonds to keep the peace. A general mêlée occurred in the spring of 1860 when Lovejoy, whose brother had been shot by a pro-slavery mob in Illinois, made an unbridled attack on slave owners and Democrats, advanced to their side of the house shaking his fists in a terrible rage, and threw the whole chamber into such a confusion that all the resources of experienced leaders were needed to prevent bloodshed then and there. Without exaggeration did Jefferson Davis exclaim that members of Congress were more like the agents of belligerent states than men assembled in the interest of common welfare—an utterance that was startlingly accurate—born of prophetic certainty. After a few fleeting days, the irrepressible conflict that had so long been raging was actually to pass from the forum to the battlefield, to that court where the only argument was the sword and where the one answer that admitted of no appeal was death.

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Every shocking incident on the one side only consolidated the forces on the other. By 1860 leaders of the planting interest had worked out in great detail their economic and political scheme—their ultimatum to the serried opposition—and embodied it in many official documents. The economic elements were those made familiar to the country

through twenty years of agitation: no high protective tariffs, no ship subsidies, no national banking and currency system; in short, none of the measures which business enterprise deemed essential to its progress. The remaining problem before the planting interest, namely, how to clinch its grip and prevent a return to the Hamilton-Webster policy as the industrial North rapidly advanced in wealth and population, was faced with the same penchant for definition.

Plans for accomplishing that purpose were mapped out by able spokesmen from the South in a set of Senate resolutions adopted on May 24-25, 1860: slavery is lawful in all the territories under the Constitution; neither Congress nor a local legislature can abolish it there; the federal government is in duty bound to protect slave owners as well as the holders of other forms of property in the territories; it is a violation of the Constitution for any state or any combination of citizens to intermeddle with the domestic institutions of any other state "on any pretext whatever, political, moral, or religious, with a view to their disturbance or subversion"; open or covert attacks on slavery are contrary to the solemn pledges given by the states on entering the Union to protect and defend one another; the inhabitants of a territory on their admission to the Union may decide whether or not they will sanction slavery thereafter; the strict enforcement of the fugitive slave law is required by good faith and the principles of the Constitution.

In brief, the federal government was to do nothing for business enterprise while the planting interest was to be assured the possession of enough political power to guarantee it against the reënactment of the Hamilton-Webster program. Incidentally the labor system of the planting interest was not to be criticized and all runaway property was to be returned. Anything short of this was, in the view of the planting statesmen, "subversive of the Constitution."

The meaning of the ultimatum was not to be mistaken. It was a demand upon the majority of the people to sur-

render unconditionally for all time to the minority stockholders under the Constitution. It offered nothing to capitalism but capitulation; to the old Whigs of the South nothing but submission. Finally—and this was its revolutionary phase—it called upon the farmers and mechanics who had formed the bulk of Jacksonian Democracy in the North to acknowledge the absolute sovereignty of the planting interest. Besides driving a wedge into the nation, the conditions laid down by the planters also split the Democratic party itself into two factions.

Soon after the Democratic convention assembled at Charleston in April, 1860, this fundamental division became manifest. The northern wing, while entirely willing to indorse the general economic program of the planters, absolutely refused to guarantee them sovereignty in the party and throughout the country. Rejecting the proposal of the southern members to make slavery obligatory in the territories, it would merely offer to "abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court on all questions of constitutional law." Since the Dred Scott case had opened all the territories to slavery, that tender seemed generous enough but the intransigent representatives of the planting interest would not accept it as adequate. Unable to overcome the majority commanded in the convention by the northern group, they withdrew from the assembly, spurning the pleas of their colleagues not to break up the union of hearts on "a mere theory" and countering all arguments with a declaration of finality: "Go your way and we will go ours."

After balloting for a time on candidates without reaching a decision under the two-thirds rule, the remaining members of the Charleston conference adjourned to meet again at Baltimore. When they reassembled, they nominated Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois, the apostle of "squatter sovereignty," who was ready to open the territories to slavery but not to guarantee the planting interest unconditional supremacy in the Democratic party and the Union. Determined to pursue their separate course to the

bitter end, the Charleston seceders adopted the platform rejected by the Douglas faction and chose as their candidate, John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, an unyielding champion of planting aristocracy and its labor system. The union of farmers and slave owners was thus severed: the Republicans had carried off one large fragment of the northern farmers in 1856; Douglas was now carrying off another.

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During the confusion in the Democratic ranks, the Republicans, in high glee over the quarrels of the opposition, held their convention in Chicago—a sectional gathering except for representatives from five slave states. Among its delegates the spirit of opposition to slavery extension, which had inspired the party assembly four years before, was still evident but enthusiasm on that ticklish subject was neutralized by the prudence of the practical politicians who, sniffing victory in the air, had rushed to the new tent. Whigs, whose affections were centered on Hamilton's program rather than on Garrison's scheme of salvation, were to be seen on the floor. Advocates of a high protective tariff and friends of free homesteads for mechanics and farmers now mingled with the ardent opponents of slavery in the territories. With their minds fixed on the substance of things sought for, the partisans of caution were almost able to prevent the convention from indorsing the Declaration of Independence. Still they were in favor of restricting the area of slavery; they had no love for the institution and its spread helped to fasten the grip of the planting interest on the government at Washington. So the Republican convention went on record in favor of liberty for the territories, free homesteads for farmers, a protective tariff, and a Pacific railway. As the platform was read, the cheering became especially loud and prolonged when the homestead and tariff planks were reached. Such at least is the testimony of the stenographic report.

Since this declaration of principles was well fitted to work a union of forces, it was essential that the candidate should not divide them. The protective plank would doubtless line up the good old Whigs of the East but tender consideration had to be shown to the Ohio Valley, original home of Jacksonian Democracy, where national banks, tariffs, and other "abominations" still frightened the wary. Without Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, the Republican managers could not hope to win and they knew that the lower counties of these states were filled with settlers from the slave belt who had no love for the "money power," abolition, or anything that savored of them. In such circumstances Seward, idol of the Whig wing, was no man to offer that section; he was too radical on the slavery issue and too closely associated with "high finance" in addition. "If you do not nominate Seward, where will you get your money?" was the blunt question put by Seward's loyal supporters at Chicago. The question was pertinent but not fatal.

Given this confluence of problems, a man close to the soil of the West was better suited to the requirements of the hour than a New York lawyer with somewhat fastidious tastes, obviously backed by fat purses. The available candidate was Abraham Lincoln of Illinois. Born in Kentucky, he was of southern origin. A son of poor frontier parents, self-educated, a pioneer who in his youth had labored in field and forest, he appealed to the voters of the backwoods. Still by an uncanny genius for practical affairs, he had forged his way to the front as a shrewd lawyer and politician. In his debates with Douglas he had shown himself able to cope with one of the foremost leaders in the Democratic party. On the tariff, bank, currency, and homestead issues he was sound. A local railway attorney, he was trusted among business men.

On the slavery question Lincoln's attitude was firm but conservative. He disliked slavery and frankly said so; yet he was not an abolitionist and he saw no way in which the institution could be uprooted. On the contrary, he

favored enforcing the fugitive slave law and he was not prepared to urge even the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. His declaration that a house divided against itself could not stand had been counterbalanced by an assertion that the country would become all free or all slave—a creed which any southern planter could have indorsed. Seward's radical doctrine that there was a "higher law" than the Constitution, dedicating the territories to freedom, received from the Illinois lawyer disapproval, not commendation.

Nevertheless Lincoln was definite and positive in his opinion that slavery should not be permitted in the territories. That was necessary to satisfy the minimum demands of the anti-slavery faction and incidentally it pleased those Whigs of the North who at last realized that no Hamiltonian program could be pushed through Congress if the planting interest secured a supremacy, or indeed held an equal share of power, in the Union. Evidently Lincoln was the man of the hour: his heritage was correct, his principles were sound, his sincerity was unquestioned, and his ability as a speaker commanded the minds and hearts of his auditors. He sent word to his friends at Chicago that, although he did not indorse Seward's higher-law doctrine, he agreed with him on the irrepressible conflict. The next day Lincoln was nominated amid huzzas from ten thousand lusty throats.

A large fraction of Whigs and some fragments of the Know Nothing, or American, party, foreseeing calamity in the existing array of interests, tried to save the day by an appeal to lofty sentiments without any definitions. Assuming the name of Constitutional Unionists and boasting that they represented the "intelligence and respectability of the South" as well as the lovers of the national idea everywhere, they held a convention at Baltimore and nominated John Bell of Tennessee and Edward Everett of Massachusetts for President and Vice-President. In the platform they invited their countrymen to forget all divisions and

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"support the Constitution of the country, the union of the states, and the enforcement of the laws." It was an overture of old men—men who had known and loved Webster and Clay and who shrank with horror from agitations that threatened to end in bloodshed and revolution—a plea for the maintenance of the status quo against the whims of a swiftly changing world.

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A spirited campaign followed the nomination of these four candidates for the presidency on four different platforms. Huge campaign funds were raised and spent. Besides pursuing the usual strategy of education, the Republicans resorted to parades and the other spectacular features that had distinguished the log-cabin crusade of General Harrison's year. Emulating the discretion of the Hero of Tippecanoe, Lincoln maintained a judicious silence at Springfield while his champions waged his battles for him, naturally tempering their orations to the requirements of diverse interests. They were fully conscious, as a Republican paper in Philadelphia put it, that "Frémont had tried running on the slavery issue and lost." So while they laid stress on it in many sections, they widened their appeal.

In the West, a particular emphasis was placed on free homesteads and the Pacific railway. With a keen eye for competent strategy, Carl Schurz carried the campaign into Missouri where he protested with eloquence against the action of the slave power in denying "the laboring man the right to acquire property in the soil by his labor" and made a special plea for the German vote on the ground that the free land was to be opened to aliens who declared their intention of becoming American citizens. Discovering that the homestead question was "the greatest issue in the West," Horace Greeley used it to win votes in the East. Agrarians and labor reformers renewed the slogan: "Vote yourself a farm."

In Pennsylvania and New Jersey, protection for iron and

steel was the great subject of discussion. Curtin, the Republican candidate for governor in the former state, said not a word about abolishing slavery in his ratification speech but spoke with feeling on "the vast heavings of the heart of Pennsylvania whose sons are pining for protection to their labor and their dearest interests." Warming to his theme, he exclaimed: "This is a contest involving protection and the rights of labor. . . . If you desire to become vast and great, protect the manufactures of Philadelphia. . . . All hail, liberty! All hail, freedom! freedom to the white man! All hail freedom general as the air we breathe!" In a fashion after Curtin's own heart, the editor of the Philadelphia American and Gazette, surveying the canvass at the finish, repudiated the idea that "any sectional aspect of the slavery question" was up for decision and declared that the great issues were protection for industry, "economy in the conduct of the government, homesteads for settlers on the public domain, retrenchment and accountability in the public expenditures, appropriation for rivers and harbors, a Pacific railroad, the admission of Kansas, and a radical reform in the government."

With a kindred appreciation of practical matters, Seward bore the standard through the North and West. Fully conversant with the Webster policy of commercial expansion in the Pacific and knowing well the political appeal of Manifest Destiny, he proclaimed the future of the American empire—assuring his auditors that in due time American outposts would be pushed along the northwest coast to the Arctic Ocean, that Canada would be gathered into our glorious Union, that the Latin-American republics reorganized under our benign influence would become parts of this magnificent confederation, that the ancient Aztec metropolis, Mexico City, would eventually become the capital of the United States, and that America and Russia, breaking their old friendship, would come to grips in the Far East—"in regions where civilization first began." All this was involved in the election of Lincoln and the triumph

of the Republican party. Webster and Cushing and Perry had not wrought in vain.

The three candidates opposed to Lincoln scored points wherever they could. Douglas took the stump with his usual vigor and declaimed to throngs in nearly every state. Orators of the Breckinridge camp, believing that their extreme views were sound everywhere, invaded the North. Bell's champions spoke with dignity and warmth about the dangers inherent in all unwise departures from the past, about the perils of the sectional quarrel. When at length the ballots were cast and counted, it was found that the foes of slavery agitation had carried the country by an overwhelming majority. Their combined vote was a million ahead of Lincoln's total; the two Democratic factions alone, to say nothing of Bell's six hundred thousand followers, outnumbered the Republican army. But in the division and uproar of the campaign Lincoln, even so, had won the Presidency; he was the choice of a minority—a sectional minority at that—but under the terms of the Constitution, he was entitled to the scepter at Washington.

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From what has just been said it must be apparent that the forces which produced the irrepressible conflict were very complex in nature and yet the momentous struggle has been so often reduced by historians to simple terms that a reëxamination of the traditional thesis has become one of the tasks of the modern age. On the part of northern writers it was long the fashion to declare that slavery was the cause of the conflict between the states. Such for example was the position taken by James Ford Rhodes and made the starting point of his monumental work.

Assuming for the moment that this assertion is correct in a general sense, it will be easily observed even on a superficial investigation that "slavery" was no simple, isolated phenomenon. In itself it was intricate and it had

filaments through the whole body economic. It was a labor system, the basis of planting, and the foundation of the southern aristocracy. That aristocracy, in turn, owing to the nature of its economic operations, resorted to public policies that were opposed to capitalism, sought to dominate the federal government, and, with the help of free farmers also engaged in agriculture, did at last dominate it. In the course of that political conquest, all the plans of commerce and industry for federal protection and subvention were overborne. It took more than a finite eye to discern where slavery as an ethical question left off and economics—the struggle over the distribution of wealth—began.

On the other hand, the early historians of the southern school, chagrined by defeat and compelled to face the adverse judgment of brutal fact, made the "rights of states" —something nobler than economics or the enslavement of Negroes—the issue for which the Confederacy fought and bled. That too like slavery seems simple until subjected to a little scrutiny. What is a state? At bottom it is a majority or perhaps a mere plurality of persons engaged in the quest of something supposed to be beneficial, or at all events not injurious, to the pursuers. And what are rights? Abstract, intangible moral values having neither substance nor form? The party debates over the economic issues of the middle period answer with an emphatic negative. If the southern planters had been content to grant tariffs, bounties, subsidies, and preferences to northern commerce and industry, it is not probable that they would have been molested in their most imperious proclamations of sovereignty.

But their theories and their acts involved interests more ponderable than political rhetoric. They threatened the country with secession first in defying the tariff of abominations and when they did secede thirty years later it was in response to the victory of a tariff and homestead party that proposed nothing more dangerous to slavery itself than the mere exclusion of the institution from the territories. It

took more than a finite eye to discern where their opposition to the economic system of Hamilton left off and their affection for the rights of states began. The modern reader tossed about in a contrariety of opinions can only take his bearings by examining a few indubitable realities.

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With reference to the popular northern view of the conflict, there stands the stubborn fact that at no time during the long gathering of the storm did Garrison's abolition creed rise to the dignity of a first rate political issue in the North. Nobody but agitators, beneath the contempt of the towering statesmen of the age, ever dared to advocate it. No great political organization even gave it the most casual indorsement.

When the abolitionists launched the Liberty party in the campaign of 1844 to work for emancipation, as we have noted, the voters answered their plea for "the restoration of equality of political rights among men" in a manner that demonstrated the invincible opposition of the American people. Out of more than two and a half million ballots cast in the election, only sixty-five thousand were recorded in favor of the Liberty candidate. That was America's answer to the call for abolition; and the advocates of that policy never again ventured to appeal to the electorate by presenting candidates on such a radical platform.

No other party organized between that time and the clash of arms attempted to do more than demand the exclusion of slavery from the territories and not until the Democrats by repealing the Missouri Compromise threatened to extend slavery throughout the West did any party poll more than a handful of votes on that issue. It is true that Van Buren on a free-soil platform received nearly three hundred thousand votes in 1848 but that was evidently due to personal influence, because his successor on a similar ticket four years afterward dropped into an insignificant place.

Even the Republican party, in the campaign of 1856,

coming hard on the act of defiance which swept away the Missouri compact, won little more than one-third the active voters to the cause of restricting the slavery area. When transformed after four more years into a homestead and high tariff party pledged merely to liberty in the territories, the Republicans polled a million votes fewer than the number cast for the opposing factions and rode into power on account of the divided ranks of the enemy. Such was the nation's reply to the anti-slavery agitation from the beginning of the disturbance until the cannon shot at Sumter opened a revolution.

Moreover not a single responsible statesman of the middle period committed himself to the doctrine of immediate and unconditional abolition to be achieved by independent political action. John Quincy Adams, ousted from the presidency by Jacksonian Democracy but returned to Washington as the Representative of a Massachusetts district in Congress, did declare that it was the duty of every free American to work directly for the abolition of slavery and with uncanny vision foresaw that the knot might be cut with the sword. But Adams was regarded by astute party managers as a foolish and embittered old man and his prophecy as a dangerous delusion.

Practical politicians who felt the iron hand of the planters at Washington—politicians who saw how deeply intertwined with the whole economic order the institution of slavery really was—could discover nothing tangible in immediate and unconditional abolition that appealed to reason or came within the range of common sense. Lincoln was emphatic in assuring the slaveholders that no Republican had ever been detected in any attempt to disturb them. "We must not interfere with the institution of slavery in the states where it exists," he urged, "because the Constitution forbids it and the general welfare does not require us to do so."

Since, therefore, the abolition of slavery never appeared in the platform of any great political party, since the only

appeal ever made to the electorate on that issue was scornfully repulsed, since the spokesman of the Republicans emphatically declared that his party never intended to interfere with slavery in the states in any shape or form, it seems reasonable to assume that the institution of slavery was not the fundamental issue during the epoch preceding the bombardment of Fort Sumter.

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Nor can it be truthfully said, as southern writers were fond of having it, that a tender and consistent regard for the rights of states and for a strict construction of the Constitution was the prime element in the dispute that long divided the country. As a matter of record, from the foundation of the republic, all factions were for high nationalism or low provincialism upon occasion according to their desires at the moment, according to turns in the balance of power. New England nullified federal law when her commerce was affected by the War of 1812 and came out stanchly for liberty and union, one and inseparable, now and forever, in 1833 when South Carolina attempted to nullify a tariff act. Not long afterward, the legislature of Massachusetts, dreading the overweening strength of the Southwest, protested warmly against the annexation of Texas and resolved that "such an act of admission would have no binding force whatever on the people of Massachusetts."

Equally willing to bend theory to practical considerations, the party of the slavocracy argued that the Constitution was to be strictly and narrowly construed whenever tariff and bank measures were up for debate; but no such piddling concept of the grand document was to be held when a bill providing for the prompt and efficient return of fugitive slaves was on the carpet. Less than twenty years after South Carolina prepared to resist by arms federal officers engaged in collecting customs duties, the champions of slavery and states' rights greeted with applause a fugitive

slave law which flouted the precious limitations prescribed in the first ten Amendments to the Constitution—a law which provided for the use of all the powers of the national government to assist masters in getting possession of their elusive property—which denied to the alleged slave, who might perchance be a freeman in spite of his color, the right to have a jury trial or even to testify in his own behalf. In other words, it was "constitutional" to employ the engines of the federal authority in catching slaves wherever they might be found in any northern community and to ignore utterly the elementary safeguards of liberty plainly and specifically imposed on Congress by language that admitted of no double interpretation.

On this very issue of personal liberty, historic positions on states' rights were again reversed. Following the example of South Carolina on the tariff, Wisconsin resisted the fugitive slave law as an invasion of her reserved rights—as a violation of the Constitution. Alarmed by this action, Chief Justice Taney answered the disobedient state in a ringing judicial decision announcing a high nationalism that would have delighted the heart of John Marshall, informing the recalcitrant Wisconsin that the Constitution and laws enacted under it were supreme; that the fugitive slave law was fully authorized by the Constitution; and that the Supreme Court was the final arbiter in all controversies over the respective powers of the states and the United States. "If such an arbiter had not been provided in our complicated system of government, internal tranquillity could not have been preserved and if such controversies were left to the arbitrament of physical force, our Government, State and National, would cease to be a government of laws, and revolution by force of arms would take the place of courts of justice and judicial decisions." No nullification here; no right of a state to judge for itself respecting infractions of the Constitution by the federal government; federal law is binding everywhere and the Supreme Court, a branch of the national government, is the final judge.

And in what language did Wisconsin reply? The legislature of the state, in a solemn resolution, declared that the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case in question was in direct conflict with the Constitution. It vowed that the essential principles of the Kentucky doctrine of nullification were sound. Then it closed with the rebel fling: "that the several states . . . being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of its [the Constitution's] infraction and that a positive defiance by those sovereignties of all unauthorized acts done or attempted to be done under color of that instrument is the rightful remedy."

That was in 1859. Within two years, men who had voted for that resolution and cheered its adoption were marching off in martial array to vindicate on southern battlefields the supremacy of the Union and the sovereignty of the nation. By that fateful hour the southern politicians who had applauded Taney's declaration that the Supreme Court was the final arbiter in controversies between the states and the national government had come to the solemn conclusion that the states themselves were the arbiters. Such words and events being facts, there can be but one judgment in the court of history: namely, that major premises respecting the nature of the Constitution and deductions made logically from them with masterly eloquence were minor factors in the grand dispute as compared with the interests, desires, and passions that lay deep in the hearts and minds of the contestants.

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Indeed, honorable men who held diametrically opposite views found warrant for each in the Constitution. All parties and all individuals, save the extreme abolitionists, protested in an unbroken chant their devotion to the national covenant and to the principles and memory of the inspired men who framed it. As the Bible was sometimes taken as

a guide for theologians traveling in opposite directions, so the Constitution was the beacon that lighted the way of statesmen who differed utterly on the issues of the middle period. Again and again Calhoun declared that his one supreme object was to sustain the Constitution in its pristine purity of principle: "to turn back the government," as he said, "to where it commenced its operation in 1789 . . . to take a fresh start, a new departure, on the States Rights Republican tack, as was intended by the framers of the Constitution."

This was the eternal refrain of Calhoun's school. The bank, subsidies to shipping, protection for industries, the encouragement of business enterprise by public assistance were all departures from the Constitution and the intentions of its framers, all contrary to the fundamental compact of the land. This refrain reverberated through Democratic speeches in Congress, the platform of the party, and the official utterances of its statesmen. "The liberal principles embodied by Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence and sanctioned by the Constitution . . . have ever been cardinal principles in the Democratic faith"—such was the characteristic declaration of the elect in every platform after 1840. The Constitution warrants the peaceful secession of states by legal process—such was the answer of Jefferson Davis to those who charged him with raising the flag of revolution. Everything done by the Democratic party while in power was constitutional and finally, as a crowning act of grace, the Constitution gave approval to its own destruction and the dissolution of the Union.

It followed from this line of reasoning as night the day that the measures advanced by the Whigs and later by the Republicans were unconstitutional. In fact, Calhoun devoted the burden of a great speech in 1839 to showing how everything done by Hamilton and his school was a violation of the Constitution. Party manifestoes reiterated the pronouncements of party statesmen on this point. In their

platform of 1840, the Democrats highly resolved that "the Constitution does not confer upon the general government the power . . . to carry on a general system of internal improvement . . . the Constitution does not confer authority upon the federal government, directly or indirectly, to assume the debts of the several states . . . Congress has no power to charter a United States Bank . . . Congress has no power, under the Constitution, to interfere with or control the domestic institutions of the several states." This declaration was repeated every four years substantially in the same form. After the Supreme Court announced in the Dred Scott case that Congress could not prohibit slavery in the territories, the Democratic party added that the doctrine "should be respected by all good citizens and enforced with promptness and fidelity by every branch of the general government."

In the best of all possible worlds everything substantial desired by the Democrats was authorized by the Constitution while everything substantial opposed by them was beyond the boundaries set by the venerable instrument. Hamilton, who helped to draft the Constitution, therefore, did not understand or interpret it correctly; whereas Jefferson, who was in Paris during its formation was the infallible oracle on the intentions of its framers.

On the other hand, the Whigs and then the Republicans were equally prone to find protection under the ægis of the Constitution. Webster in his later years devoted long and eloquent speeches to showing that the Constitution contemplated a perpetual union and that nullification and secession were utterly proscribed by the principles of that instrument. He did not go as far as Calhoun. He did not declare free trade unconstitutional but he did find in the records of history evidence that "the main reason for the adoption of the Constitution" was to give "the general government the power to regulate commerce and trade." A protective tariff was therefore constitutional. Furthermore "it was no more the right than the duty" of Congress "by just discrim-

ination to protect the labor of the American people." The provision of a uniform system of currency was also among "the chief objects" of the Fathers in framing the Constitution. A national bank was not imperatively commanded by the letter of the document but its spirit required Congress to stabilize and make sound the paper currency of the land. In fact Webster thought the Democrats themselves somewhat unconstitutional. "If by democracy," he said, "they mean a conscientious and stern adherence to the Constitution and the government, then I think they have very little claim to it."

In the endless and tangled debates on slavery, the orators of the age also paid the same sincere homage to the Constitution that they had paid when dealing with other economic matters. Southern statesmen on their side never wearied in pointing out the pro-slavery character of the covenant. That instrument, they said, recognized the slave trade by providing that the traffic should not be prohibited for twenty years and by leaving the issue open after that period had elapsed. It made slavery the basis of taxation and representation, "thus preferring and fostering it above all other property, by making it alone, of all property, an element of political power in the union, as well as a source of revenue to the federal government." The Constitution laid a binding obligation upon all states to return fugitive slaves to their masters upon claims made in due course. It guaranteed the states against domestic violence, not overlooking the possibilities of a servile revolt. "Power to abolish, circumscribe, or restrain slavery is withheld but power is granted and the duty is imposed on the federal government to protect and preserve it." The English language could hardly be more explicit.

All this was no accident; it was the outcome of design. "The framers of the Constitution were slave owners or the representatives of slave owners"; the Constitution was the result of a compromise between the North and the South in which slavery was specifically and zealously guarded and se-

cured. Such were the canons of authenticity on the southern side.

This view of the Constitution contained so much sound historical truth that the opposition was forced to strain the imagination in its search for an answer. In an attempt to find lawful warrant for their creed in 1844, the abolitionists made a platform that became one of the prime curiosities in the annals of logic. They announced that the principles of the Declaration of Independence were embraced in the Constitution, that those principles proclaimed freedom, and that the provision of the Constitution relative to the return of fugitive slaves was itself null and void because forsooth common law holds any contract contrary to natural right and morality invalid.

Although the Republicans did not go that far in their defensive romancing, they also asserted, in their platform of 1860, that the principles of the Declaration of Independence were embodied in the Constitution and they claimed that neither Congress nor a state legislature could give legal existence to slavery in any territory of the United States. But there was one slip in this reasoning: the Supreme Court of the United States, with reference to the Dred Scott case, had read in the same oracle that Congress could not deprive any slave owner of his property in the territories and that the abolition of slavery there by Congress was null and void.

Nevertheless, the Republicans neatly evaded this condemnation of their doctrine, by calling it "a dangerous political heresy, at variance with the explicit provisions of that instrument itself, with contemporaneous exposition, and with legislative and judicial precedent." In short, the Republicans entered a dissenting opinion themselves; while it was hardly authentic constitutional law it made an effective appeal to voters—especially those fond of legal proprieties.

Even in their violent disagreement as to the nature of the Union, the contestants with equal fervor invoked the authority of the Constitution to show that secession was

lawful or that the perpetuation of the Union was commanded as the case might be. With respect to this problem each party to the conflict had a theory which was finely and logically drawn from pertinent data and given the appearance of soundness by a process of skillful elision and emphasis.

Those who to-day look upon that dispute without rancor must admit that the secessionists had somewhat the better of the rhetorical side of the battle. Their scheme of historicity was simple. The thirteen colonies declared their independence as separate sovereignties; they were recognized by Great Britain in the treaty of peace as thirteen individual states; when they formed the Articles of Confederation they were careful to declare that "each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." These were undeniable facts. Then came the formation of the Constitution. The states elected delegates to the federal convention; the delegates revised the Articles of Confederation; the revision, known as the Constitution, was submitted for approval to the states and finally ratified by state conventions.

Q. E. D., ran the secessionist argument, the sovereign states that entered the compact can by lawful process withdraw from the Union just as sovereign nations may by their own act dissolve a treaty with other foreign powers.

There was, of course, some difficulty in discovering attributes of sovereignty in the new states carved out of the national domain by the surveyors' compass and chain and admitted to the Union under specific constitutional limitations—states that now outnumbered the original thirteen. But the slight hiatus in the argument, which arose from this incongruity, was bridged by the declaration that the subject territories when taken in under the roof were clothed with the sovereignty and independence of the original commonwealths.

The historical brief of those who maintained, on the other hand, that secession was illegal rested in part on an interpretation of the preamble of the Constitution, an interpretation advanced by Webster during his famous debate with Hayne. "It cannot be shown," he said, "that the Constitution is a compact between state governments. The Constitution itself, in its very front, refutes that idea; it declares that it is ordained and established by the people of the United States. . . . It even does not say that it is established by the people of the several states; but pronounces that it is established by the people of the United States in the aggregate." That is, the Constitution was not made by the states; it was made by a high collective sovereign towering above them—the people of the United States.

This fair argument, which seemed convincing on its face, was later demolished by reference to the journals of the Convention that drafted the Constitution. When the preamble was originally drawn, it ran: "We, the people of the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, &c., . . . do ordain and establish the following Constitution." But on second thought the framers realized that according to their own decree the new government was to be set up as soon as nine states had ratified the proposed instrument. It was obviously undesirable to enumerate the states of the Union in advance, for some of them might withhold their approval. Therefore the first draft was abandoned and the words "We the people of the United States" substituted. The facts of record accordingly exploded the whole thesis built on this sandy foundation.

This fallacy Lincoln was careful to avoid in his first inaugural address. Seeking a more secure historical basis for his faith, he pointed out that the Union was in fact older than the Constitution, older than the Declaration of Independence. It was formed, he said, by the Articles of Association framed in 1774 by the Continental Congress speaking in the name of revolutionary America. It was matured

and continued in the Declaration of Independence which proclaimed "these United Colonies" to be free and independent states. It was sealed by the Articles of Confederation which pledged the thirteen commonwealths to a perpetual Union under that form of government; it was crowned by the Constitution designed to make the Union "more perfect."

Far more effective on the nationalist side was the argument derived through logical processes from the nature of the Constitution itself, by Webster, Lincoln, and the philosophers of their school. It ran in the following vein. The Constitution does not, by express provision or by implication, provide any method by which a state may withdraw from the Union; no such dissolution of the federation was contemplated by the men who drafted and ratified the covenant. The government established by it operates directly on the people, not on states; it is the government of the people, not of states. Moreover the Constitution proclaims to all the world that it and the laws and treaties made in pursuance of its terms, are the supreme law of the land and that the judges of the states are bound thereby, "anything in the constitution and laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States is the ultimate arbiter in all controversies arising between the national government and the states. Chief Justice Marshall had proclaimed the doctrine in beating down the resistance of Virginia, Maryland, and Ohio to federal authority; Chief Justice Taney had proclaimed it in paralyzing the opposition of Wisconsin to the fugitive slave law. Such being the grand pledges and principles of the Constitution it followed, to use Lincoln's version, that no state could lawfully withdraw from the Union; secession was insurrectionary or revolutionary according to circumstances.

What now is the verdict of history on these verbal contests? Did the delegates at the Philadelphia convention of 1787 regard themselves as ambassadors of sovereign states

entering into a mere treaty of alliance? Did they set down anywhere a pontifical judgment to the effect that any state might on its own motion withdraw from the Union after approving the Constitution? The answer to these questions is in the negative. Had they thought out a logical system of political theory such as Calhoun afterward announced with such precision? If so, they left no record of it to posterity.

What then was the Constitution? It was a plan of government designed to effect certain purposes, specific and general, framed by a small group of citizens, "informed by a conscious solidarity of interests," who, according to all available evidence, intended that government to be supreme over the states and enduring. They were not dominated by any logical scheme such as Calhoun evolved in defending his cause; they were engrossed in making, not breaking, a Union; they made no provision for, and if the testimony of their recorded debates be accepted as conclusive, did not contemplate the withdrawal of the states from the federation by any legal procedure. Surely it was not without significance that James Madison, the father of the Constitution, who lived to see secession threatened in South Carolina, denounced in unmistakable terms the smooth and well-articulated word-pattern of Calhoun, condemning secession as utterly without support in the understandings of the men who made, ratified, and launched the Constitution.

But it may be said that the men of Philadelphia merely drafted the Constitution and that what counts in the premises is the opinions of the voters in the states, who through their delegates ratified the instrument. Did, then, the men who chose the delegates for the state ratifying conventions or the delegates themselves have clearly in mind a concept that made the great document in effect a mere treaty of alliance which could be legally denounced at will by any member? The records in the case give no affirmative answer. What most of them thought is a matter of pure conjecture. Were any of the states sovereign in fact at any time; that is, did any of them assume before the world the attributes

and functions of a sovereign nation? Certainly not. Did the whole people in their collective capacity make the Constitution? To ask the question is to answer it; they did not.

When the modern student examines all the verbal disputes over the nature of the Union—the arguments employed by the parties which operated and opposed the federal government between the adoption of the Constitution and the opening of the Civil War—he can hardly do otherwise than conclude that the linguistic devices used first on one side and then on the other were not derived from inherently necessary concepts concerning the intimate essence of the federal system. The roots of the controversy lay elsewhere—in social groupings founded on differences in climate, soil, industries, and labor systems, in divergent social forces, rather than varying degrees of righteousness and wisdom, or what romantic historians call "the magnetism of great personalities."

## CHAPTER XVIII

### *The Second American Revolution*

In the spring of 1861 the full force of the irrepressible conflict burst upon the hesitant and bewildered nation and for four long years the clash of arms filled the land with its brazen clangor. For four long years the anguish, the calamities, and the shocks of the struggle absorbed the energies of the multitudes, blared in the headlines of the newspapers, and loomed impressively in the minds of the men and women who lived and suffered in that age.

Naturally, therefore, all who wrote of the conflict used the terms of war. In its records, the government of the United States officially referred to the contest as the War of the Rebellion, thus by implication setting the stigma of treason on those who served under the Stars and Bars. Repudiating this brand and taking for his shield the righteousness of legitimacy, one of the leading southern statesmen, Alexander H. Stephens, in his great history of the conflict, called it the War between the States. This, too, no less than the title chosen by the federal government, is open to objections; apart from the large assumptions in-

volved, it is not strictly accurate for, in the border states, the armed struggle was a guerrilla war and in Virginia the domestic strife ended in the separation of several counties, under the ægis of a new state constitution, as West Virginia. More recently a distinguished historian, Edward Channing, entitled a volume dealing with the period The War for Southern Independence—a characterization which, though fairly precise, suffers a little perhaps from abstraction.

As a matter of fact all these symbols are misleading in that they overemphasize the element of military force in the grand dénouement. War there was unquestionably, immense, wide-sweeping, indubitable, as Carlyle would say. For years the agony of it hung like a pall over the land. And yet with strange swiftness the cloud was lifted and blown away. Merciful grass spread its green mantle over the cruel scars and the gleaming red splotches sank into the hospitable earth.

It was then that the economist and lawyer, looking more calmly on the scene, discovered that the armed conflict had been only one phase of the cataclysm, a transitory phase; that at bottom the so-called Civil War, or the War between the States, in the light of Roman analogy, was a social war, ending in the unquestioned establishment of a new power in the government, making vast changes in the arrangement of classes, in the accumulation and distribution of wealth, in the course of industrial development, and in the Constitution inherited from the Fathers. Merely by the accidents of climate, soil, and geography was it a sectional struggle. If the planting interest had been scattered evenly throughout the industrial region, had there been a horizontal rather than a perpendicular cleavage, the irrepressible conflict would have been resolved by other methods and accompanied by other logical defense mechanisms.

In any event neither accident nor rhetoric should be allowed to obscure the intrinsic character of that struggle. If the operations by which the middle classes of England

broke the power of the king and the aristocracy are to be known collectively as the Puritan Revolution, if the series of acts by which the bourgeois and peasants of France overthrew the king, nobility, and clergy is to be called the French Revolution, then accuracy compels us to characterize by the same term the social cataclysm in which the capitalists, laborers, and farmers of the North and West drove from power in the national government the planting aristocracy of the South. Viewed under the light of universal history, the fighting was a fleeting incident; the social revolution was the essential, portentous outcome.

To be sure the battles and campaigns of the epoch are significant to the military strategist; the tragedy and heroism of the contest furnish inspiration to patriots and romance to the makers of epics. But the core of the vortex lay elsewhere. It was in the flowing substance of things limned by statistical reports on finance, commerce, capital, industry, railways, and agriculture, by provisions of constitutional law, and by the pages of statute books—prosaic muniments which show that the so-called civil war was in reality a Second American Revolution and in a strict sense, the First.

The physical combat that punctuated the conflict merely hastened the inevitable. As was remarked at the time, the South was fighting against the census returns—census returns that told of accumulating industrial capital, multiplying captains of industry, expanding railway systems, widening acres tilled by free farmers. Once the planting and the commercial states, as the Fathers with faithful accuracy described them, had been evenly balanced; by 1860 the balance was gone.

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When the armed contest was precipitated, the eleven states in the southern Confederacy were confronted by twenty-three states in the federal Union. Nine million people, more than one-third of whom were slaves, faced

twenty-two million people nearly all white. Before the strife was over there had been 2,898,000 enlistments in the federal armies and approximately 1,300,000 enlistments in the confederate armies; on the basis of men and terms of service, the ratio of the contending forces was about three to two. Practically all the iron, steel, textile, and munition industries of the country were in federal control. By far the major portion of the foreign commerce had long centered in the ports above the Potomac; even most of the foreign goods destined for the South had poured through the warehouses of northern cities. More than two-thirds of the banking capital of the country was in northern hands. The North also had an almost complete monopoly of the science and skilled labor required to furnish the sinews of warfare. In fact the real revolution—the silent shift of social and material power—had occurred before the southern states declared their independence and precipitated the revolution of violence. As Seward had warned the planters, they could accept the inescapable either in peace or in battle.

How then could the planting aristocracy hope to form a combination of interests strong enough to resist such superiority in men, money, and metal? Only by seeing things through the eyes of the confederate leaders of 1860 can the question be answered. They faced an unknown future and made their calculations on what appeared to be certainties at hand. They had long been taught and they were convinced that Cotton was King and that their control over staples essential to northern industries would enable them to bring on a ruinous crisis in the manufacturing states in case force was applied against them. "I firmly believe," exclaimed Senator Hammond of South Carolina in the year of secession, "that the slave-holding South is now the controlling power of the world; that no other power would face us in hostility. Cotton, rice, tobacco, and naval stores command the world; and we have the sense to know it and are sufficiently Teutonic to carry it out success-

fully. The North without us would be a motherless calf, bleating about, and die of mange and starvation."

The same mastery of raw materials, they thought, would induce England and France to recognize their independence, grant them aid, keep the seas free, and permit them to exchange their output for the materials of war. To such substantial interests, they added sentimental considerations. They knew that the aristocracy of England and Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, looked with pleasure upon the prospective break-up of the American republic—the failure of that disturbing experiment in democracy. So they planned to paralyze northern industries by cutting off their supplies and to gather abundant assistance from a sympathetic England and France.

Those southern statesmen who sought to save the planting aristocracy from its doom by withdrawing from the Union had also other grounds for optimism. They expected to push the Confederacy up to the Ohio River and with the aid of Missouri to lay hold of the Mississippi Valley, the granary of the nation, overestimating the power which they could wield in that region through their control over the outlet at New Orleans and undervaluing the efficiency of the railways which bound the Middle West with the seaboard.

At the same time they attached, and apparently with good reason, a very great importance to the internal conflict which promised to weaken the North. Facts betraying that division were patent to all: Lincoln had received just a little more than one-third of the popular vote; he confronted a formidable opposition on his own ground; and his mandate at best was vague. No issue of secession and civil war had been submitted to the country in the election of 1860. In condemning slavery in the territories, the Republicans did not say that they would fight, if necessary, to gain their ends, or to keep the South in the Union. Indeed, the new party embraced a large number of people interested primarily in the protective tariffs, free homesteads,

and related matters, practical people who thought the less said about slavery the better.

Nor were the Republicans when safely installed at Washington in a position to exert force on a large scale; the national government which passed into their control had an empty treasury, a mounting debt, a sorry navy, and a pitiable army. Whether the southern members of Buchanan's Cabinet had deliberately weakened its military strength for ulterior purposes was a matter of debate. Whatever the cause the fact remained that the Union government was not prepared for any great demonstration of armed might whereas the Confederacy had taken care to seize practically all the available munitions within its domain.

Finally, in striking their balance sheet, the mettlesome planters of the South placed on record their low opinion of the northerners generally, declaring that "the greasy mechanics" would not fight, thus discounting the numerical superiority of the North. With confident assurance they cited historical parallels showing how on numerous occasions small but valiant armies had vanquished hosts. "Our fathers, a mere handful," said John Tyler of Virginia, "overcame the enormous power of Great Britain." Even those who believed with Jefferson Davis that the war, if it came, would be long and awful, did not foresee the terrible struggle which was to mark its course.

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So it was with fairly buoyant hopes that the southern leaders sought to retain their economic and political power by cutting loose from the dominion of northern capitalists —by taking the southern states out of the Union. Jubilant spirits in South Carolina had announced during the campaign that they would withdraw from the federation if the balloting gave victory to "the Black Republican nominee and his fanatical, diabolical Republican party." The news of Lincoln's election was, therefore, merely a long-awaited

signal for action. The planters had threatened to leave the Union thirty years before on account of the high tariff—at a time when slavery had not become the subject of serious agitation; by resistance then they had forced a reduction of the hated duties and won nearly three decades of economic security. Now they were about to be ruled by a party openly committed to high protection, slightly tainted with abolitionism, and avowedly in favor of excluding slavery from the territories.

In this crisis the most dogmatic group among the planters acted with decision. A few days after Lincoln's election, namely, on November 10, the state legislature of South Carolina, without a dissenting voice, called a popular convention to choose the course appropriate to the emergency. In December the convention met in a thrill of excitement. The galleries and lobbies of the assembly hall were crowded with ladies in gala attire, soldiers in bright new uniforms, judges, editors, and officers, all in high spirits and sanguine as to the outcome. The delegates were nearly all old men or men beyond the middle years, too old to fight but too proud to let the Lincoln menace pass without an answer. Divine blessings were invoked, the issue was submitted to debate, and then by a unanimous vote South Carolina declared her independence. As soon as the momentous verdict was rendered, a shout of triumph ran through the streets of Charleston and the night was made joyous with merrymaking, enlivened by song and wine, dancing and fireworks. Those wiseacres who thought they saw dark shadows in the background slunk away or held their tongues. The jubilee was perfect.

As in the time of the nullification struggle, South Carolina now called upon her neighbors to follow her example; and before Lincoln was inaugurated six of them—Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas—had proclaimed their union with the northern states at an end. Though in Alabama and Georgia a respectable minority was opposed to secession, in the other four states only a

few malcontents could be mustered to resist the flushed and confident majority. Having declared their independence, the seceded states, acting on a summons from Mississippi, sent delegates in February, 1861, to Montgomery, Alabama, where a plan of union was adopted and preparations were made for the establishment of a new general government.

This was the posture of affairs when Lincoln took the oath of office on March 4, 1861. Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas trembled in the balance. Conventions had been called in these states but they had all refused to take the fatal step, preferring to await the course pursued by the incoming President. In Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee there was a large majority against secession on the issues presented before Lincoln's inauguration. Though they all upheld slavery, their economy was more diversified than that of the cotton belt; they had wide upland sections occupied by small farmers who had no special love for the planting aristocracy at the head of southern affairs.

Even after Fort Sumter fell, when the call for blood was running through the land, there was still a formidable opposition to secession in each of these states. In North Carolina, the federal faction resorted to the tactics of indifference and obstruction; in Virginia, it managed to tear away several disaffected counties, organize them into the new state of West Virginia, and enter the Union as a separate commonwealth; in Tennessee, it furnished thousands of soldiers for the northern army and kept whole counties in constant turmoil. Hence it happened that Lincoln on the day of his coming to power found secession menacing but by no means triumphant. The chemicals for a crisis were prepared but some stroke was necessary to explode them.

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From the early days of November, 1860, to March 4, 1861, while planters prepared for the worst, the govern-

ment at Washington drifted, helpless in the conflicting currents. According to the terms of the Constitution, Lincoln could not be inaugurated until the day lawfully appointed, and so for four critical months the Democratic party, which had been split wide by the campaign and defeated at the polls, continued to hold the reins of power. Its titular leader, President James Buchanan, had no popular mandate to deal with the question of secession. Nor had he any overmastering will of his own in the premises. Obviously bewildered by the stirring events taking place about him, he exclaimed in one breath that the southern states had no right to withdraw from the Union and in the next that he had no power to compel them to retain their allegiance. His Cabinet crumbled away, his host of advisers wrangled among themselves, and inaction seemed to him the better part of valor—at least it could be defended on the ground that nothing should be done to embarrass the incoming President.

On every side were heard the buzzing voices of politicians attempting to forecast the future, effect compromises, soothe angry passions. The Congress which assembled in December had no mandate from the election of the preceding month; the House had been chosen two years earlier and the Senate piecemeal over a period of six years. Congressmen were as perplexed as the President. To the public generally it seemed as if the solid earth were dissolving.

Southern residents of the capital were rapidly closing their houses and leaving for "their own country," most of them with confidence in coming events. Henry Watterson of Kentucky, who was on the ground, tells of a southern belle who drove away waving the Palmetto flag defiantly as her carriage rolled toward the blue hills of Virginia. She was a type of her class.

"She truly believed secession a constitutional right, slavery a divine institution. To her the mudsills of the North, as she dubbed them, were an inferior people. Cotton was king and she preferred a monarchy to a republic. If there

should be any war at all, which was unlikely, it would be short-lived. Washington would become quickly the seat of the Confederate government. . . . All Europe would welcome the New Aristocracy of the South into the firmament of nations."

During the winter preceding Lincoln's inauguration the whole Washington scene was dismal beyond description. In an imperial system when Cæsar rides in state to the capitol, with unclouded brow and firm-set jaw, he spreads around him, no matter how great the perturbation of his inner spirit, an atmosphere of authority, stability, decision, and prescience. In the swirling democracy of Washington there was no Cæsar, though Sumner and Seward at least felt competent to steer the ship of state away from the rocks. Instead of Augustan assurance, confusion, difference of opinion, and uncertainty as to the outcome prevailed among the victorious Republicans. When it rained or snowed the unpaved streets of the uncouth city swam in mud; when they were dry the wintry winds swept clouds of dust up and down the thoroughfares—a physical condition that typified the mental atmosphere. The air was thick with gossip and opinion.

Amid the babel of tongues, presumably speaking for the North, only three clear notes were discernible: far to the left declaimed the professors of a simple doctrine—let the seceding states depart in peace; far to the right shouted the professors of immediate and unconditional coercion, with Sumner and Chase in the lead; in the middle were the conciliators and opportunists led by Seward, the former fire-eating promoter of the irrepressible conflict. In the Autobiography of Charles Francis Adams these anxious saviors of their country are represented as rushing to and fro in eager haste to be doing something. Charles Sumner, who did not take the Adams view of the dilemma, was "a crazy man, orating, gesticulating, rolling out deep periods in theatrical whispered tones—repeating himself and doing everything but reason." William H. Seward was always running

in and out of the Senate, "the small, thin, sallow man, with the pale, wrinkled, strongly marked face—plain and imperturbable—the thick, guttural voice and the everlasting cigar,"[1] the Wellington of the picture, at Waterloo, praying in vain for night or Bluecher. In the White House, poor distraught Buchanan, he of "the wry neck and dubious eye," was wringing his hands, proclaiming the Union indissoluble, and himself unable to prevent it from dissolving. Meanwhile the unknown and unfathomable Lincoln "was perambulating the country, kissing little girls, and growing whiskers."

In that milling tumult, not one statesman foresaw the immediate future or read correctly the handwriting on the wall. Those oldest in experience and most learned in the arts and sciences of the schools turned out to be no wiser than the rough men of the frontier who stumbled and blundered along in the dim light of their conscience and understanding. All were caught up and whirled in a blast too powerful for their wills, too swift for their mental operations.

§

Even the safe inauguration of Lincoln and the straightforward words of his first address made no immediate change in the situation. The new President took a positive stand on the nature of the Union: it was perpetual and no state could lawfully withdraw from it. He was equally firm in declaring that he would enforce the Constitution and the statutes against states that sought to violate or defy the law but his tone was conciliatory and he closed with a simple and moving appeal to sentiments of union, peace, and friendship.

Still these were merely spoken words which left the affairs of state exactly as they stood, great events continuing to wait on action, on the movement of federal authorities, on some overt physical stroke, on some outward manifestation of will and decision. Though on both sides hotheads

clamored for bloodshed, all hesitated to make the fateful thrust that was to draw it. Day after day passed with the ship of state rolling erratically in the trough. April came and the warm spring sun seemed to beckon the nation to the pursuits of peace; dark clouds on the horizon looked dim and far away. In the White House, plagued by the horde of office-seekers hungry for jobs and by advisers swollen with infallibility, Lincoln wrestled with the multiplicity of minor questions permitting of decision.

Beyond all dispute Lincoln's problems in those tense days were stupendous. He spoke for a minority. He was no dictator standing for a triumphant majority and commissioned to carry out its appointed task. On the contrary he was aware, as southern planters were aware, that the North was torn by factions and he had no way of discovering how the bulk of his own party wanted him to act in the crisis. He knew that the anti-slavery sentiment in the country, though strong, was limited in its appeal; that, except in the hearts of the abolitionists, it was timid; that the Quakers who professed it were in general against emancipation by war.

Moreover abolitionists were divided on secession. Henry Ward Beecher, when informed that the southern states were withdrawing from the Union, burst forth: "I do not care if they do." Horace Greeley wrote in the Tribune: "If the cotton states shall decide that they can do better out of the Union than in it, we insist on letting them go in peace. The right to secede may be a revolutionary one but it exists nevertheless." It required events to drive that editor into the ranks of the coercionists.

Few, indeed, were the prophetic opponents of slavery who welcomed the test of battle and believed that the great solution of force foretold by John Quincy Adams was at hand. To no one except the fanatic was the issue simple. A wide belt of slave states had not seceded: a single utterance or act by Lincoln savoring of a war on slavery would have sent them all into the arms of the Confederacy. Nor could Lincoln count with certainty on undivided ec-

onomic support above the Potomac. Ardently as they desired the preservation of the great customs union, northern business interests did not want war, save in the last bitter extremity. With respect to this problem Greeley estimated that southern debtors owed at least $200,000,000 to creditors in New York City alone, drawing from his figures the conclusion that a resort to arms meant general ruin in commercial circles. Unless human experience was as naught, the watchword of the solemn hour was Caution.

For good reasons, therefore, all practical men, including Jefferson Davis on the one side and Abraham Lincoln on the other, feverishly sought some middle ground of compromise. Speaking for eastern finance, Thurlow Weed, an Albany journalist and politician, who had done valiant work in carrying New York for the Republicans, proposed that the Missouri Compromise line be extended by common consent to the Pacific. Though this offer called for a partial surrender, Davis, warning his followers that a war would be terrible, expressed a willingness to accept the adjustment. But Lincoln stood rigid as a rock against it, pointing to his own pledges and to those of his party—promises to drive slavery from the territories. Eastern business men might bargain over the matter but the western farmers had decided that national lands must be dedicated to freedom and the President could not ignore their resolve. In Congress, Senator Crittenden of Kentucky proposed a compromise similar to that offered by Weed but Lincoln's followers could not be induced to support it.

On this point the fate of the nation seemed to turn. Lincoln was prepared to give any reasonable guarantee to the slave owners against interference with their peculiar institution as it stood. As evidence of his sincerity, he wrote to Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia, assuring the planters that the Republican administration would not "directly or indirectly interfere with their slaves or with them about their slaves"; that "the South would be in no more danger in this respect than it was in the days of Washington".

Not only that; Lincoln and his Republican brethren, offering proof of their readiness to seal the covenant forever, supported and carried through Congress an amendment to the Constitution declaring that for all the future the federal government should be denied the power to abolish or interfere with slavery in any state. On March 4, 1861, the resolution was sent forth to the states for their ratification, with Lincoln's approval, and three states had actually ratified it when the outbreak of physical combat stopped the operation. By the irony of fate, not the deliberate choice of men, the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution when it finally came was to abolish slavery in the United States, not to fasten it upon the continent to the end of time.

Why was the fatal blow that substituted armed might for negotiation ever struck? According to all outward and visible signs the opposing sections might have stood indefinitely in the posture of expectancy. Why did any one seek to break the spell? In whose brain, in the final analysis, was made the decision which directed the hand to light the powder train and blow up the wall of doubt that divided peace from war? No unanimous verdict on that point has yet been rendered by a court of last resort; one more question of war guilt remains unsolved.

It has been said that Lincoln, by deciding to send relief to Fort Sumter in the harbor of Charleston, splashed blood on his own head. The answer to such a thesis is that the relief sent to the beleaguered fort consisted mainly of provisions for a starving garrison and offered no direct menace to the Confederacy. It has been alleged that the inner leaders of the Confederacy, feeling the ground slipping from under them, thought bloodshed necessary to consolidate their forces and bring the hesitant states into their fold. The answer commonly made to this argument is that President Davis, in his final instructions to General Beauregard, commanding the Confederates at Charleston, spoke merely in general terms about the reduction of Sumter and advised action only if certain conditions of evacuation were rejected.

As a matter of fact, Major Anderson, in charge of Union forces, offered a compromise which should have been sent to Davis for review but Beauregard's aides, spurred on by an ardent secessionist from Virginia, made the decision on their own account in favor of audacity and at 4:30 on the morning of April 12, started the conflagration by firing on Fort Sumter. This bombardment and the surrender of the fort had just the effect foreseen by the extremists: the South, by striking the first blow and hauling down the Stars and Stripes, kindled the quivering opinion of the North into a devouring flame. Lincoln's call for volunteers and answer of force by force pushed Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas into the Confederacy. The die was cast.

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The event at Fort Sumter, by quickening the revolutionary zeal of the South, gave heart to the Confederates who for two months had been engaged in constructing a new union at Montgomery. Early in February, 1861, after adopting a tentative plan of government, they put it into effect by electing Jefferson Davis of Mississippi provisional president. In due course Davis appeared to deliver his inaugural address.

Cheer on cheer rose from the throngs gathered from far and wide to view the spectacle. "The man and the hour have met"; clear as the snap of a rifle rang the words of the orator who presented the hero of the occasion and the crowd replied with the voice of thunder.

This man of destiny was indeed an arresting figure. He was lithe and sinewy, just above the middle height. A square chin, thin lips, a firm nose, deep-set eyes, and a high, noble brow revealed a thoughtful spirit and a strong will. "He is certainly a very different looking man from Mr. Lincoln," wrote the correspondent of the London Times; "he is like a gentleman." And yet in birth the social gulf between the two presidents was not as deep as sometimes

imagined; for Davis was the son of a Kentucky farmer, and he, too, had no mansion for his birthplace. His father, however, unlike the luckless Thomas Lincoln, moved South instead of North and acquired a modest fortune as a planter in Mississippi. Well endowed with earthly goods, Jefferson Davis enjoyed the advantages of a college education in Kentucky, finished by a military training at West Point. Having chosen the profession of arms and politics, he served with distinction in the Mexican War, and after the close of that struggle, spent much of his time in Washington, either in the Senate or in the Cabinet. He was a United States Senator when the fateful "hour" drew near.

Throughout his career Davis had been loyal in defending the planting interest but he was not as caustic and unbending as many on his side. With Calhoun he believed that "African slavery, as it exists in the United States, is a moral, a social, and a political blessing." He favored the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the extension of slavery throughout the territories. Penetrating the verbalism of the contest, he plainly grasped the economics of the political conflict. The South, he said repeatedly, was an agricultural section whose interest demanded the freest possible trade with other nations. The protective tariff was to him merely a tribute laid on the planters for the benefit of northern capitalists and accordingly he opposed it to the bitter end. And yet he was no extremist; he was ready to accept the project for extending the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific, which Lincoln so resolutely rejected. Davis foresaw that the war would be long and desperate if it came and he took up the sword with anything but a light heart.

A short time after the inauguration of Davis as provisional president the congress at Montgomery drafted a permanent constitution for the Confederate States of America. In November, 1861, the elections were held and on the 22d of the following February Davis, already worn and haggard, took his place at the foot of the Washington Monument in Richmond, the capital chosen for the Confederacy,

to deliver his inaugural. By this time Fort Donelson had fallen and gloom had begun to settle down on the southern cause. Rain poured from heaven on the assembled throng as an evil omen but Davis was not daunted in the "darkest hour of our struggle." Disaster would only call forth renewed effort. "To thee, O God!" he exclaimed at the end of the ceremony, "trustingly, I commit myself and prayerfully invoke Thy blessing on my country and its cause."

The confederate constitution which thus went formally into effect was in most respects like the instrument drafted by the Fathers at Philadelphia in 1787 for the whole Union. It provided for a president, a senate, and a house of representatives and it empowered the congress to give department heads seats upon the floor of either house and to confer upon them the right to take part in debates. Echoing the long economic contest between North and South, it withheld from the congress, however, certain significant powers: it forbade appropriations for internal improvements, the granting of bounties to private enterprise, and the levy of import duties for the purpose of fostering any branch of industry. For the silence of the federal Constitution with regard to the nature of the Union it substituted the express declaration that each state acted "in its sovereign and independent character." The cornerstone of the new system rested, as the vice-president, Alexander Stephens, said, "upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man, that slavery—subordination to the superior race—is his natural and normal condition. This our new government is the first in the history of the world based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth."

As to the ethical character of their enterprise, the confederate leaders were somewhat confused. In his first inaugural address, Davis rested the case on the natural right of the people to alter or abolish their governments and on the legal nature of the constitutional compact; he objected to calling secession "revolution." His colleague, Stephens, however, boldly spoke of the dissolution of the Union as

"this revolution." Senator Iverson, of Georgia, also took the ground that the secession of a state was "an act of revolution" and that the question of attempted coercion by the national government was one of policy and expediency. Using almost the same language Robert E. Lee declared in 1861 that "Secession is nothing but revolution." Robert Toombs, of Georgia, said with engaging frankness to the North that he did not care about the language of the occasion: "You may call it secession, or you may call it revolution; but there is the big fact standing before you ready to oppose you—that fact is, freemen with arms in their hands."

But as time advanced and as doom loomed larger and larger on the horizon, especially after the battle of Gettysburg in 1863, southern leaders in high places began to lay increasing emphasis on their constitutional and legal right to withdraw from the federal Union. Triumphant revolution carries its own moral justification; a revolution suppressed wears another aspect. So the official tradition in due course came to be that secession was an act solemnly sanctified by the federal Constitution—not revolution, not rebellion, not insurrection, but due process of law.

§

When the southern leaders turned from legal theory to the task of raising money, materials, and men for the titanic struggle, they faced problems of a different order. The North had a national currency system, such as it was; the South had to create one. Though its finances were at a low ebb, the North had a treasury and a scheme of taxation; the South had to build its fiscal structure from the base up. At first, the Confederacy placed its main reliance for current income on customs duties levied for revenue rather than for protection—a frail reed soon broken by the blockade of southern ports which Lincoln proclaimed in April, 1861. Resort was then had to a direct property tax

apportioned among the seceding states; but this also proved disappointing to its sponsors.

There was but one prime resource left—paper; so bond issue after bond issue flowed from the central and local treasuries in a steady torrent. Southern patriots bought confederate securities by the ream. Large blocks were sold in London, Paris, and Amsterdam; many an English lord sought to combine profit with sympathy for the planting aristocracy, only to lament in later years the proofs of his nescience. To bonds were added bills of credit; all in all the confederate treasury issued more than a billion dollars in paper. States, banks, city governments, and business men contributed floods to the main stream. Even grocers, barbers, butchers, bakers, and candlestick makers floated bills of small denominations. But all this paper brought little cash. During its entire existence the Confederacy gathered in less than thirty millions in hard money, a large part of which was sent abroad to pay for goods.

It could, therefore, make no pretense at keeping its currency on a specie basis. The old yet ever new story was repeated. Attempts were made to prevent depreciation but they were all in vain. Though the paper rose and fell with the fortunes of war, it exhibited on the whole a marked downward tendency. Before two years of the struggle had passed, one gold dollar was worth twenty-two in confederate paper and an ordinary dinner in a good Richmond restaurant cost from fifty to a hundred dollars in currency. And yet the printing presses had difficulty in keeping up with the call for paper—more paper—until at length the vast house of rags and pulp came down in complete collapse. That the smash finally came was not surprising; the amazing thing was that the southern people were able to carry on the unequal contest with such enthusiasm and effect in spite of their chaotic currency.

Though enjoying a far more strategic position, the federal government was itself driven to its wits' ends in financing the war. The enormous and unexpected cost of

the undertaking was bewildering to officials accustomed to handling only petty sums. During the four years of the conflict, the army and navy departments alone disbursed over three billion dollars—more than twenty times the outlay of the preceding four years of peace. In meeting these charges, Congress resorted to loans at high rates rather than to heavy and drastic taxes. In the first year of the war, it borrowed $8.52 for every dollar of revenue it raised by taxation and at the end the ratio was still as high as three to one.

Most of the federal bond issues were floated on a liberal commission basis through the banking house of Jay Cooke. With astonishing energy, "the financier of the Civil War" organized bond "drives" from Boston to San Francisco, which supplied Lincoln's administration with funds in fair weather and foul. In this operation of course Cooke did not escape criticism: charges were made repeatedly by the press that he reaped exorbitant profits from his transactions; and it is true that he grew immensely rich during the war. Nevertheless an investigation showed that his earnings from bond sales were on the whole as moderate as the people had a right to expect from bankers in circumstances that were highly speculative. At all events, Cooke's gains were relatively small as compared with the magnitude of his undertakings. In September, after the close of the war, the national debt stood at $2,846,000,000 as against $74,985,000 on the day that Lincoln took over the administration of affairs.

By that time the revenues from taxation had risen to the highest point in the history of the country. After dodging the question for many months, Congress eventually came face to face with reality. It increased the rates on imports, more than incidentally pleasing the protected interests; it imposed direct taxes on the states according to their respective populations; and it laid duties on luxuries, occupations, incomes, the earnings of corporations, and almost every other available object. The fiscal year ending in June,

1862, showed a revenue from taxes of only fifty millions; the year 1865 reported nearly three hundred millions—one-tenth from the income tax.

In addition to laying taxes and issuing bonds, the federal government, driven to desperation for funds, began in 1862 to issue bills, popularly known as "Greenbacks," unsupported by specie. At the end of two years over four hundred million dollars' worth of such paper had poured from northern printing presses into the market to pay the Union soldiers and meet current expenses, except interest on the debt which was paid in specie. When this paper began to decline, as it naturally did, those who sold supplies to the government, in keeping with historic practices, raised their prices to cover the differences—but the soldiers whose wages were fixed could not recoup their losses so easily. In the dark days of 1864, it took nearly three dollars in Greenbacks to buy one dollar in gold.

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The same experience of initial buoyancy and later depression was reported by the departments of government that raised the armed forces for the struggle. At the outset both sides were able to rely on the enthusiasm of the masses to fill the ranks of fighting men. Lincoln called for seventy-five thousand volunteers when the news from Sumter reached his ears; by the first of the following July more than three hundred thousand soldiers were at his command. Similar loyalty was shown in the South. "The anxiety among our citizens," said Howell Cobb of Georgia, "is not as to who shall go to the war but who shall stay at home." When Davis faced a special session of his congress on April 29, he could boast that forty-five thousand men were under arms for the Confederacy and that volunteers were rushing in faster than they could be equipped and trained.

Then the tide turned. After the appalling magnitude of the struggle became evident and the passions of the early

weeks cooled in the grim test of actual fighting, neither government was able to rely upon volunteers to fill the gaps and enlarge the forces necessary to meet the rising call of necessity. In 1862 the confederate government resorted to the draft; the next year the federal government was driven to the same expedient. In 1864 the Confederacy prepared to enlist all white males between seventeen and fifty, thus, as the phrase went, robbing the cradle and the grave; in its dire need at the last it decided to enroll slaves. On each side the great principle of universal liability was at first violated by invidious exceptions which were made doubly odious by the provision that persons drafted might by hiring substitutes escape service altogether—a privilege so crass and so plainly favoring the rich as against the poor, that it sowed seeds of bitterness everywhere.

In both sections of the country hostile demonstrations greeted the conscription acts. The beginning of the drawings for the federal service on July 13, 1863, was the signal for a serious riot in New York City which to timid civilians seemed like a revolution. The draft headquarters were destroyed; the office of the Tribune was gutted; Negroes were seized, hanged, and shot; the residence of the mayor was attacked; the homes of several Unionists were burned to the ground; and pitched battles were fought in the streets between the rioters and the police. For three days the revolt raged. Not until a large contingent of troops arrived on the spot was the insurrection quelled. By that time at least a thousand people had been killed or wounded and a million dollars worth of property destroyed. In other parts of the North there were evasions and desertions; the number who bought substitutes was also beyond all expectations.

The South, too, had its heartburnings. The governor of Georgia declared to President Davis that no law passed by the Congress of the United States had ever struck such a fell blow at liberty as the conscription act of the confederate government. In the mountain districts of North Carolina,

Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina there was open resistance to the draft; public meetings were held to denounce it; throngs of eligible men fled to escape it; and in some places lawless men gathered in bands to overawe the officers engaged in executing it. Everywhere resentment was aroused by the provisions which allowed the rich to avoid service by money payment and in effect exempted owners of the larger plantations. Finally under pressure, the confederate congress, against the hot protests of those who had hired substitutes, abolished the practice and made liability universal, subject to the usual exemptions and special considerations for the owners of more than fifteen slaves. At the end both governments were displaying relentless vigilance in combing the populace for recruits to fill the gaps and swell the ranks of their armies; but the Confederacy proved unequal to the task. During the closing months of the war, conscription "utterly failed" in the South and the authorities at Richmond had to report a hundred thousand deserters.

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Another task which confronted the belligerent governments, in some ways more baffling than that of raising money or organizing armed forces, was the mobilization of public opinion and civilian forces in support of the war. In a large measure, of course, that operation was at first automatic; the clash of arms, the shock, the challenge rallied masses of people on both sides to the battle standards. While youths rushed to the colors, older men of affairs, laying aside their private concerns, dedicated themselves to the official and unofficial assistance of their respective governments, often allowing their emotion to outrun their discretion.

Responsible statesmen and politicians, it seems, were on the whole more temperate than the vociferous among their constituents. "The truth is," recorded Jefferson Davis,

"the southern people were in advance of their representatives throughout"—an opinion underlined by the newspapers. The Charleston Mercury, for example, could not conceal its impatience at all attempts to effect a compromise at the opening of 1861. "Southern Senators upon the floor of Congress," wrote the editor, "demean themselves by pitiable lamentations and lachrymose appeals to haughty, contemptuous, and openly threatening enemies—Republicans—Yankees." The English journalist, Russell, writing from New Orleans to the London Times in May, 1861, declared: "There is no doubt of the unanimity of the people. If words mean anything, they are animated by only one sentiment and they will resist the North as long as they can command a man or a dollar."

If on the other side there was no such singleness of purpose, there was a resolution no less grim. The shot at Sumter produced a mass response; as Garrison remarked, sent a "mighty current of feeling . . . sweeping southward with the strength and impetuosity of a thousand Niagaras." Other witnesses confirmed that view. "That first gun at Sumter," said Lowell, "brought all the free states to their feet as one man."

The rolling tide of war swept women with men into its current. Until the end of the eighteenth century war had been almost exclusively a man's business—a trade followed by kings to acquire territory and renown—a trade carried on with the aid of feudal retainers and bands of professional soldiers—a trade in which peasants and merchants had little part—a trade in which women were even less involved except as victims or as camp followers. But the democratic movement of the eighteenth century which culminated in the French Revolution lifted merchants and peasants to the enjoyment of rights and privileges, gave them the ballot, thrust muskets into their hands, and made them patriots. It was the French who, under Napoleon, instituted the practice of general conscription and taught the art to Europe. As democracy advanced on universal-

ity, the principle of general liability to military service became widely fixed; inevitably, therefore, as women won economic independence, gained legal rights, and demanded equality in politics and every other sphere, they too were drawn into, or entered of their own accord, the trade of war. A logical outcome of Jacksonian Democracy was a new relation of women to the business of fighting, in all its branches and agitations.

So the Civil War in the United States marked the next era in the history of American feminism. Previously men had done the nursing at the front as well as the fighting and cooking. Now northern women, under the leadership of Clara Barton, in spite of bitter official opposition, insisted on bearing all the hardships and enduring all the perils of nursing and cooking in the field hospitals just behind the battle front, carrying into warfare woman's passion for order, comfort, and cleanliness. Southern women also took up these burdens: "the exception," said Mrs. Jefferson Davis, referring to her Richmond friends, "was a woman who did not nurse at a hospital."

The introduction of the feminine arts at the battle front in turn induced an enormous demand for hospital supplies, conveniences, and delicacies—a demand which was in its turn met largely by the efforts of women themselves. In the organization and management of the United States Sanitary Commission they were especially active; the sanitary fairs which received such high praise from Lincoln were almost entirely their work. Nor were the women of the Confederacy backward in this respect; in the letters and memoirs of southern writers are recorded strenuous labors of women in preparing and forwarding supplies for hospitals and camps. Writing of her neighbors at Richmond, Mrs. Davis said: "They clothed and cared for their own households, sewed for the soldiers, made our battle flags, and sent their dearest and only breadwinners to give their lives for them. They fed the hungry, cared for the orphans, deprived themselves of every wonted luxury to give

it to the soldiers, and were amid their privations so cheerful as to animate even the men with hope."

Apart from rendering wider services in direct connection with the fighting, women extended the range of their economic and political activities as a result of war necessities, especially in the North. They entered the new industrial enterprises which made supplies for the armies by the factory process. They poured into the recently established schools to take the places of men summoned to the front. On hundreds of farms where there were no slaves to till the soil, women picked up the lines and plow handles as the men dropped them, assuming the burden of the heavy work in the fields. On that scene Anna Howard Shaw raised the curtain in her vivid reminiscences of war days in Wisconsin.

Throughout the North where women had waged a long and bitter struggle for platform privileges, they now became accepted speakers at public meetings held to raise money, sell bonds, and keep alive the martial spirit. The young "spellbinder," Anna Dickinson, became so indispensable during the war to the Lincoln party that at its close Republican politicians made a special appeal to her to postpone still longer her woman suffrage activities to help maintain them in power. In fact, in 1872, so grateful were they for such support that they recognized the rising power of women to the extent of a plank in their platform reading: "The Republican party is mindful of its obligations to the loyal women of America for their noble devotion to the cause of freedom. Their admission to wider spheres of usefulness is viewed with satisfaction; and the honest demand of any class of citizens for additional rights should be treated with respectful consideration." North and South, women of every rank felt the old order falling down about them as the tide of battle flowed on to its inexorable end.

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Notwithstanding the yearning for war service that was evident among great masses of people, men and women alike, both governments found it difficult to maintain the morale of the public, especially after a few months of bloodshed had cooled the ardor of zealots. In controlling opinion and rallying scattered forces, each had its peculiar difficulties. According to outward signs, the resolve of the South to carry the struggle through to the end was more completely fused in the white heat of unity; at all events the confederate administration was harried by no such formidable opposition as that presented to Lincoln by the Democratic party and its press.

Still it would be a mistake to speak of a "solid South" at that time. In large sections of the upland and mountain region were powerful unionist movements. During the course of the war peace societies, some of them clearly disloyal to the confederate cause, were discovered in North Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, Virginia, and Mississippi. A few newspapers openly refused to give wholehearted aid to the Richmond administration. The editor of the Raleigh Standard, for instance, consistently adhered to policies that bordered on rebellion and even ventured to run for governor of the state in 1864 on a platform that was called "a peace-at-any-price proposal." When his printing plant was wrecked by irate soldiers, his civilian patrons replied by smashing the office of a rival secessionist organ. Furthermore the anarchic force of states' rights, invoked by the confederates against the government at Washington, raged against the government of their own making. In the final stages of the awful struggle, the governors of North Carolina and Georgia were on the verge of revolt against the Davis régime. Indeed in February, 1864, the southern president was moved to send a special message to his congress directing attention to "secret leagues and associations" and to the "disloyalty and hostility to our cause" shown in various quarters.

With a view to counteracting disruptive tendencies, the

confederate government resorted to special measures. Early in 1862 the writ of habeas corpus was suspended by a general act; later the suspension was renewed in more sweeping terms; and many citizens were imprisoned under military authority. But on the whole Davis had to walk warily in employing repressive tactics. On every side he heard vigorous protests, made in the name of civil liberty, against martial rule, against centralized and autocratic government even though southern in personnel and temper. When near the end an effort was made to ignore them and erect a dictatorship under General Lee, the design was quickly frustrated. The states' rights bias of the confederate constitution ran against all strong measures, thus contributing to the ultimate ruin of the southern cause.

The federal government was better equipped than its southern rival to exert heavy pressure on the public; and from the beginning of the war to the conclusion, it made constant and drastic use of its military power in dealing with speech and press. At the very start of the conflict, Lincoln as Commander-in-chief authorized the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus along the lines of march between Philadelphia and Washington. Later the martial area was extended, likewise by proclamation.

In the spring of 1863, Congress, bent on laying all doubts as to the President's power, provided that he might suspend the writ anywhere in the United States and after a few months of hesitation Lincoln destroyed this ancient weapon for the defense of civilian rights throughout the length and breadth of the land. Thus autocratic prerogatives could be exercised, under the President, by military officers authorized to arrest without warrants, imprison, and mete out penalties at the drumhead. While the military arm was made in effect omnipotent, the civil arm of the government was strengthened in 1861 by an act which imposed heavy penalties on all persons who interfered by threats, intimidation or force with the prosecution of the war.

Of the powers just enumerated, the federal government

made extensive use against persons accused or suspected of southern sympathies. Editors of hostile journals were put in prison, their papers suspended, their newsboys arrested. Peace meetings were broken up and the organizers sent to jail. Members of the Maryland legislature, the mayor of Baltimore, and local editors accused of holding obstructive views were arrested on military order; though they were charged with no overt act of any kind, they were held in jail and denied the privilege of a hearing before a civil magistrate. All over the country, the net was thrown out to catch offenders—in the theater of war, in the border states where there was constant danger of new uprisings, and far away in the North to the boundaries of Canada, where the ordinary criminal courts were competent to handle the most fiery advocate of secession. With devotion to the national cause went zest for persecution, that persistent passion of mankind, and thus a kind of iron discipline was spread to the remote recesses of the continent.

Such measures and activities on the part of the federal administration naturally aroused deep hostility among the victims—among Democrats on whom most of the stigma fell and among Republicans who disliked harsh policies of coercion. Meetings of protest were held in the great cities; deputations of dissenters besieged the White House; and members of Congress sought to put on record a resolution of objection to the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. In an effort to uphold civil liberties, Roger B. Taney, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, before whom the case of a man arrested on military order was brought for a hearing, declared, in an opinion bristling with citations, that the President had no power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Lincoln put the opinion of the learned Justice in a pigeon hole. A Democratic leader in Ohio, C. L. Vallandigham, kept up a defiant criticism of the federal government, insisting that oppression would produce a reign of terror, and declaring the war "a costly and bloodly failure"—until he was finally banished to the

South on military order. Wendell Phillips assailed Lincoln as "a more unlimited despot than the world knows this side of China."

At heart a friend of liberty and a foe of wanton oppression, Lincoln sought to adjust the rigors of the military régime to evident necessities. In the very midst of the war he granted amnesty to all "political prisoners" who would promise to give no aid or comfort to the enemy. He endured without murmuring personal abuse at the hands of hostile editors and politicians who, while they were declaiming against restraints on their liberty, were carrying it to the extreme of license. Yet in general Lincoln held strictly to the view that strong measures should be used in dealing with those who "talked against the war." On one occasion, after listening to arguments from a committee of objectors, he asked in his quiet way: "Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of the wily agitator who induces him to desert?" When accused of violating the Constitution, he replied that he had taken an oath to uphold it and that any action necessary to carry out his oath was lawful. This was "liberal construction" with a vengeance but it pleased Lincoln's supporters; so the rigor of the law was invoked against "political offenders," with varying emphasis, to the end.

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Among the many threads that were woven into the web of fate, diplomacy figured beside finance, armies, and opinion. The facts of 1861 burst the shibboleth of isolation. If England and France had recognized the independence of the Confederacy, forced the North to relax the blockade, and opened the way for money and supplies to pour into the South, the history of the Second American Revolution would have been far different. Fully alive to the perils of this situation, Lincoln gave constant attention to the task of conciliating English opinion and counteract-

ing movements looking toward foreign intervention. More than once he softened the language of diplomatic notes; continuously did he sustain Charles Francis Adams, federal minister in London, in the diplomacy of patience and firmness.

Happily for the Union cause, the North had many loyal friends among the people of England—sympathizers who believed that the issue of slavery *vs.* democracy was really hanging in the balance. Despite sneers from the upper classes, liberal leaders, such as John Bright, worked night and day to convince their countrymen that aiding the slaveowners' Confederacy was striking at liberty throughout the world. And the textile workers of the mill districts applauded that sentiment. Even in the gloomiest hours when the cotton famine had brought them to the verge of starvation, they petitioned their government to aid the North by allowing the blockade to continue unmolested.

Especially after Lincoln's "Proclamation of Emancipation" did popular opinion in England run clear and strong in favor of the North. "Bondage and the lash can claim no sympathy from us," exclaimed Spurgeon the famous preacher, to his vast congregation; "God bless and strengthen the North; give victory to their arms!" By immense public meetings held in the industrial centers of England, the anti-slavery passion was kept at white heat. At one assembly Bright declared that, while statesmen were hostile or coldly neutral, while many rich men were aiding the Confederacy, while the press betrayed the Union cause, the English masses believed in the triumph of freedom and prayed for the success of northern armies. Diplomatic strategy, wheat, and fate crowned Lincoln's efforts in England with success.

President Davis likewise grasped the significance of the foreign problem and spared no effort to propitiate the powers of the Old World. Early in the struggle he sent special commissioners abroad and until its close he did everything he could to win foreign aid. At first the omens

were favorable. With the ruling classes of Europe, the southern cause was undoubtedly popular, since they felt instinctively that the triumph of the North would imperil their dominion at home. In England a majority of both houses of Parliament was in open sympathy with the Confederacy; leading statesmen, especially among the landed aristocracy, hoped that the war would end in the downfall of "the contemptible democracy" beyond the sea.

Across the Channel, Napoleon III was anxious to throw himself officially on the southern side. In 1861, he proposed to Russia a coalition against the North. Defeated in this, he suggested to England joint intervention. Receiving a non-committal answer from her wary Cabinet, he ventured in 1863 to offer his services directly to Lincoln as mediator. Again he met a rebuff; Lincoln declined the offer politely while Congress suggested in a sharp resolution that he attend to his own affairs.

From time to time throughout the war, however, it looked as if England and France were about to recognize the Confederacy. On one occasion Gladstone, whose family fortune contained profits from the slave trade, speaking as a responsible officer in the British government, virtually acknowledged southern independence. In a speech at Newcastle in 1862, he announced: "Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South . . . have made a nation. . . . We may anticipate with certainty the success of the southern states so far as their separation from the North is concerned."

In dealing with practical concerns, the British ministry also showed a certain benevolence toward the South. With indifference, if not approval, it permitted war vessels to be built for the Confederacy in English shipyards and allowed them to sail forth to prey upon Union commerce. It looked calmly on while one of these ships, the Alabama, constructed in Liverpool by an English firm and paid for by bonds sold to English investors, destroyed more than fifty merchantmen before she was brought to book by the

Kearsarge in 1864. Again and again did the American minister in London protest that such actions were unlawful —merely to meet indifference. It was only by a threat of retaliation in the form of war on England that Lincoln was able at last to arouse the British authorities to stop the sailing of ships built for the confederate service.

Nevertheless it must be admitted in all fairness that the British government had good reasons for entertaining some ill-will toward the North. Viewed in a detached way, the pleas of English democrats in behalf of the Union on the score of liberty were without justification, for the Lincoln government, far from vowing a war on slavery in the early days of the conflict, offered to guarantee the institution forever if the secessionists would only come back into the Union. It was not without excuse that English critics cried: "The Yankees are after all only fighting for the tariff and hurt vanity." And the English government, it must be remembered, years before had adopted the "grand principles of free trade" which the Confederacy professed to the world. Nor must immediate economic considerations be overlooked. The English cotton business was hard hit by the blockade, especially after the stocks on hand were consumed—hard hit in spite of the compensations offered by the federal purchases of war supplies and the great inpouring of American wheat.

To make irritating matters worse, the spokesmen of the Union were not always as tactful in their foreign relations as they might have been. In his capacity as Secretary of State, Seward was often curt with England, even though Lincoln more than once toned down the acerbity of his diplomatic notes. Inflexible in its support of the government, the administration press was frequently needlessly severe, especially the New York Herald which kept declaring that the English aristocracy was conspiring against American liberties and every now and then hinted that war with England would be a desirable thing. "Let England and Spain look well to their conduct," the editor of that

paper once roared, "or we may bring them to a reckoning." Unquestionably American explosions of that kind had unfortunate reverberations abroad. With a great show of authority, Herbert Spencer could argue that English sentiment was less friendly to the North after months of such bickering than at the beginning of the civil conflict.

This state of affairs was partly the result of a single untoward incident. In the autumn of 1861, two confederate agents, Mason and Slidell, appointed by Davis to represent the Richmond government at London and Paris respectively, sailed for their posts on the British steamer, the Trent. Getting wind of this adventure, Captain Wilkes, in command of a Union vessel, overhauled the English ship and took off the two confederate commissioners, giving the world a fine example of search and seizure and thereby raising anew burning questions in the law of the sea. On her part, England had often resorted to analogous, though not identical, practices before the War of 1812 and the United States had hotly objected on the ground that such deeds violated American rights. Now the tables were turned.

Without any ado, England demanded the release of the two men and a proper apology for their seizure. Incensed by this peremptory call, belligerent politicians at Washington wanted to fight; but both Seward and Lincoln kept their heads. Calmly reviewing the merits of the case, they decided to surrender Mason and Slidell and disown the action of Captain Wilkes. So the cloud passed and the following autumn, after the emancipation of slaves was announced, the sentiment of the English public, as distinguished from the ruling classes, began to veer more strongly than ever toward the northern side.

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Supplementing their formal diplomatic negotiations, Lincoln and Davis both paid court to the art of propaganda. The extent to which the federal government engaged in

frank and covert efforts to influence foreign opinion is not easy to discover because all the official papers are not available. But there is reason to believe that it neglected no opportunities. The State Department had at its disposal a secret service fund which it had used on at least one occasion to sway opinion at home and had it neglected opportunities abroad during the war it would have been strangely remiss. At all events when the confederate commissioner visited the Pope in the interest of the Richmond government, he found His Holiness duly informed that "Lincoln and company" were waging a war against slavery.

As to the propaganda of the Confederacy in foreign fields, more is actually known because its archives, seized after the war, were thrown open by the national government, revealing to the public the official efforts of President Davis to win support by the circulation of prepared ideas. Hoping to win a recognition of independence, if not direct assistance, the Confederacy placed money at the disposal of its agents to be devoted to "the enlightenment of public opinion in Europe through the press." It freed the directors of this secret service from the necessity of furnishing vouchers for their expenditures, if circumstances did not permit an accounting. For the propaganda in England "the chief editor of one of the leading journals" was engaged and every occasion was seized to strengthen the intimacy of the confederate agents with "established organs of public opinion." In France chambers of commerce were induced to petition Napoleon III for intervention with a view to restoring commercial relations with the South. Beyond the Rhine the support and encouragement of Prussian army officers and upper classes were enlisted, a fact reported to Richmond with no little satisfaction.

Paying respect to the utility of religious emotions, a carefully selected Catholic priest was dispatched to the Continent—to work especially in Paris, Madrid, Vienna, and Rome. As a stimulus to action, the confederate secretary of state, Judah P. Benjamin, an astute Jewish lawyer, in-

formed this clerical diplomat that a recent raid had been made on Richmond for the purpose of committing it to flames, exposing its women to nameless horrors, and putting to death the chief magistrate and principal officers of the government; and by way of elaboration, Benjamin added that the fury of the federals "spares neither age nor sex, nor do they even shrink from the most shameful desecration of the edifices in which the people meet for the worship of God." News of such things the priest was told to distribute among foreign religious bodies where it would serve the southern cause.

Keeping in mind similar ends, the confederate secretary announced to his commissioners abroad that "the time is not far distant when the massacre of Catholics at the North will exhibit the full spirit of the Puritan on a scale of which mankind has yet had no example." As if to confirm the prophecy, he added that New England soldiers were even then desecrating Catholic churches and suggested the dissemination of statements to that effect in Catholic countries.

For the purpose of checking Irish emigration, a special agent, a Catholic priest, was instructed by Secretary Benjamin to visit Ireland and enlighten her people on the American situation: to tell them that the United States government was enticing laborers to migrate ostensibly for work on the railroads and then forcing them into the army; and to suggest that it was shocking for the Irish to leave their own land "for the purpose of imbruing their hands in the blood of a people that has ever received the Irish emigrant with kindness and hospitality."

To engage the sympathy of the Vatican, the Confederacy sent to it an envoy of peculiar accomplishments. Bearing an official letter from President Davis, this commissioner was duly received and reported a touching interview at the reading of his state paper to the Pope: "When the passage was reached wherein the President states in such sublime and affecting language, 'we have offered up at the footstool

of our Father who art in Heaven prayers inspired by the same feelings which animate your Holiness,' his deep sunken orbs, visibly moistened, were upturned toward that throne upon which ever sits the Prince of Peace. . . . At length His Holiness asked whether President Davis were a Catholic. I answered in the negative."

Not inclined to be captious on that point, the Pope inquired whether it would not be judicious for the confederate government to consent to the gradual emancipation of the slaves. Thereupon the envoy explained the mysteries of constitutional law which gave the government at Richmond no control whatever over the domestic institutions of the states, suggesting in conclusion that if slavery were an evil, "there was a power which in its own good time would doubtless remove that evil, in a more gentle manner than that of causing the earth to be deluged with blood for its sudden overthrow." This position, having met the approval of His Holiness, the commissioner then went on to say that "Lincoln and Company" were decoying Irishmen to America "to be murdered in cold blood" and that northern "pulpit buffoons whose number is legion" were teaching shocking doctrines of cruelty to the people. By all these things too His Holiness was visibly moved.

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The long conflict which ended in the downfall of the Confederacy thus had many phases. It was waged on land and sea by arms, in the capitals of Europe by diplomacy, and in the sphere of morals by propaganda, publicity, and coercion. Descriptions of the war itself must be entrusted to those who have charted the science of military tactics or mastered the art of depicting tragedy and romance. Since every one of its great battles has been the subject of fierce debate among experts, the layman does well to leave the technical issues to them. In the large, however, the problem for the South was mainly that of defense, although

one heroic effort was made to push the war into the enemy's domain by a thrust into Pennsylvania—a thrust parried at Gettysburg in July, 1863. On the other hand, the problem of the North, to state it simply, was one of invasion and conquest. Lincoln's task was that of beating southern armies on their own soil or wearing them down to exhaustion.

Geography, as often happens, gave a distinct turn to the military process. The Appalachian mountains, stretching through the Confederacy into Alabama, divided the theater into two immense sections, in each of which, east and west, were prizes sought by northern armies. If Richmond, the confederate capital, could be taken by a bold stroke, the moral effect would be electric of course. If a wedge could be driven down the Mississippi Valley to the Gulf, the Confederacy would be severed and the southwest cut off from the center of power. Moreover victories in the west were necessary to hold the wavering states of Kentucky and Missouri in line with the Union. All this was patent to Lincoln and his advisers and on such theories they started operations in both areas.

To the armies of the western arena, victory came first. In February, 1862, General Grant captured Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River, offering to his defeated foeman the ultimatum: "No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender." At Shiloh, Murfreesboro, Vicksburg, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, and other points desperate fighting occurred, with varying results, but with an unmistakable drift. Within little more than a year after the fall of Donelson, the Mississippi Valley was open to the Gulf. "The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea!" exclaimed Lincoln when he heard of the surrender of Vicksburg on July 4, 1863. The initiative in the West had passed to the Union commanders who continued to hammer the wedge, making wider and wider the rift between the two sections of the Confederacy. In the autumn of the next year, Sherman was at Atlanta and soon on his devas-

tating march to the sea. To the complaint against his ruthless severity, he had an emphatic answer: "War is hell!" On Christmas day, Savannah was in his hands; the ocean was open before him.

Contrasted with the successes in the West, Union operations in the East during the first two years of the war presented an almost unbroken series of misfortunes. Hurried into action against better counsels by the popular cry, "On to Richmond," the federal army rushed into the enemy's country in July, 1861, to meet a terrible disaster at Bull Run. For four years periodical advances were made on Richmond without important military results. General after general—McClellan, Pope, Burnside, Hooker, and Meade—was tried and found wanting; none could administer the fatal blow. Their highest achievements amounted to little more than successful defense. McClellan checked General Lee at Antietam in September, 1862; and Meade paralyzed his northward thrust at Gettysburg in July of the following year; but nothing decisive was accomplished. At last in February, 1864, Lincoln turned to General Grant whom he placed in command of the armies of the Union. After surveying the ground, the new military master, supported by unlimited supplies, commenced a pitiless drive on Lee's army in Virginia. Though every inch of ground was stubbornly contested, the relentless pressure told in the end. Richmond fell, the Confederacy collapsed, Lee surrendered at Appomattox on April 9, 1865. The war was over.

To this outcome the contest on the sea, though less dramatic than that on the land, bore a vital relation. There, too, the task was cut out by remorseless fact: the South, an agricultural region, was largely dependent upon Europe for manufactured goods and in turn had to pay its bills in cotton and other raw materials. Once more, therefore, the sea power loomed large on the horizon of those who weighed national destinies. Quick to perceive it, Lincoln, on April 19, 1861, proclaimed a blockade against southern ports and, to make his order more effective, proceeded to

increase the naval forces depleted by neglect. As time moved on, the iron grip of the northern patrol upon the sea-borne trade of the Confederacy grew tense. Only once within the four years was the blockade in serious peril—in the spring of 1862 when the confederate ironclad, the Merrimac, steamed out into Hampton Roads, crushed two federal vessels as if they were paper, and spread consternation far and wide in the Union ranks. At that very moment, however, a northern ironclad, the Monitor, was ready for the test and met it, ending the depredations of the Merrimac. A new epoch in sea fighting was opened; the success of the blockade was assured; the fate of the Confederacy was sealed.

Day and night, through winter and summer, the war vessels of the Union patrolled the coast, performing a relentless routine that was only now and then enlivened by an exciting chase when a blockade runner hove in sight. Though many adventurers, European and southern, equipped swift ships and risked lives and fortunes trying to break the cordon, the unresting vigilance of the federal navy steadily raised the hazards of the game. In 1860, the value of the cotton exported amounted to about two hundred million dollars; two years later it had fallen to four millions. Correlatively the foreign trade of the Confederacy in commodities of every kind was also cut to trifling proportions. Near the end of its career, the Richmond government could not get enough high-grade paper for its bonds and notes or enough iron to keep up the tracks and rolling stock of its railways. Southern business men no doubt showed great energy and capacity in building plants and furnishing supplies but they could not repair the industrial neglect of two centuries during the four years of the war.

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The armed combat which called forth so much heroism and sacrifice was accompanied by all those darker mani-

festations of the human spirit that always mark great wars: corruption in high places, cold and cynical profiteering, extravagance, and heartless frivolity. Before six months had passed, the air of Washington was murky with charges of fraud. "We are going to destruction as fast as imbecility, corruption, and the wheels of time can carry us," said a discouraged Senator. A congressional investigation revealed startling facts: contractors had made fat profits; they had charged outrageous prices; they had deliberately cheated the government by the delivery of inferior goods. The trail led in the direction of the War Department; thereupon Lincoln removed the Secretary, a machine politician from Pennsylvania, and with a touch of poetic justice sent him as minister to the court of the Tsar. An eminent authority estimated that from one-fifth to one-fourth of the money paid out of the federal treasury was tainted with the tricks of swindlers.

Troubles of the same nature plagued the South. Richmond newspapers were full of complaints about robberies by "official rogues." A Georgia editor lamented that "quartermasters and commissaries grew rich by speculation and robbery." In fact allegations of this type became so numerous that the confederate congress enacted a special law against knavery in the bureaus charged with buying war materials. But apparently the disease could not be stamped out; for one competent southern writer attributed the downfall of the Confederacy to the curse of corruption. Men of more moderate temper on both sides ascribed the evils that worried their respective governments more to inefficient administration than to the inordinate rapacity of merchants and capitalists.

Luxurious living and profiteering on the part of civilians as well as official transgressions characterized the struggle. The new rich could not restrain their emotions. "We are clothed in purple and fine linen," exclaimed the Chicago Tribune, "wear the richest laces and jewels and fare sumptuously every day." When Secretary Chase visited New

York on urgent treasury business in the spring of 1864, he found men of affairs more interested in the stock market than in the awful news of bloodshed at the battle front. Running through the letters and papers of the time was the continuous dirge that contractors and profiteers were hoping for a long war and still better "pickings." "No one can fail to perceive," declared Robert C. Winthrop in 1864, "the danger that a real or even a professed patriotism may be made the cover for a multitude of sins and gallantry on the field of battle be regarded as a substitute for all the duties of the decalogue."

Notwithstanding the poverty of the Richmond government, chances to make huge profits and live on the fat of the land were also abundant in the South. Blockade-running presented prizes especially tempting: one ship alone yielded to her owners seven hundred per cent profit before she was captured. Some of the railways paid dividends ranging from thirty to sixty per cent and politicians waxed rich from army contracts. "The passion for speculation," cried President Davis in 1863, "has seduced citizens of all classes from a determined prosecution of the war to a sordid effort to amass money." Though the curtailment of foreign commerce made it difficult to import European finery, editors daily lamented that, while confederate soldiers were dying for the lack of medicines, the shops of the cities made more extensive displays of foreign fabrics than ever before. "On with the dance!" bitterly commented a southern writer when he read in the columns of the same newspaper that flour was more than a hundred dollars a barrel and that five grand balls were announced.

Over against stories of profiteering and luxurious displays were equally insistent tales of poverty and suffering among the working classes. It is easy to pile up illustrations from the daily press. To be sure, the wages of skilled artisans, especially in the North, rose rapidly and gross figures were often cited to silence the mutter of misery; but a scientific study of the facts long afterward showed conclusively that

earnings did not keep pace with commodities and that the loud protests of factory operatives had a basis in reality. As a matter of course also the prices of agricultural produce shot upward but they did not tally in any way with the cost of the manufactured goods which the farmers had to buy. On the whole therefore the balance tipped sharply in favor of the entrepreneur. Prices were not checked by government intervention; loose buying in huge quantities for war purposes tended to push them still higher; while rich winnings escaped heavy taxation to pay current bills. In the general ruin at the end, southern profiteers lost most of their ill-gotten gains but northern capitalism certainly grew fat on Cæsar's meat.

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All the passions of the war inevitably got into politics, giving intensity to emotions naturally bitter enough. The confederate administration, although it was not shaken from center to circumference by a presidential election in the midst of the conflict was continually disturbed by dissenters. On every hand, doubters and critics assailed the policies of the Richmond government, making the days of President Davis heavy with jarring discords and heedless abuse. Indeed recent historians, such as Frank L. Owsley and A. B. Moore, are inclined to attribute the final collapse of the Confederacy not so much to a failure of material goods as to a lack of support from state authorities, to evasions of the draft, and to discouragement among the masses; above and beyond everything, to the growing conviction among the southern farmers of the uplands that the confederate government was a slave owners' agency of power given to class favoritism, that the conflict was "a rich man's war and a poor man's fight," all the more poignantly evident when the draft laws exempted first the owners of at least twenty and then fifteen Negroes from military service on the ground of supervisory requirements.

No less trying perplexities vexed Lincoln to the day of

his death. Constantly was he reminded that he was the leader of a minority. Democrats of all schools and Whigs of the old line who wanted to preserve the Constitution and maintain "business as usual" could not forget their partisan interests even when they cordially supported the Union. And many of them were aggressively hostile to the administration. Stephen A. Douglas did indeed pledge his allegiance to Lincoln at the opening of the war but death soon laid that masterful leader low, leaving no Democrat of equal power to succeed him as a unifying force.

Never for an instant was Lincoln allowed to forget politics, either by his followers or by his opponents. At the outset, he was simply besieged by office-seekers. "I seem like one sitting in a palace, assigning apartments to importunate applicants while the structure is on fire and likely soon to perish in ashes," he said in his direct way a short time after his inauguration; and until the last shadows fell, job hunters asking for places in the administration and in the army tormented his waking hours. Nearly every action, civil or military, had to be taken with reference to politics. Frémont was given a high position in the army, not for his talents, but to satisfy the radical Republicans who had once voted for him. Battles were fought and blood was shed with relation to election returns. And so the story ran. No matter what he did, Lincoln came under the censure of editors who had no respect for the bounds of propriety. On one occasion, a New York paper went so far as to inquire: "Mr. Lincoln, has he or has he not an interest in the profits of public contracts?" and then without giving any evidence, answered its own query in the affirmative. Members of his Cabinet esteemed him lightly and thought themselves far wiser than he; one of them, Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, thought it not unworthy of his honor to carry on a lively backstairs campaign to wrest the presidency from Lincoln in 1864.

Attacked on all sides, Lincoln held true to his central idea of saving the Union and when the end of his first term

arrived the Republicans decided that they would not "swap horses while crossing a stream." Taking the name Union Party as their title, they renominated Lincoln for President and selected as his associate a southern man, a Unionist from Tennessee, Andrew Johnson. Having to meet this call for an endorsement of the administration, northern Democrats, in their platform, denounced the war as a failure, advocated an immediate peace, and favored a restoration of the federal system—with slavery as before. Choosing as their candidate, General McClellan, who was in their eyes "a military hero," they tried to carry the country by means of drum and trumpet, expedients that had so often brought victory in the past. The appeal and the array of strength were ominous, especially as McClellan took the sting out of his platform by saying that he could not look his soldiers in the face and pronounce the war a failure.

But the answer of the people at the polls was decisive. The Republicans, besides reëlecting Lincoln, returned enough Senators and Representatives to force Congress to adopt the Fifteenth Amendment abolishing slavery forever within the jurisdiction of the United States. The war was to go on, therefore, until peace could be won by the sword. Thus the voters vindicated the great mystic in the White House, disclosing as if by some subtle instinct the fateful mission of their generation.

At this distant day it is difficult to discern the man Lincoln through the clouds of myth that surround him or to imagine what his status in history would have been had the war ended in defeat or had he lived through the reconstruction scandals and the malodorous frauds of the gilded age. If we look at him through the letters and diaries of the men associated with his administration in the early days of the war, we certainly see a person far removed from the picture of the neat bourgeois which Ida Tarbell has drawn. Taking as authoritative the testimony of men like Sumner, Chase, Seward, and Charles Francis Adams, Lincoln dis-

played a lack of sensibilities, an uncouthness of manner, and a coarse jocularity that were shocking to persons of taste two or three generations removed from the soil. He told tales none too elegant for chaste ears. "An ignorant Western boor," sniffed a hostile New York editor. His pictures reveal him as a tall, lanky, homely, awkward countryman.

And yet the severest of his critics was arrested by something impelling about the personality of Lincoln—something transcending the roughness of the frontier. In his face during repose, in his glance, in his messages and decisions, lay proof that he "knew the sadness of things," as the Japanese would say. It was his nature to temper official words and deeds with moderation. He was in very fact President of the United States in a tragic hour, measuring up in full length to his Augustan authority and responsibility. When the more cultured Seward proposed to act with churlish rudeness in foreign relations, Lincoln softened his caustic notes by words of wisdom. While men like Adams who could boast of education and refinement were cocksure that they could avoid war and save the Union, Lincoln was the soul of modesty. If politicians besieged him with their personal bickerings, he tried to draw them to high ground by fixing their attention on the main challenge of the moment. He never heedlessly turned a deaf ear to the plea of mercy. When he addressed the country through a message to Congress, wrote a letter to a mother who had given her sons to the supreme sacrifice, or made a speech dedicating a battlefield, he emphasized great issues, offered wise counsel, revealed the "deathless music" of his spirit. In all things, however, he was practical, watching the strategy of the war with the eyes of a hawk and giving advice at every crucial point.

Notwithstanding the elusive phases of his character, Lincoln was an astute politician rather than an idealist or a doctrinaire. He was made the "Emancipator" by circumstances and expediency rather than by his own initiative.

When it became necessary to traffic in petty jobs to get votes with which to carry the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery, he made use of the tools of the trade. He never invited the purist's doom by flying in the face of organized society but he had the good sense to grasp the inexorable by the forelock. With a resignation that seemed to betray a belief in the philosophy of history cherished by Bishop Bossuet, he wrote in the spring of 1864: "I claim not to have controlled events but confess plainly that events have controlled me. Now at the end of three years' struggle, the nation's condition is not what either party or any man devised or expected. God alone can claim it. Whither it is tending seems plain." It was fate that gave Lincoln the martyr's crown and the good fortune of being justified by events. He steered the ship of state with the gale, not against it, and it was one of the ironies of historic destiny that he was assassinated, on April 14, 1865, as the spokesman of the triumphant cause for which Wendell Phillips and William Lloyd Garrison had defied mobs and courted the fate of Lovejoy.

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When at the close of the great tragedy, the statisticians came upon the scene to make their calculations, the world was astounded to read the record of the awful cost in blood and treasure. Comprehensive and accurate figures were not available and the most cautious estimates varied but there were gross totals that staggered the mind. On the northern side, the death roll contained the names of three hundred and sixty thousand men and the list of wounded who recovered two hundred and seventy-five thousand more. On the southern side, about two hundred and fifty thousand men had given their lives to the lost cause and an unknown number had been wounded. According to a conservative reckoning, therefore, six hundred thousand soldiers had paid the last full measure of devotion.

In treasure the cost was not as easily appraised. The mere war expenses of the belligerents amounted to about five billion dollars in round numbers. The outlay for three years of reconstruction was placed at three billions more. In a strict sense the property destroyed in the struggle, the pensions paid to the surviving soldiers, the economic losses due to the immense diversion of energies were all a part of the price paid for the preservation of the Union. A grand assessment of values was therefore impossible but one thing was certain: the monetary cost of the conflict far exceeded the value of the slaves. *Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.*

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Neither the losses nor the costs of the war, not even the heroic deeds on the field of battle—so lovingly described in a thousand memoirs and histories—were after all the final phases of the great process that flowed through the years of the conflict and transformed American society. From one standpoint they were means to ends, ends that usually outran the purposes and visions of the masses who played their several rôles in that long drama. Viewed in the large, the supreme outcome of the civil strife was the destruction of the planting aristocracy which, with the aid of northern farmers and mechanics, had practically ruled the United States for a generation. A corollary to that result was the undisputed triumph of a new combination of power: northern capitalists and free farmers who emerged from the conflict richer and more numerous than ever. It was these irreducible facts, as already noted, that made the Civil War a social revolution.

And that revolution was thoroughgoing. Beyond a doubt the ruin of the planting class through the sweep of the war was more complete than the destruction of the clergy and the nobility in the first French cataclysm because the very economic foundations of the planting system, including slavery itself, were shattered in the course of events.

In wide regions of the South, estates had been devastated by fire and pillage, buildings had decayed, tools and livestock had wasted away. The bonds and notes of the Confederacy had fallen worthless in the hands of their holders and there was little fluid capital available for the restoration of agriculture to its former high position. To pile calamity on calamity, the old debts due northern merchants and capitalists, long overdue indeed, could now be collected by distraint through the medium of the federal courts sustained by northern bayonets. To complete its ruin, the planting aristocracy was subjected to the military dominion of the triumphant orders ruling through Washington while its own leaders, with some exceptions, were excluded by law from places of trust and influence in their respective states as well as in the national government. Finally the new combination was supported by the emancipated bondmen into whose hands the ballot was thrust by the white victors.

A crucial stroke in this revolution—though by no means as significant as sometimes suggested—was the confiscation or, to use a more euphonious term, the abolition of the planter's property in labor. Whatever may be the ethical view of the transaction, its result was the complete destruction of about four billion dollars' worth of "goods" in the possession of slave owners without compensation—the most stupendous act of sequestration in the history of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. Even that was not drastic enough for some radicals. Extremists wanted to make the execution still more crushing by transferring to the slaves the estates they tilled but this was too much for the temper of those who directed the course of federal affairs in Washington.

Indeed emancipation itself was not effected hastily at one fell blow directed by abstract policy; it was only brought to pass when the conquest of the South on other terms seemed impossible. At the commencement of their administration in 1861, as we have seen, the Republicans were

willing to guarantee slavery in the southern states if they would return to the Union and peacefully accept the clear verdict of the census returns. The war had been raging a year before Congress attacked even the outworks of slavery. Not until April, 1862, did it begin to move by resolving to offer financial aid to any state that would start gradual emancipation. A few days later it abolished slavery in the District of Columbia.

Within two months the tide rose higher. Summoning all its courage on June 19, Congress fulfilled the Republican pledge by sweeping slavery from the territories forever. Lincoln had said that if the opportunity was given him he would strike at slavery in the territories in spite of the Dred Scott decision. Chief Justice Taney still lived; his solemn opinion stood unaltered in the law books; the letter of the Constitution was unmodified; it was time, circumstance, and sentiment that had changed.

By these acts all the normal powers of Congress over slavery under the Constitution, even as construed by radical Republicans, were exhausted. Negro bondage stood unscathed in the states where it was lawful. But the Second American Revolution was still making headway. The government of the United States was at war; the President was Commander-in-chief of its armed forces; and there were precedents for aggression. In the days when American troops were marching on Mexico, enlarging the slave empire, President Polk had declared in effect that, in exercising his war power in enemy country, he was limited only by the law of nations and could blockade ports, capture property on the high seas, levy tribute, and do all things necessary and proper to vindicate the rights and honor of the country. Long before Polk's announcement, John Quincy Adams had foreseen that a revolutionary blow at the vested interests of the slavocracy could be struck in a time of crisis by the use of extraordinary military authority.

The crisis had arrived. Abolitionists urged Lincoln to seize the opportunity and attacked him bitterly for every

sign of hesitation. Through many weary months, unperturbed by their criticism, he bent his energies to his major task of saving the Union, knowing that the country was not generally abolitionist in sentiment, that hasty action might drive into the arms of the Confederacy the border slave states still loyal to the federal government. He was likewise aware that thousands of soldiers in the army and some of the high commanders, such as McClellan, were utterly opposed to a war on slavery: that as long as the issue on the battlefield was uncertain, emancipation would be an empty, futile, ridiculous measure, even if he desired to proclaim it himself. Though the whirling currents for a long time seemed to have no forward direction, the brooding man in the White House kept his own counsel and his balance.

At last, in the summer of 1862, Lincoln reached the great decision. He then drafted the Proclamation of Emancipation, read it to his Cabinet, and laid it aside until some military achievement might beckon him on the shadowy way. In September, McClellan rolled Lee's forces back at the awful battle of Antietam. It was a doubtful victory, if a victory at all, but Lincoln felt that the omen was favorable. Consequently on the twenty-third of that month, he sent forth his immortal document announcing that, unless the confederate states returned to the Union by the first of the following January, all the slaves in every place under arms against the federal government would be given their liberty.

On the appointed day, duly informed that the aforesaid states had ignored his appeal, Lincoln fulfilled his decree to the letter: the drastic act of emancipation—in language that seems cold and formal when compared with the language of Jefferson's Declaration of Independence—was spread on the pages of time's ledger. Within a few days President Davis made answer in a scornful message to the confederate congress: "Our own detestation of those who have attempted the most execrable act recorded in the his-

tory of guilty man is tempered by profound contempt for the impotent rage which it discloses."

Whether Lincoln's Proclamation was an act of futile wrath or not, the issue raised by it was certainly clouded. Slavery as a system was not in fact then and there abolished; only bondmen dwelling in those states and parts of states in arms against federal authority were declared free; in all other places the peculiar institution, according to the outward signs of law, stood unimpaired. Moreover the freedom of the emancipated rested upon a mere ukase of the President issued with doubtful constitutional warrant. What would happen when peace came and civil authority supplanted the military régime no statesman could divine.

Oppressed by apprehension about the future, Lincoln urged upon Congress the adoption of a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution to prohibit slavery forever throughout the length and breadth of the land. At the conclusion of a long and bitter fight, this project was carried and sent to the states for ratification in January, 1865.

Clearly a great advance had been made but the goal was still far off. It was obvious that extraordinary methods —methods hardly contemplated by the founding Fathers —would be required to win the approval of three-fourths of the commonwealths then theoretically composing the Union. Appreciating full well the necessities of the case, the sponsors of the proposal bent to their task. By trading federal patronage for Democratic votes in Congress, Lincoln secured the admission of Nevada, adding one more sure vote in the North for the Amendment. A few months later Lee surrendered, the Confederacy collapsed, and the work of the Emancipator, now laid low by an assassin, was brought to fruition. Under the pressure of federal military authorities enough southern states were forced to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment to give it the requisite semblance of propriety, and on December 18, 1865, the momentous resolve was proclaimed in effect.

At last the unconditional emancipation demanded by Gar-

rison three decades before, to the horror of his countrymen, had come, sealed by blood and authorized by law; and with it a grand moral victory for its champions. By the same act, the destruction of the slavocracy that had dominated the country for a generation was assured: the Republicans had accomplished amid the crash of arms what neither the Federalists nor the Whigs had been able to achieve in time of peace.

The prostration of the planting aristocracy was made more thorough by the Fourteenth Amendment ratified three years later. Besides attempting to confer certain civil rights on all Negroes and to assure political rights to Negro men, that amendment struck at the political and economic powers of the leaders in the Confederacy who were the spokesmen of the planting interest. It declared that no person who had once taken an oath as a federal or a state officer to support the Constitution and then had participated in the "rebellion" or given aid and comfort to it should hold any state or federal position, civil or military, until Congress by a two-thirds vote removed the disability. In other words, until an extraordinary majority could be mustered in the national legislature, the statesmen of the planting interest were to have no share in the governing process. Freedmen were to enjoy political privilege. White leaders of the South were to be deprived of it.

In addition to suffering the loss of their slaves without compensation, men of property in the South were further penalized. All the war debts and obligations incurred by the Confederacy and the states under its jurisdiction were abrogated by the Fourteenth Amendment and payment of the same by the United States or by any state was absolutely forbidden—a pronunciamento that caused intense grief in London and Paris as well as below the Mason and Dixon line. This cancellation of the whole confederate debt was attended by a provision that the validity of the public debt of the United States and also pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion should never

be questioned. Consequently the securities of the Confederacy fell dead in the hands of the owners while the obligations issued by the Washington administration were given a constitutional status. In this manner bonds and other paper to the value of millions were destroyed by the stroke of a pen and their repudiation placed beyond all hope of revival. The financial circles of Europe, accustomed in new settlements to funding the debts of both parties to every revolutionary struggle in Latin-America, were excited over what appeared to be an act of bad faith but their complaints fell upon Republican hearts that were like stone.

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While the planting class was being trampled in the dust —stripped of its wealth and political power—the capitalist class was marching onward in seven league boots. Under the feverish stimulus of war the timid army marshaled by Webster in support of the Constitution and Whig policies had been turned into a confident host, augmented in numbers by the thousands and tens of thousands who during the conflict made profits out of war contracts and out of the rising prices of manufactured goods. At last the economic structure of machine industry towered high above agriculture—a grim monument to the fallen captain, King Cotton. Moreover, the bonds and notes of the federal government, issued in its extremity, furnished the substance for still larger business enterprise. And the beneficent government, which had carefully avoided laying drastic imposts upon profits during the war, soon afterward crowned its generosity to capitalists by abolishing the moderate tax on incomes and shifting the entire fiscal burden to goods consumed by the masses.

To measurable accumulations were added legal gains of high economic value. All that two generations of Federalists and Whigs had tried to get was won within four short years, and more besides. The tariff, which the planters had

beaten down in 1857, was restored and raised to the highest point yet attained. A national banking system was established to take the place of the institution abolished in 1811 by Jeffersonian Democracy and the second institution destroyed by Jacksonian Democracy in 1836. At the same time the policy of lavish grants from the federal treasury to aid internal improvements so necessary to commerce was revived in the form of imperial gifts to railway corporations; it was in the year of emancipation that the construction of the Pacific railway, opening the overland route to the trade of the Orient, was authorized by the Congress of the United States. With similar decisiveness, the federal land question which had long vexed eastern manufacturers was duly met; the Homestead Act of 1862, innumerable grants to railways, and allotments to the states in aid of agricultural colleges provided for the disposal of the public domain. As a counter stroke, the danger of higher wages, threatened by the movement of labor to the land, was partially averted by the Immigration Act of 1864—an extraordinary law which gave federal authorization to the importation of working people under terms of contract analogous to the indentured servitude of colonial times.

While all these positive advantages were being won by capitalists in the halls of Congress, steps were taken to restrain the state legislatures which had long been the seats of agrarian unrest. By the Fourteenth Amendment, proclaiming that no state should deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, the Supreme Court at Washington was granted constitutional power to strike down any act of any state or local government menacing to "sound" business policies. Finally the crowning result of the sacrifice, the salvation of the Union, with which so many lofty sentiments were justly associated, assured to industry an immense national market surrounded by a tariff wall bidding defiance to the competition of Europe.

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Since this view of the so-called "Civil War" or "War between the States" will appear novel to many, it seems desirable to reinforce it by some illustrative details. First of all a word may be said on the methods employed by the federal government in financing the war—methods which served to increase the amount of fluid capital in private hands. As we have noted, the profitable principle was adopted that the generation which directed the war should not bear the main burden of paying for it. At the very start, the Secretary of the Treasury took the position that there should be no extraordinary taxes except to meet the interest on the new loans and redeem a small part of the debt annually; so the first year of the war saw loans amounting to nearly half a billion dollars and no material increase in taxation. Later this easy-going philosophy was modified; taxes were increased in all directions; and an income tax running as high as ten per cent on incomes above five thousand dollars was imposed; but at the close of the conflict it was found that in the operation the government had floated loans to the amount of $2,621,000,000 and collected from various sources taxes totaling only the sum of $667,000,000.

Although the bonds issued from time to time varied greatly in their stipulations, according to the prospects of ultimate success which seemed to lie before the Union cause, their provisions were seldom ungenerous to the money lenders. Often the rate of interest ran to seven per cent, occasionally slightly higher. In some cases certain depreciated Greenbacks were received in exchange for bonds payable, interest and principal, in gold, thus giving the holder two or three times the rate of annual return nominally written in the contract. As always, necessity was the mother of policy: the exigencies of the federal government were great; the risks incurred by money-lenders were serious though time proved their faith well justified; and in its distress the federal treasury had to deal gently with its creditors. If the Union had been dissolved their losses

would have been overwhelming; as things turned out, their earnings were immense.

Industry as well as finance had its reward in the Second American Revolution. The armed conflict, the withdrawal of southern members of Congress, and the demand for revenue enabled the advocates of a high protective tariff to push through measure after measure and to fasten their system upon the nation so tightly that it was not even shaken for nearly half a century. Until the eve of the war the doctrine of free trade, or rather of tariff for revenue only, had been steadily gaining under southern leadership; suddenly this process was completely reversed. When secession came, the cotton planters, long the bulwark of low duties or no duties, passed from the picture; an enormous economic power exercised against protection was shattered.

Relieved of heavy pressure from this quarter, the protectionists, now firmly in the saddle, were able to frame tariff bills primarily designed to afford advantages to industries. Even after the federal government had been at war for many months and the treasury was on the brink of bankruptcy, customs schedules were still drawn up mainly with reference to protection rather than revenue. At no time was the issue lost to sight as Congress ground out act after act with mechanical regularity. In the operation the general average of tariff rates was raised from about nineteen per cent as fixed by the measure of 1857 to forty-seven per cent in the law of 1864. Furthermore when it was found that other internal taxes bore heavily upon manufactures, "proper reparation" was made in the form of higher and countervailing tariff duties. The demands of the war gave excellent justification for the inevitable. There were protests from some agricultural districts—echoes of former days—but there were no longer any powerful southern planters to direct the low-tariff hosts and turn the engines of the federal government against the spokesmen of machine industries.

That other great requirement of business enterprise—the

national banking system—was also scrutinized by the politicians during the storm of the war. As a matter of prosaic fact, in those dark and trying days, the statesmen of sound money found a chance to return to the policies which had been so ruthlessly discarded by Jacksonian Democracy. When the Republicans came to power in 1861, local banks, either managed or chartered by states, possessed the field, having in circulation seven thousand kinds of paper notes, to say nothing of more than five thousand varieties of counterfeit and fraudulent issues.

Viewed in any light, the confusion was unendurable to Secretary Chase, long a foe of all agrarian devices, especially of easy money; and soon after his installation in the Treasury Department he took up the problem of ending the financial chaos. In the first year of his service, he recommended to Congress the establishment of a new national banking system; and, when he was defeated on the merits of his case, he made full use of the opportunity presented by the necessity of selling war bonds, wringing from Congress at last the national banking act of 1863. By express terms, this law authorized the formation of local banking associations under federal authority and empowered them to emit notes on the basis of United States bonds up to ninety per cent of the par value. In other words, a local bank could buy federal securities, receive interest from the government on its holdings, and then issue on the strength of those securities paper bills to be lent to borrowers at the current discount.

Having driven this wedge into the system of local currency and having attracted the support of powerful banks by favorable terms, the party of sound money completed its program in 1865 by carrying through Congress an act which imposed a tax of ten per cent on all state bank notes, absolutely wiping them out by a single stroke. In this fashion sweeping designs, which neither Clay nor Webster had been able to accomplish by oratory in days of peace, Republican leaders effected by arrangement during

the pressing time of war. When southern statesmen returned to the Union after the curtain was rung down on the battlefield, they found the national banking system intrenched in the financial structure of the nation.

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But capital, no matter how enormous or carefully buttressed by tariffs and sound finance, was helpless without an adequate labor supply—a plain economic truth well known to the industrial members of the Republican party. Their forerunners, the Federalists, had understood that; Hamilton, in his Report on Manufactures in 1791, had spoken about the necessity of drawing upon Europe in addition to native sources for labor to operate the machinery set in motion by tariffs. His Whig successors often emphasized the point.

Continuing the refrain, the Republicans, known temporarily as the Union party, declared in their platform of 1864 that "foreign immigration, which in the past has added so much to the wealth, the development of resources, and the increase of power to this nation—the asylum of the oppressed of all nations—should be fostered and encouraged by a liberal and just policy." Responding to the new demand that very year Congress incorporated the policy in law by creating a bureau of immigration and, as pointed out, authorizing a modified form of indentured labor which permitted the importation of workers bound for a term of service. Though the latter feature of the law was soon repealed, the corresponding practice was long continued, eastern capitalists bringing in laborers from Europe under contract and western railway builders drawing upon the inexhaustible supplies of the Orient.

To the cry of survivors from the Know-Nothing faction that the old Anglo-Saxon stock was being diluted and submerged, the champions of free immigration answered that America was the asylum of the oppressed. So it was—

and incidentally the coming of the oppressed augmented the earnings of stockholders and land speculators tremendously. Thus light and shadow continued to play down the ages.

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While winning its essential economic demands in the federal sphere, the party of industrial progress and sound money devoted fine calculation to another great desideratum —the restoration and extension of federal judicial supremacy over the local legislatures which had been so troublesome since the age of Daniel Shays. Restoration was heartily desired because the original limitations imposed by the Constitution on the power of the state to issue money and impair contracts had been practically destroyed by adroit federal judges imbued with the spirit of Jacksonian Democracy. An extension of federal control was perhaps more heartily desired because, for nationalists of the Federalist and Whig tradition, those limitations had been pitifully inadequate even when applied strictly by Chief Justice Marshall—inadequate to meet the requirements of individuals and corporations that wanted to carry on their business in their own way, immune from legislative interference.

In all this there was nothing esoteric. Among conservative adepts in federal jurisprudence the need for more efficient judicial protection had been keenly felt for some time; and when the problem of defining the rights of Negroes came before Congress in the form of a constitutional amendment, experts in such mysteries took advantage of the occasion to enlarge the sphere of national control over the states, by including among the safeguards devised for Negroes a broad provision for the rights of all "persons," natural and artificial, individual and corporate.

Their project was embodied in the second part of the Fourteenth Amendment in the form of a short sentence intended by the man who penned it to make a revolution in

the federal Constitution. The sentence reads: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Just how this provision got into the draft of the Fourteenth Amendment was not generally known at the time of its adoption but in after years the method was fully revealed by participants in the process. By the end of the century an authentic record, open to all, made the operation as plain as day. According to the evidence now available, there were two factions in the congressional committee which framed the Amendment—one bent on establishing the rights of Negroes; the other determined to take in the whole range of national economy. Among the latter was a shrewd member of the House of Representatives, John A. Bingham, a prominent Republican and a successful railroad lawyer from Ohio familiar with the possibilities of jurisprudence; it was he who wrote the mysterious sentence containing the "due process" clause in the form in which it now stands; it was he who finally forced it upon the committee by persistent efforts.

In a speech delivered in Congress a few years later, Bingham explained his purpose in writing it. He had read, he said, in the case of Barron *versus* the Mayor and Council of Baltimore, how the city had taken private property for public use, as alleged without compensation, and how Chief Justice Marshall had been compelled to hold that there was no redress in the Supreme Court of the United States—no redress simply because the first ten Amendments to the Constitution were limitations on Congress, not on the states. Deeming this hiatus a grave legal defect in the work of the Fathers, Bingham designed "word for word and syllable for syllable" the cabalistic clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in order, he asserted, that "the poorest man in his hovel . . . may be as secure in his person and prop-

erty as the prince in his palace or the king upon his throne." Hence the provision was to apply not merely to former slaves struggling for civil rights but to all persons, rich and poor, individuals and corporations, under the national flag.

Long afterward Roscoe Conkling, the eminent corporation lawyer of New York, a colleague of Bingham on the congressional committee, confirmed this view. While arguing a tax case for a railway company before the Supreme Court in 1882, he declared that the protection of freedmen was by no means the sole purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. "At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified," he said, "individuals and joint stock companies were appealing for congressional and administrative protection against invidious and discriminating state and local taxes. . . . That complaints of oppression in respect of property and other rights made by citizens of northern states who took up residence in the South were rife in and out of Congress, none of us can forget. . . . Those who devised the Fourteenth Amendment wrought in grave sincerity. . . . They planted in the Constitution a monumental truth to stand four square to whatever wind might blow. That truth is but the golden rule, so entrenched as to curb the many who would do to the few as they would not have the few do to them."

In this spirit, Republican lawmakers restored to the Constitution the protection for property which Jacksonian judges had whittled away and made it more sweeping in its scope by forbidding states, in blanket terms, to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. By a few words skillfully chosen every act of every state and local government which touched adversely the rights of persons and property was made subject to review and liable to annulment by the Supreme Court at Washington, appointed by the President and Senate for life and far removed from local feelings and prejudices.

Although the country at large did not grasp the full meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment while its adoption

was pending, some far-sighted editors and politicians realized at the time that it implied a fundamental revolution in the Constitution, at least as interpreted by Chief Justice Taney. Ohio and New Jersey Democrats, reckoning that it would make the Supreme Court at Washington the final arbiter in all controversies over the powers of local governments, waged war on it, carrying the fight into the state legislatures and forcing the repeal of resolutions approving the Amendment even after they had been duly sealed. As a matter of course all the southern states were still more fiercely opposed to the Amendment but they were compelled to ratify it under federal military authority as the price of restoration to the Union. Thus the triumphant Republican minority, in possession of the federal government and the military power, under the sanction of constitutional forms, subdued the states for all time to the unlimited jurisdiction of the federal Supreme Court.

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While business enterprise received its share of the advantages accruing from the Second American Revolution, other elements in the combination of power effected in 1860 —namely the free farmers of the West and the radical reformers of the East—also had their rewards. On the outbreak of the war, their old opponents on the land question were no longer in a position to dictate. The planters of the South were out of the political lists and northern mill owners, who had feared that free farms would lure away wage-workers, were shown the possibilities of a counterpoise in the promotion of alien immigration. If some were unconvinced by such reasoning, they could at least see that the agrarian element in the Republican party was too strong to be thwarted by the business wing. So eventually in 1862 the hard contest over the public domain came to an end with the passage of the Homestead Act which provided for the free distribution of land in lots of one hundred and sixty acres each to men and women of strong arms and

willing hearts, prepared to till the soil. In this action, the appealing slogan, "Vote yourself a farm," was realized and before the ink of Lincoln's signature was dry the rush to the free land commenced.

To northern farmers who had no thought of going to the frontier, the war likewise brought marked advantages. Especially did the Mississippi Valley, former home of agrarian discontent and Jacksonian Democracy, reap immense gains in inflated prices paid for farm produce, in spite of the mounting cost of manufactured goods. At one time wheat rose to more than two dollars and a half a bushel and other commodities followed its flight. From overflowing coffers debt-burdened tillers of the soil who had once raged against the money-power now discharged their obligations in Greenback "legal tenders" received for the fruits of their labor. The more fortunate farmers collected large returns from rising land values, accumulated capital, and became stockholders in local railway and banking enterprises. For many years a prosperous farming class, tasting the sweets of profit, could look upon the new course of politics and pronounce it good. There was discontent, no doubt, and a reaction against industrialism was bound to come but the political union of 1860, though strained, was never successfully broken.

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The main economic results of the Second American Revolution thus far noted would have been attained had there been no armed conflict for the census returns with rhythmic beats were recording the tale of the fates. But one great outcome of the war itself was the sudden creation of a large and anomalous class in the American social order—a mass of emancipated slaves long destined to wander in a hazy realm between bondage and freedom. Emancipation cut two ways: it ruined the planting class and it threw into the turbulent forces of democracy a strange and distracting element.

Nothing just like this had ever happened in history, at least on such a scale. On the Continent of Europe, the liberation of serfs generally left them freeholders or tenants on the land which they tilled. In the South, on the other hand, where slaves were chattels bound to their masters and not to the land, their emancipation sent them flying off into social space as "a laboring, landless, and homeless class," to use Lincoln's phrase. Moreover most of the upheavals in other times and countries had been due to the growing power of the subjected orders. No such thing occurred in the case of the slaves. They had not essentially improved their status through their years of bondage; at any rate they had made no striking development in intelligence; nor had they succeeded in acquiring property to any extent. If many of them yearned for freedom, few took any steps to gratify their desire. In fact the overwhelming majority were loyal to the masters who were fighting against their freedom—proof of their contentment, their affection for their owners, their inertia, or their helplessness—or all four combined. So when the abolition of slavery was assured by the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment the freedmen were in no way prepared to become an effective factor in the new order of society to which they were admitted. For practical purposes they were powerless in the hands of the governing group that directed the revolution and reconstruction from Washington, a group naturally concerned, among other things, with maintaining its supremacy.

It was accordingly an almost insuperable task which the Republican administration encountered in trying to give civil rights to a class that had no economic power or social organization. Seeing the logic of the situation, the radical wing of the party proposed to face it by transferring to the freedmen a part of the soil they had tilled; but, when asked for a bill of particulars, the advocates of this heroic remedy surrendered. The slaves had not been accustomed to any village coöperation akin to that practiced by the servile

peasants of old Europe. They did not have historic rights in cottages and plots of land. They knew little or nothing about the managerial side of agrarian economy. If land was given to them outright, there was little reason to believe that they could find the capital with which to develop it or could show the proprietary skill or knowledge necessary to hold it against speculators and sharpers in general. Obviously any effort to establish the ex-slaves on an economic foundation involved immense difficulties even if the idea of confiscating the land as well as the masters' personal property had been acceptable to the majority in Congress.

In these circumstances, the Washington government, apart from attempts to give temporary economic relief through a freedmen's bureau, confined its work on behalf of the Negroes mainly to conferring civil and social rights upon them in paper proclamations. Indeed some action of this nature was rendered imperative by events. Soon after slavery was legally abolished the former masters, working through state legislatures, restored a kind of servitude by means of apprentice, vagrancy, and poor laws. This strategical movement the radical Republicans in Congress answered by passing the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 designed to assure American citizenship and the legal rights of citizens to all freedmen—a mere statute which a succeeding Congress could undo.

Anticipating such a reaction as the tide of northern war passion receded and knowing that they were in a minority in the country as a whole, the Republicans undertook to place the civil rights of freedmen beyond the reach of an ordinary majority forevermore—in a constitutional provision. If the opportunity was lost it might never come again; so the joint committee on reconstruction drafted the necessary instrument which now appears upon the books as the Fourteenth Amendment, a complicated device already considered in another connection. But when the proposal was sent to the states in 1866 for approval, it was definitely rejected. Three former slave states which had not seceded

—Delaware, Maryland, and Kentucky—registered their disapproval and the Amendment was also repudiated by nine slave states which had seceded.

Realizing that it was impossible to win ratification by the ordinary procedure of voluntary authorization as contemplated by the Constitution, the sponsors of the proposal in Congress then resorted to peculiar measures. After terrific arguments in Republican ranks, intransigent members of the party forced through Congress the drastic Reconstruction Act of 1867, an elaborate statute which put ten of the former confederate states under military rule, provided for the organization of local governments under federal supervision, and declared that the said states should not be entitled to representation in Congress—in effect denied them readmission to the Union—until they ratified the pending Fourteenth Amendment. Unquestionably this heroic project for military occupation placed a severe strain upon the consciences of some Republicans; but, driven by an emergency that seemed to call for a broad interpretation of their rights and duties under the Constitution, they gave their consent to the bill.

Face to face with the iron regimen of martial rule, the southern states capitulated. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified and proclaimed a part of the law of the nation on July 28, 1868.

Aside from the sections which repudiated the confederate debt, disfranchised certain participants in the confederate war, and established broad rights of persons and property, the Fourteenth Amendment made three general offerings to Negroes. It assured them citizenship by declaring that all persons born or naturalized in the United States were citizens. It promised them certain civil rights by asserting that no state should ever deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or deny to any person equal protection of the law. It attempted to confer the vote on Negro men by the negative provision that, if any state refused the ballot in specified elections to

any adult male citizens, its representation in Congress should be proportionately reduced.

All these stipulations seemed to be pointed but in practice they proved to be little more than platonic theories. Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and other northern states still excluded Negroes from the suffrage, the voters of Connecticut having rejected a proposition to enfranchise them as late as the summer of 1865. And the South, in no mood to grant what these commonwealths withheld, simply declined to confer the ballot on the freedmen. Defeated in the attempt to enfranchise all Negro men by indirection, Congress passed and the states ratified, while the South was still under military rule, the Fifteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, declaring that the right of citizens to vote should not be denied on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. That provision, formally ratified, in 1870, was apparently invulnerable but it failed to reckon with the political and juristic ingenuity of the Anglo-Saxon race.

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The process of reconstruction in the South helped to accelerate the revolution hastened by the war. A man of moderate temper, Lincoln would have restored each of the seceded states to the Union as soon as a body of citizens qualified under the old laws and equal to one-tenth the number of the voting population in 1860 stood ready to take the oath of allegiance to the United States and to establish a formal government again—a program for rapid rehabilitation cut short by the deed of an assassin. Lincoln's successor, Andrew Johnson, a southern Democrat, proposed to follow with some modifications the same general course with respect to reconstruction but he was blocked by a hostile group of Republicans headed by Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania and Charles Sumner of Massachusetts. Though Johnson managed by a narrow margin to escape conviction when he was impeached before the Senate by the House of

Representatives in 1868, he was from first to last helpless in the presence of his foes. In fact Congress, not the President, now held the whip hand. It alone had the power to admit states to the Union and each house had the right to pass judgment upon the qualifications of every person claiming to be elected to membership, whether his seat was contested or not.

Thoroughly intrenched the determined majority in Congress proceeded to pass a series of complicated reconstruction acts, in addition to the three amendments to the Constitution already described. It laid out the prostrate southern states into military districts, each in command of an army officer, conferred the right to vote on Negro men, disfranchised most of the leading Confederates, and empowered the military authorities to proceed to the organization of state governments with the aid of Negro voters and such white men as were left in possession of the ballot. It forced the southern states to ratify three amendments to the constitution as the price of admission to the union and not until 1870 did the last one find shelter again under the national roof.

But when all the states of the Confederacy were back in the Union the Republicans continued to maintain their strong grip on the helm. Seven years more elapsed before the last military commanders were withdrawn from southern capitals. And after every vestige of the armed occupation had been removed, various civilian agencies of northern dominion remained in operation. In 1870, 1872, and 1873 Congress enacted three drastic measures, sometimes known as "force bills," providing for the use of federal officers in the supervision of elections throughout the Union, measures necessary, the framers argued, to sustain the Negro in the exercise of his new political rights and to prevent fraudulent voting in the crowded cities of the North. Admitting that their force laws were stringent in terms, the Republicans long defended them against Democratic assaults, yielding with deep reluctance to a pressure which abrogated

one section after another and culminated in the repeal of the last fragment in 1894.

The same radical majority in Congress that sought to uphold the legal rights of the Negro, with equal insistence tried to keep the surviving members of the planting aristocracy, battered and beaten, in complete subjection. Seven years passed before Congress could be induced to grant, in 1872, a general amnesty, and at that late hour it sternly resolved upon exceptions which remained in effect until 1898 when the Spanish-American War finally brought about a union of hearts and spread the mantle of oblivion over the past. Thus in addition to working a profound social and economic transformation, the leaders of the government at Washington sought to guard themselves as long as possible against the expected reaction. Seldom, if ever, before had there occurred in the affairs of a nation a revolution so drastic, so effective, and so well protected against the inexorable recoil.

## CHAPTER XIX

### *Rounding Out the Continent*

One of the richest prizes at stake in the physical combat of the early sixties was, as we have seen, the huge territorial spoil lying beyond the outpost states of the Mississippi Valley—a prize which fell to farmers and capitalists victorious in the struggle. In superficial area this magnificent domain was almost equal to all the states in the Union combined. The half-way point along the fortieth parallel between the Atlantic and the Pacific lay in the heart of the Kansas-Nebraska district where the first blood of the civil conflict was shed, where the tocsin was rung for the gathering of the armed hosts.

Though rivaling in extent the older East, this dominion differed from that section in nearly every other respect. More than half of it was arid plain and broken land. It is true that in the region adjoining Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri and in broad belts near the Pacific shore there was fertile soil fit for the plow of any pioneer. But on the western border of the Mississippi Valley the land began to rise steadily across semi-arid reaches to the foothills of the

Rockies. Beyond those towering piles of stone lay more than a thousand miles of plateau and basin serried by mountains, slashed by valleys, blistered into deserts by a burning sun. At the western edge of this huge stretch rose the Sierra Nevada buttressed by coastal ranges and the Cascades that sloped rapidly down to the Pacific, spreading out occasionally into swards and mesas made arable by seasonal rains.

If in the dry and hilly regions, the offerings of this territory to the farmer were rather niggardly, the same could not be said of the booty presented to miners, cattle barons, and lumber kings. Hidden under the mountains and the wild wastes were gold and silver surpassing in bulk the wildest dreams of the Spanish conquerors of the sixteenth century; even transcending the fancies of medieval alchemists who sought a magic way to transform baser into finer metals. Here were copper deposits wide and deep and rich. Here were pasture lands for flocks and herds vaster than any assembled on the deserts and steppes of the Old World. Here was a supply of timber to fill the gap caused by the disappearing forests in the settled sections of the country. Here were ranges of climate cold enough to make the Scandinavian feel at home and warm enough to attract Orientals whose original habitat lay under the mild skies of the South Seas. And the western shores looked out upon the Pacific to fabled Cathay, to realms of mystery and unknown potentiality. Still the star of Manifest Destiny hung high in the heavens. Ambitious leaders in Lincoln's party, such as William H. Seward, saw it beckoning Americans across land and wave to battle for empire on the plains of Asia.

Huge and significant as was this territorial prize little had been done to exploit its resources and not much was known about it in detail by the busy masses of the East when Lincoln was inaugurated. The explorers, Lewis and Clark, Pike and Frémont, had, indeed, tramped over wide reaches of it and written bulky reports for them that cared to read. Gold had already made California famous and

paved its way into the Union in 1850. Persistent advertising had drawn to the fertile valleys of Oregon enough settlers by 1859 to warrant the admission of that territory to statehood. Under the leadership of Brigham Young, Mormons were turning a Utah desert into a garden spot and giving to their strange colony a notoriety that echoed far into Europe. Across plain, desert, and mountain, trails had been worn deep by the tread of oxen and the grind of wheels that marked the westward migration of settlers. A stagecoach line connecting St. Joseph on the Missouri with the Pacific offered passengers a trip to the coast in twenty-five days; while a pony express carried letters into San Francisco in ten days. Travel books and tales of life in the Wild West had appeared in the bookstalls and lively journalists, with Horace Greeley in the lead, had gone over the Rockies to see the western heritage with their own eyes. But on the whole the wide expanse of plain, mountain, and desert between Iowa, the last state on the Mississippi, and California on the Pacific coast was, at the opening of 1861, an undeveloped land awaiting the prospector, surveyor, pioneer farmer, and capitalist. In all the territories combined were not more than half a million people. Over this imperial domain, Indians and buffalo roamed at will, unvexed by the pressure of the white man's enterprise.

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Such was the stage upon which the last scenes in the drama of the movement to the Pacific were to be enacted. Here the frontier, long a striking characteristic of America, was kept open for a generation and then closed for all time. Here the old processes of colonization were repeated but with distinct features that gave a different twist to the story, making it more varied and colorful. With the farmer who again assumed his familiar task came cowboys, miners, cattle kings, Mexicans, Chinese, Japanese, Indian outlaws, highwaymen, female adventurers, and "bad men" playing new

rôles in American history. The Far West soon had mining camps and boom towns as well as prim villages on the New England model—bustling cities putting on the airs of financial centers—princely estates tilled by labor imported, not from Africa, but from Mexico and the Orient, some of them great baronies held by foreign owners—and special industries based on migratory labor, restless and tempestuous. In the Far West, Nordic stocks received their first experience with aridity and large scale irrigation. There vast areas devoted to agriculture were plagued by periodical drouths that brought crop failures, followed by agrarian revolts against the eastern plutocracy, revolts that culminated in populist uprisings in national politics. It was the Far West that yielded to the American pioneer for the first time a rich treasure of precious metals; it was in the Rockies and beyond that the dream of Sir Walter Raleigh's men and John Smith's companions of the seventeenth century was finally realized.

Even the political conditions of colonization were in some respects unique. Unlike the settlers of the Mississippi Valley, the pioneers of the Far West for a whole generation could deal with a lenient body of politicians in Washington who had definitely abandoned the idea of securing revenue from the public domain and were committed to a wholesale free distribution of the land. Under federal patronage, arable soil was now given outright to farmers and capitalists; timber, stone, and mineral grants were sold on nominal terms; the Indian menace was removed by troops paid and commanded from Washington; and means of rapid communication with the two oceans were provided. And after all the territories were erected into commonwealths and admitted to the Union, the nature and disposition of the soil created peculiar relations with the federal government, for at the expiration of nearly half a century at least one-half the land in eleven states—Washington, Oregon, California, Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, and New Mexico—was still held in national owner-

ship; and problems of conservation, reclamation, and administration were being pressed upon Congress and the executive departments of the government. Finally, the immigrants who crowded into the region, with the exception of the Mormons, were not primarily seeking a haven for religious and political liberty or interested in building another New Canaan in the wilderness. Rather were they directly and frankly interested in improving their economic lot—in making money. Some of them found great riches; others comfort; many of them, like the wanderer in Hamlin Garland's tale of the middle border, nothing but a mirage at the end of the long trail.

Innumerable factors, therefore, conspired to give the Far West a singular place in the annals of American culture. In the beauty and majesty of the natural setting and in its types of settlement, it presented amazing contrasts with the relative uniformity of town and country in the Northeast, the serried monotony of the Middle West, and the planting levels of the South. The very magnitude of the theater and the gargantuan shapes of the rocks and hills gave a grandiose flare to the thought and gestures of the people and high pretensions to their oratory. Torrential rushes to the mineral fields, to the rich arable lands, and to the luxuriant timber resources produced varied social groupings unlike those left in the wake of the advance into the Mississippi Valley. In the process novel modes of conduct were evolved; throughout immense areas, where the population was thin and the yoke of law sat lightly on every shoulder, the primitive instincts of an adventurous people, tinged with anarchy, found free play, providing shooting affrays, robberies, murders, as daily diversions. In the frenzy of speculation let loose by miners and prospectors and in the swift acquisition of fortunes effected by the hurried partition of the federal domain, the construction of railways, and the opening of new mineral deposits, breaking all precedents, the whole continent was agitated from axis to periphery.

In many ways a new tone was given to American nation-

ality by this last westward movement. A dash, verve, and flourish, supposed to be appropriate to the life of the "Wild West," became the symbols of all America in the eyes of those who hankered after the bizarre. Stories of stage-coach and conestoga wagon robberies, bad men and coarse women, Indian massacres, and sudden riches poured from the pens of facile writers and were sold by the millions. A whole generation of boys was brought up on the deeds of Wild Bill, Buffalo Bill, and other heroes of the Nick Carter and Diamond Dick library. A quarter of a century later the moving picture carried on this entertainment, providing for a sober and industrious multitude the vivid reproduction of life on a surging, drinking, fighting frontier. Thus in fiction and in film, business enterprise advertised to the world a passing phase of sectional development as the typical product of American culture. In fact, laying out homesteads on the plains, driving cattle from Texas to Montana, wielding the pick and shovel in mines and on railway embankments, and cooking in tents, huts, and shanties were the modes by which the Far West was subdued; but, offering tamer themes for the romancers, they received little attention save at the hands of a few realists.

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Control over the territorial prize of the West had hardly passed definitely to the Republican leaders in 1861 when the government at Washington undertook the task of developing its holdings. Every year of the decade which opened with Lincoln's first election witnessed some important action designed to draw the region into closer relations with the Union and promote its interests. In 1861, telegraphic communications were established with the Pacific Coast, Kansas was admitted as a state, and the Colorado, Nevada, and Dakota territories were organized. The following year, 1862, Congress, no longer hampered by fearsome slave owners, passed the Homestead Act offering

free farms to all adult citizens and to aliens who had filed their declaratory papers, thus in effect inviting the laborers of the Old World and the farmers and mechanics of the East, women no less cordially than men, to come and share the bounties of nature, and setting in motion a swift partition of riches which, before twenty years had elapsed, transferred over fifty million acres from the national domain to private ownership.

Forty-one days after Lincoln signed this sensational act came the settlement of another long contested issue, the railroad to the Pacific. Since the very opening of the railway age, statesmen of all sections had grasped the import of a transcontinental system and had discussed with no little acrimony the subject of the proper route. One grand scheme, a Charleston-Vicksburg-San Diego line, promised facilities for the expansion of the planting area. Another project, linking St. Louis with Sacramento by way of Salt Lake City, was especially attractive to miners and the shippers of manufactured goods.

But no agreement on the route could be reached until the Republicans ousted the southern contingent from the federal government. Then, true to their sectional loyalty and interests and under the constraint of necessity, they chose a northern route—beginning at Omaha in Nebraska and running across Wyoming, Utah, and Nevada to California—and by two acts of Congress, the first passed in 1862 and the second in 1864, they conferred lavish grants upon private corporations enlisted for the enterprise. To the Union Pacific Railroad Company, authorized to build the line from Omaha almost to the California border, Congress gave a right of way across the public domain, all the timber, stone, and earth needed for the undertaking, twenty sections of land with every mile of road constructed, and a credit ranging from sixteen to forty-eight thousand dollars a mile, secured by a second mortgage on the completed system. To local corporations organized in California for the construction of the western end, Congress offered similar generous

subsidies, thereby assuring the completion of the project all the way to the Coast.

This magnificent program, advancing so eminently the commercial interests of the Pacific Ocean, cherished by Webster, and bringing appreciably nearer the goal of Asiatic empire eloquently portrayed by Seward in the campaign of 1860, conciliated all elements of the Republican party. It pleased the northern manufacturers, now exfoliating into new life under the influence of high tariffs, for it offered to them in place of the long and perilous voyage around the Horn a more direct route to the trade of the Far West and the Orient. On the completion of the transcontinental railway, as one of their distinguished merchants proclaimed, "the drills and sheetings of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts and other manufactures of the United States may be transported to China in thirty days; and the teas and rich silks of China, in exchange, come back to New Orleans, to Charleston, to Washington, to Baltimore, to Philadelphia, New York and Boston in thirty days more."

The northern course chosen for the Union Pacific was equally satisfactory to farmers because it was to open the fertile prairies of Kansas and Nebraska to settlement and provide an outlet for their grain, pork, and cattle. Miners of the West were likewise gratified by the prospect which promised them an easy channel to eastern markets for their mineral output and cheaper foodstuffs and other supplies in return. To the capitalists who furnished the directive impulse the outlook was especially pleasing because they were called upon to contribute so little money relatively and yet were assured handsome profits from the construction of the roadbed and tracks and from the land endowments accompanying the long mileage. Secretly awarded compensation for their interest, in the form of stocks and bonds, many of the leading politicians who voted for the railway bills also took comfort from the proceedings.

In 1863, the year following the passage of the first Union Pacific bill, Congress created a territorial govern-

ment for Idaho. The next year it gave Montana a territorial status and admitted Nevada to the Union to furnish more votes for the Lincoln policies. Only one more obstacle had to be removed to clear the way for acquisition on a mammoth scale; it was necessary to determine the final position of the Indians in American economy. At that time it seems there were about three hundred thousand Indians in the West. A large district known as the Indian Territory was occupied by peaceful tribes which had been pushed beyond the Mississippi in Andrew Jackson's day; to the north were the Sioux; to the west, the Cheyennes and the Arapahoes; to the south, the Apaches, Comanches, and other minor groups. By the federal government all these tribes were regarded as "nations" and many of them held large tracts of land under solemn treaties duly negotiated and ratified. Living on subsidies from Congress, on the produce of a crude agriculture, and on the wild game of plain and mountain, enjoying nearly half a continent as their preserve, they were on the whole content with their lot; at all events they seldom molested the white pilgrims who crossed their hunting-grounds on the way to the Coast. Such in general was the state of affairs when the Lincoln administration launched its great drive to possess, organize, and develop the West at the opening of the Civil War—the last phase in the long struggle between the white man and the red.

Homesteaders and the prospectors now looked upon the remaining Indian lands, pronounced them good, and from time to time served notice on Washington that "the savage must go." Usually the federal government complied with the lightest demand of the white man for the opening of new regions to settlement. If it delayed a few months now and then, pioneers were likely to seize any coveted district even though the title was solemnly guaranteed to the Indians by treaty. As a matter of fact, therefore, the prime question before the government was one of means: the subjugation of the Indian by the slow process of industry or by the quicker arts of war.

To the political managers in Washington, the conventional resort to physical force seemed the easier way and it was chosen. In the second year of the war for the maintenance of the Union, accordingly, a military campaign was started against the Indians, which lasted for a quarter of a century and ended in the removal of that long-standing issue for all time. It was marked by more than a thousand armed clashes, many desperate and deadly, a few disastrous to federal troops, all pointing pitilessly to the expulsion of the red man from lands coveted by farmers, prospectors, and railway builders. "There are no good Indians but dead Indians," exclaimed General Philip Sheridan, who, after Appomattox, was commissioned to "pacify" a wide section of the frontier. In that spirit no small part of the undertaking was realized. "Many, if not most, of our Indian wars have had their origin in broken promises and acts of injustice on our part," laconically remarked President Hayes in a message to Congress in 1877.

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Since the federal government, even while engaged in a struggle for self-preservation, could find leisure to work out a legislative program for western development and could wage war on the Indians as well as on southern armies, it is not surprising that the energies and resources of private citizens could be enlisted to promote every form of economic enterprise in the Far West. Indeed the civil conflict at once stimulated rather than retarded the exploitation of the empire beyond the Mississippi. The "terrible sixties" of suffering in the East and South were the "roaring sixties" of prosperity in the West. While the war drew its thousands to the battlefields, it also sent thousands on the long trails to the Pacific. In many parts of the country, especially in the border states of Missouri and Kentucky, were discontented people who regarded the war as a folly or had no stomach for fighting or were noncom-

batants harassed by guerrilla bands. To them the distant frontier offered a haven from the turmoil of the war.

So the westward current, instead of diminishing, increased with the progress of the civil conflict. According to estimates, in the single year of 1864, at least one hundred and fifty thousand emigrants fled from the Missouri River country into the Far West, mostly to the mines. In the same year, it is recorded, seventy-five thousand people passed through Omaha on the westward march, taking twenty-two thousand tons of freight, thirty thousand horses and mules, and seventy-five thousand head of cattle.

Under the stimulus of war, the agricultural regions of the West, enlarged by the army of immigrants and enriched by inflated war prices, entered upon an era of booming prosperity. With amazing speed the cultivated area of the Mississippi Valley spread out toward the arid uplands of the plains, pouring millions of bushels of wheat into eastern markets to feed the Union army and to supply the pressing needs of English buyers. Far out beyond the Rockies, the Columbia River Valley teemed with new life. Walla Walla in Washington territory, already a lively trading center, fairly hummed with activity as caravans were being outfitted there for ranches and mining camps near and far, as families seeking homesteads, miners, prospectors, cattlemen, missionaries, and adventurers of every brand passed through it in a steady stream in search of fortune. All the way from Walla Walla to the Pacific Coast could be seen the frames of farmhouses rising on unbroken ground, wagons heaped with wheat and oats destined for the mining camps of California, and cattle wending their way to coastal markets.

To the south the agricultural settlements of the Mormons flourished with increasing vigor on the traffic with the prospectors and miners who poured in an endless procession through Salt Lake City to and from the gold fields. Well supplied with cash from this trade, agents of the Mormon Church carried on their operations unabated during

the darkest days of the war, removing other members of their original congregation from the Missouri region and enlisting recruits in the East and in Europe by giving them the financial aid necessary to reach a haven of peace in Zion.

Even the lure of California gold failed to check the growth of the Mormon settlement. When the young men, naturally dazzled by it, proposed to leave Zion for the mines, Brigham Young urged them to stay in Utah where diversified industry and agriculture offered comfort and security. "In a few years," he argued, "you will be able to buy out everyone who goes to California—tenfold over"—a prophecy strangely accurate, as events proved. Within a short time enormous coal fields were discovered in Utah; silver, copper, lead, and even gold mines were unearthed. Accordingly the Saints, by hard labor, wise economy, and good luck waxed rich and powerful in the tempestuous days between Sumter and Appomattox.

Scarcely less important in an economic sense than the opening of new agricultural lands during the stern days of the war—with its devastating effect on large areas of the South—was the development of western mining. On the very eve of Lincoln's election, the gold fields of California that had poured their stream of wealth into the national treasury for ten years were enlarged by new discoveries. Far and wide in the vast region of mountain and basin embraced between the Rockies and the Coast, as the years flowed on, rich mines one after another were uncovered, stirring even the war-worn nation with sensational reports of fortune piled on fortune. Between 1861 and 1865, the annual output of gold rose from forty-three to fifty-three millions.

To this hoard was now added a treasure of silver, drawn from great beds unearthed in Nevada, Colorado and Montana in the late fifties and early sixties by the prospectors, miners, and promoters who swarmed out in all directions, exploring, washing, digging in a feverish search for wealth.

Every year was marked by increased earnings; in 1860 they wrung nearly a million dollars worth of silver from the soil; five years later their annual findings totaled more than eleven millions. When Lee and Grant made the great peace, there was hardly a spot in the mineral belt that had not been visited, mapped, and described by aggressive fortune-hunters.

As soon as a fresh deposit was revealed by a miner's pick, a rush to it commenced; if the vein was thick enough, a town of wooden shanties sprang up on the site almost overnight. Before the decade of the Civil War had closed, every mountain territory was boasting of swelling populations and metropolitan enterprise. Nevada pointed with pride to her capital, Carson City; Montana to Missoula, Helena, and Alder Gulch, rechristened Virginia City; Idaho to Boise City; and Colorado to Denver. Nothing like the speed of this occupation had ever before occurred on the soil of the New World save perhaps in the mining camps of California in the days of the gold rush. "Only eighteen months ago," wrote a miner in 1863 describing the Alder Gulch district, "this was a howling wilderness. . . . Truly truth is more wonderful than fiction and excels in marvelousness even the Arabian Nights, but truth and the marvelous go hand in hand when Young America finds a good gold gulch."

And in their early days these mining communities were the strangest aggregations of human beings ever brought together on this continent of diversities. It was fortunate for posterity that no less a genius than Mark Twain caught the spirit and drew a picture of the mining frontier. In the autumn of 1861, shortly after his arrival in Carson City, he characterized that wooden village of two thousand souls—and the surrounding regions—in a breath-taking letter to his mother. "This country," he wrote, "is fabulously rich in gold, silver, copper, lead, coal, iron, quicksilver, marble, granite, chalk, plaster of Paris (Gypsum), thieves, murderers, desperadoes, ladies, children, lawyers, Christians, Indians, Chinamen, Spaniards, gamblers, sharpers, coyotes

(pronounced ci-yo-ties), poets, preachers, and jackass rabbits. I overheard a gentleman say the other day that it was 'the d--dest country under the sun'—and that comprehensive conception I fully subscribe to." Later he portrayed the scene, with its actors undisguised, in his incomparable Roughing It.

Among the adventurers who opened and exploited the mineral resources of the Far West were some whose ambitions did not stop at the water's edge. Far to the north beckoned Alaska and American explorers soon answered its call. Though the Russians ruled this distant peninsula when the search for precious metals began in the mountain territories, that fact mattered little to strong-armed miners, following the lure of their craft; and one of these, more imaginative than the rest, Joseph Lane Macdonald, even dared to dream of annexation and a transcontinental railway linked by steamboat connections with Alaska. Transferred by the fortunes of politics to Washington during the stirring times of the war, Macdonald served as chief clerk in the House of Representatives, where he came into touch with men who could, if they would, make Alaska a part of the American estate. Between discussions of news from the battle front, the indefatigable propagandist sandwiched remarks on the importance of adding the new dominion to the American empire and steadily made his way into high circles where the idea was already approved by men of Seward's imperial school.

Out of effort and fortune came the purchase of Alaska just two years after Grant made terms with Lee. "We could have bought a much superior elephant in Siam or Bombay for one hundredth part of the money," groaned a resentful editor. "We have in our grasp the control of the Pacific Ocean and may make that great theatre of action for the future whatever we may choose it shall be," remarked a member of Congress. The victorious party in the Civil War thus bore the western front out on the Pacific to a point not far from the sentinel islands of the Japanese

Empire so recently visited by American gunboats under the command of Commodore Perry.

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With the program of the federal government fully outlined and the economic development of the Far West already in rapid swing, the release of national energies at the close of the war gave a terrific impulse to frontier ventures. The first heavy task was of course the construction of the railways which Congress had duly authorized and in 1866 the drive on the Union Pacific line began in deadly earnest. At the eastern end, great gangs of Irish immigrants and veterans fresh from the battlefields of the South began to grade, cut, and bridge their way across plains, mountains, plateaus, and rivers. At each stage of the progress a movable town was erected, pleasantly dubbed by the workmen, "Hell on Wheels," where an army of cooks, sutlers, harpies, and gamblers assembled to serve, entertain, and fleece the brawny sons of toil. With incredible haste the eastern company carried its track forward across Nebraska and Wyoming into Utah. Simultaneously an army of Chinese coolies marshaled under the direction of California capitalists pressed eastward over towering mountains and yawning gorges across California and Nevada, overcoming physical barriers that seemed insurmountable and finally reaching the upper region of Utah.

On May 10, 1869, the two advancing hosts met at Promontory Point, near Ogden, where their tracks were united with an imposing ceremony. Peace had its victories, no less renowned than war. The last spikes were connected by telegraph wires with leading cities in all sections of the country so that the final strokes of the hammer could convey to the uttermost parts some of the thrilling pride that animated the conquerors of plain, desert, peak, torrent, and ravine. The work that Lincoln had sanctioned was now finished. The age of the pony express, overland coach, and

wagon train had closed. Steam and steel were to master a continent.

Before the work on this central line had been fairly started, projects for three additional railways to the Pacific Coast were afloat. In 1864, Congress chartered the Northern Pacific, under the direction of Jay Cooke, financier of the war, who sold huge issues of securities in America and in Europe to provide the capital for uniting Lake Superior with Puget Sound. Two years afterward Congress authorized lines to the Far South which, later fused under the name of the Southern Pacific, in due course linked New Orleans with San Francisco. About the same time it chartered the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé, projecting a route that finally cut through the center of Kansas, crossed a corner of Colorado, ran through New Mexico and Arizona, and found an outlet at the Pacific.

Endowed by Congress with magnificent gifts of land but given no such assistance in credits as the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific had received, these later companies found the task of financing their schemes exceedingly difficult. Moreover, construction was delayed by the panic of 1873 which temporarily paralyzed capitalist undertakings of every kind. Collapse succeeded collapse; one group of promoters followed another into chancery; and yet defeat was never confesssd. By 1884, there were four railway lines connecting the Mississippi Valley and the Pacific Ocean, opening up the intervening region to settlement and exploitation.

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Before long, however, railway promoters learned that they had built on flimsy foundations. In the very year which witnessed the completion of the three new lines to the Coast, another financial panic sent scores of companies into bankruptcy courts producing a search for more freight and passenger business. With relative ease, the inquiry showed that the western concerns which held imperial domains of

public lands could turn their claims into profitable properties if they had labor to develop their resources—presenting to railway managers the task of securing a closer settlement of the regions penetrated by their lines. The need, once firmly grasped, was answered in a truly American fashion—by an army of aggressive promoters who inaugurated a "boom." Land speculators and railway operators —the Baltimores and Penns of the new day—commenced to colonize on a colossal scale. Widespreading towns were platted on treeless plains that had not a house in sight as yet. Advertising campaigns were organized. Eastern states and the Old World were scoured for settlers to take up federal lands under the Homestead Act or to buy tracts from railway companies or from forehanded real estate agents. Sometimes schemes for the occupation of whole counties were announced in advance and the brave of all nations invited to help realize the paper project with its proposed railway, its towns to be built on virgin prairie, and its farms to be staked out and brought under cultivation.

Among the hundreds of leaders in the westward movement that rounded out the continental domain there was none more forceful or spectacular than James J. Hill of Minnesota, who in later years became head of the Great Northern and allied railway lines. Reared on the frontier, Hill knew its people and its potentialities; and turning to railroading as a business, he early grasped the key to successful operation. Unlike the land gambler in search of instant profits at any expense to his victims, Hill took a long view of things, basing his vision on definite realities: every state should be closely studded with homesteads; all the arable land should be tilled by competent farmers; every facility should be afforded them to help improve their crops and their livestock; and markets should be developed in Europe and the Orient to provide freight for the long haul.

With these ends in mind, Hill set to work to conquer the Northwest. He sent agents into the older states to tell the farmers and their wives of the wonderful opportunities on

the advancing frontier. Warning them against allowing their children to become "farm hands" or factory workers, he urged, as a preventive, migration into the West where rich lands could be obtained so easily. Not content with words, Hill organized excursions and carried train loads of prospective settlers to see for themselves the kind of soil that awaited their plows. "You farmers talk of free trade and protection and what this or that political party will do for you. Why don't you vote a homestead for yourself? That is the only thing Uncle Sam will ever give you." In that vein his publicity men appealed to the people of the East and of the Middle Border.

Tens of thousands answered Hill's appeal. Whole communities of farmers and merchants, hoping for "better luck" in the new country, indicated their desire to migrate to it. Religious congregations sometimes offered to move en masse as in the days of the Puritan exodus from Europe. Whenever a large company of prospective settlers assembled at one place, Hill's agents provided trains of passenger and freight cars to carry the emigrant families with their livestock and household goods to their destination.

After the settlers arrived, Hill did not leave them to shift for themselves. On the contrary, he took a continuous and profound interest in the welfare of every community along his railway lines—in its tillage, ditching, highways, credit facilities, and improved methods of production. Going still further in his imperious dream, he sent representatives to China and Japan to discover what American products those countries might consume and what they had to give in exchange. In line with this interest he established direct steamship communication between his Coast terminals and the Orient, encouraging Japanese railway engineers to buy supplies in America and ship them by his lines.

Through a long and active life, Hill carried on this process of promotion, passing from the primitive stage of frontier society through the pioneer epoch into the age of high finance. All the way from the Dakotas through Montana

and Idaho to the Coast, his enterprises bore fruit in prosperous farms, thriving towns, and great industries. Before he died in 1916, Hill had the satisfaction of seeing the wheatfields of the northwest bound by economic ties to the mill towns of the Old World and the cities of the Far East. What he did with a grand sweep, others accomplished on a smaller scale, giving to the last strong tide of westward migration in the United States a peculiar direction, character, and force.

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Railways and promoters, however, merely accelerated a westward movement that was inevitable and indeed was in progress even while the Union Pacific track layers were grading and driving spikes. At the close of the Civil War, when thousands of able-bodied young men anxious to win economic independence were released from the armies, the federal government encouraged them to go West by allowing them to count their term of military service as a part of the five years' occupancy required for the permanent possession of a free homestead under the act of 1862. From this source the migration into Kansas and Nebraska, which had continued during the war, was especially augmented—now that the strife between slaveholders and free farmers was laid to rest. Within twenty years the population of Kansas leaped from one hundred thousand to a million, an increment greater than that of New England between the landing of the Pilgrims and the eve of the American Revolution. In the two decades between 1860 and 1880, Nebraska's twenty-eight thousand increased to nearly half a million; in 1867 the territory was admitted as a state to the Union.

Before General Grant, the victor at Appomattox, died in 1885, the central frontier had reached its last belt of arable land and had merged into the treeless and arid regions of the plains that sloped upward toward the Rockies. By that time the stream of migration had been turned north-

ward beyond Minnesota into the Dakotas where the rich soil of the Red River Valley lay fallow for the plow. Within a few years more, even the frontier of the northwest had been pushed beyond the fertile regions into the barren lands and forbidding hills that announced the mountain ranges.

In settling the upper reaches of the Mississippi and the Missouri, pioneers from the older states had the help of new racial stocks from Scandinavia, as well as of the Germans who continued to come though after a while in diminishing numbers, and of their Russo-German kindred. The Swedes had first appeared in the New World in a colony of their own on the Delaware founded long before the days of William Penn and all through the succeeding generations immigrants from Denmark, Sweden, and Norway had filtered into the country—in these later years into Wisconsin and Minnesota mainly; but it was not until after the Civil War that their small number became a multitude.

By that time the pressure of population upon the limited agricultural resources of Scandinavian countries had reached an acute stage. A man in Denmark who had enough land to support two or three cows and a horse was considered independent and prosperous while tenant farmers and day laborers of Norway or Sweden who netted fifty or a hundred dollars a year were deemed among the fortunate of the earth. Even the grassy walls of the fjords were close cropped by hungry herds, the daring goat was hoisted or lowered to little niches of grass that could not be reached in any other way. Evidently conditions were ripe for another Viking movement, not to conquer the towns of England or the fair lands of Normandy, but to occupy by peaceful penetration wide-stretching prairies of virgin soil beyond the Mississippi River.

News of opportunity in America had already reached Scandinavia through the letters of forerunners in Wisconsin and Minnesota when the signal for a general exodus was given by the restoration of peace in 1865—a signal which started a migration so enormous that it frightened the

Scandinavian governments. Within one generation, Norway lost a larger percentage of her population to America than any other Old World country save Ireland alone. One-third of Denmark's Icelandic subjects crossed the Atlantic in search of fortune. Before half a century had passed, the Scandinavians in the United States were equal in number to one-fourth the combined population of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.

By use and wont these new stocks were well fitted to occupy the upper Mississippi country and build prosperous communities there. They were skilled in agriculture and forestry; they were hard-working, Puritan in temper, devoted to education, and frugal in habits. Accustomed to the cold climate of northern Europe, they did not quail in the stinging blasts of the American northland. Before the railways offered them easy transportation, they advanced on western Minnesota and the Dakotas, pressing upward into the Red River Valley where the trappers of the Hudson's Bay Company were making their last stand. By 1870, there were more than two thousand farmers in the valley, announcing the doom of the fur monopoly in that region. With astonishing energy the Scandinavians then spread out in all directions, seizing every opportunity to develop the resources at hand. They fished in the Red River, contrasting it no doubt a bit ruefully with the salt waters of the North Sea where their ancestors had plied that trade for a thousand years; they worked on the flat boats carrying hay and grain to market; they hauled their produce to shipping points in wagons, picturesque like the carts of Peking; they established tiny trading towns here and there in the forests and on the plains; as lumberjacks they cut and hewed timber for houses and barns.

Though their life in the New World was hard, their labor brought material rewards which, in comparison with their meager earnings at home, seemed riches indeed; while some amassed millions from crops grown on their broad acres. In an appealing vignette Henry Goddard

Leach has etched the life history of a family of Norwegians that garnered a fortune from the golden grain of the Red River Valley. The father was a bronzed pioneer of the frontier; the mother came to America "a Valkyrie in a red bodice and a black shawl with the bright mountain bloom of Norway on her cheeks"—a vigorous couple blessed with many stalwart sons and daughters who bent to heavy work with strong arms and willing hearts. Year after year the family treasury swelled with fresh returns from crops, the old couple retaining the simplicity of earlier days in the midst of plenty, while their grandsons studied at Yale and Harvard and took on urban airs. At the age of seventy-five the woman, then a widow, erect as a Viking still, "great-limbed and competent," though she could count her millions drawn from wheat, proudly wore, even at parties given in her honor, a black shawl such as she had when she came in the steerage more than a half century before.

Within twenty-five years after the passage of the Homestead Act all the best land between the Mississippi and the mountains, available under that statute, had been staked out and transferred to private ownership, except the rich Indian Territory occupied by red men. Already the longing eyes of a soil-hungry people were turned upon the acres still lying fallow or only half-tilled under Indian ownership. Already a clamor had been heard in Washington for the removal of this barrier to the march of Manifest Destiny. Since, without legal authority, land jumpers had begun to invade the red man's domains staking out homesteads in defiance of the law, the inevitable could not be turned or stayed.

Yielding finally to political pressure, the federal government bought from the Indians a large region known as Oklahoma and in 1889 threw it open to an army of white invaders encamped on the border awaiting the sign to rush in. At the appointed moment a stampede of settlers swept into the coveted region. Within twenty-four hours colonies had risen at Guthrie and Oklahoma City; within ten days

frame buildings appeared; within one year there were churches, schools, banks, newspapers, and with them saloons, "bad men," and reckless women. Having occupied that much of the Indian Territory, the settlers then demanded the rest and bit by bit it was subjected to similar invasions until nothing was left to the former Indian owners save a small strip in the southwest. In 1890, the territory of Oklahoma was organized and the drive for statehood had begun.

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When the combing outriders of the homestead frontier reached the semi-arid borders of western Kansas and Nebraska, a new conflict arose—this time with cattlemen who claimed as their special preserve a vast unfenced domain stretching from Texas to Canada. For many years, without interference from any one, rangers had been breeding cattle in Texas and driving them north with the advancing spring, fattening them for market on the way as they grazed across the plains to ever fresher grass and herbs. Within the twelve months of 1884, for example, nearly a million head of livestock, it is reckoned, were moved to the north by four thousand cowboys. In area the cattle dominion claimed by these nomads embraced 1,300,000 square miles or more than one-third the total expanse of the United States and on its wide acreage huge fortunes were continually made from grazing. There cattle kings and queens flourished, accumulating wealth which enabled them to rival the pretensions of the sovereigns enriched by cotton, gold, silver, and wheat. There immense quantities of beef were produced at a nominal cost, supplying an abundance for the meat-eating American nation and for untold millions of Europe. In short, like railroading and cotton-spinning, cattle-raising had become a staple industry, a formidable vested interest. Now it was menaced by a powerful combination of men who possessed hard fists, weapons, keen

eyes, and political power in Washington, to wit, farmers and sheep raisers.

Both parties to this masterful combination were bent on fencing the plains and making them private property. To the homesteader, of course, fences were necessary as a protection for crops against animals, wild and tame. Similarly the prosperity of the sheep raiser depended on enclosures; Texas steers might defend themselves with hoof and horn against dogs, wolves, and other beasts but sheep needed careful safeguards; moreover cattle in great herds tramped down the vegetation of the plains, ruined water holes, and made great tracts useless for the producers of wool and mutton. Without much difficulty, therefore, farmers and sheep raisers reached a common conclusion, namely, that the free play of the cattle rangers must be reduced to barbed-wire limitations. Hard battles and desperate skirmishes followed their decision but in the end the cattlemen lost the war: their dominion was broken up into enclosures and their grand drive from Texas northward had to be abandoned. Eventually no wild grazing land was left except in the forests and reserves of the federal government.

Even in that last stronghold the cattlemen lost their traditional liberties at the opening of the twentieth century. Under President Roosevelt the national forestry service deliberately favored the settler as against the large stock raiser and, in the summer of 1906 for the first time, cattle and sheep owners were both forced to pay for their privileges on the American public domain. No doubt the new rule was painful to men accustomed to freedom; and in an attempt to regain their old rights, they kept up a running battle with the officers in charge of the federal reserves. Though they never raised the white flag, in the dissolution of their empire that picturesque figure of American romance—the cowboy with his broad hat, his pistols, his lasso, his shining spurs—definitely lost his vocation. Grazing had also become a form of capitalist enterprise.

In place of the adventurer who had rounded up cattle, half for the fun of the game, had come a matter-of-fact laborer, a wage worker, who, in his wildest moments, seldom commanded the imagination required for shooting up a town or the sentiment necessary for yodelling melodies to frightened flocks and herds. On "dude" ranches and at show places in the national parks, it must be admitted, a few gaily caparisoned horsemen tried to maintain frontier appearances but only in fiction did the historic cowboy continue to ride and shoot as in the "good old days." Moving picture stars might make money portraying him to gaping multitudes of many lands—alike in Nara, the ancient capital of Japan; in Oxford, home of the classics; and in Venice beside the storied pile of St. Marks and the Bridge of Sighs. Students of folklore and professors of anthropology might gather up and treasure his yodels, his musings under the starry sky, and his ballads thrown off in lonely hours; but the real cowboy was seen no more in all the land. One more primitive phase of society had passed.

In the same relentless economic process that destroyed the free cattle range, the wild Indian at last disappeared. The warfare of subjugation, begun by the federal government in 1862, was continued for nearly thirty years, accompanied by cruelty, treachery, and injustice on both sides, the white man proving himself on the whole little if any above the red man in morals or humanity. To such a conflict, whatever its merits, there could be only one conclusion. Of course the Indians occasionally won battles that deceived them with hopes; for example in the summer of 1876 the Sioux, angered at the invasion of their Black Hills by prospectors, put on the war paint and destroyed General Custer's command on the Little Big Horn. But such transient victories only nerved the federal authorities for more effective fighting. When in 1886 the Apaches of the Southwest gave up the cause as hopeless, the long armed contest between the European and the Indian for the possession of the American continent came to an end. Even the

recorder with no illusions about "the noble savage" had to draw a black border around that page in American history —that story of one elemental force, the eternal clash of races, illustrating Anaximander's thesis.

While remorselessly closing in on the Indians, the federal government made attempts to work out a system of control that would assure some protection to those who survived the heroic remedy prescribed by General Sheridan. In 1869, upon reading the report from a special committee of inquiry, Congress created the Board of Indian Commissioners charged with caring for the nation's wards, and two years later the practice of dealing with the tribes through the formalities of treaties was abandoned. Pressed by the friends of the red men for more liberal treatment, Congress in 1887 passed the Dawes Act which offered citizenship to Indians and permitted them to take up land in individual holdings, allowing them to merge their race in the body politic. Though many availed themselves of this invitation, the great majority preferred to settle down on government reservations where they were supported in part at least by federal doles; for at any rate life according to that plan, such as it was, offered security and no responsibility.

Three hundred years after the arrival of the white man and the founding of Jamestown, there were probably as many Indians in the area now embraced within the United States as there were when Captain John Smith landed on the shores of Virginia; and the latest census reported an increase within the decade. It is not exactly correct, therefore, to speak of the "extermination" of the red man. Indeed it is doubtful whether the arms and whisky of his white competitor were more destructive than his own diseases, such as smallpox, his tribal wars, his clannish jealousies. Neither Rousseau nor Cooper, in their most restrained moments, came near the realities of the matter —this without any apologies for cruelties inflicted by the rifleman of the frontier, the mistakes of the government, or the rapacities of liquor dealers and land grabbers. Some

things seem to be deeply rooted in the very constitution of the universe.

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When the rangers and the Indians were overcome and deprived of their free dominion, the western pioneer still had contests enough to fill his days with trouble—against his fellow-men and against nature. Angry and incessant were his wrangles with the railway companies which, in several of the western states and territories, held one-third or more of the land under titles acquired from the federal government. In some cases, squatters, anticipating such grants, had settled upon soil afterwards claimed by railway promoters; in other cases, concessions to railways were vague in terms and contingent upon the final location of their lines, thus jeopardizing the farms of homesteaders who had entered their holdings in due form. Disputes arising from such collisions were thick as autumn leaves, crowding the federal land office with claims and counter-claims and the courts with litigation. Whoever lost in a suit before administrative or judicial officials turned to Congress for relief, asking indemnities or compensating favors.

From these appeals sprang repeated debates in the Senate and House, studded with eloquent pleas for the settlers in their struggle against railways. "These citizens are humble," exclaimed James Wilson, of Iowa, stating their case with reference to one issue, "but their rights . . . should be as sacred in the contemplation of the Government as though they were the owners of principalities of lands and millions of invested capital. A government can be as truly great in guarding the comparatively insignificant rights of its humblest citizens as in contests of empire." Another congressman, defending the claims of some constituents against ouster proceedings, hinted that justice was hardly to be expected in the other branches of the government. "When laws are passed for their protection it is meet that those who sit upon the softly-cushioned seats of advantage

should heed these laws—in a contest of abstractions (corporations) and such men. . . . The history of these cases would seem to illustrate the unhappiness of those who do business with a department of chance (Interior) and afterward are so unfortunate as to encounter the over-ruling Providence of that department which alone is a law unto itself (Judicial)."

In this prolonged controversy, both political parties tendered their good offices to voters in quest of relief. "These settlers," lamented a Nebraska statesman, "read the platform of the great Republican party which promised them the earth if they would vote the straight ticket and then they read the platform of the great Democratic party which promised them not only the earth, as the other platform did, but everything over it and under it, and they said: 'We are safe; our friends, the politicians, will take care of us.'" When the politicians did attempt to fulfill their pledges, they usually compensated railways that lost to the settlers, by giving them grants in other places, thus saving them from material damage. Indeed it frequently happened that all parties to hotly contested transactions were gratified with the outcome of their disputes.

On two other counts the western pioneer had quarrels with the common carriers. The first of these related to the lands held for appreciation in price by the railways under grants of apparent validity. Although the companies always sold large areas of their imperial domains at reasonable rates with a view to developing the country along their tracks, they generally retained a substantial portion for speculative purposes—waiting on an unearned increment that would flow from the intensive development of adjoining regions. Naturally the settlers, who bore the brunt of the labor involved in pushing land values upward, looked with some envy upon the corporate beneficiaries, especially after all the choice land available under the Homestead Act was gone. If by any chance therefore a flaw could be found in the title of an offending company, an agitation

was started to annul by judicial or legislative process its unlawful claims. In this way millions of acres were wrested from the railways for entry by farmers and grazers.

If there was no possibility of victory in that direction, the feeling against the railways as landowners could easily be merged in the resentment aroused against them on account of their high rates and their practices as carriers. Accepting the Manchester creed for gospel truth, the railroad corporations, as one of their competent lawyers explained, like other capitalists, "charged all the traffic would bear." Bent upon the profitable business of the long haul, they often refused to build extensions, side tracks, and collateral lines demanded by local patriots, thereby opening springs of ill-will which burdened the politics of western states and territories with interminable controversies and forced the statesmen who managed affairs at Washington to keep a watchful eye on "the demands of the western farmers."

Scarcely less irritating to the possessors of small freeholds were the huge estates of landlords, both American and alien, often secured by fraud and usually held for speculative increments or developed by tenant and wage labor—the alien owners naturally receiving the heavier condemnation because they had no patriotic interest in the prosperity of the West, were actuated by motives purely mercenary, and held areas regal in size. From colonial times Old World capitalists had been accustomed to making handsome fortunes in American land speculation but after the Civil War their avidity was even more marked than in the days of King Charles II. Now besought by American railway promoters to buy blocks of stocks and bonds, they looked into the nature of congressional grants and acquired a lively interest in the general free-for-all distribution of land and resources in the Far West.

"The glittering accounts of our prolific soil and the immense area of our pasture lands," explained a congressman from Pennsylvania, "soon caught the eye of European

capitalists. And our railroad companies with a thrifty purpose of their own stimulated the interest already aroused by free excursions in well-stocked palace cars, by which noblemen and other men of wealth saw the bounteousness of our prairies through the sparkle of champagne and the delicate smoke of pure Havana; and the enormous returns which foreign investors received from their American cattle ranches still further inflamed the cupidity of their countrymen and many others sought these rich fields of gain." By 1884, approximately twenty million acres had passed into alien hands. Lord Dunmore had one hundred thousand acres; Lord Dunraven had sixty thousand; the Duke of Sutherland, who owned so much of Scotland, had nearly half a million acres of American soil; an English syndicate headed by the Marquis of Tweedale had more than a million and a half; two English syndicates over seven millions in Texas alone; and a German concern more than a million acres.

In the aggregate the large estates in the hands of American and alien investors constituted at the opening of the twentieth century a huge dominion. Almost one-half the farm land in the Mountain and Pacific states was then laid out in lots of a thousand acres or more, occupied by tenants or laborers; making the absentee landlordism that had plagued Ireland for centuries a familiar thing in an area of the United States many times the size of the Emerald Isle. Throughout wide reaches of territory, something like the plantation system of the Old South was being reproduced in different circumstances, frequently with Japanese and Mexicans as laborers instead of slaves imported from Africa—a method of exploitation which, in its social consequences, approached chattel servitude rather than the freedom of the system obtaining in the Middle West. If after a while the bars had not been put up against Oriental labor, there is no doubt that one of the striking features of civilization in the lower South would have been duplicated in large sections of the Southwest and the Far West;

a minority of whites would have been ruling a majority of laborers drawn from other races not readily assimilable—Chinese, Hindu, Japanese, and Mexican. Unquestionably the exclusion of Orientals slowed down this process but it went forward inexorably, if at a slower pace, as the flood of Mexican Indians rolled over the border and streamed out in every direction.

The forces of nature, no less than the systems of land tenure and tillage, gave a peculiar direction to agricultural development in the Far West. Neither the farmers from the older East nor the immigrants from Europe had ever faced exactly such conditions. In the northern reaches of the Mississippi and Missouri valleys frequent hurricanes spread wreckage in their wake, and blizzards isolated lonely farms for weeks at a time. Often mountains of snow almost buried houses, barns, and cattle pens; in the autumn of 1881, for example, an avalanche of snow, which came down early on the cornfields of North Dakota before the crop could be gathered, held it for months in an icy embrace. In summertime came pests, locusts and grasshoppers, that devastated thousands of acres as if by fire, bringing poverty and misery to prosperous communities.

If insects did not devour or snows cover, droughts were apt to wither and blast the grain in the field. This alternative the pioneers in western Kansas and Nebraska soon learned to their sorrow. When they first entered the lands of the distant plains, a series of unusual rainfalls had given false notions of the weather, but in 1887 the course changed and for several years there was not enough rain to sustain the crops. "Week after week," wrote an eyewitness of one awful summer, "the hot, burning sun glared down from a cloudless steel-blue sky. The dread hot winds blew in from the south. Day after day they continued. All fodder, small grain, and corn were cut short." Economic ruin followed; debts were unpaid; mortgages were foreclosed; men, women, and children were driven homeless out into the world. A wave of agrarian unrest swelled up into the

great populist movement that alarmed political leaders from Penobscot to the Golden Gate.

Beyond the drought-harassed regions of the plains lay arid lands that would yield no crops at all except under irrigation, presenting an entirely new problem to the American farmer. In ancient times, the Indians of Arizona and New Mexico had attacked it by constructing dams and ditches, displaying in their work an engineering skill of high order. Long afterwards, the Mormons in Utah, at first baffled by aridity, took the offensive and mastered it, their irrigation works serving as inspiration to the pioneers about them. When eventually the watered lands of the Mississippi Valley were practically all entered by homesteaders, the oncoming hosts of settlers had to face in all seriousness the task of reclaiming the desert. And they set to work on it with a will. Some ranchers with an instinct for water like that of the miner for metal "located" supplies, sank wells into dry, parched soil and brought forth water that "soused the thirsty desert and turned its good-for-nothing sand into good-for-anything loam." Private capitalists entered the lists, buying up large areas, erecting irrigation plants, and selling their watered lands in small lots at good prices. Joint stock concerns organized by farmers and financed by local resources made successful demonstrations in cooperative irrigation.

Near the turn of the century when the magnitude of the problem was realized, western Senators and Representatives in Washington drew the attention of the nation to the war for the conquest of the desert. In 1895, Congress authorized the transfer of arid lands to the states on the understanding that irrigation projects were to be constructed. Seven years later a program of reclamation under federal authority was sanctioned and the construction of immense works begun. In 1911 coöperation between the national government and the states was inaugurated. Thus by individual and corporate enterprise, by federal and state assistance, millions of acres were redeemed and transformed

into fertile farms for producing hay, corn, fruits, and vegetables. Whole communities were founded on the science and art of irrigation—communities that were as different from the great estates and ranches of the West as from the farming regions of the East.

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Before the restless drive on the agricultural, mineral, and timber resources of the great West had gone very far, local patriots in the several territories started pressure for statehood on grounds not difficult to trace. As long as a region was governed from Washington through officers appointed by the President, pioneers on the spot were prevented from disposing of lands, mineral rights, forests, and water power sites at pleasure and compelled to bargain and truck with politicians at the national capital. In their battles against aridity, alien landlords, cattle rangers, and railways, they had to petition for federal aid through agents who had no votes in Congress; and often for the want of adequate powers they saw victory snatched from their hands by puissant cattle, railway, and lumber kings possessing the ear of the national administration. Such obstacles, they said, put a damper on their prosperity and hindered the development of their resources. In any case the condition was intolerable to them, especially to passionate individuals brought up on the gospel of self-determination. Embittered by experience they resolved to be their own masters.

But resolution was simpler than achievement for there were colossal barriers in the way of mastery. As a rule, eastern investing interests with high risks in the West, fearing the radical politics of the frontier, preferred to operate under the ægis of federal authority rather than to entrust themselves to the mercies of local patriots striving for independence. Railroads, badly stung by the granger legislation of the seventies, had enough trouble on their hands without taking on more state legislatures—and they were

the greatest single force in western politics. Furthermore, the Democrats, suspecting that the northwest, inhabited by men owing their very farms to Republican generosity under the Homestead Act, would support the ticket of that party in all national elections, could see no reason for making a party sacrifice. So the enlargement of the Union halted. Except for Nebraska admitted in 1867 and Colorado nine years later, no new state was organized until the end of the century approached.

Fretted by delays, the people of southern Dakota called a convention in 1885, drafted a constitution, and pressed their claims with vigor. "Every printing press that is whirling to-night," declared a champion of Dakota, "has advertised to the world that you have 600,000 people, over 4,000 miles of railway, over 100,000 farms and happy homes and lowing cattle and mines of precious metal—more and better than all the other territories put together and far in advance of many states. What more does Congress want to know than all this?" The figures were a little high but the argument was sound. Yet Congress hesitated. "We have seen people fighting to get out of the Union," lamented a disappointed spokesman of statehood, "amid the protests of the national government; it is a novel sight to see 500,000 people struggling to get into the Union without being heeded." With equal force the territory of Washington on the Pacific coast could plead for the privileges of statehood; with less justification intervening mountain territories could demand their place at the national council table.

It was only after prolonged debate and much political intrigue that the federal government could be induced to move, and when action came it was in the form of "omnibus bills." In two years, 1889-90, Congress admitted six states —the two Dakotas, Washington, Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming—the last with the innovation of woman suffrage. After the lapse of six more years the Mormons bowed to the necessity of prohibiting polygamy, a requirement im-

posed by national legislation, and were taken into the Union in spite of strong protests from conscientious objectors who held that longer probation was imperative to "wipe out the stain." In 1907, Oklahoma, entitled to statehood on the score of population and economic prosperity, managed to wring that prize from a reluctant Republican Congress; and five years later the last of the continental territories, New Mexico and Arizona, came under the national roof. Thus in the administration of President Taft was finally brought to a close the long process of creating self-governing commonwealths, begun in the days of President Washington.

Before its admission each new western state was required, in accordance with time-honored custom, to present a constitution drafted by a convention representing the local voters. In the main, of course, these new fundamental laws followed the models of older states, offering in only a few cases marked departures from accredited usage. Wyoming went beyond the standards of the time by insisting upon the continuance of woman suffrage established in territorial days; since the feminine voters were likely to be Republicans the innovation was accepted by a Republican Congress with a wink and a nod—to conciliate the region. Oklahoma and Arizona, entering the Union at the time of a Progressive wave, brought the initiative and referendum with them and the latter state, the greater experimenter of the two, added the recall for all public officers, including even judges—after getting safely past the gates.

The assemblies that framed these constitutions naturally mirrored the varied interests of their constituents, with gentlemen of the bar usually at the head of the steering committee. In the North Dakota convention of 1889, for instance, were twenty-nine farmers, twenty-five lawyers, nine merchants, five bankers, three real estate dealers, two publishers, one doctor, and a railroad man. The Washington convention, embracing besides native Americans a remarkable number of Scotch, English, Irish, Canadians, and Ger-

mans, divided according to occupations into twenty-one lawyers, five bankers, six doctors, fifteen farmers, four stockmen, two hop growers, six lumbermen, three teachers, one preacher, one mining engineer, and a few editors, surveyors, and real estate men. In every case the transactions of the constitutional assembly were carefully scrutinized by able counselors for the railway companies having extensive property rights involved in the deliberations. Whole sections of the South Dakota constitution, for example, were framed by a distinguished professor of law in the service of Henry Villard whose large railway holdings and knowledge of the Far West gave him a peculiar interest in the political affairs of that region. Nor was this solicitude without warrant. The haste with which local legislatures began to regulate and tax showed the perspicacity of such general oversight on the part of those whose property was subject to special burdens.

Admission to the Union, in a few cases, heralded a struggle over the location of the state capital. In South Dakota where competing railway lines held large blocks of land, the battle assumed a sensational form. The Chicago and Northwestern, which had extended its lines as far as Pierre, presented to the voters the superlative merits of that particular town as a prospective metropolis. It organized excursions and carried farmers, their wives, children, and "hired hands" to its favorite village. On one such occasion, the little place of two thousand inhabitants had to entertain five thousand guests brought by the railroad company "to view the sights." For months the state indulged in a general picnic while "threshers stood unfed among the grain shocks, plows rusted in their furrows, and the potatoes crowded undug in the hills. Merchants locked their doors and schools closed to permit the people to visit the rival cities." At the close of a lively agitation, Pierre won the honor. The victory was great but the seat of government never showed any signs of rivaling Chicago or New York —at the end of half a century its population was under three

thousand. The number who could thrive on politics alone was apparently limited.

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Besides producing colorful local incidents, the development of the Far West exercised a profound influence on the politics and economy of the entire nation. It bore the frontier, which had been a characteristic feature of American life since colonial times, steadily away from the Mississippi toward the Pacific and finally extinguished it completely. With the movement of that belt line of pioneer farmers engaged in breaking virgin soil, usually poor in earthly goods and in debt for capital advanced to finance the operation, went the political belt line of agrarian unrest, a ferment that was periodically whipped into an explosion by crop failures and business panics. At no time between the Civil War and the end of the century was any administration in Washington able to move hand or foot without considering members of Congress from the Far West, whose constituents, toiling under the open sky, felt that they were bearing American plutocracy on their backs.

To make politics more ticklish, those laborious voters had a representation in the Senate all out of proportion to their numerical strength. Unlike the older middle states, such as Ohio and Illinois, the new commonwealths did not grow rapidly after their admission to the Union; by 1900 nine western states—Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Idaho, Washington, Nevada, Oregon, and California—had fewer than four million inhabitants but nevertheless sent eighteen Senators to the national capital to offset the weight of an identical number from nine industrial states on the Atlantic Coast speaking for twenty-one million people. Nevada with its forty-three thousand had the same voting power in the Senate as New York with its seven million. Had it not been for the fact that in the worst of the rotten boroughs copper, silver, lumber, railway, and cattle kings could usually buy their way into the upper chamber the

western states would have proved still more irritating to the directors of national politics in the age of Marcus A. Hanna.

Hardly less disturbing to the managers of the federal government were the agitations on the western coast that grew out of the conflict between domestic and Oriental labor. The Chinese were the first to bear the impact of the collision with the Nordic. In the days of the gold rush they had come in throngs with immigrants from all parts of the world to seek their fortune in California. Later, railway and mining corporations imported them in large numbers as cheap and patient laborers who did not organize and never struck. To meet this demand the Pacific Mail Steamship Company established in 1866 a regular traffic between Hong Kong and the Golden Gate, deriving a large part of its revenue from the steerage business. Setting an official seal on such operations by a treaty signed in 1868, the Republican administration in Washington, in keeping with the liberal policy recently written into the contract labor statute, authorized the wholesale immigration of Chinese, specifically recognizing their right to come and go at will—to enjoy all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the most favored nation. At the end of the decade consequently there were approximately sixty thousand subjects of the Peking emperor in the region west of the Rockies, nearly half of whom were engaged in industries.

Just as the Chinese were about to settle down to the enjoyment of the welcome extended to them by the government, they became the objects of a bitter attack launched by California workmen aided by discontented farmers, under the leadership of Dennis Kearney, an Irish drayman and orator of undoubted parts. Day and night this intrepid master of invective carried on an agitation of whirlwind intensity, closing every speech after the fashion of Cato with the thunderous command: "The Chinese must go!" Kearney's progress, swift enough without artificial stimulus, was helped by the business panic started in 1873 which sent

multitudes of American workers into the streets to beg for work or bread and also by the local contest then raging between the railway and ranch kings on the one hand and farmers and laborers on the other—a conflict that resulted in the formation of a new and radical constitution in 1879. Not until the federal Congress in 1882 gave heed to the agitation by enacting the Chinese Exclusion law did the storm blow over and the hatred that had flamed out against the Chinese die down. Even then it was not expedient for any candidate for public office or employer of union labor to show too much open sympathy for immigrants from the Celestial Kingdom.

Out of similar social forces sprang a few years later a kindred hostility for the Japanese. Like their Oriental neighbors, the Chinese, they too had been cordially invited by the United States government to settle in America—by Commodore Perry when he forced the gates of Japan with the mailed fist in 1854 and by a special treaty flinging wide open to them the ports of this country. Though at first indifferent to the invitation, the Japanese, near the end of the century, began to take advantage of the proffered hospitality, attracted by the congenial climate of the Coast and by the varied industries adapted to their versatile talents. In 1900, there were about twenty-five thousand Japanese in the continental United States; during the next decade their number multiplied three-fold, owing in a large measure to their extremely high birth rate.

As the representatives of the only non-Caucasian nation on the globe that had been able to hold off the imperial powers of western civilization and defend their own soil against foreign invaders, these later immigrants from the Orient raised again all the issues generated by the Chinese and several in addition. They were more eager to acquire property, more zealous in educating their children, and quicker to resent demands for servility. In such circumstances, Californians reasoned that the Japanese if not checked would, within a relatively short span of time, oc-

cupy a large part of the Pacific slope and, being backed by a powerful government of their own at home, would present grave problems in American local administration, domestic economy, and international relations. Dennis Kearney was dead but there were more leaders, some of them Irish also, ready to take his place and blazon on their escutcheons: "The Japanese must go!"

In 1906, the racial conflict flared up over an order of the school board of San Francisco proposing to segregate Asiatics. Although there were not many Japanese among the thousands of white children enrolled in the local schools, the government of Japan, sensing the discrimination inherent in the regulation, lodged protests at Washington claiming rights under treaties. With an eye to the balance of power in the Orient, President Roosevelt, while sympathizing with the desire of the Californians to restrict Oriental immigration, promptly objected to the school decree and by patient, but firm, negotiation reached a compromise. As a part of this settlement, Washington and Tokyo concluded a secret understanding, known as the Gentlemen's Agreement, in which Japan undertook to stop the emigration of her laborers to America in exchange for a promise on the part of the United States to make no open discrimination against her people. That was in 1907.

If this adjustment relieved diplomatic tension, it did not check the agitation against the Japanese, for a few years later California passed a law forbidding aliens ineligible for citizenship to hold land anywhere in the state. In vain did Roosevelt's successor in the White House, President Wilson, stand out against this law in the name of international harmony. Besides rejecting advice from Washington, leaders in the exclusion movement continued to advance relentlessly, enacting legislation which made it impossible for Japanese adults to acquire land in trust for their children born on American soil and entitled under the Constitution to all the rights and privileges of American citizens. Flushed with local victories, champions of exclusion now de-

manded the abolition of the Gentlemen's Agreement and the sealing of American ports to Japanese immigrants.

To this proposal the Tokyo government objected, citing the bilateral provisions of the compact but offering to make concessions—even to accept a quota arrangement that would admit to the United States not more than one hundred and fifty Japanese annually. Giving no heed to such overtures, Congress in 1924, against the protests of President Coolidge and the Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes, met the call of the Pacific Coast by passing an Exclusion law which placed the Japanese in the same category as the Chinese. "Now," it was said, "the Yellow Peril is laid to rest." And yet the protectors of the white race saw no incongruity between the total exclusion of Orientals and the free admission of more than one hundred thousand Mexican Indians every year, raising a question as to whether after all it was a desire to protect the Nordic stock that primarily produced the drive against the Japanese. In any event the planters of the Southwest and the ranchers on the Coast wanted laborers who were not likely to acquire land, push into business, or organize under the ægis of revolutionary socialism.

With respect to other phases of the labor question, the Far West also presented features not to be found in the eastern sections of the country. In the Coast cities, of course, trade unionism of the conventional type flourished, often assuming dictatorial powers, but on the great cattle, sheep, and fruit ranches and in the mining and lumber camps, laborers worked under conditions so different from those of urban employees and indeed under conditions so different from those prevailing among freehold farmers that a new type of organization arose among them. In ranching, mining, and lumbering industries, employment was more seasonal and fluctuating, utilizing armies of workers at high tension in certain periods and turning them off to shift for themselves in the intervening times. Wages were often low and standards of living unspeakable; while constant mi-

gration from camp to camp, from ranch to ranch, made the normal home life prevailing in other agricultural and industrial communities practically impossible.

Among these migratory workers efforts at union organization and the improvement of hours and wages and conditions of labor by collective effort naturally presented problems of peculiar difficulty. Miners, lumberjacks, and roving harvesters, brawny in frame and accustomed to a life of hardship, were more ruthless in temper and independent of routine habits than the ordinary craftsman of the cities, less interested in the formation of permanent locals, the holding of business meetings, and the creation of enduring ties in harmony with the regular trade union principles.

For these and other reasons, there arose from the peculiar labor conditions of the Far West a type of unionism formed on the radical pattern of the old Knights of Labor rather than on the craft basis of the American Federation of Labor. The new organization was all-embracing in membership, loose in government, supported by stanch individualists usually of ripe American stock and frankly built on revolutionary aims, taking the catholic name of Industrial Workers of the World, a title soon shortened by the public to the I. W. W. In the opening decades of the twentieth century, therefore, the most radical leaders of American labor were to be found in the camps, fields, mines, forests, and cities of the Far West rather than in the cotton centers and steel mills of the East, even though for a brief moment they seemed to be making headway with their form of unionism in the East. At that time, the most lawless conflicts of capital and labor occurred in Idaho, Montana, and Colorado rather than in Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania—a frontier phase of American civilization, perhaps a passing phase.

The development of the Far West after the Civil War did more than raise new problems in politics and labor organization. It helped to effect an economic transformation in the regions beyond the Mississippi. The gold, silver,

grain, and meat that moved eastward and on across the ocean to Europe, in addition to paying off gigantic debts to creditors, brought fresh capital with which to push the exploitation of American resources. With payments made from the riches of the West—especially from its agricultural produce and bullion—the dependence of the United States upon foreign capital, which had been such a striking feature of American economy since Alexander Hamilton's day, was steadily diminished.

In the same process the agriculture of the older East was brought under a severe pressure that drove whole sections of the poorest land out of cultivation, the abandoned farms of New England bearing mute witness to the competing power of western fields. It is true that after the first shock was over, tobacco raising, truck gardening, and dairying made up some of the loss while summer visitors and tourists and "gentleman farmers" who bought up the old homesteads helped to restore life to desolated regions; but the former economic security of well-balanced farming could not be recalled. The same movement that produced such depressing effects on eastern agriculture also contributed to the gradual shift of industrial power into the Mississippi Valley, by inducing manufacturing corporations to discontinue their local expansion in the East and build their new plants beyond the Alleghenies in order to escape the long haul and get nearer to their customers.

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As the star of empire moved with the riding sun, enthusiasts on the western coast began to speak in grand style of the Pacific as the center of the coming civilization. With growing emphasis they repeated the saying that, whereas the civilization of antiquity had flourished on the shores of the Mediterranean and the culture of the modern age on the Atlantic, the future belonged to the Pacific where the oldest and the newest were meeting in trade and eco-

nomic rivalry. Though there was exaggeration in that outburst of anticipation, the development of American interests on the Pacific Coast and in the distant islands of that ocean undoubtedly gave a powerful impetus to all the imperial enterprises of the United States in that sphere. As long prophesied by political soothsayers, the extension of American sovereignty over islands in the Pacific—the Philippines and Hawaii—soon followed the rounding out of the continent, and in a few years more controversies over the Boxer rebellion in China and contests with Russian and Japanese capitalists in Manchuria indicated that Seward's early prophecy might soon be fulfilled. When at length the Washington Conference of 1921 assembled, it was hailed in some quarters as a sign that the supremacy of the Pacific was at hand.

But as a matter of fact that view of the situation was eminently one-sided. Seven of the nine nations that participated in the Washington Conference were primarily Atlantic, not Pacific, powers and the significance of the diplomatic gathering was due essentially to imperial rivalries in which the trade of the Far East was but one factor. In the very year that the Conference was held, "the declining nations of the West" purchased in American markets goods worth five times the commodities bought by all the teeming millions of the Orient combined; even the workmen of war-sick Germany showed on the average a buying capacity ten times as great as the laborious coolies of China. With reference either to economy or culture, therefore, the peoples of the Orient could not by any conceivable operation supplant the Europeans in influencing the onward course of civilization in America. Far from transferring the center of gravity to the Pacific, the rounding out of the American continent really emphasized the closely-knit unity of the world.

## CHAPTER XX

## *The Triumph of Business Enterprise*

THE Second American Revolution, while destroying the economic foundation of the slave-owning aristocracy, assured the triumph of business enterprise. As if to add irony to defeat, the very war which the planters precipitated in an effort to avoid their doom augmented the fortunes of the capitalist class from whose jurisdiction they had tried to escape. Through financing the federal government and furnishing supplies to its armies, northern leaders in banking and industry reaped profits far greater than they had ever yet gathered during four years of peace. When the long military struggle came to an end they had accumulated huge masses of capital and were ready to march resolutely forward to the conquest of the continent—to the exploitation of the most marvelous natural endowment ever bestowed by fortune on any nation.

History was repeating old patterns in a new and more majestic setting. In the development of every great civilization in the past, there had come to the top groups of rich and enterprising business men devoted to commerce, in-

dustry, and finance. The sources of their fortunes varied and their modes of acquisition differed from age to age, but they formed a dynamic element in every ancient society that passed beyond the primitive stage of culture and everywhere they advanced with deadly precision on the classes which derived their sustenance from agriculture. In the documents which record the rise of civilization in Egypt, Babylonia, and Persia and in the trading centers of Tyre, Sidon, and Carthage, the immense operations of business men can be traced, though priests, singers, poets, philosophers, and courtiers were the chief masters of the written word.

Even in Athens, acclaimed the cultural center of antiquity, the directors of trade and industry played a powerful rôle that can be discerned through the thick layers of clerical and classical tradition. With full and sufficient warrant, a competent modern historian, W. L. Westermann, commenting on Alma Tadema s famous painting, A Reading from Homer, remarks that the conception would be equally applicable to the ancient Hellenes "if the roll from which the rhapsodist is reading were a business document; if the subject of rapt attention were the possibility of a profit of twenty-five per cent a year instead of the deep-sounding harmonies of Homeric hexameter."

Nor were the noble Romans from Remus to Cicero merely engaged in demonstrating their excellence in law or their proficiency in arms. Long before the era of the republic had drawn to a close, the forum at the capital had become the center for the greatest network of commerce and finance that the genius of man had yet woven out of economic enterprise. When the ears of antiquarians are correctly attuned, they can hear the clank of the money-changer's metal above the measured periods of Marcus Aper, Cicero, and Julius Secundus. At the opening of the Christian era, the Appian Way was lined by banking houses which carried on transactions with Athens, Alexandria, and every important city of the republic—then slowly changing

into an empire while still paying homage to its ancient constitution. Wide spaces of the Forum and halls of official buildings were crowded with *publicani* and *negotiatores* chaffering, haggling, and closing deals.

The former, the publicans, hated of the populace, did business with the state and made their fortunes in political undertakings. They lent money to the government in times of necessity, collected taxes in the provinces on a contract basis, and constructed the highways, aqueducts, and public buildings which expressed the economic and martial power of an imperial race. As the Roman state had no administrative agencies for executing such projects directly, it let them at auction to companies of promoters headed by the Morgans, Vanderbilts, and Goulds of that period—masterful capitalists whose augmenting riches and luxurious lives shocked stern old patricians drawing meager revenues from estates tilled by slaves. The other leading group of Roman business men, the negotiators, were mainly engaged in brokerage and banking: they accepted deposits, managed checking accounts, sold drafts and bills of exchange on distant cities, dealt in securities, lent money to farmers, merchants, and manufacturers, and carried accounts for the politicians.

In fact the relations between the statesmen and capitalists of Rome seem to have been more than intimate. Proud members of the old aristocracy, who depended upon their estates for their income, finding it increasingly difficult to keep pace with the rising publicans and negotiators, supplemented their landed revenues by investments in business themselves. They took stock in the contracting companies upon which they bestowed favors as senators and speculated in financial ventures which were contingent upon the fortunes of war waged under their direction.

By the life of Cicero the run of affairs was abundantly illustrated. Though not of blue blood, he was intimately affiliated with the patricians as their orator. Like Edmund Burke, who centuries later served well the English Whigs, Cicero loved lavish living and was always borrowing from

the money lenders. Having the reputation of an honest man according to the standards of the Forum, his influence in the councils of state was enormous, his standing in the market place was good, and his shares in economic concerns both diversified and lucrative. Indeed during the latter days of the Empire, the publicans, money lenders, politicians, and military men had become so closely united that no one could tell where private enterprise ended and the business of the state commenced. By that time the doom of all was at hand.

As medieval civilization rose on the ruins of the Roman system, business men appeared once more at the center of things. The Italian fortunes that fertilized sources of letters and art in Venice, Florence, and Genoa and sustained the Renaissance, which in turn introduced the modern age, were made mainly by trade, barter, and industry. Many a noble plutocrat was created out of the toll taken from the goods of the Orient which flowed through the peninsula on their way to the markets of Lisbon, Paris, Rouen, and London. The Bardis from the banks of the Arno, who financed more than one royal war, were valiant successors of the Roman negotiators on the banks of the Tiber and equally valiant forerunners of the Rothschilds on the shores of the Thames. As Manifest Destiny made its way westward, merchants and manufacturers of the Hanse towns, of France, and of England grew rich from the profits of trade. Sagacious cobblers, astute weavers, and clever tailors, who began in a small way at stalls in the public square, often ended as wealthy and mellow gentlemen in grand establishments surrounded by choice bits of art collected from the treasuries of the known world.

When again a new epoch was opened by mechanical inventions, when Arkwright, Crompton, Watt, and Stephenson turned the medieval civilization upside down, the business man rose to heights undreamed by his predecessors. In medieval cities, as in Rome, he was always conscious of the fact that the barons of the crags looked down upon the

barons of the bags; if perchance an impoverished nobleman married one of his children into a mercantile family, stifling his instinctive repugnance to the alliance by the thought of the economic advantage carried with it, the practise was never regarded as altogether proper in feudal societies.

But in the nature of things the hereditary exclusiveness of the clan could not last forever: the domain of the landed aristocracy was limited—the acreage of a country is fixed—whereas the empire of capital was apparently infinite and birth was no key to authority within its portals. So from small beginnings, merchants, weavers, dyers, fullers, and tailors, incipient capitalists of the Elizabethan age, could develop into the mill-owning and banking magnates of the Victorian age. They bought, earned, intrigued, and forced their way into the aristocracy until that ancient landed class was subjected to the sovereignty of trade.

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Compared with their historic forerunners, the triumphant business men of America had a freer field and a richer material endowment. Their planting opponents were laid lower in the dust by one revolutionary stroke than the nobility of France or the landed gentry of England by the upheavals which had broken their ranks. In the United States, no royal families, no great landed aristocracy, no heavily endowed clergy owned the forests, plains, and mountains where lay the natural resources so necessary to the development of business. More than one-half of the whole area of the country, to be exact, 1,048,111,608 acres, belonged to the government in 1860—a benevolent government in the hands of friends, ready to sell its holdings for a song, to give them away, or to let them pass by mere occupation. The rest belonged in large part to farmers and could be easily bought, leased, or rented for mineral exploitation. So no ancient titles, parchments, and seals prevented an enterprising individual from getting at the

materials for his operations; vast mining royalties did not flow into the coffers of an opposing class to enrich it and give more substance to its power in the state. In short, much of the land for industrial exploitation could be had for the asking or at the price of a little political manipulation; the rest could be obtained in a fairly easy market.

Equally available were willing hands to develop the natural endowment. On the shores of the Old World stood a limitless supply of laborers, reared to manhood and womanhood at the expense of their mother countries, awaiting an opportunity to take part in the American advance; and competing steamship companies were now prepared to bring them across at a mere fraction of the passenger rate imposed by shipmasters in the days of Alexander Hamilton.

The American stage furnished by nature to business men for the fulfillment of their customary rôle was magnificent beyond comparison. Counting Alaska, it embraced 3,600,000 square miles—an area nearly equal to that of all Europe. Within the geographical limits of the domain beyond the Mississippi, the entire Roman Empire, so marvelously described in the first chapter of Gibbon's imperishable work, could be comfortably tucked. The principality of American coal alone included more than 335,000 square miles; under the coal and often beyond its boundaries lay priceless stores of oil. The principality of iron offered treasures of astounding riches in the Pennsylvania, Lake Superior, and Appalachian regions. The principality of copper and precious metals, though not fully explored in 1865, was dimly outlined and its significance was comprehended by those who stood in the vanguard of business enterprise. The principality of timber, covering more than a third of the whole American estate, contained nearly every variety of wood needed for industrial and domestic purposes.

On the border of these principalities and in and out through their confines were waterways opening practical channels of commerce, the Mississippi and its tributaries

alone draining one-third of the continental area. The reaches of the navigable rivers and the shore lines of the Great Lakes exceeded in mileage the ice-free seashores of all Europe; and a coast nearly equal in length, washed by the Atlantic, the Mexican Gulf, and the Pacific offered harbors and bays for ships of every class. And widely distributed over the arable portion of this spacious realm were millions of hard-working farmers exploiting fertile soil and wistfully watching every chance to exchange their produce for the commodities that streamed from mine and forge and loom. Special laws kept foreign ships from the coastwise trade while all around the vast American dominion rose a wall of high protection which sheltered capitalists from the keen and cutting competition of their European brethren.

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With capital at hand, with natural resources to be had for the asking or the taking, with stalwart labor ready for the fray, with a vast domestic market assured, with politicians impatient to coöperate and share the fruits, and unhampered by a powerful aristocracy, lay or clerical, attached to other manners and other ideals, American business men leaped forward as strong runners to the race when the news of Lee's surrender boomed throughout the land. Just how many notables of various degrees took part in directing the exploitation of the continent is nowhere recorded in the census, but above the multitude who worked in the sphere of business towered a few figures as imposing in their day as the barons of Magna Carta, rulers of England in the days of King John.

There are, of course, good grounds for differences of opinion as to the names to be enrolled first in the peerage of the new industrial age; yet none will exclude from it Jay Gould, William H. Vanderbilt, Collis P. Huntington, James J. Hill, and Edward H. Harriman of the railway principality; John D. Rockefeller of the oil estate; Andrew

Carnegie of the steel demesne; Jay Cooke and J. Pierpont Morgan of the financial seigniory; William A. Clark of the mining appanage; or Philip D. Armour of the province of beef and pork. To draw the American scene as it unfolded between 1865 and the end of the century without these dominant figures looming in the foreground is to make a shadow picture; to put in the presidents and the leading senators—to say nothing of transitory politicians of minor rank—and leave out such prime actors in the drama is to show scant respect for the substance of life. Why, moreover, should any one be interested in the beginnings of the house of a Howard or a Burleigh and indifferent to the rise of the house of a Morgan or a Rockefeller?

From a review of the American business peerage, it appears that the eleven men just named had so many things in common that they can be treated collectively. All were of north European stock, mainly English and Scotch-Irish; Gould alone, according to Henry Adams, showing a "trace of Jewish origin." The old planting aristocracy of the South furnished no major barons of business. Of the group here brought under examination only two, Morgan and Vanderbilt, built their fortunes on the solid basis of family inheritances while only one had what may be called by courtesy a higher education: Morgan spent two years in the University of Göttingen. Carnegie began life as a stationary engineer; Jay Cooke as a clerk in a general store in Sandusky; Jay Gould as a surveyor and tanner; Huntington, Armour, and Clark as husky lads on their fathers' farms; Hill as a clerk for a St. Paul steamboat company; Harriman as an office boy in a New York broker's establishment; and Rockefeller as a bookkeeper in Cleveland.

All but Carnegie, who was tinged with skepticism, were apparently church members in good and regular standing. Jay Cooke, his biographer tells us, was "a liberal patron of the Evangelical Christian Church and of those who preached its doctrine." He was a strict and conscientious observer of the Sabbath, displaying during the Civil War a great deal

of anxiety about "the laxity of Lincoln and Grant on the Sunday question." In addition to setting apart one-tenth of the profits from his business for charitable uses, Cooke gave bells, steeples, organs, Sunday-school books, rectories, and silver communion services to churches, while bestowing generous subsidies on deserving ministers—at least until he was overwhelmed by bankruptcy. He taught a Sunday-school class at great personal sacrifice and, although he disliked ritualistic controversies, was loyal to the Episcopalian Church unto his death. His faith he summed up in the words: "We must all get down at the feet of Jesus and be taught by no one but Himself." Rockefeller was a no less active and devoted member of his church, the Baptist denomination. Armour gave liberally to a non-sectarian Sunday school. Hill, though a Protestant, settled more than a million dollars upon a Catholic seminary because he thought the papal organization best fitted for the task of bringing immigrant workingmen under civic discipline in America. "What will be their social view, their political action, their moral status, if that single controlling force should be removed?" he once asked in cautious tones. Morgan seems to have been reticent on religious as well as other matters but his semi-official "Life" shows him contributing generously to the Episcopalian Church of which he was a consistent member.

Those leaders in the new capitalist baronage who were eligible for military service seem to have been alike also in their relation to martial glories. If none of them was a theoretical pacifist or lacking in affection for the national cause, none, for one reason or another, was found in the ranks of the Union army in the fateful months when Lincoln and Grant were saving the republic. Three—Cooke, Huntington and Vanderbilt—all born in 1821, were mature men when the first call for volunteers was issued and perhaps felt handicapped for military service by age. Harriman, then but thirteen years old, was too young for the warrior's life. Hill was ineligible on account of his defective

vision. Carnegie, Armour, Clark, Gould, Rockefeller, and Morgan, though born in the thirties, found services in other spheres more to their taste than carrying the sword or musket. Armour was merchandising in Chicago when Grant started his drive through the shambles of the Wilderness and he made his great "killing" by selling pork "short" on the strength of his faith in the indomitable hero of Donelson and Vicksburg.

Above all else, the new economic barons were organizers of men and materials—masters of the administrative art—who saw with penetrating eyes the wastes and crudities of the competitive system in industry and transportation. Possessed of a luminous imagination they could think imperially of world-spanning operations that lifted them above the petty moralities of the village-smith or of the corner-grocer. In coöperation with tireless workers in science and invention, they wrought marvels in large-scale production, bringing material comfort to millions of people who never could have wrung them barehanded from the hills and forests. "Two pounds of ironstone mined upon Lake Superior," to use a single illustration, "and transported nine hundred miles to Pittsburgh; one pound and one-half of coal, mined and manufactured into coke, and transported to Pittsburgh; one half-pound of lime, mined and transported to Pittsburgh; a small amount of manganese ore mined in Virginia and brought to Pittsburgh—and these four pounds of materials manufactured into one pound of steel, for which the consumer pays one cent." With natural pride did Andrew Carnegie, the recorder of this achievement, put it among the wonders of the world. Compared with the complicated Pittsburgh operation, the deeds of the pyramid builders—who merely commanded under the lash armies of slaves to drag by brute force huge blocks of stone into one enormous pile—sink into banalities, inviting respect neither for the intelligence displayed nor for the object in view.

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In four great provinces bound together by ever-constricting ties of federation—manufacturing, extractive industries, transportation, and finance—the leaders of business enterprise, sustained and assisted by a host of liegemen, marched from victory to victory in the decades that followed the triumph of Grant at Appomattox. Statistics but dimly shadow their progress. In 1860, just a little more than a billion dollars was invested in manufacturing and only 1,500,000 industrial wage earners were employed in the United States. In less than fifty years the capital had risen to more than twelve billions and the number of wage earners to 5,500,000. During the same period, the value of manufactured products had leaped to fourteen billion dollars a year, fifteen times the total at the beginning of the epoch. The output of American iron and steel—that measure of modern power—was, in 1870, far below the tonnage of England or France; within twenty years the United States had outstripped them and was pouring from its forges more than one-third of the world's total annual supply. The iron crown, as Andrew Carnegie said, had been placed on the brow of Pennsylvania.

With a stride that astounded statisticians, the conquering hosts of business enterprise swept over the continent; twenty-five years after the death of Lincoln, America had become, in the quantity and value of her products, the first manufacturing nation of the world. What England had once accomplished in a hundred years, the United States had achieved in half the time.

In this development industry had moved swiftly through three stages. The little old-fashioned mill on the river's bank turned by a lumbering water wheel, marking the first step in machine manufacture, had given way to the immense plant driven by engines or turbines of gigantic power. Then in turn the isolated establishment under the ownership of a single master or a few masters had surrendered to the corporation. At the end of the century three-fourths of the manufactured products came from factories owned by as-

sociations of stockholders; in each great industry was a network of federated plants under corporate direction; by 1890 combination was the supreme concept of the industrial magnate. Oil products, iron, steel, copper, lead, sugar, coal, and other staples were then in the hands of huge organizations that constituted, if not monopolies, efficient masters of their respective fields. During the following decade, the work of affiliation went forward with feverish haste, culminating in the billion dollar United States Steel Corporation of 1901.

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Since generalizations about the barons of capitalist enterprise give but a pale and colorless picture of their cyclopean operations, one concrete and detailed analysis seems worth a volume of miscellanies. And the best example of all is offered by the oil business, for in its development is illustrated in clear and vivid outline the whole gigantic process—industrial, political, and legal—which followed the overthrow of the planters and revolutionized the heritage bequeathed by Washington, Jefferson, and Jackson. In the unfolding of this single industry, we see modern science, invention, business acumen, economic imagination, and capacity for world enterprise at work creating material goods and organizing human services to supply not only every nook and cranny of this country but the uttermost parts of the earth with useful commodities of a high standard.

In the record of this industry lies the story of aggressive men, akin in spirit to military captains of the past, working their way up from the ranks, exploiting natural resources without restraint, waging economic war on one another, entering into combinations, making immense fortunes, and then, like successful feudal chieftains or medieval merchants, branching out as patrons of learning, divinity, and charity. Here is a chronicle of highly irregular and sometimes lawless methods, ruthless competition, menacing intrigues, and pitiless destruction of rivals. Private companies organize

armed guards and wage pitched battles over the possession of rights of way for pipe lines. Men ordinarily honest are seen slinking about in the cover of night to destroy property and intimidate persons who refuse to obey their orders. Agreements are made with railway companies to obtain secret rebates on shipments of oil and, what is more astounding, rebates on the shipments of rival concerns. Newspapers are purchased; editors are hired to carry on propaganda and to traduce respectable citizens whose sole offense is the desire to handle an independent business. The most astute counsel, occupying conspicuous positions in public service and social esteem, are employed to sustain the rights of defendants in litigation.

In the same chronicle, the relations of economics and politics are unfolded. The sources of attacks on trusts are exposed. Combinations and their enemies are seen operating in legislatures and courts, drawing lawmakers, governors, and judges into one structural pattern. Bribery, intrigue, and threats are matched by blackmail until the closest observer often fails to discover where honor begins and corruption ends. Public policies, lawmaking, and judicial reasoning become unintelligible except in relation to the interests of oil producers, shippers, and refiners.

Meanwhile, as this running warfare goes on from year to year, the production, refining, shipment, and selling of oil concentrate in the hands of one gigantic combination. Legislatures assail it; courts declare it dissolved; but its economic power is steadily augmented. And all through this drama, from the start, dishonesty, chicane, lying, vulgarity, and a fierce passion for lucre are united with an intelligence capable of constructing immense agencies for economic service to the public and a philanthropic spirit that pours out money for charitable, religious, educational, and artistic plans and purposes.

Like all other great American industries, the oil business had its small beginnings, its day of romance, its period of consolidation and regular routine. Long before 1850, "rock

oil," as it was known, had been found in various parts of Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Ohio, and the region now embraced in West Virginia. Sometimes it appeared on the surface of streams and creeks; sometimes it broke into wells driven to tap supplies of brine for the manufacture of salt. At first oil was sold as a medicine, those who put it on the market having the temerity to say that, taken in liberal doses, it was good for "cholera morbus, liver complaint, bronchitis, and consumption." By chance or experiment, one of the vendors, Samuel Kier, who had a bottling plant near Pittsburgh, found his medicine also useful as a lubricant and luminant and, after having a sample studied by a chemist in 1849, commenced to refine crude oil by the process of distillation.

Attracted by an advertisement of Kier's medicine, G. H. Bissell, Dartmouth College graduate, wandering teacher, and journalist, had some of it analyzed independently by Professor Silliman of Yale. Receiving favorable reports on its value for lighting and lubrication, Bissell turned to the art of promotion, interested some capitalists in a speculative venture, and in 1854 organized a company to begin productive operations. With these preliminaries out of the way, the corporation leased land in northwestern Pennsylvania and sent its representative, Edwin Drake, a former clerk, express agent, and railway conductor, to sink a well on the property. Amid the amused pity of the local wisemen, Drake commenced his labors near Titusville and day after day worked on his "folly," as they named it, until at last late in August, 1859, while John Brown was gathering the forces for another "folly" at Harper's Ferry, Drake struck oil on his own.

Those who had watched with laughter now began to applaud and then to lease land themselves in the surrounding region while the whole East was set aflame by a frenzy almost equal to the gold fever that had swept through the country ten years before. Farmers, who had been wringing nothing but a scanty living from the soil with their

gnarled and knotted hands, suddenly found themselves millionaires, with town houses, bank accounts, bonds and stocks—and culture. A country doctor, who gave up pills for oil, drew a fortune of $1,500,000 from a single well. Prospectors, investors, workingmen, speculators, gamblers, and women of easy virtue rushed into the enchanted kingdom. Towns sprang up like magic. The hills were dotted with derricks. Fields, roads, and grass were splashed with oil. Backwoods trails were crowded with swearing teamsters hauling barrels of the precious fluid to the railways and to flatboats on Oil Creek, which carried it to Pittsburgh by way of the Allegheny. In short a novel and powerful economic force was released in the world of business enterprise.

Owing to the play of many factors, the oil industry was highly dynamic. In the first place, the supply of raw material fluctuated widely, for it cost but a few thousand dollars to drill a well and the operation might yield a million dollars worth of oil—or nothing. If a gusher was tapped, it might deliver thousands of barrels every day for weeks and then suddenly dwindle to a trickle or even dry up completely. Thus as the old fields were exhausted, additional sources were hunted with hysterical energy. The same uncertainty permeated the business of refining—a simple process involving no immense and expensive machinery and permitting individuals with little capital to push their way into the trade. Hence competition in refining was keen and variable, keeping the whole industry in a constant flush of speculation. Oil was twenty dollars a barrel in 1859 and fifty-two cents in 1861; it was over eight dollars a barrel in 1863 and under three dollars two years later. And in spite of these oscillations, the industry was rapidly expanding. The domestic demand continually mounted and by 1871 the oil men were sending one hundred and fifty million gallons abroad: to Europe, Egypt, Syria, India, the East Indies, China, and South America. To meet the increasing orders for deliveries, the number of refineries multiplied at Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Philadelphia, and New

York, cities favorably located for selling and shipping but remote from the fields, thereby creating a huge carrying business which augmented the cupidity of the competing railways to the point of open violence.

Early in the stages of this remarkable development, the genius of the new industry entered the arena—John D. Rockefeller, son of a farmer, born in Richford, New York, in 1839. While yet a boy, he was taken by his father to a farming community in upper Ohio where he received the bare rudiments of formal education. At the age of sixteen, after tramping the streets of Cleveland many weary hours in search of work, young Rockefeller found a position as clerk and bookkeeper at an initial salary of $12.50 a month, a princely income which enabled him with his thrifty habits to pay his board and save money. Having accumulated some capital, he embarked in 1858 in the produce commission business and, all during the Civil War, remained at his desk adding to his tiny fortune as the price of commodities soared with the demands of the government.

Cautiously branching out in 1862 Rockefeller invested some of his savings in oil, in a Cleveland refinery, and three years later when the battle-scarred veterans who had fought under Grant and Lee were making their way back to their homes or their ruined fields, he organized an oil concern of his own. These efforts crowned with success, he then helped to establish in 1870 the Standard Oil Company, an Ohio corporation, with which were associated two other men famous in the kingdom of oil, H. M. Flagler and S. V. Harkness.

By this time Rockefeller was well started on his dominating career—a thrifty, silent, tireless worker at the oil industry. With unrelaxing scrutiny, he watched every department of the business to ferret out waste and inefficiency, to improve its processes, to effect economies, and to enlarge its sphere. He made no display of wealth for a long time and took little part in the political and social affairs of Cleveland. Apparently he had but one consuming passion

—organizing the oil industry and reaping his reward. To accomplish his purpose he could be as suave and compromising, as hard and relentless, as informed or as forgetful, as occasion necessitated.

When Rockefeller entered upon his career with the Standard Oil Company, the industry was in one of its periodical depressions: the prices of kerosene were falling, refineries were multiplying, and ruin was staring the weaker operators in the face. With a view to eliminating just such accidents of fortune, a group of men at this juncture set about stabilizing the whole business by bringing it under the "South Improvement Company," a mysterious corporation founded on the authority of a charter bought from a defunct concern in Pennsylvania. To this maneuver Rockefeller's own relations were shadowy. Once he swore that he was not a member of the Company but shortly afterward he swore that he was; his name appeared on its records as a stockholder and there was other evidence that he was active in the enterprise.

At all events, the corporation managed to unite a number of Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and New York refineries in a federation and then arranged a secret plan with the Erie, Pennsylvania, and New York Central Railway managers for rebates on its oil shipments—a scheme requiring all the carriers to return to the Company $1.06 out of the $2.56 charged per barrel for hauling crude oil to New York, $1.06 on every barrel sent by its competitors, and similar drawbacks on shipments to other points than New York. No doubt the conception was Napoleonic and if it could have been realized, rebates alone would have brought in $6,000,000 a year; but unfortunately for the officers on the bridge, the ship could not get under weigh. As soon as the increased freight rates were announced, producers of the oil district, in a towering rage, organized and declared war on the South Improvement Company. A congressional committee characterized it as a "gigantic and daring conspiracy" and the Pennsylvania legislature, aroused

by popular indignation, was forced to annul its curious charter.

Defeated in his first grand plan for organizing the oil industry, Rockefeller went about his purpose in a more circuitous way, using the Standard Oil Company, of which he was the driving genius, as the instrument for his proceedings. Within a few months after the South Improvement Company lost its charter, he made a compact with the New York Central for secret rebates—a structure of freight rates which he readily extended to other lines. From time to time, these agreements were interrupted but insistence on such favors continued to be a part of the systematic policy of the Standard Oil Company. Occasionally there were no rebates; frequently they were high and yielded immense profits.

Having established among the railways its right to special privileges, the Company then began to buy out competitors under propitious conditions. By the close of 1872 it had acquired nearly all the refineries in Cleveland, twenty out of twenty-six. In 1874, it secured control of the Warden Refinery in Philadelphia, the Lockhart concern in Pittsburgh, and the Pratt interests in New York. The next year a Central Association of Refiners was formed with Rockefeller at the head. In 1876, the Harkness plant in Philadelphia passed under the Standard Oil yoke, followed in 1877 by the last adversary in Pittsburgh. Meanwhile the argus-eyed Company had got control of its rivals in the oil-producing districts and in the city of Baltimore. In other words, before it was ten years old, the Standard group had possession of the refining field. Independents there were still, struggling along against adversity, but the Standard's holdings and its railway connections made it the master of the industry.

At this point the business of transporting oil became the next link in Rockefeller's administrative chain. The barreling and shipping of crude and refined products had been from the beginning of course an important factor in the

industry and in its early phases a number of concerns specializing in that operation had appeared—some independent and others affiliated with railways. Generally speaking, all had gone merrily enough until 1876 when the Empire Transportation Company, closely associated with the Pennsylvania Railroad, found its customers dropping off as they were absorbed one after the other into the Standard Oil federation and sought to recoup its losses by investing in independent refineries with a view to controlling their shipments.

When this new combination rose above the horizon, Rockefeller protested vigorously against the union of shipping and refining. In a cavalier manner, he told the directorate of the Pennsylvania Railroad that it would get no more Standard Oil freight until it broke with its Empire confederate and he then enlisted the Erie and the New York Central railroads in this attack, thereby making the storming party too strong for the adversary. Already half paralyzed by a formidable strike among its employees, the Pennsylvania capitulated in August, 1877, forcing its ally, the Empire Transportation Company, to sell out to the Standard Oil Company. The objection which ran against a combination of shipping and refining evidently did not apply to refining and shipping.

This specter had hardly been laid when another broke in upon Rockefeller's peace, namely, the independent pipe line to the Atlantic Coast. In 1878, the Tidewater Company began to pump oil over the Alleghenies to Williamsport, announcing to producers that oil could now be carried to the seaboard for about sixteen cents a barrel as against $1.25 or $1.40 by rail. In reply, the Standard Oil group secured a right of way from the Bradford oil field to Bayonne, New Jersey, organized the National Transit Company, and acquired by purchase a large block of stock in the competing Tidewater concern. With two weapons in hand, it finally got complete control over its rival in 1883 and then having a new outlet to the sea eliminating dependence upon the

railways, it spoke to their managers in more magisterial tones. If they did not come to terms, oil could be carried without them.

Having secured for all practical purposes control over the transporting and refining business, the Standard Oil concern now pushed forward with great energy the work of perfecting its selling system. For this purpose the country was laid out into districts and subdistricts; companies and individuals were selected to undertake the distribution of oil; cities, towns, villages, and hamlets were covered by an immense network of agencies. In technique and management, the system became a model for all captains of business enterprise. The ideal, generally realized in practice, was to deliver goods of a standard quality promptly to merchants and consumers as ordered, while making desperate and unremitting efforts to kill off competitors and maintain prices at a level yielding enormous profits. Whenever necessary, rates were cut until competitors were ruined; then raised to recoup the losses. With the same remorseless precision, devices of doubtful legality and questionable morality, including espionage and intimidation, were used to compel merchants to sell only Standard oil.

While control over selling was being pushed to the very door of the consumer, a similar dominion was carried back into the extraction of crude oil. In 1887, the Standard group entered the drilling and pumping field on a large scale and after that date steadily extended its authority over oil lands and leases, until within ten years it was practically master of the oil business from the well to the lamp. And within this economic kingdom, its services to the public were immense and efficient, its administrative organization marvelous in structure and performance, its earnings as high as the managers cared to make them. No competition worthy of the name remained to reduce prices, and the consumers, incapable of organization themselves, lay at the mercy of the Standard Oil satrapy.

In the expansion of its business, the Standard Oil system

grew to unwieldy proportions, taking the form of a loose federation grouped around the original company as the owner of the controlling interest in all affiliated plants. An awkward arrangement, requiring the direction of widely scattered subsidiaries from a single center, it naturally produced a dispersion of forces and a great deal of friction, especially since the major portion of the stock was held by about fifty individuals. Obviously a closer organization was prescribed by the canons of efficiency, if nothing more, and this centralization was finally effected. In the transaction, separate Standard Oil corporations were formed in the strategic states and then fused into one grand combination by placing all the shares of the various concerns in the hands of nine trustees who in turn issued trust certificates to the respective holders and took over the management of the entire enterprise. Such was the nature of the Standard Oil Trust formally created in January, 1882, bringing the direction of an enormous economic empire under the authority of nine men, among whom Rockefeller was the first consul.

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It is impossible, and it would be unjust, to attempt to characterize by a phrase the business methods of the Standard Oil group. For many of the evil deeds laid at its door, it disclaimed responsibility, declaring that its agents had showed excessive zeal or had violated their instructions. As to many acts only inferences could be drawn. When, for an example, armed thugs assailed the workmen of an independent pipe line company, the assumption usually was made that the assailants did not act without motive or direction; but it was one thing to assume, another thing to prove, and a nice problem in ethics anyway to render a just judgment in a baronial epoch when physical force was a normal part of high business procedure. Only one case of this nature ever came to trial in the courts, the famous Buffalo case of 1886, and it ended in a divided verdict: two men con-

nected with a local Standard Oil subsidiary were found guilty and three representatives of the Trust, indicted in connection with the crime, were cleared of all complicity. The evidence in the case revealed a sordid story from which neither side emerged with any credit; and the historian of the distant future will probably call it a case of the kettle and the pot.

Whatever the merits of the leading actors in this particular affair, many counts in the indictment of the Standard Oil group as a community and as individuals were well established. It did receive rebates from time to time on its own and on its competitors' shipments of oil; it did crush out by methods none too delicate its rivals and adversaries; its agents did resort to espionage and intimidation in destroying opposing concerns; its high spokesmen either lied deliberately or suffered from deficient memories on various stands; it had prominent politicians on its pay roll as counselors; and it contributed heavily to party campaign funds. On the other hand it was constantly assailed and blackmailed by men whose motives were no better and whose principles were no higher than its own.

By reason of the general animus in her remarkable account of the Standard Oil Company, Ida Tarbell is partly responsible for the distorted view of its history mirrored in the popular mind. Her record is a drama with heroes and villains, rather than a cold and disinterested summary by an impartial student. In her first chapter she draws a picture of upstanding and adventurous American citizens developing the resources of the oil district, building homes for themselves and their families, erecting altars for the worship of God, establishing schools and hospitals, and founding happy and prosperous communities. Then the villain comes upon the scene stealthily and under the cover of darkness to bring ruin and desolation. "Life ran swift and ruddy and joyous in these men. . . . They would meet their own deeds. They would bring the oil refinery to the region where it belonged. They would make their towns the

most beautiful in the world. There was nothing too good for them, nothing they did not hope and dare. But suddenly, at the very heyday of this confidence, a big hand reached out from nobody knew where, to steal their conquest and throttle their future. The suddenness and blackness of the assault on their business stirred to the bottom their manhood and sense of fair play, and the whole region rose in a revolt."

But in depicting the contest between the upright, God-fearing oil heroes and the wicked oil villain, Miss Tarbell incidentally portrays the former as reckless in their methods, wasteful in their operations, and contemptuous of moderate profits which other men in business would have been glad to earn. She shows that they were willing at almost any time to make terms with the Standard Oil group as against the public and failed not because their system of morals was different but because they were unable to hold their bargains on account of treacherous defections in their own ranks. Again and again they sought to keep up the prices of crude oil by curtailing extraction, and, for the purpose of intimidating independents who insisted on drilling and pumping in times of over-production and low prices, they resorted to tactics certainly as reprehensible as those employed by the villain in the play. "Men who appeared at church on Sunday in silk hats, carrying gold-headed canes—there were such in the Oil Region in 1872—now stole out at night to remote localities to hunt down rumors of drilling wells. If they found them true, their dignity did not prevent their cutting the tools loose or carrying off a band wheel."

In the end the failure of the producers to cope with the Rockefeller interests was due to no lack of will but to their own incapacity—their inability to restrain their profit-taking instincts and to maintain a producers' combination equal in strength to that of the refiners. One of their own number, after battling for years in their behalf, spoke of them as "a cowardly, disorganized mob." Some of their leaders, no doubt, assumed heroic proportions but the ques-

tion may well be asked: "Would the public, the politicians, and the consumers have been more fortunate in the hands of a grand consolidated producers' union composed of Miss Tarbell's heroes than under the imperial sway of the Standard Oil Trust?"

In this stirring contest between major and minor barons over dominion in the kingdom of oil were revealed the processes of American politics as well as the nature of the economic drama. From its very inception, the Standard Oil group encountered investigations and hostile legislation, injunctions and judicial orders, lawsuits and prosecutions. As soon as the South Improvement Company embarked upon oil in 1872, it faced an attack in the legislature of Pennsylvania, directed by independent producers, and lost its anomalous charter—without suffering any material damage. About the same time a congressional committee pried into the case, denounced the Company as a conspiracy—and gracefully withdrew.

Foiled in these attempts to break down the Rockefeller alliance, the oil producers again appealed to Congress in 1876 for an inquiry into the growth of combinations in the refining field. The appeal was heard and an investigation was made under the direction of H. B. Payne, chairman of the committee on commerce, father of O. H. Payne, treasurer of the Standard Oil Company—an investigation which failed to develop any substantial evidence showing irregularity in the methods of the Company. Three years later, the Hepburn commission in New York, acting under the authority of the state legislature, managed to wring from the leaders of the oil industry important testimony as to the extent of their control and the character of their operations—also without any ponderable effect. In 1888, the senate of New York ordered another inquiry into trusts and during the same year the committee on manufactures in the House of Representatives at Washington conducted a searching inquest along similar lines. Ten years later, an industrial commission established by Congress once more

surveyed the ground with thoroughness, filling bulky volumes with their findings.

At first the representatives of the Standard Oil interests either flouted official investigators or treated them with scant regard. Then as time passed, they adopted more conciliatory tactics. They no longer refused to testify before tribunals of inquisition but appeared when summoned and spoke softly under the promptings of cunning and distinguished counsel. For example, when Rockefeller himself was grilled by the New York senate commission on trusts in 1888 he showed no extreme irritation at the interference with his private affairs but amiably remembered or forgot under the guidance of competent lawyers. If the arts of diplomacy failed, his personal adviser, the Honorable Joseph H. Choate, could usually find a refuge for him in the dædalian technicalities of jurisprudence.

Altogether, the numerous legislative inquiries, while producing bales of information on the practical methods of the Oil Trust, had little or no influence on the progress of its business. They harassed its officers but did not impede its development. It would be surprising if the representatives of the industry did not secretly regard these researches as the necessary devices of gentlemen engaged in "playing democratic politics."

Perhaps somewhat more alarming to them was the petition filed in the Supreme Court of Ohio in 1890 by the attorney-general of the state, David K. Watson, asking for a dissolution of the Standard Oil Company on the ground that it had violated its charter in entering the Standard Oil Trust—a suit famous in the annals of American politics, especially because McKinley's manager, Marcus A. Hanna, appeared in the background as a moderating spokesman of the oil interests. The battle, at least to spectators, assumed regal proportions. Powerful attorneys were employed by the Standard Oil Company; Mr. Choate, who had so ably managed the trust investigation two years before, again bringing his genial wits to bear on the strategy of

the litigation. And yet for a moment the state seemed victorious—to the inexperienced eye of the layman. The Ohio court ordered a dissolution of the Trust. But the charter of the Company remained intact and the decree of the tribunal could not be enforced. Supplementary proceedings, instituted to bring about the overthrow of the Trust, dragged through eight weary years—until public interest waned and the case was finally dropped by a capable politician, John M. Sheets, who came to the attorney-generalship at Columbus in 1900.

Though finally successful in the Ohio action, the leaders in oil felt the need of a more elastic organization. Accordingly in 1899, they reconstructed the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, incorporated seventeen years before, by securing an amended charter broad and sweeping in its scope, far outrunning the rights of the defunct South Improvement Company—a legal bull which permitted them to engage in almost any kind of business that pleased their fancy.

Thus equipped in law, the Company flourished and waxed fat under the congenial skies of New Jersey, until 1911 when another wave of anti-trust feeling culminated in a decree from the Supreme Court of the United States ordering its dissolution into constituent elements. Still the New Jersey corporation did not perish; it declared a sixty per cent dividend in 1913 and a 400 per cent stock dividend in 1922. By that time much water had run under the bridge.

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With the high velocity that marked the advance of manufacturing and the extractive industries, the system of transportation passed through many phases during this period. Naturally the first railroad builders had concentrated their efforts on short lines between important cities, such as Baltimore and Washington, Philadelphia and Reading, Boston and Springfield, New York and New Haven; for the prospects of profitable business on such roads were good, the

terrain offered no great obstacles, the capital could be obtained with relative ease. By 1860, nearly all the important cities of the East were connected by one or more tracks and the railway leaders were taking up the next obvious task: that of uniting short lines and forming continental projects. Indeed by that time the chief seaboard cities were already linked with Chicago and St. Louis by various systems and the call for the advance to the Pacific was heard in the land.

This movement the Civil War expedited rather than checked. During the gloomiest days of the conflict, as we have seen, Congress gave a strong impetus to it by authorizing railway companies to bridge the gap between the Atlantic and the Pacific. That undertaking, pushed with lightning speed, heralded still more magnificent adventures. Congress now granted public lands to railway corporations in imperial domains; states, cities, and counties bonded themselves for staggering debts to get rail connections; farmers and merchants along projected lines invested their savings in securities; and European capitalists were induced to take heavy risks. Sustained by lavish financial backing, construction and consolidation swept on at a magic pace up and down the continent.

Fifteen years after the completion of the first road to California, the Southern Pacific had linked New Orleans with the Coast; the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé had united the waters of the Mississippi with the Western Ocean; and the Northern Pacific had cut a path from the Great Lakes to Puget Sound. By 1890, America had 163,562 miles of railways, more than all Europe had and indeed nearly half the mileage of the world. At that date, the nominal capital represented by the business had reached a total of almost ten billion dollars or about one-sixth of the estimated national wealth—easily twice the value of all the slaves on whose labor the planting aristocracy of the South had once built its political power. Moreover the process of consolidation had gone so far that seventy-five

companies, out of about sixteen hundred, dominated more than two-thirds of all the mileage in the country.

Notwithstanding the high degree of concentration thus attained, there was evidently room for still greater confederacies, promising returns still more colossal to their architects. Besides the lure of larger profits, the casualties of competition were driving railway promoters to seek closer affiliations; rate cutting, rebating, and promoters' wars, coupled with periodical panics, had brought financial difficulties even to the strongest lines. Only one American railroad listed on the London Exchange in 1889 was paying dividends on its common stock; within less than fifteen years more than four hundred companies, representing two and a half billions in capital, had perished in bankruptcy.

It was such calamities, no less than colossal ambitions, that moved the empire builders, like Morgan, Harriman and Hill, to attack the problem of unification, thereby opening a new era in transportation. Certainly it was just such economic anarchy that brought the first of these three giants to the conclusion in 1885 that he must "do something about the railroads" and led him in the short space of seventeen years to gather under his control thirteen systems having a mileage of fifty-five thousand and a capital of three billion. With the same volcanic energy and feudal ruthlessness Harriman united thousands of miles under his sovereignty and was in a fair way to encircle the globe when death overcame him. He made his most daring stroke in combining the Union Pacific and the Southern Pacific—more than fifteen thousand miles—and he had his eyes on Siberia when the long shadows closed upon him.

The work of the railway men, like that of the oil magnates, involved political complications; but the former, compelled to deal with organized farmers and manufacturers, were subjected to a control far more stringent than that imposed upon the oil interests. In fact they were harassed almost beyond endurance, so they thought, by the hue and cry of shippers and travelers and threatened on all sides

by prosecutions under the Sherman Anti-Trust law enacted in 1890.

Even Morgan and Hill, powerful as they were, could not escape political entanglements. After effecting a vast consolidation of the Northern Pacific, the Great Northern, and the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy under the Northern Securities Company chartered in New Jersey, they found themselves face to face with the redoubtable Theodore Roosevelt in the White House, a man who genuinely loved a good fight. "If we have done anything wrong," said Morgan to the President, "send your man (meaning Attorney-General Knox) to my man (naming one of his lawyers) and they can fix it up." But Morgan was not now dealing with Grover Cleveland. Roosevelt replied: "That can't be done"; and pressed the suit until the Supreme Court in 1904 by a decision of five to four declared the merger illegal. "It really seems hard," complained Hill on hearing the outcome, "when we look back upon what we have done . . . that we should be compelled to fight for our lives against political adventurers who have never done anything but pose and draw a salary."

Faced always by the danger of dissolution at the hands of the government, subjected to the rule of "reason" in fixing rates, and compelled to deal with national trade unions in arranging wage schedules, promoters and organizers in the railway sphere at length found the range of their activities materially limited. Moreover the collapse of many a grand structure, such as the New York, New Haven and Hartford system, bringing sickening losses to "innocent investors," intensified the rising hostility of the public in every direction and drew the net of official control still tighter. With the pleasures and profits of the game abated and its hazards raised, railway construction and consolidation were brought almost to a standstill.

Yet the evils of disjointed and conflicting lines inadequate to the requirements of national transportation remained painfully manifest—so impressive to the doubting Thom-

ases among manufacturers and farmers that Congress in the Railway Act of 1920 actually sought to encourage more and greater railway federations under government supervision. By that time the capital of the lines, real and fictitious, was set down at more than twenty billion dollars.

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With the consolidation of industries and railways and the necessary financial maneuvers went a fundamental shift of economic authority from promoters to financiers. In the old days of petty industry, the master of each plant extended his operations by means of his savings and profits, supplemented occasionally by loans from local bankers. The latter stood, so to speak, on the edge of the industrial realm; the isolated bank, employing neighborhood savings and deposits, served the isolated plant. In those more primitive times, opportunities for investment were limited mainly to government bonds and the stocks of minor canal, turnpike, industrial, shipping, and railway concerns; accumulations of capital were small and the area of speculation, except in public lands, was narrowly bounded. It was perfectly natural, therefore, that local sovereignty in industry should be associated with states' rights in banking politics; that attempts of Federalists and Whigs to force the barriers of tomorrow by creating a permanent national banking system should be effectively blocked by the Democratic party.

Broadly speaking, such was the state of affairs when the Civil War broke rudely in upon the old order, setting in train forces that changed the face of things within a few years. The very financing of the conflict itself taught countless thousands, through public drives and the ownership of "baby bonds," the mysteries of interest and saving while the profits of war manufacturers furnished vast reservoirs of active capital seeking general investment, thus amalgamating local publics into a national public. Far from

stopping at the close of the military struggle this process was quickened by the sale of securities for the building of continental railways supported by national credit, which in turn paved the way for the sale of securities issued by distant industrial corporations.

As such transactions multiplied and opportunities to amass new capital by the manipulation of paper increased, the New York Stock Exchange raised its economic forum to the position of an all-American tribunal. Thus localism in finance broke down and the banks of the strategic cities, meeting the new demand, began to operate on a national scale, somewhat as the Bank of the United States was operating when destroyed by Jackson's farmer-labor party. It was to their hoardings, to their stock and bond departments, that promoters of railways and industrial corporations now had to turn for assistance; and in the course of time bankers learned that they could in reality become masters of the economic scene—were in some measure forced to assume that rôle. If industrial magnates could visit them, they could pay visits in return. In the exchange of courtesies, it was soon discovered that the weapon of the hour was finance and that the possession of the weapon had passed to the bankers.

With financial control, managerial sovereignty was transferred from the operators of industries and railways to the directors of capital accumulations—a fact illustrated in a striking fashion when Morgan brought about the union of fifteen great railway organizations and created a steamship trust, a harvester trust, the United States Steel Corporation, and numerous other combinations less pretentious in scope. By the end of the century the government of American railways and staple industries, with exceptions of course, had been lost by the men who had grown up in the roundhouses and the mills through all the technical processes. On the whole, the high command in the empire of business was now in the hands of great banking corporations, and captains of industry were as a rule no longer evolved by natural se-

lection; they were chosen by the dominant bankers who served as financial guardians.

And these dominant bankers were so united by treaties of alliance and by conversations, to use the language of diplomacy, that the boundaries of their respective dominions were difficult to delimit. In 1911, Morgan's semi-official biographer, after enumerating the giant banks under his sovereignty, placed his total banking power at more than a billion dollars and the assets of the railway and industrial corporations under his paramount influence at ten billions. About the same time, the authority on trusts, John Moody, recorded that two mammoth financial complexes—the Morgan and Rockefeller interests—had gathered under their suzerainty a network of enterprises which constituted "the heart of the business and commercial life of the nation."

Of course there was always warfare on the borders of this new Roman empire; novel industries were continually springing up with the progress of invention; and minor princelings and earls, as long as they restrained their pretensions, enjoyed a high degree of local autonomy. But new enterprises of any moment found it hard, if not almost impossible, to obtain a foothold without paying tribute to the grand seigneurs; certainly no large issue of stocks and bonds could be floated in defiance of their orders.

By the end of the nineteenth century the hegemony of American financiers was supreme at home and they were ready for foreign conquests. It was in 1899 that Morgan and Company floated the first significant foreign loan ever issued in America, the bonds of the Mexican republic. This was followed in two years by a fifty million loan to the government of Great Britain to help pay the expenses of conquering the Boer republics. Soon after this came another opportunity, the Russo-Japanese War; while the Tsar's agents were begging and borrowing in Paris and London, fiscal agents of Tokyo, in dire straits for money, were copiously supplied by New York banking houses until

the danger point was reached. So American capital contributed to the extension of English supremacy in Africa and Japanese supremacy over Manchuria. A little later with the aid of President Roosevelt, China was forced to grant American bankers a share in a fifty million dollar loan negotiated with Germany, France, and England; the House of Morgan floated it. In the meantime American capital directed by New York bankers poured down into the Caribbean, making smooth the path of American dominion there.

Roads from four continents now ran to the new Appian Way—Wall Street—and the pro-consuls of distant provinces paid homage to a new sovereign. The land of Washington, Franklin, Jefferson, and John Adams had become a land of millionaires and the supreme direction of its economy had passed from the owners of farms and isolated plants and banks to a few men and institutions near the center of its life.

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The methods by which this immense concentration of wealth and power was effected have never been subjected to scientific analysis. With all the endowments for research into everything from plant rust to hookworms, no considerable sum, perhaps for obvious reasons, was ever devoted to a thoroughgoing and dispassionate inquiry into the fundamental economic processes that created modern America —inquiries so essential to the formulation of a sound public policy. Though no balance sheet can be struck at this time, therefore, note may be taken of many factors lying on the surface of the development. For one thing, all the manufacturing operations were carried on behind the walls of a high tariff which protected the profits of American enterprise against the competition of European capitalists. While cheap products were barred, the cheap labor of the Old World poured through the wide open gates to man the mills, forges, and looms, and native labor, unorganized

or but half-organized, was long forced to accept wages determined by highly competitive conditions.

In the next place, the extractive and lumber industries owed a large part of their prosperity to the benevolent paternalism of a government that sold its natural resources for a song, gave them away, or permitted them to be stolen without a wink or a nod. Indeed until the second administration of Cleveland, the public land office of the United States was little more than a center for the distribution of plunder; according to President Roosevelt's land commission, hardly a single great western estate had a title untainted by fraud.

Any one who was squeamish about bald prehension could obtain generous gifts with a show of legality. Within a quarter of a century ending in 1872, the government granted to railway concerns more than one hundred and fifty million acres of public land—an area equal to Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York, with a large slice of Pennsylvania thrown in. During the same period, states, cities, and counties bonded themselves heavily to underwrite such enterprises. To the Union Pacific alone Congress granted a free right of way through public lands, great blocks of land on both sides of the line, and an enormous loan secured by a second mortgage. A chart of the railway land grants in the West looms up like the map of the Roman Empire in the age of Augustus.

To the fortunes made in industries protected by a paternal government and those accumulated by the acquisition of natural resources were added others reaped by manipulations in paper. The watering of stocks, namely, the issue of securities in excess of physical values, early became a favorite device among the lords of business enterprise. On the testimony of Charles Francis Adams, an expert in railway affairs, the promoters of the New York Central injected fifty thousand dollars of "absolute water" into the value of every mile between New York and Buffalo. In

the five years between 1868 and 1872, the share capital of the Erie jumped from $17,000,000 to $78,000,000 and most of the increase was pure fiction. The company that built the Central Pacific made a profit of about sixty millions. The Louisville and Nashville added twenty millions of fiction to its stock in 1880, an example followed by the Boston and Albany two years later. About 1902 the Rock Island Company acquired the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific "capitalized at $75,000,000 and substituted therefor its own stock to the amount of $117,000,000 together with $75,000,000 of collateral trust bonds, secured by the stock of the property acquired." Near the same time sixty million dollars of Alton securities were issued during the short course of seven years "without one dollar of consideration." According to the United States bureau of corporations the stock commission gathered in by the Morgan syndicate for underwriting the Steel Corporation was $62,500,000 in cash value and the tangible worth of the property of the giant concern in 1901 represented $682,000,000 as against $1,400,000,000 outstanding securities.

In several cases the increased earning power of the watered concerns, due partly to higher efficiency, quickly absorbed the shock. But in many conspicuous instances—for example, the New York, New Haven and Hartford, the International Mercantile Marine, the Southern Railway, and the United States Steel Corporation—crashes sooner or later carried thousands of "innocent" investors down to ruin. Completeness in figures is, of course, impossible but beyond all question an enormous proportion of the capital amassed between 1860 and the end of the century represented profits arising from protective tariffs, from natural resources fraudulently or surreptitiously acquired, and from water injected into industrial and railway corporations. It is a commentary on the intellectual life of the time that no scientific inquiry into complex facts so tangent to public policy was ever begun.

Whatever may be said on fine points of legality it is certain that the methods used by the giants of industrial enterprises were artistic in every detail. Undoubtedly in versatility and ingenuity these new lords far outshone the princes of the middle ages who monotonously resorted to the sword, marriage, or poison in the building up of family estates. Related to more complex situations, the modern modes were more varied. If the barons of capitalism did not themselves put on armor and vanquish the possessors of desirable goods in mortal combat at the risk of their lives, they did sometimes hire strong-arm men to help them seize the property of a coveted company; and occasionally they planned real battles among workingmen in an effort to appropriate a railway or pipe line. Usually, however, they employed less stereotyped means to attain their ends; namely, stock manipulation, injunctions, intimidation, rate cutting, rebates, secret agreements, and similar pacific measures.

By a single case of authentic record the martial diversions of the process may be illustrated. In the late sixties Jay Gould and Jim Fisk of the Erie started a war on a neighboring barony—to get possession of the Albany and Susquehanna Railway. Through a clever stratagem they drove the coveted line into bankruptcy and Fisk took a gang of Bowery toughs to a stockholders' meeting in Albany to close the deal. When Fisk reached the head of the stairs leading to the board room, the doughty president of the endangered railway knocked him down to the ground floor, and his army of retainers, frightened by this unexpected display of physical energy on the part of a high railway officer, fled from the scene in disorder. Dazed by the sudden onslaught, Fisk himself was seized by one of the company's men masquerading in the garb of a policeman and taken to a police station.

Defeated in this turn at open diplomacy, Gould and Fisk thereupon declared war, issuing a challenge which was accepted by the lords of the Albany and Susquehanna. Fisk

opened the fray. Putting a brigade of fighting men in charge of an Erie train, he sent them full steam on to the rival line for the purpose of confiscating its rolling stock. On the other side, the Susquehanna company, after waving in the face of the enemy a judicial order obtained by J. P. Morgan, turned to counter-violence, dispatching a train load of men at top speed down the track to meet the invaders. When the two engines collided with a terrific impact, bands of workmen leaped from the cars, marched on each other in close array, and waged a pitched battle in the darkness of the night.

At this point the majesty of the commonwealth being defied, the governor of the state intervened. Then under martial law, the disputed line was wrested from the grasp of Fisk and Gould and leased to the Delaware and Hudson, sending the stock of the company, which had been selling as low as eighteen, all the way to one hundred and handsomely rewarding those who had labored for the grand seigneurs of the Susquehanna.

Less entertaining but more imperial in its range was a contemporary operation in transcontinental railway politics, known as the Credit Mobilier scandal. After Congress authorized the Union Pacific line, a construction company, called the Credit Mobilier, was formed, mainly among Union Pacific stockholders, and given the task of building the railway at a profit estimated at from ten to twenty millions. Although the shares of the railway company, according to acts of Congress, were to be sold for cash at par, they were in fact handed over to the construction ring at about one-third their face value in exchange, not for money, but for road-making at handsome prices.

Beyond all doubt, this was high finance with a vengeance and rumors of the fancy "killing" made in the transaction were not long in reaching Congress. At length when some prying statesman stirred restlessly, Oakes Ames, a member of the House of Representatives and a leader in the railway enterprise, fearing unfriendly legislation, began a "back

fire" in a tactical war of defense. As a part of his program, he had Credit Mobilier stock transferred to him as trustee, saying to his colleagues in the business that, since he was on the ground in Washington, he could put the shares "where they will do most good to us."

His expectations were quickly realized, many members of Congress welcoming the chance to take part in so great an undertaking, especially as a generous reward followed a display of their interest. All went well until the Credit Mobilier in 1868 "cut a melon" in the form of dividends composed of the stocks and bonds of the Union Pacific, an allotment amounting in cash to nearly $3500 for every thousand dollars invested. The story of this juicy transfer, too good to keep, leaked out filling the air with charges and suspicions and finally in 1872 forcing a congressional inquiry. Besides several other diverting truths, the investigation disclosed the fact that many men of the highest political standing had taken the profitable stock without realizing that they were "guilty of any impropriety or even indelicacy." Still Ames was censured; a Senator from New Hampshire was found guilty of corruption and perjury by a committee of his colleagues; all without making any change in the distribution of the Union Pacific returns.

Indeed any radical alteration in financial policy would have checked railway construction. Risks in those days were large; losses were gigantic; and, taking the bitter with the sweet, the earnings of the railways in 1870, according to Charles Francis Adams, did not run much above a fair return on the actual money put into them. Yet the same authority felt compelled, on a candid review, to say that "every expedient which the mind of man can devise has been brought into play to secure to the capitalist the largest possible profit with the least possible risk." That was natural, if not magnanimous, and revealed the inward spirit of business enterprise.

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The devious operations that went with industrial progress in its normal days were varied by periodical panics which shook the structure of national economy from top to bottom. Such an industrial depression opened in 1873 and lasted for five years. In 1884, came a crash on Wall Street that wrecked bankers and brokers, carried General Grant's publishing house into bankruptcy, and shattered the business of the whole country. Another prolonged and widespread industrial upheaval followed nine years later. The captains of industry, victims of cyclical disasters, evidently could not keep their headquarters in order.

Neither could they adequately feed their armies. Strike after strike, many of them long and bloody, pitched battles between Pinkerton detectives and discontented workmen, clashes between soldiers and employees, and widespread destruction of property periodically disturbed their sovereignty, raising in the minds of anxious observers like John Hay, within a decade of Appomattox, the question whether the republic that had survived the civil conflict was to be destroyed by social wars. Every panic was shadowed by strikes, and Pittsburgh, Haymarket, Homestead, Leadville, and Cœur d'Alene were made significant names in the annals of industrial progress, as important there as many a battle in the records of armed might. In some of these contests loomed labor leaders of high character and great talent for strategy; in others strike directors as reckless and vulgar as Jim Fisk with his diamond shirt studs, his retinue of women, and his bands of thugs; and in a few cases violent men who, when restraints were unleashed, stopped at nothing. The land of rocks and rills, of woods and templed hills, was being shaken by industrial earthquakes—just as Calhoun had prophesied.

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When the twentieth century dawned, the statisticians of the census bureau and the sociologists, in constructing the mathematics of human life, unfolded a story that made the

political rhetoric handed down from the days of the Fathers seem strangely formal and antiquated. They recorded a growth in population unprecedented in western history, passing from thirty-one millions in 1860 to seventy-six millions in 1900, a population exceeding that of England in 1860, France in 1870, Germany in 1880, and standing at last without a peer in Europe save great Russia alone. Hopeful prophets could look forward, as Andrew Carnegie exclaimed, to the day "when five hundred millions, every one an American, and all boasting a common citizenship, will dominate the world—for the world's good."

Statisticians also showed how the United States which, at Webster's death, did not have national wealth equivalent to one-third that of the United Kingdom had in fifty years piled so high its money bags that it could boast of property estimated at thirteen billions more than Britain's fifty-two billions. "The sixty-five million Americans of today," shouted the happy ironmaster of Homestead in 1893, "could buy up the one hundred and forty millions of Russians, Austrians, and Spaniards; or, after purchasing wealthy France, would have pocket money to acquire Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, and Greece"—yes, even Greece, the discus-thrower and all!

The same statisticians revealed a national market extending from coast to coast, surrounded by a wall of protective tariffs, offering to American industrial captains an internal commerce exceeding the combined foreign trade of Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Holland, Belgium, and Austria-Hungary. They then described the new industrial structure itself. In the place of innumerable isolated plants owned by natural persons engaged in competitive production to meet local needs, was exhibited a network of corporations controlling enormous establishments from which issued three-fourths of the annual output of manufactures—indicating that the anarchy of competition was held in check by combinations, conversations, and understandings competent for most eventualities.

Only on one important point were statisticians in doubt. For reasons, not mysterious even to laymen, they could not discover in what shares this immense economic estate was distributed among the seventy-five million triumphant democrats. They could tell how many slave owners there had been in the South at every decade from the founding of the republic to the Proclamation of Emancipation; they could calculate the number of pigs raised for the stockyards; but they did not know how many persons owned the major part of the physical layout of the United States after a century of unparalleled progress. Certainly at one end of the scale were millionaires whose riches would have made the eyes of Crœsus start from their sockets. At the other end of the scale was poverty widespreading and degrading enough to arouse fear among those who scanned the horizon of the long future. Between these extremes was a middle order of prosperous farmers, professional workers, and small merchants larger in proportion and enjoying a higher degree of material comfort than in any other country on the globe.

In the swift transformation of the whole economic order, the very texture of American society had been recast. A rural scene had become urban. On the day of Lincoln's first election, not more than one-sixth of the people lived in towns of eight thousand and upwards; by the end of the century one-third of the people were in centers of that class. Reckoning as rural only those who lived on farms, then less than two-fifths of the people were on the land in 1900. In a word, when McKinley was inaugurated the second time, the day so dreaded by Jefferson had arrived: the people were "piled high up on one another in cities." The area now embraced in Greater New York, which contained a population of less than seven hundred thousand in 1850, had more than three millions at the end of the fifty years that followed. Chicago, a frontier town with a hundred thousand inhabitants in 1860, boasted more than a million when the administration of Roosevelt began. Towns

that had not appeared on the map at all in 1860 or were set down as mere villages—such as Milwaukee, St. Paul, Minneapolis, Omaha, Denver, Portland, Seattle, Houston, and Birmingham—had grown to proportions that would have made Senator Benton exhaust his vocabulary if he had lived to see them.

And in these urban areas, statisticians went on mercilessly to record, was an increasing mass of landless, toolless, homeless people dependent upon the caprices of trade, as Jefferson put it, with nothing but their labor power to sell and hence never far from the gates of poverty. In Manhattan, the heart of Greater New York, more than ninety per cent of the inhabitants lived in rented homes and tenements in 1900; in Boston, Fall River, Jersey City, and Memphis four-fifths of the people were renters; Detroit, standing at the head of cities for its proportion of home owners, could only show a little more than one-fifth of the population possessing houses free from mortgage.

Nor was the home itself always that closed, sheltered, and sacred circle pictured in Godey's Lady's Book. In 1870 fifteen per cent of the women were engaged in gainful pursuits, a proportion which moved up steadily to sixteen per cent in 1880, to nineteen in 1890, and to twenty when the curtain of the century was rung down. At that hour one-third of all the females over ten years of age in Philadelphia were employed away from the domestic hearth; at Fall River more than one-third of them were dedicated to the machine. Evidently swift currents of change were bearing the nation on through the pillars of an unknown future.

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While the industrial structure had sunk its roots deeper into the social order of the Northeast, it had shifted its center of gravity. The old valley of Jacksonian Democracy had become the home of modern capitalism. Of the ten states standing highest on the census returns for the value

of their annual output of manufactured products in 1910, only four, New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, lay on the Atlantic seaboard, while six, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Missouri, were in the region long ruled by agrarians. By that time many a captain of industry beyond the Alleghenies could boast of a private fortune larger than the total stock of the United States Bank, which had been overthrown in 1836 as a terrible "money power." In the region beyond the Mississippi the railway mileage had increased from 1,840 in 1860 to 114,465 in 1910, making the wilderness to which Daniel Boone had fled from advancing civilization in Kentucky to vanish as if in a dream. Like a colossus, machine industry stood astride the continent.

Having swept triumphantly to the Pacific, the industrial system invaded the planting South. If some of the old Bourbons stood wringing their hands around "this once fair temple of liberty rent from the bottom, desecrated by the orgies of a half-mad crew of fanatics and fools, knaves, Negroes and Jacobins," other Southerners, such as Benjamin Hill of Georgia, advanced on the future, demanding that the people forget the dead past, which was largely imaginary at best, and seek their salvation in science, industry, and popular education. After wordy battles and years of hesitation, the advice began to sink in and, once opened, the way was found surprisingly smooth. In many respects the South was in a position more favorable to industrial development than New England. Southern states had at hand unlimited power in the form of waterfalls, an abundant supply of labor unrestricted by state legislation and uncontrolled by trade unions, raw material such as coal, cotton, tobacco, oil, and iron, and a climate as hospitable to man as that of Italy. All that was needed was business enterprise and in time that was supplied.

Under the direction of descendants of old planting families, aided by young men who had made their way up from the bottom and by northern capitalists, many sections

of the South were swiftly transformed into manufacturing districts. Whereas in 1860 cotton spinning was a negligible matter in the southern states, they had in 1880 one-fourth of all the mills in the country; at the end of the next decade their quota had risen to one-half. When the new century turned its first quarter, the cotton states reported that they were doing each year nearly five-eighths of all the spinning in the country. Likewise in the iron, lumber, mining, and tobacco industries and in the construction of railways, the South went forward with a speed that overwhelmed those who still stood around the once fair temple of liberty, thinking of plantations and slaves, Calhoun and Jefferson Davis. So rapid was the stride that all New England became worried by the competition from the land of Washington, Davis, Pinckney, Toombs, and Stephens. Southern statesmen, gray and bent, who had looked upon Grant's victory at Appomattox as marking the conquest of the cotton kingdom by northern capitalism had at last their revanche, but with the sweet the bitter—science, labor agitation, trade unions, radical politics, free thought, and feminism, those corroding forces so menacing to all that was left of the aristocratic order and its clinging culture.

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When near the end of the nineteenth century, watchmen from their turrets scanned the landscape, they saw various visions. Carnegie, announcing his book, Triumphant Democracy, in 1893, joyfully declared that it was written "at high noon, when the blazing sun right over head casts no shadows. . . . There is not one shred of privilege to be met with anywhere in all the laws. One man's right is every man's right. The flag is the guarantor and symbol of equality. There is no party in the state that suggests or which would not oppose any fundamental change in the general laws. These are held to be perfect and differences between parties are limited to questions of their proper or improper administration."

From other angles the view seemed less roseate. The year before Carnegie proclaimed perfection, a million voters set their approval on a Populist platform which declared that America was ruled by a plutocracy, that impoverished labor was laid low under the tyranny of a hireling army, that homes were covered with mortgages, that the press was the tool of wealth, that corruption dominated the ballot box, "that the fruits of the toil of millions are boldly stolen to build up colossal fortunes for a few unprecedented in the history of mankind; and the possessors of these in turn despise the republic and endanger liberty." It seemed that a trial at politics was impending between the party of high noon and a host of doubters. And so it was.

## CHAPTER XXI

## *The Rise of the National Labor Movement*

INHERING in the onward flow of stubborn facts which shook to pieces the planting aristocracy and assured the triumph of business enterprise were the inevitable factors foreseen by southern statesmen—a growing army of wage workers haunted by poverty, an increasing solidarity among skilled craftsmen, and periodical uprisings of labor in industry and politics. While vainly attempting to stem the course of machine production and natural science, Calhoun had warned his countrymen against their fated fruits. "It is useless to disguise the fact," he announced from his place in the Senate while Lincoln was yet a young man. "There is and always has been in an advanced stage of wealth and civilization a conflict between capital and labor. . . . We have, in fact, but just entered upon that condition of society where the strength and durability of our political institutions are to be tested."

Within little more than a decade after Lincoln's death, to be precise in 1877—the very year in which the last northern bayonet was withdrawn from the capital of Calhoun's state

—the social order of the victors was threatened by a violent railway strike stretching from Pennsylvania to Texas. More years rolled on and the Congress of the United States, under the command of labor leaders sitting in the gallery with stop watches in their hands, dictated to the owners of railways the hours of work for their trainmen. And a successor of Thomas Jefferson signed the bill.

The clash of arms started at Fort Sumter compelled the labor leaders, who were directing the trade union movement at the close of the middle period, to make the first in a series of momentous decisions, for the sectional strife had passed from debate to action. As American citizens, they had to choose their cause. Until that hour their sympathies had been on the whole with southern planters rather than with northern capitalists. Certainly the bulk of the mechanics had been enrolled under the Democratic standard.

Beyond all question the officials of the American labor movement, such as it was in 1860, were opposed to Garrison's uncompromising theories of emancipation. Apart from the immediate problems of their respective crafts, those officials were more interested in free land than in the slavery question, moving on to the latter in some cases largely because free land and slavery in the territories had become reciprocally involved. At any rate, during the hectic days that immediately followed Lincoln's election, the leading trade unionist of the time, W. H. Sylvis, head of the iron molders, and many of his strongest colleagues worked for an adjustment that would protect chattel bondage in its existing domain and avoid war by taking the issue out of Congress. When that effort failed, however, and the military struggle actually came, organized labor in the North gave its support to the federal government in a manner fairly ungrudging.

For the workingmen who remained in civilian pursuits, the war raised perplexing economic problems—especially competition and mounting prices of goods. Business enterprise,

quickened into life by the demand for military supplies, called to loom and forge and throttle thousands of new laborers—men and women—from the farms of America and from the fields and shops of the Old World, unorganized, unacquainted with trade union principles, and frequently accustomed to low economic standards. Financing its armies mainly by bond issues and inflated currency, without taking effective action to control prices in any sphere, the federal government allowed the cost of living to shoot skyward like a rocket. It cannot be denied that wages moved in the direction of prices but they lagged far behind and at no time during the armed conflict did they fairly correspond with the level of commodities or place labor in the happy realm of those who gathered great fortunes from the necessities of the perilous hour. If the war assured employment, it also raised the cost of everything the workers had to buy and sharpened their struggle for existence.

To meet a crisis of this kind labor was ill-prepared. In 1861, only a few of the standard crafts were organized into unions, amalgamated on a national scale, able to lay down terms in the market place. More than that, there was among the unions so organized no common association to operate throughout the country, no federation of all organized labor to give solidarity to opinion and power to demands. It was not until rising prices began to pinch severely and the closing of the war began to send wages down, that working people, driven by hardships, commenced to draw together in large bodies. Between 1861 and 1865 the number of local unions multiplied nearly fourfold; at the end of the decade, the number of strategic crafts nationally organized had risen to at least thirty, claiming a total strength of more than two hundred thousand enrolled members.

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From that time forward the history of the labor movement ran parallel in many respects to the history of business

enterprise. With increasing tenacity the work of organizing was pushed through the decades that followed, on the whole with an enlarging measure of substantial results. When the full story of self-government in America is written, reviewing the commonplace no less than the spectacular, pages on the cellular growth of local craft unions will be placed beside the records of town meetings; while chapters on the formation of national labor structures will complement the sections on the origin and development of the federal Constitution. Although the prosaic effort of trade union agents and secretaries did not arouse the interest or the fear evoked by the brusque language and hostile acts of the agitators, it was more significant in fact because it brought about an immense and compact organization of industrial workers capable of supporting their demands by something more potent than words.

Compared with the task of the rich capitalist organizer, that of the labor leader was infinitely severe. The former, in effecting combinations in industry and transportation, dealt with relatively few people and had the assistance of the ablest attorneys, technicians, and editors that the whole country could provide. On all counts the status of the trade union director was decidedly inferior. Often he himself was harassed by the kind of sacrificial poverty that is etched with steel in the early pages of Samuel Gompers' Autobiography; never did he have at the outset a full treasury or the aid of powerful figures from the ranks of law and journalism. If the capitalist suffered a serious curtailment of his income in a panic, the labor leader in his time of crisis usually faced starvation, the deadly blacklist, or prison bars.

Moreover the organizer in the labor world, in marshaling his forces, had to weld together not simply a few stockholders and directors but thousands of people of every race, tongue, and opinion. He could not appeal merely to the investor's instinct of acquisition for, among the masses with whom he dealt, the most active workers were often obsessed

by theories about a social order far removed from the immediate test of dollars and cents. Through the records of the American labor movement during the seventies stalk German refugees, English chartists, Italians of Garibaldi's red-shirt army, Irish Fenians, French communards, Russian nihilists, Bismarck's exiles, and Marxian socialists bent on nothing less than a world revolution, philosophers of every school mingling with those hard-headed craftsmen who were indifferent to utopias and principally concerned with matters of fact—shorter hours and better wages.

Three social groups in the industrial field made the problem presented to labor organizers especially perplexing: women, aliens, and Negroes. Upon the labor of women and children the Hamilton-Webster program for industrial America had largely rested from the beginning. But, tossed from one industry to another with the changing course of business enterprise, women had never been accepted in social fact and economic theory as an integral and permanent part of the machine system either by the capitalist or by the labor leader. The necessity that drove them to the mills had been generally ignored by the philosopher of ethics and matrimony, their industrial occupation regarded as transient, and their proper sphere held to be romantic—husbands, babies, and kitchens. In general, it seemed to be taken for granted that, if women insisted on remaining in industry, long hours and low wages were the unavoidable concomitants of their perversity. Whenever they chafed against their conditions of labor and asked for a more generous consideration, they were likely to be told that a husband or his substitute was the proper provider and that, anyhow, adequate economic independence for them was an impossible ideal. They managed, it is true, to organize unions occasionally, especially in the textile trades, but seldom were their efforts at improving their lot strong enough to command authority in the wages market. And the women themselves, heirs of an older tradition and pitched about in the dissolving forces that destroyed their hand looms and

their village life, could hardly discern on their part any fixed relation to the industrial process.

The confusion brought about by the wholesale movement of women into industry was confounded by the swelling stream of alien immigrants—men and women from almost every country of the globe—that poured into the United States after the Civil War. In two respects the foreigners made the task of the labor statesman working for national organization particularly arduous. They represented many races, divided into factions by long standing grudges and historic wrongs, by diversity of languages, religions, and customs, making it often necessary to form separate locals in each craft for each nationality and to publish the journal of a trade in as many languages as there were races in the industry. If perchance several nationalities were united in a single union, its business had to be transacted and controversies adjusted in a perfect babel of tongues.

In case such obstacles were surmounted, one equally perplexing remained to plague the labor organizer, namely, the practice of importing laborers in armies bound by contract to specified employers, coupled with the reduction of the ocean fare by competing steamship companies which kept the tide of immigration at its flood. When a union successfully organized a craft and struck, either against a wage cut or in favor of an increase, it was comparatively easy for the employer to cable to Europe for a new supply of workers and have them on the spot within a fortnight, if indeed a shipload of competent workers, brought by the latest steamer, did not stand at the moment on the docks in New York waiting for jobs. That a trade union movement was able to get under way at all is a marvel.

A third distracting factor for the labor organizer was the Negroes, northern and southern, all freed at the end of the war from ties of slavery and thrown into competition at several points with white wage earners. Though few of the freed men had ever come into contact with machinery before 1865, many had acquired by hook or by crook some

skill in various handicrafts and it was evident that, with the multiplication of educational opportunities and the removal of apprenticeship obstacles, an increasing number would advance into the mechanical trades. Moreover, owing to the constant dislocation of craft lines by technical changes, Negroes were often able to penetrate into the industrial field through the ranks of casual or semi-skilled laborers. Hence they were an ever present element that could not be ignored in any attempt to control the labor market.

And yet, when trade union organizers came to face this novel feature in the economic situation, they were embarrassed by puzzling problems. On every side they saw white craftsmen, impelled by racial antipathies or a desire to limit the labor supply in their own protection, insisting on the exclusion of Negroes from employment as well as from their local unions, even calling strikes to force the dismissal of colored workers. If, however, Negro laborers, thus subjected to discrimination by the rank and file, were neglected by union organizers, they naturally acquired a still stronger hostility toward the unions and seized with even more eagerness all opportunities to serve as strike breakers and so get a foothold in industry. In the most favorable circumstances, therefore, Negro laborers, especially the unskilled, could not be readily organized and brought into close harmony with the general labor movement.

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It was in the face of such obstacles that American labor leaders undertook to accomplish among industrial workers a solidarity of interest and purpose comparable to that achieved by captains of business enterprise among investors, large and small, through trusts and combinations. Like the creative capitalist, the constructive trade unionist moved from the particular to the general. As the former operated first in specialized fields concerning which he had immediate knowledge, so the latter began by organizing employees in

the particular trade with which he was himself conversant. From this it resulted that the basic cell of each labor structure was the local union of the workers in a single craft, such as a town or district society of cigarmakers, iron molders, carpenters, or printers. Following the formation of basic cells in a given industry usually came a federation of such cells in a national association.

Among all the great crafts, events in detail took much the same course. Forceful leaders appeared; locals were formed, sometimes shattered and then reassembled; federations were built up, often dissolved and then re-formed; battles were fought over hours and wages; journals were published; and common standards were evolved.

Paralleling the craft movement, sometimes cutting athwart it, were efforts to form a single grand society of industrial workers—either by federating existing federations or by drawing into one big union all wage earners without respect to trade, race, sex, color, or peculiar interest of any kind. Although the fusion of so many diverse elements under one emblem would evidently tax the ability of union organizers, the idea of a national movement on some line appealed to their imagination and met their need for cooperation on a large scale in controlling wages. Inspired by this dream of universal labor solidarity, W. H. Sylvis, head of the ironmolders, started on a quest for the successful formula some time before the close of the Civil War. Knowing that the chief industrial centers already had city assemblies composed of representatives from the local unions of the various crafts, Sylvis proposed that these municipal federations be welded into a superfederation under a national constitution. Among his labor colleagues the project aroused high hopes and steps were taken to realize it. It was extensively discussed at many conferences and in 1866 the new organization, known as the National Labor Union, composed of various types of labor associations in addition to trades assemblies, was formally launched.

For six years this National Union weathered a stormy sea while many captains struggled for place on the bridge. A few stalwarts wanted to steer for the well-known port of short hours and high wages for skilled craftsmen but they could not hold their ship to that specific course. At one time the association veered in the direction of the farmers who were founding granges; at another time it lent aid to the woman movement represented by suffragists and leaders among the textile and laundry workers; in 1869 it gave its blessing to a small but determined band of Negroes who were trying to form unions of their own. Even casual observers could see that the National Labor Union, animated by generous social ideals, was finding it hard to decide upon a definite route.

Its difficulties were increased by the refusal of its strongest members to accept the capitalist order as the end of all creation. Sylvis himself, though a strict unionist with a practical mind, was ever casting about for some scheme with which to emancipate labor from the dominion of employers. At one time he thought he had found it in the coöperative society of skilled craftsmen possessing their own plant and operating it under their own management, a solution received with enthusiasm by many of the union men. Scores of such producers' organizations were formed —by ironmolders, bakers, tailors, and printers—only to fail for want of capital, technical direction, and ability to compete with giant industrial concerns already in the field. Besides making these efforts to escape from capitalist control, the directors of the National Labor Union tried to use the government in the realization of their purposes; in addition to many general propositions, they advocated, concretely, the exclusion of Chinese coolies from the country, a universal eight-hour day, and the establishment of a national bureau of labor.

While the leaders in this national organization were fixing their attention on complicated enterprises, the very foundations of their structure were crumbling away. The

city federations on which the National Union partly rested became more interested in local affairs and municipal politics than in vague projects for general improvement. Skilled craftsmen, indifferent to utopias or stung by the failure of coöperation, drifted back to concentration on their own peculiar problems. Turning from platform oratory, practical organizers devoted their energies to directing battles over wages and to holding the rank and file of single trades in line. Gradually the National Labor Union dwindled away until only the reformers and idealists were left. In 1872 it ceased to function even as a body for the formulation and approval of resolutions.

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Just as the National Labor Union was perishing in an unfriendly world, a new type of labor organization, taking the name of the Noble Order of the Knights of Labor, was making ready to enter the national field—an association that had originated in a secret society formed among the garment workers of Philadelphia in 1869. Declaring that open societies of labor had for decades failed to cope with the power of capital, leaders of the Knights decided to create a union which could operate behind the screen of secrecy, binding its members with oath and ritual. "We but imitate," they said, "the example of capital, for in all the multifarious branches of trade, capital has its combinations and, whether intended or not, it crushes the manly hopes of labor and tramples poor humanity into the dust." Fired by their success in Philadelphia, the Knights branched out, organizing local societies in neighboring cities and in 1875 transferring their efforts to the national arena by the formation of "one big union" on principles akin to those expressed by Sylvis. Casting off secrecy at this juncture they frankly announced their purposes.

In the promotion of their Order, catholicity of the broadest kind was displayed by the Knights. They summoned

all laborers, skilled and unskilled, white and Negro, male and female, to band together in a mighty association without distinction of trade, race, sex, or nationality. For reasons of expediency they were compelled to admit trade unions and socialist groups as such to their fellowship; but in managing their own lodges and locals they tried to live up to their universal faith. Their consuming idea was to fuse all labor into a single consolidated mass.

The operating methods of the Knights, like their organization, were modeled in the main on the examples set by the National Labor Union; that is, they resorted to economic pressure in the industrial sphere and to political action in the realm of government. In their economic rôle, they carried on aggressive campaigns for higher wages, declared strikes right and left when their demands were refused and, in the returning prosperity of the late seventies and early eighties, won many notable successes over their capitalist employers. For instance, by belligerent tactics, including sabotage, they were able to bring the powerful Gould railway combination to its knees in 1885 and demonstrate to an amazed country the potency of organized labor. Intoxicated by such triumphs, their leaders came to believe that there were no limits to achievement. Not until they suffered many severe defeats in a falling market did they lose their faith in the invincibility of organization, boycotts, and strikes.

In the sphere of politics, the Knights also had large plans, both immediate and remote. They favored Chinese exclusion, the establishment of state and federal labor bureaus, an eight-hour day on public works, legislation prohibiting the importation of working people bound under contract to specific employers, and other measures conceived in the interest of labor. Supporting these projects by a lively political agitation, they had the satisfaction of seeing many of their demands enacted into law by pliant legislatures.

Then, encouraged by minor accomplishments, leaders among the Knights formulated plans for the reorganization

of industrial society as a whole. They advocated the public ownership of railways, water works, gas plants, and other utilities, the establishment of productive coöperative societies in order to fuse labor and the ownership of capital; they flirted with socialists, greenbackers, populists, and even revolutionaries who talked eloquently about the overthrow of the wages system. By such radical tendencies and by their appeals to unskilled workers, the Knights raised up a host of enemies—capitalists who resented this menace to their mode of production and distribution and skilled workmen who did not want their ranks diluted by casual laborers.

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Among the leaders of various craft unions, opposition to the Knights of Labor made continuous headway, mainly on the theory that the association was doomed by inherent weakness; and, after carefully observing for many years the drift of labor events, two members of the cigarmakers' organization, Adolph Strasser and Samuel Gompers, decided that the time was ripe to attempt the formation of a new national federation. Both Strasser and Gompers were experienced operators in the labor movement, thoroughly familiar with the American terrain and also with the methods by which their British colleagues had recently built up compelling associations. Though not without social theories of their own, though conceding that there was something fine in the appeal for labor solidarity, they urged that working people could not live by discussing utopias alone and they pleaded for a combination of sentiment and substantial considerations in labor statesmanship. Furthermore they had given demonstrations of their policy in their own craft union by choosing a practical and intelligible goal of higher wages and shorter hours, assigning complete authority over locals to the officers of their national organization, increasing the dues of members, and establishing a benefit fund; in a word, by creating an efficient

central government and a prosperous treasury—a system that would hold the rank and file together by tiding its members over strikes and industrial depressions.

With solid results accomplished in a limited field, Strasser and Gompers believed that their policies would afford a realistic basis for a wide and effective labor organization on the national stage. Joined by other labor leaders with similar views and aspirations, they decided to make the great experiment in 1881. In response to a formal call, a conference was held in Pittsburgh which, after due deliberation, undertook to establish the Federation of Trades and Labor Unions of the United States and Canada. In spite of the enthusiasm generated at the moment by the adventure, the Federation, inaugurated with high hopes, languished for want of funds and, some of its promoters thought, on account of the lack of interest among the members in the political demands embodied in its program.

Instead of discouraging its promoters, however, the decline in the strength of their organization moved them to renewed endeavors. In 1886, accordingly, they called another grand convention and succeeded in bringing together a large body of forceful delegates from all parts of the country, including representatives of strong unions not drawn into the first experiment. Now at last, a solid corps of statesmen was ready for business—the men of authority in the great national unions, such as the iron and steel workers, boilermakers, tailors, coal miners, and printers. They spoke for powerful units of industry, each composed of workers in a given craft organized first into locals and then into a national association, forming what proved to be the substantial basis for a vast partnership of labor.

The prime problem before this labor assembly of 1886 was to work out a plan of government which would give sufficient strength to a central agency and yet grant requisite autonomy to each trade. With the experience of years to guide them, the leaders in the conference finally agreed upon a fundamental law for industrial workers. Taking as

their basic unit the national craft union, they formed a super-government for common purposes, a federation in which each affiliated national union of the standard type was given due representation while local or sporadic unions were recognized only in case they were not yet welded into some larger association. Such was the general structure of the American Federation of Labor created in 1886.

In the distribution of powers the new constitution makers, like all statesmen, were compelled to be tender of vested interests. So they left to the individual national union of each craft the right to issue charters to its locals, arrange wage schedules, conduct negotiations with employers, and carry on strikes. To the central association of all crafts were assigned only limited functions, such as helping in the organization of more labor unions, local and national, lending aid and comfort to each division in the conduct of its labor disputes, and watching over the legislative interests of all. Educated by events the delegates did not bind the Federation itself to come to the assistance of any craft by ordering a general strike but left it free to determine the degree and kind of assistance to be rendered to any union engaged in an industrial dispute, according to time, circumstance, and discretion. Thus the framers of the charter of the American Federation of Labor made tangible gains in the direction of unity, avoided too much detail in the constitution of their government, and left many things to the future. One of the leaders in the convention, Samuel Gompers, was chosen first president of the new association and, except for a single year, held that post until his death in 1924.

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Throughout his career as President of the American Federation of Labor, Gompers adhered with tenacity to certain principles laid down in the beginning. Whatever he may have thought about the future of capitalist society—in his early life he had socialist leanings—he made from the

housetops no call for revolution. Practically, he accepted the capitalist order and concentrated his efforts on high wages, short hours, and favorable conditions of labor within its metes and bounds. In short, he sought to make labor a contented and prosperous partner of business in the American system of acquisition and enjoyment.

With a view to advancing this design, Gompers coöperated cordially with the American Civic Federation, an association of business men and professional people, formed in 1900 to promote friendly relations between capitalists and trade unionists and aid in settling specific disputes as they might arise. With the same goal in mind, Gompers steadfastly opposed the endorsement of any revolutionary theories by the American Federation of Labor; whenever the socialists sought to commit it to their program at an annual convention, they were defeated in each passage at arms on an appeal from the indomitable president. "It will divide us over mere theory and display our weakness at the polls" was the burden of an argument so realistic that no passionate fervor for reform could overcome it.

While rejecting socialism and independent political-party action Gompers did not, however, ignore the rôle of the state. On the contrary the American Federation of Labor, like every other strong economic group, had a program of legislation which it proposed to realize by the ordinary means of citizenship. It pressed its measures upon the attention of the country, urged them upon legislative bodies, supported individual candidates who favored them, and assailed candidates who opposed them; but it never sought to form a class party designed to capture the government. Pragmatic in its views, it adopted the policy of rewarding friends and punishing enemies, on the theory that a few thousand voters, easily mobilized and shifted from one candidate to another, were more powerful in politics than a million or two separatists formed into a minority party of their own.

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Based upon a closely-knit alliance of craft unions and disavowing all forms of economic radicalism, the American Federation of Labor naturally came into collision with the Knights of Labor. At first the leaders of the two associations thought of coöperation but in practice they found that there was an incurable antagonism between them. The Federation spoke primarily for the skilled trades. The Knights, numbering over six hundred thousand, had within their ranks an army of unskilled workers—the very casual laborers who were always sapping away the foundations of the partial monopoly enjoyed by regular craftsmen, breaking through the rigid apprenticeship system and other restrictions set up by the unions for the protection of their members. "Help us organize the unskilled that we may present a united front to capitalists," said the Knights. "Very good," replied the craftsmen, "but let us proceed along trade lines." For a time conciliatory experiments were made in an effort to blend oil and water but before long the two factions of the labor movement were openly at war.

Losing the support of the better-paid workers who went over to the Federation, the Knights suffered from steadily diminishing financial resources. Their coöperative enterprises failed and with increasing frequency their strikes, waged for the most part by a floating body of workers, came to naught. Forced into competition with the Federation and suffering from structural weakness, the Knights saw their membership fade away until at the end of the century their organization passed into the dusty records of history beside the National Labor Union. Their grand master, Terence V. Powderly, whose very name had once caused investors to shudder, now found a haven in the federal bureau of labor which he had helped to call into being and spent his declining years in the service of the national government, assisting the labor movement from that side in a conservative fashion. Other leaders who had been towers of strength for the Knights in their youth became, in many

cases, agents for the Federation of Labor, a number of women going over with the men.

Though it gained a victory over the rival organization, the Federation by no means had smooth sailing on its own sea. It failed to secure the affiliation of the powerful railway unions and even found difficulty in winning recruits among the skilled workers to whom it especially appealed. In the year of its formation—1886—its membership was reckoned at about one hundred and fifty thousand and when the century closed, its enrollment had little more than doubled. Then things began to move perceptibly. The next sixteen years raised the membership to two millions and brought prestige with power, making the federated forces of the American labor movement at last a formidable factor in industry and politics.

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Keeping pace with the prosaic process of forming local and national trade unions, though often unconnected with it, ran a series of industrial struggles which menaced the structure of the capitalist system and seemed about to fulfill at times the prophecy of the planters that another irrepressible conflict would plague the victors. In 1873, while the hero of Appomattox was still President of the United States, a devastating panic arrived, scattering unemployment, poverty, and bitterness of soul in its wake. Late in the following year the anthracite regions of Pennsylvania were terrorized by crimes of violence which threatened the social order of the state. During the boom which accompanied the Civil War those districts had been flooded by unskilled laborers, many of whom were homeless and reckless characters; and mining had been carried on in feverish haste under conditions that made the lot of slaves on Jefferson Davis's plantation seem pleasant by comparison. Though efforts to organize regular unions with a view to raising standards had failed, secret societies, known as the

Molly Maguires, sprang up in the leading anthracite centers, followed by numerous outrages in which mine owners, foremen, and bosses were cruelly beaten, in some cases murdered in cold blood.

For months this terror reigned, defeating all attempts to ferret out the guilty, until by prolonged intrigue a detective wormed his way into the inner ring, and in 1875 sprang a deadly trap, revealing the operations of the conspirators, and sending several to the gallows and others to prison. When duly unfolded at the trial of the criminals, the story proved to be a curious mixture of industrial strife and private revenge, forming an important episode in the relations of capital and labor, a phase of a raw and unrelieved war over the distribution of wealth, comparable in its lawlessness, though more cruel, to the physical contests that took place between capitalists sparring for supremacy in the early days of oil and railway consolidation.

In the midst of the excitement over the Molly Maguires came a far more ominous struggle—a railway strike that involved more than one hundred thousand workers, paralyzed nearly all the lines between the Atlantic coast and the Mississippi, and reached out into allied industries. This explosion, like the upheaval in the anthracite districts, had been long in gathering and before it was over made manifest all the elements common to modern industrial conflicts. It opened in a determined resistance to falling prices. After the collapse of the war inflation in the devastating panic of 1873, railway companies began to reduce wages by successive orders, ending in the summer of 1877 with a horizontal cut of ten per cent, apparently effected by concert. In connection with the wage reductions, many managers, plainly declaring their intention to smash trade unions, adopted the practice of discharging without ceremony all the men who dared to serve on grievance committees. On the other side, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, founded in 1863, made rapid progress in organizing highly skilled engine drivers and in lining up brakemen, conductors, and

trackmen until by 1875 it could boast of fifty thousand members, a reserve fund of a million dollars, and many a decree dictated to railway presidents in minor disputes.

To the fuel for a conflagration already collected, a match was applied on July 17, 1877, when some employees of the Baltimore and Ohio, having appealed in vain to the company for relief from a cut in their wages, stopped work and called upon their comrades to prevent the movement of trains. Apparently without prearrangement and without any active direction from the officials of the Brotherhood, the strike spread rapidly all over the East.

Cessation of work was followed by the mobilization of the state militia at strategic centers, and the appearance of the state militia was frequently in turn a herald of open warfare. In Baltimore nine strikers and bystanders were killed soon after the soldiers came upon the scene. In Pittsburgh a regular pitched battle was fought; when the militiamen marched into the midst of the assembled strikers, they encountered a resistance which developed into a guerrilla war ending in several deaths and the destruction of the railway station, roundhouses, and hundreds of freight cars, causing losses running into the millions. The striking workmen of Columbus made a tour of the city, using intimidation to close industrial plants on every side. At Buffalo and Reading, skirmishes with the militia resulted in many casualties. In Chicago, where the police tried to break up a meeting of strikers in the streets, an all-day battle took place in which nineteen persons were killed and a large number wounded. When a huge crowd of labor sympathizers jeered and challenged the police in St. Louis, the latter retaliated by arresting all the trade union delegates mobilized at the central labor hall to discuss the situation. Even far away on the Pacific Coast were heard echoes of the strife as workers and vigilant committees came into combat.

For two weeks this nation-wide struggle between strikers and soldiers continued, until finally the militia, supplemented at many points by federal troops, succeeded in getting the

upper hand. The governor of Pennsylvania, for example, by sending a detachment of armed men over the railway between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh and by threatening "a sharp use of the bayonet and musket," set trains in motion to the West. By similar methods in course of time the strike was broken everywhere, forcing most of the workers to resume their places at reduced wages or on the former terms.

This deadly grapple between capital and labor, the most serious and most extensive in the history of the country, exhibited in its progress the gravest aspects of economic warfare. On the one side, the railway managers declared that they would not allow labor to lay down the law to them, asserting that wage reductions were made necessary by the state of business. On their side, labor men replied that they would not submit to dictation by the managers, that their wages were below the point of decent existence, that the railway companies, besides watering their stocks, had been guilty of perpetrating frauds on the public, and that railway directors rode about the country in luxurious private cars proclaiming their inability to pay living wages to hungry working men.

According to a judicious reporter who surveyed the field during this conflict, all the elements usually arrayed against capitalists were found in action: railway strikers, miners, and other industrial workers in various parts of the country whose wages were "oppressively low," trade unionists in general who naturally sympathized with their brethren at war, communists who hoped "for no immediate benefit from the strike unless it should lead to a general social revolution and disruption of property tenures," idle laborers of the tramp class accepting temporary jobs as strike-breakers, and the criminal fringe rejoicing in any disorder offering an opportunity for revenge and robbery. Every engine of agitation was also employed. While the strike was in progress, "knots of men gathered in all the large towns and industrial sections to listen to harangues upon the oppressions of cap-

ital, the social revolution, and the labor republic." At a monster mass meeting held under socialist auspices in Tompkins Square, New York City, on the evening of July 25, eight or ten thousand people cheered impassioned speeches by labor orators; and this was followed the next night by a similar gathering in Cooper Union under trade union management.

In the course of the warfare the public was deluged by propaganda. Whenever a fray ended in bloodshed, the press published charges and countercharges of the kind that have since become familiar items in the records of industrial conflicts. According to the employers, the strikers were guilty of starting each riot. According to the strikers, the blame rested on the militia and the proof lay in the fact that nearly all the deaths were among the ranks of workmen. Popular sympathy for labor was enlisted by pictures of starving women and children. Appeals were made on behalf of the suffering, collections for them were taken at public meetings, and farmers sent food from their fields by the wagon load.

When the awful battle was over, philosophers rushed forward with reflections on the lessons of the day. Conservative capitalists, though somewhat frightened, rejoiced in "the end of trade unionism." Strikers went sullenly back to their tasks. Socialists exulted in the fact that the skirmish had revealed so much revolutionary spirit. As the decade closed, the flames died down, the ashes grew cold, and returning prosperity brought a welcome truce. Other battles came in time but none so widespread in their menace to the American social order.

Later labor disputes were usually confined to a single industry or were localized in one or more districts. And yet, more restricted in area as they were, they were numerous and bitter, ringing out like rifle shots with deadly regularity—to the amazement of those respectable citizens who believed that all the problems of democracy had been solved with the emancipation of the slaves—and occasionally trans-

fixing the nation by ominous bloodshed. For instance in the spring of 1886, the entire country was startled by the news of an anarchist outbreak in Haymarket Square in Chicago. This incident, like most industrial storms, had a long series of events leading up to it. For several weeks regular trade unionists in Chicago had been conducting a verbal agitation for an eight-hour day and a small group of radical anarchists, fishing in troubled waters, had been urging a resort to the argument of the "deed." In the course of this movement a dispute occurred at the McCormick harvester works, ending in a lockout of the men, a local disturbance, a collision with the police, and the death of several laborers.

If society at large was inclined to take little note of this eventuality, friends of the obscure dead, quite naturally, refused to let it pass unheeded. While the air was still charged with electricity, a protest meeting, called by labor leaders, was held in Haymarket Square, and speeches made livid by high temper were delivered to a responsive throng. For some time the oratory ran on without producing any untoward results—in fact with such conformity to the ceremonials common to similar gatherings that the mayor of the city, who had attended the meeting in the public interest, left the scene with the assurance that the crowd, already breaking up in a peaceable fashion, had no evil intent. But near the close of the speaking, a group of policemen, for no apparent reason, marched on the remnants of the assembly that remained on the ground as if to disperse them by force. In a flash a bomb was exploded with terrific force, killing one policeman and wounding several others, making the square a place of death and desolation.

In the excitement which followed, the leading newspapers, now in a high temper themselves, called for summary vengeance and eight anarchists, some of whom had advocated violence on various occasions, were rounded up and put on trial for murder in an atmosphere more like that of a battlefield than a court room. Contrary to normal procedure,

men were admitted to service on the jury who confessed that they had read about the case and had made up their minds against the prisoners arraigned before them. As the proceedings dragged on, the lust for blood became more intense. Press and pulpit throughout the length and breadth of the land called for short shrift, even though the evidence as unfolded from day to day failed to show that a single one of the prisoners had anything whatever to do with the throwing of the bomb or knew anything about the person who did throw it. In the end no trace of the man actually responsible for the deed could be discovered, but the jury found all the defendants guilty.

In a laconic summary, the presiding judge, Joseph E. Gary, disclosed the spirit of the trial when he said: "The conviction has not gone on the ground that they did actually have any personal participation in the particular act which caused the death of Degan; but the conviction proceeds upon the ground that they had generally by speech and print advised large classes to commit murder and had left the commission, the time, place, and when to the individual will, whim or caprice or whatever it may be of each individual man who listened to their advice." Admitting that the evidence did not convict the accused of taking any part in the crime, the judge declared that in consequence of their "advice, in pursuance of that advice, and influenced by that advice somebody, not known, did throw the bomb that caused Degan's death."

Though the data brought out at the trial did not show and could not show that the unknown offender who threw the bomb was in fact influenced by the speeches or writings of the accused, the judge insisted on his view to the end and on that theory of justice seven of the men were sentenced to death and one to the penitentiary. Of the seven, four were hanged, one committed suicide, two escaped the gallows by the intervention of the governor who changed their sentence to life imprisonment. In vain did one of the condemned men beg the governor to spare the others and

execute him to "satisfy the fury of a semi-barbaric mob." In vain did men like William Dean Howells, Lyman J. Gage, Robert G. Ingersoll, and Samuel Gompers protest against executing men on the assumption that their spoken or written words might have induced some unknown person to commit murder.

When the passions of the hour had subsided and national interests were again diverted to business, politics, and sports, the voice of the American dissenters was finally heard for a moment above the din of democracy. Six years after the execution of the four men, Governor John P. Altgeld, on reviewing the case, pardoned the three men who were still in the penitentiary, thus reopening the wound and unleashing the old public fury. Notwithstanding the fact that scholars, editors, bank presidents, and heads of railways had signed a petition for executive clemency, Altgeld was savagely scored by the conservative press and portrayed by cartoonists as an anarchist himself with a dagger between his teeth and a bomb in each hand.

To the end of his days Altgeld's act of clemency plagued him, partly perhaps for the reason that he had used highly critical language in discussing the judicial proceedings in the case. From the pulpit Dr. Lyman Abbott, the great religious leader, lashed him as "the crowned hero and worshiped deity of the anarchists of the Northwest." Theodore Roosevelt, the idol of the reform wing of the Republican party, flayed him as a man who "condones and encourages the most infamous of murders." More years went by. The grave closed upon the central figures in the tragedy. Then sober students of history, poring over the moldy records at a safe distance, came to a general agreement that "the trial of these men showed that a panic had seized not only Chicago but the whole nation"—to use the moderate language of Professor L. B. Shippee. Then lovers of the Greek tragedy with its inexorable law drew the veil of charity over the American drama.

No doubt some of the bitterness shown toward Altgeld

was due to the fact that the country was at that moment passing through another industrial crisis. The year before the Governor opened the prison door to the surviving anarchists, there had been a bloody battle between the employees in Carnegie's plants at Homestead, Pennsylvania, and a band of Pinkerton detectives hired by the company to protect its strike-breakers and its property. After several desperate clashes between the guards and the strikers, the management carried the day and smashed the amalgamated association of iron and steel workers which had directed the strike. The corporation also profited from a revulsion of popular feeling produced by a crime in no way connected with a trade union—the attempt of a young anarchist, Alexander Berkman, to kill Henry Clay Frick, the company's captain-general, who, in the absence of Carnegie, managed the contest with the workmen. Though the effort at assassination failed, it shocked the country of course and led uninformed persons to lay the blame on organized labor, thereby identifying trade unionism with anarchy.

Within two years the tragic events at Homestead were followed by a still more significant labor quarrel also marked by disorder, namely, the Pullman strike at Chicago. In that case, President Cleveland used federal troops, in spite of a strong protest from Governor Altgeld; and the local federal court sent Eugene V. Debs, head of the American railway union, to jail for disobeying a sweeping injunction which practically forbade any kind of activity on the part of the unions involved in the contest. If the Homestead skirmish introduced the nation to the use of private armies by captains of industry, the Pullman conflict made it familiar with two powerful engines of the federal government—the judicial ukase, known as the writ of injunction, and the use of regular soldiers in industrial disputes.

These engines, it is true, were not novel. They had been brought into service during the great strike of 1877, but the attacks on them by organized labor had awakened no great popular response. By 1894, however, sentiment

had changed and there were now hundreds of labor champions, supported by competent lawyers, ready to denounce what they were pleased to call "the prostitution of the government to the service of capitalists." And the platform of the Democratic party in the next presidential election echoed their denunciation.

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In no small measure the industrial disputes associated with the advance of capitalism were due to the flat refusal of employers to recognize labor organization as an inescapable outcome of the economic process and to accept collective bargaining as a peaceful mode of reaching agreements on hours and wages. During the contest of 1877, the uncompromising resolve of the leading railway managers to brook no interference with their business helped to precipitate the strike and then to embitter the warfare that ensued. The same factor weighed heavily in the Homestead affair of 1892 and still more heavily in the convulsive struggle at Chicago two years afterward. Although the capitalists of nearly every great industry had by that time protected themselves by combinations against falling prices and the stress of competition—against the law of supply and demand—neither they nor their spokesmen were willing, as a rule, to concede to labor the same right or necessity.

In their opposition to collective bargaining, they were supported by many learned economists who, after more or less research, discovered that trade unions violated the natural right of men to buy and sell labor and "other commodities" to the best possible advantage. Speaking for this school, William G. Sumner, for example, while teaching a whole generation of young business men at Yale, continually employed heavy-shotted batteries of argument against labor organizations, laying down the law with Mosaic finality. "If any man is dissatisfied with his position," exclaimed the Professor from his chair, "let him strive to

better it in one way or another by such chances as he can find or make, and let him inculcate in his children good habits and sound notions. . . . But every experiment only makes it more clear that for men to band together to carry on an industrial war, instead of being a remedy for disappointment in the ratio of satisfaction to effort, is only a way of courting new calamity."

From no mere prejudice against organized labor sprang this dictum; at least not in the opinion of the Professor. On the contrary, it flowed inexorably, he thought, from the iron laws of political economy as disclosed to the adept: "Wages of employees and the price of products have nothing to do with each other; wages have nothing to do with the profits of the employer; they have nothing to do with the cost of living or the prosperity of business. They are really governed by the supply and demand of labor, as every strike shows, and by nothing else." Applying this doctrine to the telegraph strike of 1883, Sumner announced oracularly: "The only question was whether the current wages for telegraphing were sufficient to bring out an adequate supply of telegraphers." Still he was not without hope of amelioration. "The way to improve the relation of employer and employee," Sumner suggested at a later date, "is not to get sentiment into it, but to get sentiment out of it"—a statement put forward not as sentiment but as obstinate fact discerned by the author.

To all political economists, however, these infallible dogmas were not as plainly revealed. At Johns Hopkins University, for instance, Richard T. Ely, fresh from long and laborious studies in the Old World, was teaching historical rather than pontifical economics; and in his book on the American labor movement issued in 1886, he seemed to recognize in the formation of trade unions a drift of things quite as decisive as the facts covered by Sumner's prelatical dicta. And one of his associates, John R. Commons, much to the dismay of several college presidents, was distributing the news abroad that the organization of labor was as

natural as flowing water—a means of raising the standard of life for the masses and a procedure worthy of approval in polite society.

The way being thus broken, other recruits from the middle classes joined the pioneer professors in asserting that employers should recognize unions and accept the practice of collective bargaining. "I believe in strikes. I believe also in the conservative value of the organization from which strikes come," declared the eminent Episcopal Bishop, Henry Codman Potter, in 1902. Sentiment was suffusing iron law, in spite of all the warnings.

By that time the National Civic Federation, composed of capitalists, labor leaders, and professional people, and dedicated to the fostering of harmony between organized capital and organized labor had begun to function. Marcus A. Hanna, master in industry, finance, and politics, had joined it and was pointing out what seemed to be the handwriting on the wall. Once outlawed and hunted to its lair, trade unionism was now mounting high on its dusty way toward reputability. The president of the American Federation of Labor had the support of many professors and was dining with magnates in New York. There were Mirabeaus of industrial democracy at the court of capitalism.

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Long before this demonstration, statesmen had become acutely conscious of a new factor in the noble art of politics. According to reports, that gruff old warrior, General Grant, on hearing of the disorders arising from the strike of 1877, wished once more for the presidential scepter that he might use the effective tactics of the Wilderness on leaders of labor, but that was only a lingering touch of the old régime. Other presidents may have enjoyed the emotion; none expressed it as freely. Indeed Grant's successors—whatever their actions—spoke softly on the subject of capital and labor.

During his first term, President Cleveland wrote a message to Congress recognizing the place of trade union organizations in modern life and urging voluntary arbitration as a solution of the problems of industrial strife. Congress also took note of changing currents, enacting in 1888 a law which created a federal commission charged with the duty of tendering its services to employers and workers whenever they entered upon an industrial dispute in the field of interstate commerce. Four years later a congressional committee made a searching inquiry into the conditions of labor at Homestead and into the circumstances of that violent outbreak of labor—an inquiry that was not all whitewash. When the Pullman strike soon afterward shook the country, President Cleveland, though uncompromising in the use of federal troops, sent a special commission to Chicago to bring out the facts in the case. Upon full investigation it rendered a verdict which, in effect, condemned the Pullman company and suggested that employers should recognize trade unions in the interest of capital as well as of labor. Theory was altering in the realm of statecraft.

Under the American constitutional system, the federal Congress possessed a large authority over interstate and foreign commerce—the right to deal with labor controversies arising in that sphere; and the state legislatures, according to the same legal arrangement, enjoyed important prerogatives over manufacturing and mining in general. Thus the politicians in both spheres, national and state, had to face problems presented by trade unions.

While nominally operating within the realm of private economy, as they bargained with employers over hours and wages, such unions in fact came in contact with all branches of government at numerous points. Being huge societies with potential power to restrain trade, their very right to existence depended upon the sanctions of law. On this point questions had been raised at the end of the eighteenth century and for several decades they were debated with acrimony. Although some courts declared labor associa-

tions as such to be illegal conspiracies, the issue was decided mainly in favor of the unions long before the Civil War. By 1865, as a general principle, therefore, labor had the right under state laws to form societies for mutual benefit.

But what could such organizations do in advancing their aims? The answer to that question depended upon the jurisprudence of each state, in theory at least, and in the best of circumstances it was by no means clear. Evidently trade unions were not authorized to violate state law in any particular while bargaining and conducting strikes; and after Congress passed the federal anti-trust act in 1890 they were forbidden to operate as combinations in restraint of foreign and interstate commerce. What labor unions could actually do to realize their purposes also depended, even to a greater extent, upon the way in which mayors of cities, sheriffs of counties, governors of states, and the President of the United States made use of the police and military arms entrusted to them. In short, the right to strike, picket, persuade, hold meetings, parade, and coerce at any specified time and place depended more upon the authorities in control of physical force than upon any fine theories embodied in the law books.

Into the contest between capital and labor the judiciary as well as other departments of government was continually drawn. The courts of law tried persons arrested in times of industrial disputes, decided in final analysis what particular deeds were permissible, and, subject to vague words in statutes, defined the area of prohibited actions.

Nor was this the limit of their jurisdiction. Under American practice, the courts, state and federal, could employ the bill of injunction in labor controversies; for an ancient prerogative authorized judges, by such a bill or writ, to order corporations or persons to do specific things or to refrain from doing specific things likely to cause irreparable damage. The same prerogative conferred upon judges the right to punish by fine and imprisonment, without jury trial, any one who disobeyed a decree of this nature duly

signed and sealed. By long-standing custom, the courts had freely used the injunction in the transaction of their regular business and in the course of time attorneys for employers engaged in contests with labor discovered its utility with respect to strike-breaking. It was brought into play during the railway battle of 1877 and again with special severity in the Pullman dispute seventeen years later.

Naturally, therefore, if trade unions and their tactics were matters of intimate concern to legislators, executive officials, and judges, the law and its administrators were in turn the objects of grave consideration for the unions. Accordingly, with increasing diligence, organized labor scrutinized candidates for public office and worked its way into the processes of politics—always preferring to incline government agents in its direction by threats or promises rather than to declare war on intrenched party machines. At the strategic points of the political conflict, especially in the industrial states, and in all the great contests at the polls, from the close of the Civil War to the end of the century, labor sought to enlarge its sphere of liberty for coercive action in struggles with employers, while capitalists pursued their interests with vigilance and on the whole with more noteworthy results.

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Fundamental as it was, freedom of action was by no means the sole demand which craft unions made of the government. From the founding of the National Labor Union onward, labor leaders and conventions put forth with steady persistence their programs of positive legislation. They favored, for instance, the creation of special offices or departments to serve labor interests in various ways and to accord to the trade union a certain dignity in the scheme of social economy. As early as 1869 they induced the Massachusetts legislature to establish a bureau of labor statistics; within a decade nine additional states followed this example;

and between 1880 and 1900 twenty-six more states made a labor agency of some sort a part of their administrative machinery. In the meantime Congress took cognizance of this general tendency by creating in 1884 a federal bureau of labor—an action which immediately started a movement to elevate this bureau to the position of a Cabinet Department, a goal reached in 1913. Although the powers of these labor agencies differed from place to place, the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information relative to labor conditions was for them all an essential function—a function that carried the weight of authority in promoting a wider knowledge of trade union principles.

In the field of general legislation the gains of labor were even more important, involving as they did such matters as the payment of wages in goods or store orders, the use of prisoners in the manufacture of commodities for the open market, the importation of aliens to work under contract, the encouragement of heavy immigration, and the exemption of employers from responsibility for injuries incurred in industry save in special cases. On these and other customs legally authorized, labor kept up a running fire, making advances year by year and altering in many ways both the spirit and the letter of statutes and judicial rulings.

To cite one illustration: under the common law, an employer was not liable for damages in an accident case if the injury to the worker came from unpreventable causes or from the negligence of the employee or one of his fellow-workmen. Against this ancient theory of the master and servant relation, labor leaders early lodged complaints, insisting that physical injuries to the human factors in industry were as inevitable as damages to plants by fire and should be covered by insurance in the same way—demanding that the employers, consequently, should be held liable in every case which did not result from the willful act of the victim. After a long agitation, the spell of the common law was broken and at the turn of the century the doctrine of social responsibility was gaining ground all over the country.

Meanwhile labor was also making headway in a campaign for factory codes requiring proper ventilation and sanitary appliances, the provision of safety devices, and similar measures for the regulation of employers' plants in the interest of employees. In the operation, there were many contests and many verbal battles over the "rights of property" and "liberty of contract" but, with the aid of a few stanch friends among the professional classes, organized labor eventually rewrote whole chapters of inherited law and covered new areas of human action with its special legislation.

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In another field of social relations, intimately related to American nationality, organized labor also sought government aid, namely, in the control over the immigration of competing laborers. For nearly a century after the founding of the republic the gates of the country were wide open to aliens. Whenever Congress, under whose jurisdiction the subject came, made laws pertaining to immigrants, it sought to encourage rather than restrict the foreign invasion —an invasion that promised to transform this country as radically as the Teuton inroads had altered the social structure of Rome.

Into the formation of this liberal policy, practical interests and idealism had both entered. Land speculators who wanted to raise the value of their western holdings invited aliens to come and settle there, sometimes luring individuals with the glowing language of the promoter, sometimes importing settlers in companies. Owners of mills and mines were no less avid in their search for stout arms and strong hands to "tend" their forges and machines. Hamilton, in his first report on manufactures, called attention to the supplies of labor in the Old World waiting to be tapped by American business enterprise, and capitalists who followed his teachings never lost sight of that fact. Cooperating with these interested parties were the proprietors

of the swift steamers which had made the Atlantic a mill pond by the middle of the nineteenth century—most of them foreigners themselves—for they naturally approved the free movement of passengers so essential to large profits. And orators, applauded by these mighty friends, were fond of portraying America as the asylum for the oppressed of the world suffering from wars, revolts, pogroms, and persecutions of every kind. Seldom had economic gain and lofty idealism coincided with such mechanical precision.

True, the torrential sweep of the invasion stimulated by these forces awakened an intense opposition. In the early fifties arose a lively anti-foreign movement, directed by the American or Know-nothing party, composed mainly of Protestants who looked with alarm on the throngs of Irish and German Catholics that crowded through the gates at Castle Garden. Especially were the conservatives pained to find German socialists, fresh from the revolutionary upheavals of 1848, holding meetings to condemn American capitalism, calling upon working people to overthrow the order established by Washington and Jefferson, and demanding a voice in the government "proportionate to their numbers." With particular warmth did southern Whigs demur when these "foreign atheists" condemned in radical tones their peculiar institution. But this phase passed. The demand for laborers in the rising industries and for settlers on the vacant lands became so urgent that the voice of hostility was almost stifled.

In the grand alliance of farmers and industrialists effected at Chicago in 1860, there was no opposition to immigration. On the contrary, the Republican platform of that year specifically favored throwing wide the doors of "the asylum for the oppressed." And in 1864 a Republican administration enacted the contract labor law, to which reference has already been made, authorizing the importation of laborers under terms akin to the bonded servitude of colonial days. It is true that the law was soon repealed but the practice continued without express legal warrant

and companies were organized to supply employers with European labor in any quantity, anywhere, at any time.

With the gates of the nation flung ajar, eager capitalists bidding for cheap labor, free farms awaiting strong muscles, and greedy steamship companies drumming up steerage passengers, the surge of immigrants broke all precedents in the new age of business enterprise. From all parts of the world —from the Orient as well as from every section of Europe—laborers poured into the United States in quest of employment, a movement of peoples that was watched with growing anxiety by trade union men.

Engaged in the task of raising the American level of living by controlling the labor market, union leaders saw that their efforts were like bailing the ocean as long as employers could import at will armies of Europeans and Orientals, accustomed to low standards, whenever a demand was made for higher wages or a strike was called to resist a cut. If they had accepted the situation without a murmur, labor organizers would have been false to their chosen mission and they were not lacking in alertness on that score.

Indeed the era of triumphant industrial enterprise had scarcely dawned when they sounded a warning note. In 1872, the shoe workers of Massachusetts, the land of John Alden and Cotton Mather, cried out that the Chinese, subjects of the Son of Heaven and worshipers of strange gods, were taking bread out of their mouths. In coöperation with labor leaders and farmers on the Pacific Coast they were able, as we have seen, to drive Congress a decade later into the enactment of the Chinese exclusion law.

Flushed with this victory, labor leaders turned their guns on the practice of importing laborers under legal contract and called upon Congress to prohibit it. The battle that followed was intense, for by this time the doctrine of "the asylum for the oppressed of every land" had become intrenched in popular psychology. Defenders of the contract system, reviving the mode of slave owners who had

in the old days advocated the slave trade as a means of raising Negroes from African barbarism to American Christianity, now urged assistance to European immigrants as a method of bringing the poor of the Old World to the land of liberty and opportunity. The appeal had a fine moral ring and it was backed by fierce economic passions. But organized labor had another ethic which in the end prevailed. In 1885, Congress forbade in a tentative way the importation of laborers under contract and a few years later made the bar complete and secure.

Having carried two strategic points—the exclusion of the Chinese and the prohibition of the contract system—trade union representatives began to consider other expedients for curtailing the labor supply. All through the years the deluge of immigrant competitors had continued to rise as the steerage rates of fiercely competing steamship companies fell. Checked temporarily by the Civil War and again by the panic of 1873, the current soon swelled to a torrent; by 1880 the annual invasion was almost half a million; within a quarter of a century it passed the million mark.

As the number increased, the proportions of the nationalities changed. The first great influx in the forties had been largely Irish; this was quickly followed by the German and Scandinavian waves; in fact previous to 1880 about three-fifths of the immigrants were from these sources. Then by the time the Irish and the Germans had well established themselves in industry, agriculture, and politics, the dikes burst in other quarters. From southern and eastern Europe now came strong laborers to mine coal, work at the flaming forges, or ply the needle in the garment trades—Italians, Greeks, Croats, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Hungarians, Rumanians, Russians, and Jews. At the opening of the twentieth century the immigration of the Irish and the Teutons had dropped far behind; while the Iberic, Slavic, and Jewish races furnished three-fourths of the people who poured into the asylum.

Like the southern planters who, in their quest for riches

from the labor of hands other than their own, had flooded their land with Negroes from the wilds of Africa, the captains of industry, in their feverish search for profits, welcomed invaders from the ends of the earth. Not since the patricians and capitalists of Rome scoured the known world for slaves—Celts, Iberians, Angles, Gauls, Saxons, Greeks, Jews, Egyptians, and Assyrians—to serve them and then disappeared themselves under a deluge of strange colors had the world witnessed such a deliberate overturn of a social order by masters of ceremonies. Nothing save the peculiar circumstances of the case prevented general consternation. Until about 1890 a free farm in the West awaited every able-bodied laborer who wanted it and dared to advance to the frontier. When the free land was gone, the expanding railways, mills, and mines furnished employment for a large part of the earth's multitudes. But finally when the point of saturation seemed to be at hand, political captains who had long tossed on the main with utter indifference to the objections of trade union leaders began to take weather observations.

Though some descendants of colonial families had grown restive as they were elbowed aside by Irish mayors and policemen, it was the labor leaders, headed by an Anglo-American Jew, Samuel Gompers, who first lifted their voices effectively against the alien invasion, pointing out in unmistakable terms those features of capitalist evolution in the United States that looked particularly evil to them. In other manufacturing countries, such as England, France, and Germany, industrial workers were largely of the same stock as their employers; masters and workmen were united by ties of blood, language, and tradition. In America, on the other hand, the armies of labor became, to a surprising extent, alien in origin, divided in patriotic allegiance, given to constant argumentation, difficult to organize on account of racial and lingual barriers, and excluded from the higher social and political life of the country by their ignorance of its language and codes. While arraying themselves on the

side of loyalty in the matter of nationality, trade union leaders also urged that the tender regard for high wages made manifest, at least in orations, by advocates of protective tariffs required restraints on the free importation of competing workers just as on goods. So by one appeal or another, powerful sentiments and interests were enlisted in a crusade to restrict immigration. Before the twentieth century was very old the agitation bore fruit in federal statutes broad and strong.

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Zealous attention to legislative issues of immediate concern to working people did not prevent leaders in that sphere from making wider excursions. The National Labor Union, the Knights of Labor, and the American Federation of Labor, each in its turn, endorsed from time to time measures falling in the general domain of politics, rather than the specific field of labor legislation. Of such were the popular election of United States Senators, woman suffrage, equal pay for equal work, municipal ownership of public utilities, generous support of public schools, and the establishment of a national department of education. In all the currents and drifts that bore America in the direction of social democracy, organized labor was one of the dynamic factors, even though it rejected officially the socialist demand for independent political action.

There was nothing paradoxical in this. The philosophy of schematic socialism—with its version of the "downtrodden proletariat"—did not grip American workingmen. Trade unionists in the United States could vote and hold office; in the cities they were actually courted by the politicians rather than feared or despised as in parts of Europe; and many of them passed lightly from the payrolls of their unions to comfortable berths in municipal, state, or federal service. More than this, American society was more fluid than that of the Old World and workers could rise more

readily from the bench to the swivel chair, from poverty to ease. Indeed one of the most prominent labor leaders, without becoming a captain of industry, amassed a fortune of a quarter of a million dollars at the turn of the century. There were class lines but not caste lines in the social order of the gilded age.

Impervious to the socialist creed though the ranks of organized labor seemed to be, exponents of that doctrine kept up their agitation without despair, the course of their thought in the United States running all the time rather close to that of the Old World—through utopianism to political action. Before the Civil War there was, as we have said, a wave of idealism which inspired the formation of numerous communistic colonies. Though all, except a few subject to severe religious discipline, soon passed into the limbo of defeated hopes—Owenite, Icarian, and Fourierist alike—the sentiments that animated their founders had more vitality than their experiments in application. In any event, the ferment reflected in the utopian undertakings of the middle period touched and tinged many intellectual currents, from New England transcendentalism to western agrarianism. It sparkled in the writings of Emerson, Curtis, and Lowell. It crept into the editorials, articles, and reminiscences of Horace Greeley and Charles A. Dana.

Among the writers on economic questions who contributed articles to Greeley's Tribune was a European correspondent destined to become the philosopher of the most formidable working class movement in the history of the world. This once obscure journalist was Karl Marx—a dogged thinker who combined the laborious researches of the savant with the aspirations of the humanist and the bitterness of the social outcast. While Abraham Lincoln was busy with Illinois politics, Marx in collaboration with his friend, Frederick Engels, issued the challenge of the Communist Manifesto to the ruling classes of the world: "Workingmen of all lands, unite! You have nothing to lose but your chains!"

With the advent of this new force the European labor movement and its radical fringe began to throw aside utopian idealism—the concept of a beautiful society created by kindly efforts to fit the dreams of philanthropists—and to veer in the direction of the Marxian prophecy. Socialism thus acquired a business-like gospel of blood and iron: the story of mankind is the history of class struggles; the modern conflict is between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; in the end the death knell of capitalism will be rung and a triumphant working class will rule the earth. Such was the essence of the Communist Manifesto made public late in 1847.

Within a short time the Manifesto crossed the Atlantic. As far west as Illinois and Missouri, sermons were preached on the new articles of faith by German immigrants expelled from their Fatherland in the deadly reaction that followed the revolution of 1848. Defying the "republic of the bourgeois," a socialist paper, *Die Republik der Arbeiter,* was founded in 1850 by William Weitling; and in the same year a socialist gymnastic society was organized in New York. While Garrison was proclaiming abolition and Everett praising peace with prosperity, little knots of radicals in the industrial cities were tirelessly debating over foaming pots of beer the impending revolution, thus arousing a great fear in the minds of native Americans and furnishing the chief bugbear for the crusade which the American or Know-nothing party carried on against aliens, atheism, and anarchy.

Though never very numerous, the socialists might have raised a considerable tempest in the United States by 1860 if their energy had not been diverted by the agitation over free land, if fiery apostles of revolution had not turned from advocating the expropriation of capitalists to shouting for the expropriation of the federal government, if a bigger cataclysm than they had ever proclaimed—the Second American Revolution—had not come down upon agitators of all kinds with a terrible crash, rolling the tide of war

over all the little debating and gymnastic societies in the country.

During this storm in the United States, the first world union of the proletariat, the International Working Men's Association, was organized in Europe with Karl Marx as one of its active promoters. That was in 1864, the year before the surrender of Lee at Appomattox. Within a few months socialist branches of this Association appeared in American industrial centers, at first among Germans and then among French and Bohemian workers, supported by some native Americans who claimed to be the successors of the old land and labor reformers. In 1873, the German section issued the first number of its weekly, the *Arbeiter-Zeitung,* calling for solidarity among the working people of the United States and using the misery of the current industrial panic to illustrate the Marxian argument.

Now furnished with an organ of news and opinion and given a living theme of discourse, leaders of the socialist societies decided that the time had come to start a national movement. At a general convention held in 1874, the Social Democratic party was formally organized and the radicals, thus strengthened by union, commenced to "bore within" the Knights of Labor to whose fellowship their association was soon admitted. But the way of the agitator was thorny. The hard Marxian gospel of the class struggle grated on the ears of Americans then preparing for the nation-wide conflict between the capitalists and trade unionists which broke out in the terrible railway strike of that decade. Socialist meetings were raided by the police or by indignant civilians and the Social Democratic party, scarcely more than a shadow, sank into oblivion.

On its ruins was established in Newark, in 1877, the Socialist Labor party which managed to survive the vicissitudes of many decades—a party for various reasons largely German in spirit, like its predecessor. Sponsored at first mainly by immigrant workmen from Germany, it adopted the program of the Marxian movement then grow-

ing to huge proportions in the Fatherland, and was later recruited by exiles driven from the Empire by Bismarck's draconian law of 1878. Supplied with a coherent body of doctrines and with forceful leadership, the Socialist Labor party made a considerable furor in the late seventies and early eighties.

Indeed the lively agitation of its orators, the echoes of the recent Paris commune, and the violence of the great American railway strike—all vibrated so widely that they even reached the arguments of lawyers delivered in the calm, judicial atmosphere of the Supreme Court at Washington. Many a statesman now spoke with trepidation of the dangerous revolt raised against the republic but recently purified by fire; and a cry of horror added to the panic when John Most, an anarchist of the deed, marched into the arena in 1882 with his gospel of social war which seemed to bear bitter fruit in the Haymarket riot in Chicago and the recurring strikes after that tragic episode.

As a matter of fact, however, the numerical strength of the radicals in the United States was greatly overestimated by their foes. When the Socialist Labor party ventured in 1892 to nominate a candidate for the presidency on the mildest kind of platform, it could command only about twenty thousand votes. Like the contemporary British trades union conferences, the conventions of the Federation of Labor remained utterly impervious to socialist appeals, while American unionism continued to steer its way on an even keel toward its chosen haven of high wages and short hours within a capitalist society.

Yet socialist doctrines, seeping generally unseen through the crevices in the solid structure of acquisition and enjoyment, soon reached the most unexpected places. Radical farmers of native American stock, for example, were all through this period engaged in a class enterprise of their own which was certainly tinged with socialist theories. Many a grand bourgeois rubbed his eyes in 1884 when he read in James Russell Lowell's valedictory on democracy

that socialism means "the practical application of Christianity to life and has in it the secret of an orderly and benign reconstruction." And four years later the entire nation was stirred by Edward Bellamy's lively romance, Looking Backward—the first utopia of applied science—which naturalized socialism and baptized it anew in the name of business efficiency. At the end of the nineteenth century, therefore, fresh winds of opinion were blowing hither and yon. The organization of labor, like that of capital, was proceeding in regular form. The creeping tide of discussion and agitation was depositing new labor laws on the statute books. Though legislatures continued to meet under the guise of old formulas as did the Roman senate in the days of the divine Augustus, strange things were being done in the sacred name of tradition.



## CHAPTER XXII

## *The Triple Revolution in Agriculture*

TRIUMPHANT business enterprise, with its rush and roar of train and mill, its ostentatious display of overtopping riches, and its convulsive struggles with organized labor, gave the dominant tone to the intellectual and moral notes of the nineteenth century's closing decades, leading those who cast horoscopes in the national watchtower to neglect the quiet places of the countryside. Nothing could have been more natural. The great fortunes of the new bourgeois were heaped up in the urban centers where their retainers and vassals gathered to serve them. Of necessity, the culture that wealth attracted and fostered took on the flavor of the metropolis rather than the country house. In the cities were the industries and their hordes of employees, the newspapers, writers, publishers, libraries, parliaments, forums of discussion, and makers of opinion.

What is more, there was not, and never had been, in the United States a landed aristocracy exactly comparable to the social orders of that type in other civilizations. In the Roman empire, it was the patricians of rural origins who

ruled in the senate and gave direction to public policy even under powerful Cæsars. Men of no less consequence than Cicero, orator and rich man's client, spoke with cunning deference when they addressed a superior person from a country estate and the most gorgeous plutocrat of the Appian Way bowed more low in the presence of a scion of noble stock. It was the Junker of old Prussia who formed the pillar of the Hohenzollern state and still, after the shock of a World War, seemed to offer to the Reventlows and Spenglers of Germany the only bulwark—except possibly in desperate straits, Bolshevism—against the all-conquering power of international capitalism. At Versailles in the old régime, landed nobility and landed clergy, besides furnishing talents for war and peace, made the court of His Most Christian Majesty the envy of all princes by their lavish display and finished etiquette. In England, gentry of the same economic resources for centuries wrote the law of the land, supplied officers for state and church, served in Parliaments, and shed luster on royal houses at court. And, if one of her most penetrating wits is to be believed, to this hour there is not a plutocrat of soap or coal who would not rather be seen walking down Pall Mall with a duke on each arm than with a brace of the richest cotton spinners the broad empire of Britain could furnish. Far away in the Orient, landed samurai, proud and haughty as any courtier of Louis XVI, sustained the authority of the Shogun at Tokyo and later that of the restored imperial family, shaped the moral code, and directed the affairs of state and society.

But in America, as we have said, there never had been any such class dominant throughout the country. Practically all the soil of New England and the Middle States was divided into relatively small farms, owned by the freeholders who tilled them, the handful of great proprietors in the Hudson River Valley forming an exception of diminishing importance. Though embracing many families of seasoned stock and long monopolizing the politics of the section, the landed

gentry of the South never had a capital of concentration comparable to Rome, Berlin, Paris, London, or Tokyo and after the Second American Revolution the whole class lay prostrate before victorious capitalism.

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And yet, through the furious years of the commercial development that followed the Civil War, American agriculture, so little noticed in the writings of philosophers and economists, underwent a transformation hardly less dynamic than the revolution that overtook manufacturing and transportation; and remained at the end of the century a productive estate of the highest importance for the whole of American civilization. While the cities were growing like magic, the countryside was also growing in strength. The total population of the United States in 1850 was less than thirty millions; the first census of the twentieth century reported more than fifty millions living on farms or in villages sustained by agriculture.

America had not yet, like England, devoured her farms—drawn three-fourths of her people into industrial cities. Neither had her felicity become primarily contingent upon the casualties and caprices of foreign and imperial trade or in any respect dependent on the sale of gray shirtings to savages in Africa or Brummagem trinkets to them that sit in darkness. Until near the end of the century, the domestic market maintained by agriculture, with farming people as great purchasers, absorbed practically all the products of American mills and mines.

In short, the expansion of agriculture almost paralleled the expansion of industry. During the era that lay between Lincoln's first election and the outbreak of the World War, the mere increase in the number of farms was more than twice the total number of homesteads and plantations brought under cultivation between the landing of the Pilgrims and the victory of the Illinois rail-splitter at the polls.

In round numbers, there were two million farms in the United States in 1860; fifty years afterward there were more than six million.

Comparatively speaking, the new farming homesteads added to the national heritage in the age of business enterprise were alone greater in number than all the industrial workers enrolled upon the books of the American Federation of Labor at the moment of its supremest strength. Expressed in terms of area, the additional farms brought under cultivation embraced over three hundred million acres of improved land or a dominion larger than the productive area of France and Germany combined. During that span of years the output of wheat rose from 173,000,000 bushels to nearly 700,000,000 bushels—one-sixth the total crop of the world.

Frequently overlooked by those who imagined that prosperity and power were the fruits of urban genius alone, agriculture in reality furnished the nutriment for flourishing industry and profoundly altered the relations of the United States with the countries of the Old World. Produce from the farms supplied huge quantities of freight for the railways, thus becoming one of the main supports for that important branch of American capitalism. It fed the armies of factory workers and by a rising purchasing power steadily enlarged the demand for the commodities they manufactured. It yielded materials for domestic packing and canning industries and tonnage for fleets of merchant vessels in the seven seas. A heavy element in the discharge of American debts to European capitalists, it thus aided in the rapid promotion of economic independence for the United States.

By way of illustration, during the Civil War the increase in the wheat export to England furnished an offset to the stoppage of southern cotton, helping to turn the balance in the mind of English statesmen against any open action in favor of the Confederacy. In economic terms, the choice lay between cotton and bread and bread won. The total

export of wheat in 1860 was 17,000,000 bushels; it rose three years later to 58,000,000; at the end of the century it had gone well over the 200,000,000 mark. While advance agents for the cotton spinners of England and ironmongers of Germany, in the piping days that followed the Franco-German War, marched with measured tread into the backward and waste places of Asia, Africa, and South America and invaded islands of distant seas, the farmers of the United States poured their swelling avalanches of wheat, corn, and pork into the markets of Europe to supply food for the laborers of Manchester, Birmingham, and Essen. With true insight, a distinguished Austrian economist declared that the flow of American agricultural produce to the Old World in the latter part of the nineteenth century made a revolution in its economy comparable to that produced by the flow of gold and silver in the age that succeeded the discoveries of Columbus.

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These bald facts, hard and impressive, though striking enough to command the attention of those who reckoned national destiny in terms of the balance sheet, did not tell the whole story. While heaping its produce higher and higher, American agriculture underwent a triple revolution no less Sibylline in its social implications than the conquest of manufacture by science and the machine. First of all, this era of triumphant progress in agriculture witnessed the dissolution of the slave-owning aristocracy—a landed estate—with a correlative influence on Negroes, white farmers, southern economy, and national politics. Next, it saw the long process of colonization and settlement opened at Jamestown in 1607 brought to a close by the exhaustion of the arable land on the far frontier with its sharp repercussion on labor, farm values, tenantry, and migration. Finally, this era marked the absorption of agriculture into the industrial vortex, endlessly sustained by capitalism, science, and machinery.

By this triple revolution, basic problems of population, food supply, and social policy were raised for the consideration of economists and statesmen. At the end of the epoch the protests of the agrarian or the discontented laborer could no longer be silenced by the command to go West and exploit the fertility of fresh soil. Within less than a hundred years after Jefferson's death, his "republic of free and independent farmers" had come to the end of its rope and it was far from clear by whose hands the soil of America would be tilled at the close of another century. The experience of Rome, France, Germany, Denmark, England, Italy, and China began to have an import for those who searched the future.

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In order of time, the agricultural revolution in the South occupied first place and it displayed the most spectacular features. To that transformation there were three parties: slave owners, slaves, and freeholders. In the old régime, the first of these groups enjoyed undoubted primacy; certainly the white master's estate with its servile workers was the center of the agricultural scene, at least according to the books and the orators. Beyond all question, political leadership in the South was taken by the planters who, besides devoting great energies to the development of their holdings, insisted on directing affairs of state. Socially, the widespreading acres of the plantation with the classical mansion and imported decorations served as the symbol of southern prowess and prestige. According to outward signs the slave-owning planter was riding from victory to victory when the Civil War sent his system crashing to earth.

Working for three hundred and sixty thousand slave owners of varying fortunes were about four million slaves. These bondmen were not only chattels; they were Negroes whose original ancestors had been imported from the forests of Africa. Whether handicapped or not by innate dis-

abilities for life in America, as frequently argued, they certainly had never been subjected to any such cultural discipline as the European peasant or artisan and they seldom had been inspired through opportunity, property, and competition to raise themselves in the economic scale by industry and thrift. Whether bond or free, they were poorly equipped for developing prosperity on the land.

Outnumbering the slave owners and their chattels were the free farmers of the South whose families constituted at least two-thirds of the total white population. Of this group, the majority, industrious and self-respecting, lived in the broad belt of upland that stretched all round the coastal plain; and though deficient in formal education, these sturdy tillers of the soil showed capacity for raising their standard of living. Hanging on the lower ranges of the yeomen, but usually widely separated from them in cultural equipment, were the "poor whites," despised alike by master and slave. Scattered over barren pinelands and in mountain notches they waged a spiritless battle for existence against poverty and the hookworm. Economically futile, the poor whites were politically as negligible as the indentured servants of colonial times, from whom a large part had descended.

Between the freehold farmers and the planters there had been from the beginning a deep gulf. The latter, content with their power, were more concerned with the interests of their own class and their slaves than with the advancement of their white neighbors of the upland. Able to educate their children without the aid of public schools, they gave little thought to the intellectual needs of the white community beyond their pale. Indeed the genius of the planting system was hostile to the spirit of science, competition, and popular education so supreme in northern economy, urban and rural—a fact well known to leaders among free white farmers of the South long before the crisis of 1861.

Whatever the grounds, it was certain that the more

radical thinkers among the yeomen had come to look upon slavery as a curse to their class and upon the planters as the natural enemies of "the white democracy." Inspired by this conviction, thousands of southern farmers, especially in the mountain regions, clung to the Union during the civil conflict, and served valiantly in the federal armies waging war on their sectional brethren. Though the majority, in the exigencies of the hour, supported the Confederacy and improved their political status by their services to the common cause, they did not succeed altogether in breaking down the barriers that separated them from the planting aristocracy.

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When the curtain was rung down at Appomattox, however, all the parties to the southern triangle were forced to adapt themselves to novel conditions of life and labor. The planters, burdened by debt, restricted in their enterprises by lack of capital, and stripped, for the most part, of their complaisant labor supply, such as it was, had to devise other methods of cultivation than those they had practiced—or forsake agriculture completely for business, industry or the professions. Some who chose the first of these alternatives tried to hold their domains intact by employing their former slaves as wage earners to till the soil, but this was a strange relation both for masters and servants and only the most skillful managers could make it very productive. Other planters sought to keep their estates together by resorting to the practice of renting; dividing their land into convenient plots, they now leased it to white farmers or freedmen, receiving in return either cash or a share of the produce.

Since money was scarce, the "cropping" system was generally the method chosen. In that case the planter furnished the land and often a part of the capital while the tenant supplied the labor and occasionally some of the equipment; at the end of the year the fruits of the combina-

tion were divided according to the terms of the contract. In this fashion a tenant or cropper economy with its social implications supplanted tillage by slaves throughout immense areas formerly occupied by unified plantations under superior direction. Moreover, since the Negro or poor white seldom had any money in hand, he was usually under the necessity of receiving an advance of capital from his landlord and was thus tied to his patron by a chain of debts that never could be broken, unscrupulous landowners often taking advantage of both poverty and ignorance of bookkeeping and law.

Tested by results, none of the methods adopted by the planters was remarkably efficient. In truth the War had brought to a head a long-impending crisis in southern economy as well as the conflict between the sections of the country—an economy based on the exploitation of virgin soil by slave labor, that was already staggering under heavy burdens when the Second American Revolution struck it a mortal blow. The Virginia seaboard had been exhausted; the fields on the coastal plains of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, though still fairly prosperous, were feeling many sharp pinches; and the black lands stretching from Alabama to Texas were wearing down under Negro labor with its incessant cropping unsupported by proper rotation and fertilization. On the whole, southern agriculture was in a backward state when the crash came. In 1860 the average value of farmland and improvements per acre in the South was less than half the figure in the stony New England section—with all that meant in terms of money for homes, stock, schools, roads, public institutions, and standards of living. And even that value was due in no small part to the vigilance of the plantation owners in directing their laborers.

Although the abolitionists attributed the languor of southern agriculture to slavery alone, the fruits of emancipation, at least as carried into effect, did not sustain their contention. At the end of forty years of liberty, the acre-

value of farms in the South was relatively lower than on the eve of the civil conflict—only about one-third the amount then attained by New England with all its abandoned farms.

Unwilling to cope with the hazards of agriculture in the new conditions, a large number of planters surrendered in despair and went into business or industry. Selling their estates on the auction block, often at ruinous prices, to capitalists who felt competent to make the wage or renting system work or disposing of their property in small plots to the white farmers on their borders, these planters turned high abilities once devoted to agriculture to the service of business enterprise their ancestors had so despised. Indeed one of the foremost historians of the South, P. A. Bruce, is authority for the statement that "the higher planting class . . . so far as it has survived at all, has been concentrated in the cities. . . . The transplantation has been practically universal. The talent, the energy, the ambition, that formerly sought expression in the management of great estates and the control of hosts of slaves, now seek a field of action in trade, manufacturing enterprises, or in the general enterprises of development." Moreover, a large number of the planters, particularly the younger generation, abandoning their estates, moved from the South to northern cities, particularly the Democratic stronghold of New York, where they helped to give direction and tone to business and society.

A dead past was ready for burial. While tender memories of the old régime, often highly colored by imagination, were fondly retained and long continued to engross intellectual powers worthy of creative work in their own time, the lordly planter, real or mimic, like the hardy pioneer and the dauntless prospector, now belonged only to history and romance.

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Although, as already noted, the overthrow of the planting aristocracy was in some respects analogous to the subversion

of the landed classes in England and France, the process was by no means identical, especially as far as the servile bondmen were concerned. The serfs of the Old World were as a rule as white as their masters; if they were branded with social inferiority, they were separated by no indelible color line from the ruling orders. Nor was their social heritage comparable to that of the Negro slaves. Usually their liberation, at least in western Europe, came about gradually as by industry and thrift they worked their way steadily, if slowly, upward into freedom; and the crowning act of emancipation simply granted the inevitable. Moreover, the serfs had always been accustomed to the ownership of personal property and to the management of fields and gardens; their children sometimes escaped from bondage, rose in the church or through marriage, and served at the courts of kings. When at last their fetters were broken, they generally received land in outright ownership, if burdened by taxes—a stake in the country of their birth.

In all vital respects the status of the southern freedmen was different from that of emancipated serfs. They were of another race from their masters; the seal of color was upon them; go where they might they could not escape the ancient sign of servitude. Except for a few thousand who had passed by devious routes into the farming, professional, business, and even slave-owning classes, Negroes were not used to holding property, working for wages, or managing anything directly. Emancipation came to them as a result of no potent striving on their part but as the by-product of a war which broke the power of their masters. When their fetters were struck off, they were given no lands, no claims against their former landlords. On the day of their freedom they stood empty-handed, without property, without tools, without homes, hardly the possessors of the clothes on their backs.

It was, therefore, impossible for the Negroes to strike out boldly in the white man's world, especially as their hope

for free land, which vague rumors had awakened in them, was dashed by the federal government. It is true that thousands fled to southern cities or made their way to the distant North but the vast majority remained in their cabins on the plantations, continuing to till the fields by old methods and for wages that afforded them, for a long time at least, little more than their former standard of living.

As the decades passed, a large number became the renters of small plots on a cash or share basis, while the more enterprising and the more fortunate succeeded in passing into the realm of ownership. Ten years after emancipation, the bureau of agriculture at Washington found that about five per cent of the freedmen of the cotton belt had become freeholders. At the end of the century, one-fourth of the colored laborers on the land owned the soil they tilled, but frequently under heavy mortgage. Those who looked backward or compared the Negro with the least prosperous whites saw promise in the toilsome upward climb from bondage; those who simply looked around were apt to be discouraged.

No doubt the general course of economic affairs was unfavorable to the Negro as a farmer. The changing technique of agriculture in an age of machinery and science baffled the men and women of the colored race as well as their untutored white neighbors. Familiar with only two or three staple crops, limited in their skill to the primitive tillage of plow and hoe, they clung with pathetic devotion to tradition. They had raised three-fourths of all the cotton grown in the days of slavery, they knew how to plant, cultivate, and harvest it, they found it a commodity for which they could always get some cash at the end of the season, and they kept loyally in the way of their ancestors.

But they had not advanced very far in their freedom when they encountered formidable obstacles to continued and easy progress, namely, exhaustion of the soil, necessity for scientific fertilization, the ravages of the boll weevil, and the competition of Texas cotton culture under the stimulus

of other labor, particularly Mexican. Though Booker T. Washington and his valiant assistants made heroic efforts to meet the novel problems by education and annual conferences, the direction of the current was against them. By the end of the century only one-half of the cotton crop was produced by Negro labor. Nor were the freedmen more fortunate in the higher mechanical pursuits. In slavery they had enjoyed relatively little opportunity to test their powers as artisans; and after emancipation lack of training, deficiency in aptitude, or the jealousy of white workers—or all three—prevented them from going far in the skilled trades. Given these realities, the inevitable drift of Negroes from the land and domestic employment was toward the lower ranges of industry; only four per cent of the Negroes were in the higher mechanical ranks thirty-five years after Lincoln's death.

Unable to make rapid strides in the economic field, Negroes found themselves losing the political and civic privileges which the emancipators had tried to thrust upon the race in the days of reconstruction. After 1880 colored men were virtually disfranchised by law and social pressure throughout the South, especially in the lower seaboard. The grand words of liberty and equality still stood in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but they were as naught in practice. In short, after the passion of the Civil War cooled and northern bayonets were withdrawn from southern capitals, the Negro was as completely subjected to white government as he had been before the war. Since he was seldom rich in worldly goods, he also suffered the disabilities of the poor in the courts, high and low, receiving as a rule dubious justice from judges and jurors everywhere and often terrible punishment under lynch law for alleged offenses against the white community. Thus the Negro lost any power for social improvement that inhered in sharing the processes of southern politics.

If the mass of the colored population in the South took small notice of such matters, restive individuals made use

of the discriminations to stir a resentment that reacted unfavorably on southern agricultural economy, especially as avenues of escape were now opening northward. The enormous growth of northern industry, the increasing demand for unskilled labor, the relatively high wages offered by business enterprise, and above all the curtailment of European and Asiatic immigration multiplied the opportunities available to that portion of the negro race energetic enough to cast aside the hoe and incur the risk of migration to the cities beyond the Ohio and the Potomac.

The velocity of this movement from the land was augmented after the World War when negro soldiers, drafted into the "army of democracy," returned from camp and trench where, inspired by the lofty ideals of President Wilson, their Commander-in-chief, they had acquired sentiments that made them unwilling to wear with complacency the former badges of servitude. Moved by new theories and encouraged by active propaganda, multitudes of Negroes now chose the hard struggle of northern cities rather than the more leisurely and perhaps more healthful life on southern fields and in southern homes where reminders of fixed discriminations met them at every hand.

In fact this northward movement was so strong during the opening decades of the twentieth century that it presaged yet more radical changes in the economic and social basis of southern agriculture. Some prophets were rash enough to say that in the end the results would be beneficial to the South, on the assumption that the old-fashioned planter and the inefficient Negro on the seaboard would both be pushed aside by an invasion of white settlers from the piedmont and the North—by new stocks capable of applying thrift, capital, and energy to land which under slavery had never risen to the levels of northern production and was but little, if any, more fruitful under the labor system that superseded it. Whatever the future had in store, it was a fact that, after almost fifty years of freedom,

southern agriculture stood low in the national scale, the average value per acre of lands and improvements being only $8.96 in that section against more than four times the amount in the central states.

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The families of the white freeholders—the third party to the triangle—won more immediate benefits from emancipation, as Hinton Rowan Helper had prophesied, than the freedmen themselves. They cast off in some measure the stigma of contempt from which they had suffered in a society where all labor was regarded as servile. If the gulf that separated them from Helper's "haughty cavaliers of shackles and handcuffs" was not entirely bridged by the overthrow of the cavaliers, it was at all events no longer as obvious.

Instead of the neglect or contumely of former days, the white farmers now encountered a little respect and occasionally some flattery. Their valor had been useful to the slave owners in the war and their continued support was necessary to prevent domination by the Negroes. So faced by this direct menace, planters and small farmers rallied under the Democratic flag, buried their grudges and, making a common cause at the ballot box, created in a few years a "solid South" bent on holding the Negro to something approaching his historic status in matters social and political.

In addition to gaining prestige in the Second Revolution, white freeholders reaped economic advantages from the new order. While slavery lasted they were subject to the constant pressure of planters driving steadily onward into the piedmont in a quest for additional lands to be tilled by gangs of bondmen. With little capital at their command and unable to resist the force of rising land values in their neighborhood, the yeomen had been compelled to move higher into the hills or to betake themselves into the western country beyond the Ohio or the Mississippi.

But when the planters were wrecked by the war, the farmers began to return to the lowlands and acquire small holdings as the great plantations were broken up for sale. During the decade that followed the election of Lincoln, the size of the average farm in the ten cotton states fell from about four hundred acres to two hundred and thirty; while the number of freeholds embracing a hundred acres or less rose from three hundred and thirty thousand to five hundred and seventeen thousand. In the next thirty years the number of farms south of the Potomac and Ohio River line doubled in every state except Arkansas and Louisiana. Thus the abolition of slavery altered the status of the white farmer in a fashion that offers an interesting analogy to the change in the position of the French peasantry after the mighty cataclysm of 1789.

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Whatever the interpretation of the southern tendencies, there was no question about the reality of the second phase in the triple agricultural revolution, namely, the final closing of the frontier, the disappearance of cheap or free land. By 1900, the outstanding characteristic of American development, colonization and settlement, was brought to a dead stop and American society finally reduced to the economic laws of older societies, a dénouement startling in its swiftness. In 1827, the Secretary of the Treasury had reported that "it would take five hundred years to settle the public domain"; after that declaration the state of Texas and the fruits of the Mexican War were added to the possessions of which he spoke.

And yet within the brief space of seventy years the impossible had happened. In 1860, the free soilers voted themselves farms, to use the current phrase, and while their opponents in the South were engrossed in the war for southern independence, they legalized their expectations. In 1862, Congress passed the Homestead law, already so

fully described, and the Morrill Act assigning to each state a share of the public lands, proportioned to its representation in Congress, for the support of agricultural and mechanical education. Two years later—the year of Sherman's memorable march to the sea—came another important measure which threw upon the market an empire of coal land at a minimum figure of twenty-five dollars an acre, a nominal price which was later further reduced in the interest of purchasers. This was quickly followed by a more sweeping provision which abolished the practice of leasing, more honored in the breach than in the observance, and opened to general exploration and occupation vast areas of mineral lands in the public domain. Meanwhile huge blocks of the national estate were turned over to railway companies in aid of their enterprises. So by one legal phrase or another and by administrative procedure, the federal government prepared the way for the rapid seizure and exploitation of all the remaining lands on the western frontier.

The rush for which preparation was thus made exceeded every estimate. Within thirty years after the enactment of the Homestead law all the choice arable land on the continental domain had been staked out and occupied. By 1890, according to the historians of the West, the frontier had disappeared; the federal government had no more rich farming land to give away. Even wide semi-arid plains where the buffalo and the cowboy once roamed at will were being swiftly enclosed by wire fences; dry farming was being introduced on lands once scorned by the pioneer; and a clamor for appropriations to irrigate the deserts was already raised in Washington. A grand drama had come to an end; the doors of a great economic theater were closing. The United States was at last beginning to encroach upon marginal land and to pass into a stage which Europe and the Orient had reached centuries before.

The shock of this stupendous climax was felt throughout America and indeed throughout the world. No longer was

the native farmer to enjoy the advantage of mining virgin soil and underselling his competitors in the Old World working fields that had been tilled for ages. No longer could the wage earners of the eastern cities or the laborious peasants of other hemispheres look for freedom and a secure living on the ample domain of the United States. No longer were members of Congress to rise on the floor and advocate the settlement of the West by Orientals. The world's chief outlet for economic unrest was now shut and no political legerdemain could open it again. The frontier which had nourished the pioneering spirit and given such a peculiar flavor to the social order for three centuries had vanished foreover; there were to be no more Boones, Houstons, and Frémonts; the long wagon trains of homeseekers had gone down over the western horizon for the last time.

And with the passing of romance slowly dawned an age of realism. The army of untrained and wasteful farmers who had prospered by raising huge crops on virgin soil, in spite of their methods, could never again take refuge from themselves by leaving the exhausted lands of their first settlements for new sections in the West. At last they had to face the science of farming and marketing; and the politicians who now spoke for them in Congress stood in the presence of economic problems that could no longer be exorcised by the cabalistic phrases of Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, or William Jennings Bryan. Whether they could acquire new habits and discover new modes of agriculture was hidden somewhere in the depths of the twentieth century.

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The third phase of the revolution in agriculture was the subjection of the farmer to the processes of capitalist economy—a movement accelerated by the destruction of the slave plantation and the exhaustion of free land on the frontier. A striking characteristic of the old farming unit

had been its capacity for self-sufficiency—an ideal that was never fully realized, of course, but none the less gave a decided bent to rural life. Bread came from the corn and wheat fields; milk, butter, cheese, and meat from the pasture; clothing from the backs of the growing flock; wood from the forest; sugar from the maple grove; and leather from the neighboring tanyard. Horses and oxen raised on the farm furnished the motor power and a few simple and inexpensive tools made up the mechanical equipment. Of the annual produce a certain amount was sold to bring in cash for current expenses including taxes and some was exchanged at the village store for necessities not made at home. The essence of that system, like the economy of the middle ages, was production for use rather than for exchange or profit and the psychology of that mode of life inhered in all its transactions.

Into this order so often idealized by the sentimentalist, the American inventor and manufacturer thrust their instruments with ruthless might. Their reaper had started a revolution on the land before the Civil War and the range of its coming empire had been indicated by the establishment of the McCormick works in Chicago. But that crude affair, which merely cut the grain and left it unbound in piles, was superseded in the seventies and eighties by the automatic self-binder and later, in the Far West, by a machine that cut, threshed, and bagged wheat ready for market all in a single operation. In 1870, the chilled steel plow, light and durable, was made available at a low cost to farmers long accustomed to the heavy, back-breaking implement of ancient memories. Swift in succession came mechanical corn planters and wheat drills that drove from the fields the men who dropped or sowed grain by hand to the song of the lark. Corn huskers, shellers, riding plows, hay loaders, potato diggers, tractors, gas engines, and other prime devices of the inventor made a change in the cultivation of the soil scarcely less profound than that wrought by the spinning jenny, the loom, and the blast furnace in the methods

of manufacture. The man or woman with a hoe, bowed by the weight of centuries, now mounted a tractor and drove the furrow with the mechanical ease of the motorist. If, unlike the industrial operative, the farmer worked alone in the open country, still the automobile, telephone, and radio now gave him quick communication with the market, bank, and grange. Agriculture of the hoe and spade was reduced to a subordinate position in national economy.

Supplemented by other factors, the introduction of machinery made capital almost as important to the farmer as to the manufacturer. Formerly agricultural implements were simple and cheap, often home-made; for a thousand years the heavy hoe had served the Italian peasant; the ax, hoe, plow, and scythe had met most of the needs of the American farmer for two centuries. Then suddenly the bewildering variety of novel and expensive machinery was pressed upon him. He was urged to lay aside his scythe and cradle, which cost but a few dollars and lasted a lifetime, to buy in its place a self-binder which cost twenty times as much, was in need of constant repair, and wore out in three or four years of hard usage even if not left out in the rain and snow to rust and rot, as it often was. And as a matter of fact the farmer had no choice. The price of his grain in the market being fixed by the cost of production on the most fertile and best-equipped farms, he was compelled to buy machinery or to work for somebody who could, just as the handicraftsman had been at the start of the industrial revolution. Consequently the value of farm implements and machines per acre of land almost doubled between 1890 and 1910.

To the financial problems raised by the inventors were added economic difficulties springing from the rise in land values, especially after the closing of the frontier. So in the strategy of its advance, farming, like manufacturing, called for more and more capital, an ever larger investment to keep pace with competition—more debts and a closer reliance on banks and bankers. Swiftly and silently it became

capitalistic in nature and spirit without at the same time acquiring the social technology which capitalism had evolved to marshal its forces, command governments, break into foreign markets, scale debts by facile bankruptcy, and engage the services of experts in production, promotion, and sales.

A second capitalist tendency in agriculture was the drift toward specialization in crops—a drift aided by the introduction of machinery, the stimulus of business enterprise, and the pressure of competition. In this run of things, King Cotton was not only restored to his throne, but was given a still greater monopoly in southern rural economy than he had enjoyed in earlier days. According to the returns of 1866, the cotton crop was reckoned at less than a million bales; five decades later it had risen to more than ten million bales; and cotton culture had encroached on the fields devoted to other southern staples. At the opening of the twentieth century the per capita output of wheat in the southern states was far below the figure for 1860, the percentage of the total national crop falling even lower in the scale. In the reign of Andrew Jackson, six of the ten leading maize states were in the South; at the end of the century only three southern states were found among the ten that poured into the national market seventy-five per cent of the corn crop.

While cotton thus outstripped its competitors in the South, wheat and corn were conquering the Northwest. At the middle of the nineteenth century the center of wheat production was near Columbus, Ohio; before the Victorian age closed it had crossed the Mississippi and passed through Des Moines, Iowa, to a point seven hundred miles beyond Columbus. During this period the center of the corn area moved from southern Ohio five hundred miles in a westward direction. In the process of concentration the live-stock industry, once widely scattered on the farms and plantations of the seaboard and middle west, fixed a seat of empire in the Missouri Valley. Sustained by immense energies and huge accumulations of capital, the cotton, corn, wheat, fruit,

dairy, and live-stock industries now loomed like giants on the field of national enterprise. Now American farmers, dependent upon one or two specialties and forced to buy large quantities of supplies at stores, found their personal fortunes, like those of manufacturers and capitalists, linked with the caprices and casualties of domestic and foreign trade, though not yet primarily dependent on them. There was admonition in that for all who pondered on national destiny.

Especially distressing to those in terror about "the passing of a great race" was the rapid growth in tenant farming, a striking increase in land values, and the multiplication of farm mortgages. The old Jeffersonian ideal, never in fact realized, had been the division of the continent into single farm units worked by the owner and his family—people of North European stock—owing no tribute to any man. For a long time it seemed that this goal was within the range of possibility but the flow of facts finally turned against it.

The overthrow of slavery, unattended by any heroic effort to settle the Negroes on the soil, let loose a flood of landless people destined to wage labor or tenancy. By way of supplement, the closing of the frontier, the rise in land values, the advent of capitalist competition, and other pitiless forces drove northern agriculture in the direction of ancient servitudes. In 1880, the year of the first census of tenancy, twenty-five per cent of all the farms in the United States were tilled by renters; at the opening of the twentieth century the proportion had risen to thirty-five per cent and the curve was clearly upward. Throughout wide reaches of the country, from New England to California, the sons and daughters of the pioneer generation had moved to towns, throwing their ancestral homes upon the market for sale or rent; in Iowa, for instance, more than two-fifths of the farms were tilled by renters. No longer beckoned westward by free land, the ambitious farm laborer, bent on winning a homestead for himself, had now no choice except

to plod on through tenancy and debts to his goal; and if ill-health or crop failures fell to his lot, he remained all his days in the tenant class.

Great as they were inherently, the exigencies of the process were intensified by an invasion of laborers from other lands where different standards of life obtained—standards sometimes lower than those of the Americanized Negro. Poles and Italians from the Old World spread over New England and the Middle States; Indians from Mexico seeped out over the Southwest; Orientals, multiplying in spite of the bar on new immigration, redeemed waste places on the Pacific Coast. Those given to monitory gestures pointed to a day when the soil of America would be tilled by alien and colored races under semi-feudal tenures; with what degree of prevision no one could tell.

Even though about two-thirds of the farmers owned the land they tilled at the opening of the twentieth century, a large proportion of these more fortunate individuals labored under heavy debts which imposed servitudes on them no less real, if more euphonious, than the burdens laid upon the cottars and bordars of the middle ages. In 1910, the burden of farm mortgages stood at seventeen hundred million dollars; within another decade it leaped to more than four billions, a sum almost equal to the value of all the farm property in America seventy years before. It is true that, in no small measure, heavy indebtedness as well as tenancy represented an advance among farm laborers engaged in buying land and an increase in capital that spelled enlarged production. To some extent it was the outcome of the American mania for speculation; but viewed in the light of statecraft it meant that the early dream of a nation chiefly sustained by free, independent, home-owning farmers of North European stock had been exploded in one-fourth the time it took Rome to evolve from the economy of Cincinnatus to that of Augustus.

Nor was there any sign on the horizon of a turn in the sweep of agricultural enterprise. On the contrary an al-

most steady rise in land values under the new influences made more difficult the position of laborer, tenant, mortgagor, and owner. In the decade of the seventies in spite of the panic, they rose about forty per cent; in the decade of the World War they almost doubled. Naturally there were ups and downs; there were enormous depreciations in the South and East; but in the main each generation of laborers, tenants, and land-hungry immigrants in their toilsome battle upstream to ownership had to breast, especially between 1890 and 1920, a rising tide of capitalization. Every generation of farmers, whether owners or not, in competing with foreign agriculture, as well as in the struggle for a livelihood, had to carry an ever-mounting burden of capital charges. If the extraordinary demand for foodstuffs during the World War gave some relief to those who carried the load, the aid was temporary.

An epoch had come to an end and the iron gates were locked. Industrial capitalists were organized to make their own prices; industrial workers were organized to fix wages; whereas farmers, with the exception of a few powerful groups, were still incorrigible individualists at the mercy of the market. Throughout wide areas, the independent, self-sufficient farm unit of Lincoln's era had become a specialized concern producing for profit, forced to employ large capital in the form of machinery and fertilizers, compelled to compete with European agriculture on more equal terms, and obliged to carry the weight of an increment in land values which had mounted with the years. With energetic members of the younger generation escaping to the cities to share in capitalist enterprise, with new racial stocks occupying ancestral homesteads, with a remorseless competition determining the prices of produce, with industrial capitalists and industrial workers compactly united to dictate terms on manufactured commodities, the economy and culture of historic American farming were crumbling into ruins. Against that fact the rhetoric of Jeffersonian banquets echoed with strange hollowness; while orations on free

trade and the currency seemed almost as irrelevant as the admonitions of Buddha.

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A revolution in rural economy so vast and so deep-thrusting could not fail to cut great gashes in the texture of American sentiments and politics, changing the psychology of the countryside. In the days of frontier independence and self-sufficiency, a spirit of stubbornness and of more or less contented ignorance characterized farming communities. Often satisfied with the rough necessities of food, clothing, and shelter, they were likely to be indifferent to the amenities of science, art, and urbanity. Heirs of historic mythology, signs, omens, and rules of thumb, they remained, in the backward regions at least, the last bulwarks of magic and credulity. But assailed by machinery, science, capitalism, and education they could not hold to their ancient customs. When the lamp of science, kindled in the laboratory of the city, was carried to farm and plain and mountain cove, the tyranny of habit had to retreat before experiment and demonstration; guesses of wiseacres had to give way to reports of the weather bureau. With their own eyes farmers now saw, what Buckle long before observed in industrial affairs, that exorcism could not meet their daily needs—repair reapers, make balky engines run, or unite broken electric connections. Forced to become realistic by the demands of their craft, they commenced to discard folklore for the substance of science and technology.

By such routes, the farmers were drawn closer into all the currents of modern life; assimilated more and more to the mechanical process that was reshaping the whole world. As the capitalist and stockbroker took large risks in the hope of large gains, so the farmer now speculated in single crops and in land values with similar expectations. As the families of the cities raised their standards of living and increased their wants, the families in the country came under the same spell. Consequently the feverish search for

material possessions and a richer economic life thus engulfed the nation, reducing traditional differences between rural and urban types, and tending to create a standardized cultural unity from coast to coast. Italians on the stony hills of Connecticut, Negroes in southern cotton fields, Mexican Indians under the burning sun of Texas, and Orientals on the Pacific coast all showed signs of sloughing off age-old habits as they were swept forward into the irresistible stream. In fact no small part of the economic distress that overtook American agriculture from time to time was due to this rising desire for more worldly goods—a desire that would not brook the hard and barren fare of the European or Oriental peasant, baffled by severe economic limitations and held in place by church and state. When once the flame was kindled, no one could tell how far it would spread or how long it could be nourished by new fuel.

In the economic changes on the land were implicit new attitudes toward the state and society. It is true that farmers had figured largely in politics from the earliest time in America, but mainly as a negative and dissolving force. They finished the war on the British commercial empire which the American merchants had unwittingly started in 1765. They supplied the discontented members for Daniel Shays' rebellious army and afforded most of the opposition to the adoption of the Constitution. To them Jefferson appealed in express terms and their answer was the upheaval of 1800. To them Jackson appealed, after the notables had recovered some of the lost ground in an age of good feeling, and for a long time they formed whole battalions of Jacksonian Democracy, accepting the leadership of the planters in the war on capitalism. In the main it was farmers who started the independent movement that shattered the Democratic party and called into being the Republican opposition of 1856. If they had little love for the manufacturer who sought to place a tariff on their plows and cloth, they had less for the aristocratic planter who tried to block the way to free land in the territories. Confronted,

however, by the necessity for an alliance, the western farmers who established the Republican party on free-soil principles in 1856 found it possible four years later to effect a combination with the cotton spinners of Massachusetts and the iron founders of Pennsylvania, receiving, in the Homestead Act and other measures opening wide the treasury of western land, their share of the common rewards of victory.

But the Chicago union stayed no tide in the affairs of agriculture. The westward movement of the corn and wheat belt shifted the center of agrarian discontent from the first home of Jacksonian Democracy into new areas where at each recurring panic it flamed up again. The spreading monopoly of cotton in the South, the concentration of both planter and farmer on that one crop, linked the fortunes of those ancient foemen, adding another seal to the bond that made the Solid South—a seal that could only be broken in days of distress and agrarian upheavals. The creation of a huge tenant and debtor class, a class augmented at every cycle of depression, furnished the substance for the Greenback explosion of the seventies, the Populist revolt of the nineties, the Non-Partisan uprising of the new century, and the Farm Bloc of "normalcy." Although to the casual eye, the currents of unrest seemed to be revolving in a vicious circle, they were not in truth; for among the farm leaders there was a growing recognition of the fact that the ancient weapons of currency inflation and tariff reduction would not break the grip of industrial capitalists and industrial workers on the prices of commodities bought by the farmer or bring permanent prosperity to his class.

Casting about for other methods of improving their economic status, agrarian leaders decided at last to learn lessons from dynamic capitalism itself—to attempt a control of prices through the union of producers on the land and to make a positive use of the engine of the state in the promotion of their interests. Under their direction the National

Grange, founded in 1867, flourished, languished, and flourished again; at the end of half a century it could boast of a "powerful organization of farmers, active in thirty-three states, with its own press, its own body of organizers, its own lecturers, its own literature, poems, music, and traditions."

As in the labor movement there were special and general tendencies. While the industrial workers of the trades were drawing together in craft unions, wheat, cotton, and fruit growers also strove to stabilize production and control prices through the agency of organization. Though many of these efforts proved futile, others achieved permanent results. For example, a local association of orange growers appeared in California in 1888; it soon was followed by a district organization; in 1905 a federation was brought to pass; and in the course of a few years the California Fruit Growers' Association became as effective in its peculiar sphere as the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers in its domain.

By that time the country was literally covered by a network of farmers' societies, some of them founded on the stable basis of a special-product interest, indicating that the hour of federation had arrived. In fact, two efforts were now made to bring about a grand consolidation: by the establishment of the Farmers' National Headquarters, somewhat radical in tendencies, and the National Board of Farm Organization, more conservative in tone. Both favored an amalgamation of the agricultural forces throughout the country; both approved a plan for erecting a Temple of Agriculture in Washington to stand beside the headquarters of the American Federation of Labor. So at the opening of the new century a closely-knit farm lobby appeared in the halls of the people's Congress to jostle the elbows of labor agents and experts speaking for industrial capital.

Besides drawing together in unions and displaying an increasing consciousness of solidarity, farmers revealed a changing attitude toward the state—a resolve to use the

government for group designs. As is so often the case in history, the idea had long preceded the deed. George Washington, that practical farmer and persistent experimenter, urged, in his annual message to Congress in 1796, a federal appropriation to stimulate enterprise and experiment in agriculture, to draw to the national center the results of individual skill and observation, and to spread the collected information far and wide throughout the nation. But the seed sowed by Washington fell on barren ground. Hamilton's party, engrossed with subsidies, bounties, and tariffs in aid of commerce and manufacturing, gave no serious thought to the wise suggestion of the planter-President. Its competitor, the agricultural party, which swept Jefferson into power in 1800, felt satisfied with the existing knowledge and understanding or at all events preferred to leave the cause to state action and private patronage.

Accordingly for half a century after the adoption of the Constitution, the curious philosophy of Manchester held sway whenever the federal government considered agriculture: each farmer, relying upon his instincts and following his nose amid the commonplaces of life, knew what was best for himself and needed no aid from common effort and no illumination from universal experience. During this period, Congress gave no direct assistance to the agricultural arts and the states did little more than bestow an occasional blessing or a petty appropriation upon local agricultural societies.

It was almost by inadvertence that the first slight departure was made in an action recalling the initiative of that restless genius, Benjamin Franklin, who, while in England, had kept his eye open for better seeds, plants, trees, and domestic animals than the common stock afforded and had started the practice of sending good things across the sea. Inspired by this example, American consuls, after the establishment of the federal government, casually continued the custom; while the patent office in the Department of State on its own motion distributed the agricultural prod-

ucts sent in by its agents abroad. At last in 1839 Congress, largely in response to insistence on the part of the commissioner of patents, appropriated one thousand dollars for "the collection of agricultural statistics and for other agricultural purposes." From time to time small additions were made for chemical analyses, the assemblage of data, the purchase of seeds, and special investigations.

Nothing of note was done, however, until the swelling tide of farmers enrolled under the new Republican pennant swept into Washington in the train of Abraham Lincoln. While the manufacturers were then getting their share of the Chicago bargain in tariffs and other specific aids, representatives of the farmers, going beyond the terms of the Homestead Act which merely threw open to the plow more bare land, carried through Congress that very same year a measure creating the bureau of agriculture—and also the Morrill law dedicating an immense area of the public domain to education in the agricultural and mechanical arts.

The constitutional barrier now being forced, the course of federal farm legislation widened, slowly at first because many, who favored protective tariffs for industries, shrank from "class measures" in favor of agriculture. In 1884, the bureau of animal industry was organized and given a regulatory power over important branches of rural economy. Three years later Congress, by the Hatch Act, provided for the establishment of experiment stations in each of the once sovereign states. Two years more passed and the bureau of agriculture became a Department raised to Cabinet rank.

The agrarian drive was now on in earnest. It furnished a great deal of the momentum behind the passage of the federal interstate commerce law of 1887 aimed at the control of common carriers. Its power was reflected in the rural free delivery act of McKinley's administration, the irrigation act of 1902, the farm credits legislation of the Wilson-Harding régimes, the coöperative marketing act of silent normalcy—all of which bore the impress of the agricultural

solidarity. In the states as well as in the federal sphere, swelling pages of the statute books and mounting appropriations for boards and departments of agriculture recorded the insurgency of agrarian leaders. Before the twentieth century was well out on its course, farmers, while rejecting the doctrines of socialism, were, like all other powerful groups, in practice making use of the government to promote collective advantages and to force other interests into acceptable lines of action. Though the fickle tides of populism flowed and ebbed, the volume of farm legislation and the activities of administrative agencies showed no signs of retreat. Agriculture had passed out of the age of mere uproarious protest into the age of collective effort and constructive measures. That too was something to be observed by those who searched for omens.



## CHAPTER XXIII

## *The Politics of Acquisition and Enjoyment*

GEARED by constitutions and laws to the processes of the sun as in the age of the slave power, the American political machine ran on through the three decades of triumphant business enterprise, but driven by new motive forces and grinding out different legislative, executive, and judicial products. Whenever the earth had rotated on its axis the appointed number of times, members of state legislatures, city councils, and the House of Representatives were duly chosen by popular balloting, governors were elected, and a new President of the United States was inaugurated. At the close of each biennium, a portion of the federal Senators put off their togas to make way for successors designated by legislative caucuses. Whenever a judge of the Supreme Court at Washington died or resigned, another incumbent was nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

During those three decades, therefore, a veritable army of politicians strode in upon the floors of state houses, council chambers, and the national capitol, enjoyed a brief mo-

ment of power, and then dropped silently, most of them, into the deep valley of obscurity from which they had emerged. Seven men in due course sat in the presidential chair—Johnson, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, Arthur, Cleveland, and Harrison—and although a few Senators managed to retain their honors and emoluments for several terms, the personnel of that august body also altered swiftly with the running currents of time. Only the judges of the federal Supreme Court who held a life tenure offered a semblance of permanency; Field of California was in office from 1863 to 1897; Bradley of New Jersey from 1870 to 1892; Harlan of Kentucky from 1877 to 1911; but even they were not immortal and within a decade after Appomattox a new majority had been installed in the tribunal of John Marshall and Roger B. Taney.

In the transfer of the federal ship of state from one titular master to another, little consistency was shown in the selection of mates or crew. Indeed the nautical analogy is hardly appropriate at all; for instead of looking like a ship of state, built on the English model at least, with a captain premier and his cabinet mates theoretically commissioned to sail by a plotted chart, the American political vessel had the appearance of a loose-seamed and leaky scow, on which there were many captains and many mates contesting for cabins, rooms, and corners; and divided among themselves even as to the position of the fixed stars. During a large part of the time between 1865 and 1897, Republican Presidents faced Democratic majorities in the lower house of Congress. In Cleveland's first administration, a Republican Senate contended with a Democratic executive and a Democratic House for possession of the tiller. For only two years out of the thirty-two did the Democrats command both the political departments of the federal government; and never in all that time did they possess the citadel of the judiciary. For place and power in state and local governments, politicians also waged battles at regular intervals, in a guerrilla warfare even more confused. On a casual view, the whole

political world seemed without form and void, swept by gusts as wayward as seasonal winds.

With its fitful changes and its divided leadership the political machine presented a strange contrast to the business machine which worked endlessly, without periodic revolutions, controlled by a directorate that was unbroken in time and fairly united in purpose. In the economic world there was no electoral calendar. John Pierpont Morgan was born only a few weeks after Andrew Jackson left the capital for the blessed Hermitage in Tennessee; he entered economic life in 1857 when James Buchanan was in the White House; he was doing business as usual when Woodrow Wilson rode down Pennsylvania Avenue to his inauguration. John D. Rockefeller, born in the days of Martin Van Buren, was in active managerial life for more than half a century; in the span of his manhood years, he saw Buchanan, Lincoln, Johnson, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, Arthur, Cleveland, McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson, and Harding come and go. If few of Rockefeller's industrial generation ran such an extraordinary gamut, still all the giants of his time outlasted at least half a dozen Presidents and many of them left heirs-apparent to maintain through the coming years the unity of their houses. Thus, while political power was being shifted from party to party and dissipated among an ever-changing army of captains and subordinates, most of them nameless in history, the sovereignty of the business empire was kept continuously in the hands of a relatively few dominant figures whose grip was firm, whose experience was cumulative, and whose goal was clear.

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In the variable game of politics, two great parties according to American usage carried on the contest with the customary weapons. The Republicans, however, found themselves in a particularly fortunate position after 1865—a position far stronger than their predecessors, the Feder-

alists and Whigs, had ever occupied at any stage in their careers. On the right wing of the Republican party were, to be sure, the same elements that had supported Hamilton and Webster, namely manufacturers, financiers, and capitalists in general, but in this new era the captains of business enterprise were no mere handful of men struggling to maintain strategic citadels in an agricultural country directed principally by planters and farmers. In numbers and riches they were more powerful than ever. According to the measurement of dollars, the value of the mills, mines, railways, and urban property of the United States by 1865 had well overtopped the agricultural resources and continued to rise swiftly in the scale with the passing years as the petty manufacturers and bankers of the Whig régime gave place to a generation of giants in steel, copper, oil, and sugar. Moreover the scanty brigade of bondholders, such as the Federalists and Whigs had mobilized in their days, had grown into a militant army. In 1865, $2,700,000,000 in federal securities—thirty-five times the amount which Hamilton had funded and used as a buttress for the Federalist organization—was outstanding in the hands of public creditors, every one of whom looked to the Republicans, rather than to the Democrats, for the faithful discharge of interest and principal.

Other recruits, equally practical in their interests, added to the strength of the Republican right wing. The railway corporations which had received enormous grants from the public domain, not yet through with their business in Washington, had to adjust innumerable controversies with government officials over the fulfillment of contracts and over the titles of land seized or claimed by farmers or squatters; and fresh companies with fine projects on paper offered to build additional lines if adequate favors could be wrested from the Congress of the United States. With a ferocity that seemed to increase as the federal possessions diminished, individuals and corporations clamored for princely patents to timber and mineral resources, to ex-

ploit or hold according to the requirements of the traffic and the prospect of profits.

Last but not least, everybody who had any industrial property liable to be regulated or otherwise attacked by an agrarian legislature or a proletarian city council was, in the nature of things, drawn to the cohorts of the Republican right wing; for, according to American political practice, relief to persons, natural or corporate, thus adversely affected was provided by the Supreme Court at Washington —a tribunal not composed of Delphic oracles but of statesmen and politicians appointed by the President and Senate. It did not call for much knowledge of American history to discover that satisfactory judicial protection was more likely to come from the spiritual heirs of Hamilton, Marshall, and Webster than from those who wore the Gracchian mantle of Jefferson, Jackson, and Taney. Verily, it was a formidable combination of economic powers that gathered on the right under the ægis of the Republican party in the decades that followed the surrender of the planters in 1865.

On the left wing of the Republican phalanx was an immense body of farmers, more numerous, more prosperous, and more closely consolidated than the agricultural regiments which the Federalists and Whigs had assembled in days gone by. Indeed there was justification for the claim that the Republican party itself was agrarian in origin and that the capitalistic troops had merely joined it in 1860 in time to turn the tide of battle. At any rate, the union effected in Chicago in that year was cemented by the discharge of the agricultural terms written in the bond and strengthened by other factors, economic and racial.

It could be said with justice that millions of people owed their very homesteads to the bounty of the Republican party. It was also a matter of common observation that the frontier, which had furnished the crude substance for Jacksonian Democracy, was advancing westward and that the farmers of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Michigan were gathering in neat fortunes from the unearned increment of

rising values in land. In the best of times, a considerable portion of the farmers, perhaps as many as one-third, were able to save money, invest it in securities, and attach themselves through local banking enterprises to the higher ranges of the American system of acquisition and enjoyment. So agrarian calamities could come and go without breaking off from the Republican enrollment a formidable body of farmers whose sires had proudly worn the regalia of Andrew Jackson. From another direction the Chicago vincture was also heavily reinforced—by the German and Scandinavian recipients of Republican homestead bounties, recent immigrants who had never owed allegiance to the Democracy but had started on their careers with the Republican organization, unhampered by any former connections. Whenever they grew discontented with their party, they did not, as a matter of course, turn back with affection to the slogans and symbols of their first love.

The partnership of farmers and manufacturers, so formed and cemented, was strengthened by clever management on the part of Republican directors. At each recurring presidential election they remembered that the happy settlement at Chicago could only be maintained on a reciprocal basis. When dividing patronage and legislation, therefore, spokesmen of both contingents made concessions. In the general apportionment, the capitalistic wing usually thought it wise to give the presidency to the Mississippi Valley, once the fastness of Jacksonian Democracy where agrarian grievances might become virulent under neglect. Managers of that group had been shrewd enough in 1860 to put aside Seward of New York, an avowed imperialist, a high protectionist, and an uncompromising foeman of the planting aristocracy, in favor of Lincoln, the rail-splitter of Illinois; and they seldom forgot the lesson they learned on that occasion. So it was no mere accident that the Middle West furnished all the successful Republican candidates for the presidency between the close of the Second Revolution and the end of the century. Grant, Hayes, Garfield, Harri-

son, and McKinley were all born in Ohio; the only Republican candidate defeated during the entire period was Blaine of Maine.

In addition to the broad support afforded the Republican party by its host of embattled farmers were other popular elements arrayed on its side at the ballot box. A million northern veterans of the Civil War, nearly all organized into the Grand Army of the Republic, remembered that their Commander-in-chief, the immortal Lincoln, had been a Republican, and none of them, not even Democrats in the fellowship, could ignore the service of the Republican party in obtaining pensions for Union soldiers—pensions in generous totals amounting to more than half a billion dollars between 1879 and 1889 and over a billion in the succeeding decade. Neither could they fail to observe that Cleveland vetoed more pension bills in one year than all the Republican presidents from Grant to McKinley, incidents tending to confirm the veterans in their historic faith.

Equally reliable in their political orthodoxy were the million freedmen. Their shackles had been struck off by the Great Emancipator, a Republican, and to Republicans they owed the ballots in their hands. With an affection altogether natural, they remembered their debt on election day in the South as long as the whites would permit it, while their Negro brethren in the North, already free and enfranchised, voted their appreciation with ceremonial regularity.

By no means negligible in this enumeration of popular forces, must also be reckoned the host of federal office-holders who formed an industrious and vigilant rank and file for the Republican general staff. During the period from 1861 to 1897, the Republicans held the presidency for twenty-eight years, distributing the spoils of government almost without let or hindrance, even after the Civil Service Act of 1883 threatened to make inroads upon the patronage that fell to the victors.

To practical considerations were added ethical and senti-

mental factors. The Republican party had originated in an age of profound moral enthusiasm. If it did not win the allegiance of unconditional abolitionists, it did command the affection of many idealists, such for instance as James Russell Lowell and George William Curtis, who had denounced slavery day and night when it was neither safe nor popular to oppose that pillared institution. In the afterglow of victory the spirit of the crusaders descended upon party managers. "When in the economy of Providence, this land was to be purged of slavery," orators were fond of saying, "the Republican party came to power." In vain did the Democrats reply that the Republican party in 1861 had spurned abolition as poison, that it had offered to fasten slavery on the republic forever by a constitutional amendment, that it had accepted emancipation only as a desperate war measure, and that it had wrought the great moral achievement at the expense of the slave owners whose property had been confiscated. In vain did the abolitionists recall older days when some of the new knights in shining armor had thrown bad eggs at anti-slavery agitators. On any count the ethical issue was debatable and historical memories were short; so the Republicans were able to capitalize at par their services as emancipators.

Less controversial, indeed indisputable, was the declaration that under Republican auspices the Union had been saved and the Stars and Stripes kept floating in the heavens over a nation, one and inseparable, now and forever, fulfilling Webster's beautiful vision. Thousands of northern Democrats, it is true, had fought in the Union armies, and had served the national government faithfully in the darkest hours of its distress but there was something more than political fiction in the assertion of the stump-speaker that every soldier who fought under the confederate flag was a Democrat.

At all events in minds of a certain type the Republicans managed, by adroit appeals to war passions, to make party loyalty equivalent to national patriotism and voting the op-

position ticket identical with sedition. Though Democrats scornfully called that practice "waving the bloody shirt," it gave Republican spellbinders a sway over popular psychology which no Federalist or Whig had ever commanded. Year after year it appeared in campaigns, encouraging a wit, as late as 1884, to express the hope that they might "wring one more President" from the folds of that battle-stained garment. And long after martial sentiments began to wane, conflicts over reconstruction in the South, the use of federal troops in the elections, and the protection of Negroes in their civil and political rights aggravated the wounds of the war, making the "salvation of the Union" a long proceeding as well as a patriotic deed.

Another moral asset of undoubted potency in the Republican cause was the Lincoln tradition. The Emancipator had been a Republican; his tragic ending at the hands of a sympathizer with the South had hushed the savage voice of criticism; and around the solid substance of his deathless fame had clustered some of the sweetest memories and noblest traditions of American democracy. Lowell had shot a winged shaft with his words: "New birth of our new soil, the first American."

Besides such ethical resources, the Republicans had martial glories at their command—war heroes to offer to the populace as candidates for the presidency, not minor figures, such as William Henry Harrison who had killed a handful of Indians or Zachary Taylor who had overwhelmed bands of ragged Mexicans, but knights-errant of the first magnitude with General Ulysses S. Grant at the head. Again and again did the Republican directors in search of available nominees resort to the temple of Janus. And with telling effect, for every one of their successful contestants for the office of chief executive between the close of the Second American Revolution and the end of the century was a soldier of rank from the Grand Army of the Republic. Grant had saved the Union as the commanding general; twice was he elected to the presidency and almost

a third time. His successor, Rutherford B. Hayes, had been wounded on the battlefield and had been promoted to the status of major-general. James A. Garfield who followed Hayes had served with honor under the colors and had risen from the position of lieutenant-colonel to that of major-general. Then came a break in the martial roll; in 1884 the Republicans deserted the military list by nominating James G. Blaine who had been a mere member of Congress during the Civil War, only to meet defeat. Warned, perhaps, by this untoward incident, they presented General Harrison at the next election and finally for the last campaign of the century, they nominated Major McKinley.

Sustained by such forces, economic, ethical, and sentimental, the Republican party moved forward with confidence through the political calendar between 1864 and 1896. Neither the leaders of business enterprise on the right wing nor the farmers on the left embarrassed it by making impossible demands upon the directorate. In fact the requirements of the industrial captains were mainly on the negative side anyway. During the Civil War they had accomplished most of the positive designs for which Federalists and Whigs had struggled for generations, wringing from the distracted country, while the opposition was broken by the armed contest, high protective tariffs, a sound national banking system, generous land grants to railway corporations, and a constitutional amendment which permitted the Supreme Court to strike down state and local legislation dangerous to acquired rights—no matter how recent. Under the Homestead Act, supplemented by later Timber and Stone Acts, they could easily acquire any additional portions of the federal domain necessary to the profitable development of their enterprise. Beyond these things, they needed only one more great piece of positive legislation to complete the circle of their felicity, namely, a law establishing the currency system on a firm, metallic basis.

Having already won from the government substantially

all their historic demands, the prime consideration of leaders in business enterprise was to secure a liberal administration of existing statutes and the maintenance of *laissez faire* in the midst of law and order. Given the prevailing pattern of economic relations, it followed that the political program favored by the industrial baronage was simple in structure. Naturally it desired to see all branches of the federal government in the hands of its friends but it could make headway with a President and a Senate favorable to its requirements, even if it lost the House of Representatives.

The executive department was invested with a positive power of immense economic utility; if so disposed, it could operate the land office munificently, distribute the natural resources of the nation in generous fashion, and manage foreign policy with reference to the demands of trade. It could also wield a negative authority; the President had the legal right to veto acts of Congress; he nominated Supreme Court justices who, in the grand manner of jurists, could set aside legislative measures. With respect both to action and negation the Senate of the United States likewise had its uses; as the upper house of Congress, its consent was necessary to the passage or defeat of any new legislation and to the confirmation of the President's nominees for important public offices, including the federal judiciary. Fortunately for business enterprise, the machine for electing the President was cumbersome and costly to move; Senators were chosen indirectly by state legislatures; and federal judges were selected by the President and the Senate for life.

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Against this huge and formidable Republican combination, the Democrats, split by a furious dispute and separated into two factions for four years by a wall of fire, undertook to do battle in a struggle for the possession of political authority. Though they had constituted an overwhelming

majority of the nation when Lincoln brushed them out of office, they labored under severe handicaps in 1865. They were composed in rank and file of farmers and mechanics, who had never produced at the plow and bench leaders capable of coping with the industrial baronage.

In the old days the planters had supplied most of the high officers for the war on protection, ship subsidies, centralized currency, and national banks, but in 1865 there was no longer a united aristocracy of slave owners, rich, educated, and domineering, able to measure strength with corporation lawyers in the political forum. The surviving directors of the planting class had lost most of the economic substance that had once given lusty energy to their leadership and argument. Their property in slaves was gone, all gone, and they could not hope, like the clergy and nobility of revolutionary France, to recover a shred of it in the calmer days of reaction. Their property in confederate bonds was also gone—abolished by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. And other bitter dregs were in their cup. A large proportion of them were disqualified for voting and holding office until Congress saw fit to remove their disabilities; and that body was slow to forget the poignant sufferings of the four terrible years, loath to grant sweeping measures of amnesty. Besides losing their property and political rights, southern leaders, for many years, were mere residents of conquered provinces governed by soldiers under the authority of Republican Presidents in Washington, with the aid of Negroes. Though every confederate state had been nominally restored to membership in the Union by 1870, it was not until seven years later that federal troops were removed from the last southern capital; and it was not until 1898 that the last supporter of the Confederacy was fully restored to citizenship, spreading the mantle of kindly oblivion over the harrowing past.

As the business of party management required at least some money, leisure, and education, it was evident that the

Democratic masses would have to look to new quarters for direction; and they found it mainly among the merchants, lawyers, financiers, and office-holders of the eastern cities. From time immemorial importing merchants, ably assisted by editors of metropolitan newspapers sustained by advertising, had furnished nutriment for low tariff politics. There was no mystery about that: the more goods imported, the larger the profits.

Closely affiliated with the merchants were the bankers who brought over from Europe immense quantities of capital, principally for railway construction. Inasmuch as their imports, in the long run, came in the form of manufactured commodities rather than gold, they too looked with favor upon low tariffs, or at all events opposed a high protection which interfered with their business—with the free inflow of capital and outflow of agricultural produce to discharge the principal and interest. Even the railway financiers did not always see eye to eye with the manufacturers; they had little relish for tariffs on steel rails and rolling stock and it made little difference in their balance sheets whether the goods they hauled were imports or domestic commodities.

Thus it happened that, except on sound money and correct banking, capitalism was divided against itself. If the heaviest battalions were clearly on the Republican side, the Democratic masses could nevertheless count on securing a small directorate from the body of wealth and talent as long as they were willing to support sound money. It was, however, a timid right wing thus assembled, a contingent that could be easily driven out of the party or into retirement by an ominous action on the left.

In the matter of issues as well as leadership the Democrats suffered from embarrassments after 1865. The destruction of the planting aristocracy and the invasion of the Mississippi Valley by machine industry subdued some of the old zeal for immediate and unconditional free trade, to say nothing of tariff for revenue only. Moreover the south-

ern sugar planter, the hemp grower in the border states, or the wool raiser in Ohio, even though he might call himself a Democrat in principle, was as doughty in defending his particular infant industry as any cotton spinner from Massachusetts. So while many congressional districts sent ardent foes of protection in general to Washington, the directorate of the Democratic party had to be careful about defining the national battle lines too precisely, about a wholesale assault on the tariff. To attack the new banking system of 1863 after the fashion of the Jacksonian Democrats was also out of the question; for the financial wing of the party was easily frightened by menacing gestures of that sort. To strike at the industrial baronage with the implements of social democracy was likewise impossible because a program of that kind called for a revolution in the campaign curriculum, which merchants and financiers could not approve.

Committed by affiliations with agriculture to a creed of *laissez faire* adopted in the age of stage coaches and tallow-dips, having utterly rejected all doctrines of paternalism, the Democratic party, as things stood in 1865, could not readily endorse the kind of state interference required to scale the accumulations of the bourgeois by taxation or to hold down their earnings by regulation. In short, by its time-honored doctrines, it was pledged to administrative nihilism.

Casting about for presidential candidates capable of arousing popular enthusiasm, the Democrats ran into snags in every direction. They could not expect either the southern contingent or the lukewarm brethren of the North to endorse a military hero chosen from the Grand Army of the Republic. But they tried that expedient twice, once with General McClellan in 1864 and again with General Winfield S. Hancock in 1880, and in vain. Neither could they hope that their colleagues engaged in the mercantile and importing business would rally with enthusiasm around an agrarian hailing from the Valley of Jacksonian Democ-

racy, however much he might praise free trade; when they resorted to that stratagem in 1896, enlisting under William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska, they were simply routed.

Their best hope, so they reasoned, was to hover around the mercantile metropolis of the country when searching for available standard bearers. It was in the state of New York accordingly that they found Horatio Seymour, a gentleman of the old school, selected in 1868; Horace Greeley, the Republican editor whom they accepted in a forlorn delusion in 1872; Samuel J. Tilden, the able corporation lawyer presented in 1876; and Grover Cleveland, a "safe and sane" politician put forward in 1884, 1888, and 1892. Of the entire list, only Cleveland was able to lead them to victory—on one occasion a dubious victory at that—during all the years between Appomattox and Manila Bay.

In only one quarter and as a result of a gradual process did the Democrats capture a stronghold from which they could not be shaken in any crisis. That was the Solid South. In Hamilton's time a large regiment of prosperous lawyers and planters from that region, fearing like poison the radical agrarianism of Jefferson, had voted the Federalist ticket. Long afterward the social successors of the same class had gone with Webster rather than with Jackson, preferring the risks of high tariffs to the perils of a leveling democracy. Even in the fateful election of 1860, the South had been seriously divided. In only six of the fifteen slave states did the extreme pro-slavery candidate receive a majority of the votes cast; and throughout that section the moderate candidate, Bell, appealing to old Whig sympathies made a good showing: 42,000 in Georgia, for example, against 51,000 for Breckinridge. In a word, there was a marked cleavage between the seaboard planter and the upland farmer.

But in the clash of arms and reconstruction, it was largely overcome, except in the border states where a strong Union faction survived even that heroic welding operation. Faced by a military government directed by Republicans in Wash-

ington and supported by Negroes at hand, the white men of the South forgot ancient divisions in the presence of forces more formidable. Having determined to recover their dominion, their first task was, as a matter of course, to wrest the ballot from the newly enfranchised freedmen —the ballot conferred upon them by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, supplemented by various federal force bills for the supervision of elections.

This they accomplished, in the early stages, by forming secret societies, such as the Ku Klux Klan and the White Camelia which, by warnings, nocturnal visits, impressive parades in white hoods, and other methods, sometimes including murderous violence, managed to frighten great masses of the colored voters away from the polls, in spite of federal protection there. Very generally the freedman into whose hands the ballot had been thrust by the Republican victors did not care to risk his head in exercising his political rights, so that the mere show of force materially reduced the number of ballots cast against the Democrats.

Finding such tactics highly effective and the resistance of the northern Republicans weakening as the passions of the late war cooled, the southern whites moved from intimidation to legal procedure by writing into their state constitutions various provisions which lawfully deprived Negroes of the ballot, without disturbing the political prerogatives of the Caucasian race. Since the Fifteenth Amendment forbade them to deprive any person of the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, they hit upon devices of indirection. The most easily administered was an ingenious provision requiring the voter to read a section of the state constitution or a statute or "understand and explain it when read" by election officers. Negroes who experienced no difficulty in meeting this requirement might be caught upon an alternative, such as a tax-paying or property qualification on voting. And to let illiterate and poverty-stricken whites through the net, the inventors constructed the so-called "grandfather clause"—a

plan which admitted to the suffrage any man who did not have the property or educational qualifications, provided he had voted on or before 1867 or was the son or grandson of such person.

Although the federal Supreme Court finally annulled the grandfather clauses, the various restraining measures were strikingly effective, especially in the Far South. In 1896, for illustration, Louisiana had 127,000 colored voters enrolled; and under the reformed constitution adopted two years later the number fell to 5300. To make a long story brief, after 1890 there were at least nine southern states in which no Republican candidate for President could hope to win a single electoral vote. The South was solid. There were indeed from time to time desperate battles between the prosperous white planters and manufacturers and the populistic white farmers over state politics and seats in Congress, but only in crucial contests did either faction call upon Negro support or permit differences of opinion to cut down the Democratic vote for presidential candidates in local areas. Still, as time passed and manufacturing increased, Republicans lifted their heads in southern states, particularly in the industrial belt—indicating an economic thrust too strong for many old loyalties.

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The task of aligning party masses for hand-to-hand encounters in the political arena was further complicated by administrative factors thrown up in profusion during the era of business enterprise. All functions of government were now becoming more complex, the number of public officers was mounting, campaign funds from corporations were growing, railways, telegraph lines, and newspapers were multiplying—in combination making the work of marshaling voters, providing appropriate publicity, and managing party machinery more tortuous. In other words, the duties and emoluments of politics were increasing and the talent employed in party manipulation foliating in richer di-

versity. Entrusted with more devious exercises and sustained by larger treasuries, the directorate within each party, therefore, became more redoubtable, assuming after a fashion the nature of an economic estate or class, and enjoying the fruits of returns as sweet to politicians as the revenues of farms, railways, and mills to their respective recipients.

With his party institutionalized, the solemn obligation of the professional politician, high and low, whatever his campaign label, was to hold office if he had it and to get it if he was out of power, for without office he could collect no tolls, fees, or imposts. If to accomplish this purpose it was necessary to tack and trim, the requirement could be met by steering carefully between the sinuosities of indifference and indignation. As a result, directors of national, state, municipal, county, township, and village political engines often served those who paid them best and devoted little attention to the rhetoric of the orators as long as it was within the bounds of reason. If, perchance, the political managers of the two parties found their mutual trade in peril they could ordinarily make common cause against the menace—enter into conversations and understandings with a view to conserving their earnings.

Accordingly, in normal times, it made little or no difference to the Napoleons of business enterprise what party directorate commanded the field as long as the requirements of their political economy were met in a satisfactory manner. This fact, though generally known, was illustrated in a manner peculiarly picturesque during a federal investigation of 1893 when it was shown how the Sugar Trust gave money to both parties without prejudice. "The Sugar Trust is a Democrat in a Democratic state and a Republican in a Republican state?" queried the senatorial inquisitor. "As far as local matters are concerned, I think that is about it," replied the genial Mr. Havemeyer for the Sugar interests. "The American Sugar Refining Company has no politics of any kind. . . . Only the politics of business," continued the robust man of affairs.

Corroborating this testimony not long afterwards, an expert witness, an outspoken member of "the idle rich," Frederick Townsend Martin, remarked with charming frankness: "The class I represent, care nothing for politics. . . . Among my people I seldom hear purely political discussions. When we are discussing pro and con the relative merits of candidates or the relative importance of political policies, the discussion almost invariably comes down to a question of business efficiency. We care absolutely nothing about statehood bills, pension agitation, waterway appropriations, 'pork barrels,' state rights, or any other political question, save inasmuch as it threatens or fortifies existing conditions. Touch the question of the tariff, touch the issue of the income tax, touch the problem of railroad regulation, or touch the most vital of all business matters, the question of general federal regulation of industrial corporations and the people amongst whom I live my life become immediately rabid partisans. . . . It matters not one iota what political party is in power or what President holds the reins of office. We are not politicians or public thinkers; we are the rich; we own America; we got it, God knows how, but we intend to keep it if we can by throwing all the tremendous weight of our support, our influence, our money, our political connections, our purchased senators, our hungry congressmen, our public-speaking demagogues into the scale against any legislature, any political platform, any presidential campaign that threatens the integrity of our estate. . . . The class I represent cares nothing for politics. In a single season a plutocratic leader hurled his influence and his money into the scale to elect a Republican governor on the Pacific coast and a Democratic governor on the Atlantic coast."

Another factor which helped party directorates to avoid sharp and dangerous battles likely to unhorse them and deprive them of the emoluments of power was the fluidity of classes. Always a striking characteristic of American society, it was even more marked after 1865, especially as the growth of corporate enterprise worked for a wide and in-

visible distribution of ownership through stocks and bonds. In former days, when a southern planter rose solemnly in a political assembly, buttoned his frock coat over his bosom, and delivered his defense of slavery and free trade in Ciceronian periods, there was no doubt in the minds of his auditors about the nature of the play.

But in the new industrial age, statecraft became less obvious in its methods. When a gentleman garbed in fustian rent the skies with pleas for "the downtrodden people," there was no assurance that the raiment was not chosen for effect or that the orator did not have a strong box in a neighboring bank. Especially did lawyers crowding into politics help to blur the social dichotomy. Enjoying a certain leisure for party affairs, accustomed to rendering opinions on call, and supple in arguing causes, they were usually preferred as candidates, especially by captains of industry who were as a rule too busy or too disinclined by taste for the peculiar life of the forum. Indeed in the grand era of acquisition and enjoyment, it was the lawyer, with his special system of ethics, who appeared in leading rôles before the footlights on the political stage.

Thereupon, the substance of politics became too elusive for the eye of the inexperienced; what was going on behind the scenes was seldom fully known to the audience. For instance, until a scandal exploded the inner works, it was not disclosed that several powerful members of Congress who spoke earnestly on the urgent necessity for progress in the Far West during the sixties had handsome gifts of Union Pacific or Credit Mobilier securities safely laid away. To use a later illustration, until the agents of William Randolph Hearst purloined the papers in the case, the great American electorate was unaware that the Honorable Joseph B. Foraker of Ohio, who represented the generality of that state in the Senate and who wrote the Anti-Trust plank for the Republican platform in 1900, had received generous retainers from the Standard Oil interests. Neither did that electorate know that the Senator had received, while in of-

fice, a large sum from the same source for the purpose of aiding in the purchase of a Republican newspaper.

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If the professional members of political machines frequently softened the animosities of political warfare by acting as "honest brokers" between contending economic forces, they also occasionally added to its acerbity by scandalous and corrupt practices which furnished targets for the enemy. Whenever any political party enjoyed a long tenure of power in federal, state, or municipal offices, ringleaders were sure to accumulate large profits and hereditaments without regard for public decorum or at least without sufficient command over discretion. "What are we here for?" was the popular slogan of those who made politics itself a form of business enterprise. At Washington where the Republicans ruled the administration for more than two decades without interruption, the major delinquencies were assignable to members of their society; while in states and cities where the Democrats were in power, most of the letters of marque and reprisal were ascribed to them.

Year after year, in spite of the best efforts of those who sincerely desired clean ceremonials, scandals in high places broke out with distressing regularity at the national capital. After Jay Gould and Jim Fisk attempted to corner the gold market and brought about the financial crash of Black Friday in 1869, an investigating committee reported that President Grant's brother-in-law, a notorious speculator, had maintained a curious subterranean connection between the government and the conspirators. No one questioned for a moment the personal honesty of the President in the matter but he had undoubtedly been exploited in the operation. At all events, a few days before the grand "killing," the General and his wife had been taken by principals in the transaction to see Offenbach's La Périchole at the Fifth Avenue Theater, thus impressing intended victims by their access to

the presence of the mighty. Three years later came the unsavory exposure of the Credit Mobilier which involved many Republican congressmen of good standing; though the curtain was drawn with decent celerity, an inquiry revealed the Vice-President of the United States as a man who had sworn falsely to conceal improprieties.

Before another year elapsed, the most brilliant party leader of his era, James G. Blaine, was openly accused by the Springfield Republican of using his powers in Congress to favor high tariffs and railway corporations in return for monetary considerations. After ignoring the charge for a time, Blaine finally took notice of it, securing at the hands of a congressional committee an official examination conducted according to accepted use and wont. This inquiry failed to disclose corrupt actions on the part of the accused; but Blaine, besides exhibiting during the furor a bearing that was not conspicuous for candor and nicety, told, as the record showed, six separate falsehoods. More than that, he seized a collection of papers, known as the Mulligan letters, which, it was alleged, contained incriminating statements from his pen and, after reading in Congress what purported to be certain extracts from these documents, declined to show the actual dossier to the investigating committee. Though his Republican friends refused to believe that there had been anything improper in his conduct, the flavor of the affair was not exactly suited to an enlightened public taste.

The Blaine incident had not yet closed when the Secretary of the Treasury unearthed frauds in the collection of internal revenues from certain distilleries, revealing in the operation a "Whisky Ring" composed in part of high politicians thriving on profits derived from that form of economic endeavor. Additional inquiries made with the aid of the Attorney-General led quickly to the door of President Grant's private secretary, arousing the General once more to military wrath. When his secretary was brought to trial, the President voluntarily intervened to give testimony,

swearing that he had never seen anything in the conduct of his friend which indicated any connection with the Whisky Ring and declaring that he had "great confidence" in the integrity and efficiency of his assistant. In the end, although a few of the participants in the fraud were duly convicted and duly pardoned, Grant's secretary, sustained by high authority, was adjudged innocent and restored to his position in the bosom of the official family. But the respite was short, for into that privacy the scorn of the public penetrated, forcing the President's trusted servant to resign at last. Even in such an extremity, Grant's faith remained unshaken; nor did it fail later when the hunted man was indicted for an alleged connection with plans for breaking open a safe and getting possession of incriminating documents.

On top of the Whisky Ring scandal came startling charges respecting the Secretary of War, General William W. Belknap, accusing him and his wife of collecting for their private purse large sums of money from federal officeholders. Stirred to action by insistent rumors, a congressional committee took damning testimony on the subject in 1876 and promptly reported to the House of Representatives a resolution calling for the impeachment of the Secretary for "high crimes and misdemeanors while in office," buttressed by evidence so conclusive that the House approved it without a dissenting vote. Reading the handwriting on the wall, Belknap tried to escape his fate by resigning, to the "great regret" of President Grant; but the trial took place before the Senate in due form with distressing revelations marking every step of the inquest. At the close, thirty-seven Senators voted "guilty" and twenty-five "not guilty," some of the latter taking the ground that it was impossible to impeach a man after he had left office. In any case, the requisite two-thirds vote had not been obtained, so nothing came of the grand flourish.

Just as the interest in this affair began to wane, public excitement was renewed by a revelation of frauds in the car-

riage of mails over certain lines—roads marked by asterisks in the official records and popularly known as "star routes." It was shown by competent evidence that the men operating such lines were often paid more money than their contracts stipulated and that the secretary of the Republican national committee, which managed Garfield's campaign in 1880, had been the beneficiary of benevolence, if nothing more. Indictments followed. Some minor figures in the scandal, duly convicted, won a reversal of the verdicts against them on technicalities in the higher courts and all the prime actors in the drama were declared innocent. Distracted by the assassination of President Garfield, whose name had been unhappily dragged into the affair, the country heaved a sigh of relief on seeing the veil quietly drawn.

When the best aspect was put on all the untoward events which accompanied the triumphant march of business enterprise across the continent, a certain degree of resentment was felt by the more ingenuous masters of statecraft. In a great speech, delivered during the trial of Secretary Belknap, the Honorable George F. Hoar, a Senator from Massachusetts, soon to be a distinguished national leader, reviewed in a pathetic strain the grievous cases that had recently come to his notice. He had seen five judges of a high federal court driven from office by threats of impeachment for corruption or maladministration. He had seen four judges of New York impeached for corruption and the chief city disgraced throughout the world by the machinations of the Tweed ring. He had listened with astonishment to a demand from the chairman on military affairs that four congressmen be expelled for selling cadetships at West Point. Then he moved on to the worst. "When the greatest railroad of the world, binding together the continent and uniting the two great seas which wash our shores, was finished, I have seen our national triumph and exaltation turned to bitterness and shame by the unanimous reports of three committees of Congress—two of the House and one here—that every step of that mighty enterprise had

been taken in fraud. I have heard in the highest places the shameless doctrine avowed by men grown old in public office that the true way by which power should be gained in the Republic is to bribe the people with offices created for their service. . . . I have heard that suspicion haunts the footsteps of the trusted companions of the President."

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Inferior in pretensions to the misdemeanors committed in the national sphere by the machine politicians of the Republican affiliation, but no less commensurate with the facilities offered, were the deeds of state and municipal directors, frequently of Democratic proclivities. If the Republicans at Washington furnished flaming scandals as targets for their opponents, the Democrats in New York City proved themselves worthy rivals on a smaller stage. From the age of Jefferson forward, they had enjoyed an almost uninterrupted control of that growing metropolis while their directors were becoming firmly knit together in a sovereign association, known as Tammany Hall—a private society for good fellowship and charitable works, founded in the age of the American Revolution. Entering politics actively during the campaign of 1800, Tammany waxed fat from decade to decade, welcoming the poor immigrants who landed at the port, carrying municipal elections, and gathering in the spoils of federal and local offices. As technology revolutionized the city, as gas, transportation, and other utility corporations sought franchises and privileges, as the municipality undertook new functions in the interests of public health and safety, opportunities to make money out of the business of politics multiplied until even Clive with his Oriental imagination would have been dazed at their magnitude.

About the end of the middle period appeared a leader in Tammany Hall who was not hampered in his ambitions by any such moderation as stayed the hand of the English ad-

ministrator in India. This man was William Marcy Tweed. Born in 1823 in the city of New York, educated at a public school, introduced to ward politics as a fireman in a volunteer company, Tweed knew the local terrain as well as any general who ever won a battle. Carefully choosing the site for his operations, he had himself elected to the county board of supervisors which had large powers, distinct from those of the city government, in levying local taxes and spending money for buildings and improvements. On this board he served for thirteen years, four times as president, making it the point of vantage from which to effect an organization of kindred spirits in Tammany Hall for the purpose of controlling more places of power and pelf. By 1869, the Tweed group had possession of the mayor, the common council, the district attorney, the municipal judges, the legislature at Albany, and even the governor of the Empire State.

With reckless indifference to all amenities, Tweed and his band scooped in the rewards of their labors, multiplying the debt of the city tenfold in a decade and putting no small part of the proceeds into their own pockets. The construction of a county court house, which was supposed to cost a quarter of a million dollars, in fact involved an outlay of eight millions in which the city was charged $470 apiece for chairs and $400,000 apiece for safes in which to store valuable papers. In collateral transactions, huge sums were fraudulently paid out of the city treasury under the specious title of "general purposes," enriching politicians, contractors, and real estate speculators at the expense of the taxpayers.

According to all signs, there seemed to be no limit to the ambitions of Tweed's cohorts and indeed they might have gone on indefinitely if they had not fallen out among themselves over the division of the loot, creating dissensions which led to exposures in 1871. On the motion of a committee of indignant citizens formed to prosecute the malefactors, Tweed was arrested on a charge of having stolen

$6,000,000, convicted, and sent to prison. Escaping by connivance, he fled to Spain in 1875, only to be discovered, rearrested, brought back to New York, and kept in jail until his death soon afterward. Other members of the circle being also caught in the toils of the law, Tweed's inner Tammany ring, a closed corporation for exploiting the backward places of politics, was temporarily broken, to reassemble some years later under the more subtle and careful direction of Richard Croker.

Sensing opportunities highly attractive, if less munificent, politicians of other cities—Philadelphia, Chicago, Cincinnati, St. Louis, and nearly every municipality of importance—emulated the Tweed performance and evolved similar machines under Republican or Democratic auspices according to circumstances, with results alike in kind if not in degree. If, therefore, a Democratic orator pointed the finger of political scorn at Credit Mobilier or Star Route frauds, he was sure to receive in return a volley on the score of his own party's municipal scandals.

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With the advent of the political machine as a special form of business enterprise, farmers and mechanics, who had formed the bulwark of Jacksonian Democracy, found all the more intractable the task of forming an effective combination against the dominant Republicans. Indeed under the American system of government, it was hard for humble men of no wealth and little leisure to operate directly in any political theater larger than a town or county; the involutions of the organism were too labyrinthian.

Leaving aside the perplexities of state and local administrations, federal politics alone was divided into two great spheres—an upper and a lower. In the former took place the election of the President which required a huge, expensive, and unwieldy party machine. There also occurred the choice of United States Senators which involved neat management in the caucuses of state legislatures; and there like-

wise fell the selection of federal judges, which called for quiet ingenuity on the part of the appointing President, the confirming Senate, and their counselors. In this upper range, wealth, leisure, talent, finesse, discretion, negotiation, and a good press were the prime desiderata of statecraft.

In the lower sphere of federal politics occurred the operation of choosing members for the House of Representatives—a transaction conducted in relatively small districts, as a rule remote from the economic and political metropolis and attended by more or less activity on the part of the rank and file. Though in such elections there was usually pressure from above, the candidates for the House, being always brought personally into contact with the voters themselves, were forced to heed more closely the opinions and passions of the multitude.

It is only with reference to the upper and lower ranges of the federal government that the course and results of political warfare during the interval between the Second Revolution and the first inauguration of McKinley can be understood. In connection with the former were the presidential campaigns and elections which came along every four years, as required by the American political calendar, even though no vital issues called for popular judgment. Involving large scale exploits, they fell mainly into the hands of professional politicians who devoted their lives to their respective organizations and on both sides were consumed by the same desire to hold or to obtain offices.

Consequently caution was their supreme watchword. It is vain to search the Republican and Democratic national platforms between 1868 and 1896 for any clear-cut antithesis on any issues, economic or ethical. Democratic directors, as we have seen, could not in the nature of things agree to declare a holy war on the national debt, the national banking scheme, the protective idea, or the centralized currency system; while Republican directors, always under the necessity of placating their agrarian wing, could not be too intransigent on either side of the monetary question. In fact,

about the only substantial materials for political debate in the presidential campaigns of this period, apart from the waning war issues, were furnished by the scandals in the federal administration.

Naturally these outrages were odious to a large number of industrial barons who desired to see the process of economic development go forward with all the respect for legal proprieties that was possible under prevailing conditions. They were equally odious to a considerable estate of "intellectuals," comprising such high characters as James Russell Lowell, George William Curtis, and Edwin L. Godkin, all men of education and refinement. So unbearable indeed did the scandals become that some of the insurgents, calling themselves Liberal Republicans, broke from the party organization in 1872 and united with the Democrats on Horace Greeley as a candidate. In their desperate effort to prevent the reëlection of General Grant, they only met a humiliating disaster at the polls, which drove most of the dissidents, chastened by the experience, back to the Republican fold. Not more than a handful continued their independency—to be assailed for their "base hypocrisy and insincerity" by young Theodore Roosevelt at the beginning of his political apprenticeship.

After the ruin of the Liberal Republican movement, the rôle of organized opposition was left mainly to the Democrats. Unable, for reasons already given, to fuse all their factions on the old issues of free trade, localized banking, easy money, and their legal corollary, state sovereignty, the directors of that party devoted themselves in the presidential campaigns chiefly to the business of consolidating the elements that were discontented with the Republican régime. In 1876, they made a shrewd stroke of state by nominating Samuel J. Tilden, an able, conservative, and rich corporation lawyer of New York, sixty-two years old and beyond the age of dangerous political emotion, who, as governor of the state and as a private citizen, had fought valiantly against corruption in his own party and promised to purify politics

in Washington, if elected. With Tilden at their head, they almost captured the presidency in a contest with a "dark-horse" Republican of Ohio, Rutherford B. Hayes. Indeed, the Democrats asserted that they had in truth carried the country, pointing to the records which gave Tilden a plurality of the popular vote and claiming for him a majority of the electoral college. But, citing documents equally impressive, the Republicans asserted that Hayes was lawfully elected, precipitating on that account a dispute over the returns which raged for months while the fate of the candidates hung uncertain in the balance.

On any view of the case, the merits of the controversy were confused owing to the peculiar condition of several southern states, still disorganized from the effects of the Civil War. By both sides frauds were probably committed —or at least irregularities so glaring that long afterwards a student of the affair who combined wit with research came to the dispassionate conclusion that the Democrats stole the election in the first place and then the Republicans stole it back. Whatever the virtues of the contestants, the country was in an ugly temper for several weeks and civil strife again seemed imminent, when suddenly the managers in Congress agreed to submit the issues to a commission of fifteen. This special body, embracing eight Republican members who voted solidly on all crucial questions, surveyed the disputed election and awarded the palm to Hayes.

Having had enough strife for the time being, the Democrats acquiesced in a verdict which they detested, hoping that, on appeal, the voters would condemn it at the polls in succeeding elections. In due time they were permitted to rejoice over what seemed to be a rebuke to the Republicans, when in 1878 the people returned a Democratic House of Representatives and the state legislatures a Democratic Senate. But the emotions which produced this result were short lived; for two years later the same people, riding on a high tide of economic prosperity, elected to the presidency the Republican candidate, James A. Garfield, with a plu-

rality that could not be questioned in any tribunal, indicating that if any wrong had been done in 1876 it was hardly grave enough to demand reparation in the form of a political revolution.

At that juncture, however, fate turned the iron leaves in her book. Garfield was assassinated by a disappointed office-seeker and his place was taken by the Vice-President, Chester A. Arthur, a machine politician of New York who did not understand the Valley of Democracy and who could not keep in lockstep the federal office holders in the South, the "bread and butter brigade," as they were called at the time. When the campaign of 1884 approached, the Republican directorate was in a dilemma. Arthur was impossible; Grant lay upon his deathbed; and Blaine's public record, after every defense had been made and every apology uttered, was distressing for the reformers to contemplate. Nevertheless on the plea that Blaine had "earned the nomination," the coveted prize was given to him.

Now for the first time in their history, the Republicans in the quest for a leader had turned away from the Mississippi basin and selected as their candidate a man closely associated with that ancient demon—the money power. Besides that departure from tradition, they chose a statesman whose mercantile affiliations in politics had aroused the distrust of those reputable citizens whom Roosevelt styled the "most virtuous and desirable men of the great seaboard cities." The signs of the Republican zodiac were far from propitious.

At that very moment the Democrats were at last favored by fortune, in finding for their standard bearer a man of peculiar availability, Grover Cleveland. Though not born in a log cabin, Cleveland had made his way upward from poverty and could drink beer from the bar in a fashion approved by any mechanic in his party. Though his "moral character" had been impugned by Roosevelt, he had a general reputation for sterling honesty. He knew the ways of politics and had displayed his talents in that line as

sheriff and mayor of Buffalo and as governor of his state, one of the strategic commonwealths of the Union.

Beyond all question Cleveland was conservative—and from New York, where dwelt most of the mercantile and financial Democrats. His respect for acquired rights had been demonstrated by his refusal to sign a bill fixing a five cent fare on the elevated railway in New York City; and men of substance, especially those with no investments in protected industries, believed that Cleveland would prove trustworthy in most emergencies and conduct public business with due regard for proprieties. At any rate he was not associated with a demand for radical changes in the common run of usage; rather was he wholly innocent of convictions on that score. To complete the list of his political virtues, he had never held a post in the federal government and so had no irreconcilable enemies in the national sphere.

The whole burden of the argument for Cleveland could therefore be summed up in the ancient and persistently popular slogan, "Turn the rascals out," an appeal which Republicans answered in a manner fitted to the gage. From the beginning to the end the campaign was primitive in its tactics. Without respect for parlor etiquette, Republicans attacked the personal character of Cleveland, who was not devoid of frailties of course, who in fact confessed them; while in behalf of the Democracy a famous cartoonist drew a horrible picture of Blaine which in the eyes of decent citizens must have damned the author rather than the victim. And when the dust, smoke, and stench died down, it was found that Cleveland was elected President by a slight plurality, owing his success to a victory won in New York by methods which the Republicans called fraudulent—methods none too dainty even when viewed in the light of vulgar custom. At best the popular verdict was dubious, for the state legislatures kept an opposition majority in the United States Senate during Cleveland's entire administration.

Much to the chagrin of Republicans, the country survived

the shock of having a Democrat in the White House again after the lapse of twenty-four years, and the mills of the gods continued to grind as of yore. If the new President had cherished any plans for unique and constructive legislation, the Republican Senate would have checked him, making the security of the status quo doubly sure; but as a matter of fact Cleveland's attitude toward the state was that of classical negation with respect to business and his conduct of public affairs bore the stamp of his philosophy. Vetoes were the most significant feature of his presidency; he killed more than two hundred pension bills, thus destroying the hopes of many thousand Republican applicants; he struck down a great river and harbor bill, therewith snatching from contractors and commercial communities benefits which they had been taught to expect by long-established practice.

From the Republican standpoint, Cleveland's administrative acts were also mainly negative; for, within two years of his inauguration, he had removed four-fifths of the fourth-class postmasters, all the internal revenue collectors, and ten-elevenths of the collectors of customs—a veritable army of Republican politicians who, to use the language of the trade, had long "battened at the public crib"—and had appointed in their places deserving Democrats, to the great sorrow of the civil service reformers who had supported him at the polls. Broadening the range of his activities, the President wrested from corporations and private persons more than eighty million acres of public lands illegally obtained from the generous land office of the federal government during the benevolent régime of his predecessors. It did not entirely destroy the merit of such actions to point out, as his enemies were fond of doing, that they represented virtues exercised chiefly at the expense of Republican mesne lords.

In any case Cleveland soon accumulated a host of foes among those who lived by politics and near the end of his term he aroused consternation, real or feigned, in the hearts

of industrial captains, by assailing the moral principles of the protective tariff itself. That was the last straw; apparently the violation of a long-standing truce. In spite of more or less tinkering with the tariff schedules, the rates on the average had not been cut below the high levels established in the crisis of the Civil War. On their part, Republicans had been content to let well enough alone; while the Democratic national directorate, in its thirst for political power in Washington, had avoided making a direct attack on the whole system, after the manner of the forefathers in the day of Calhoun. So things stood in 1887 when Cleveland, taking a fresh view of the matter, announced in his annual message that the protective tariff, besides being vicious and inequitable, taxed every consumer in the land "for the benefit of the manufacturers."

If New York importers of capital and merchandise now rejoiced, the great industrial barons shouted for help like drowning men and the Republican managers made the most of the occasion. Putting aside Blaine, who was thoroughly weary of politics, they nominated Benjamin Harrison of the Middle West, a shrewd Indiana lawyer and a reticent politician who had committed no known indiscretions. To expedite his candidacy, they selected an efficient collector of campaign funds, who with charming simplicity asked manufacturers to contribute to the party war-chest on the basis of the benefits to accrue from Republican insurance against a tariff reduction. As expectations were large, the free-will offerings were generous. Cleveland was defeated.

Imagining that the old mandate had now been definitely renewed, Republicans set to work under the leadership of William McKinley in the House of Representatives to raise many notches the tariff which Cleveland had so recently condemned as exorbitant. Expecting for this achievement a chorus of approval, they were much astounded to find their work rejected of the populace. While the ink was still wet on the McKinley bill, they lost the congressional campaign in the autumn of 1890, and, two years later, they saw Har-

rison overwhelmed at the polls by his old antagonist, the author of the terrifying message of 1887, Grover Cleveland. They were even more amazed to learn that over a million citizens in the same election had repudiated both established parties—had voted the populist ticket and demanded something more drastic in the line of political action than the observance of obvious decencies in the process of acquisition and enjoyment, indicating that the end of a period had come.

If, at the close of thirty years of campaigning in the upper range of American politics, any Herodotus had inquired into the grand measures of national policy consistently advocated by the victorious candidates previous to their nominations, he would have met disappointing results. Grant had been a grim and silent soldier who knew little about politics before he took office in 1869; his opinions on the subject, such as they were, rather inclined him to the Democratic side; at least he voted the Democratic ticket in 1856 and would have done it again in 1860 if he could have acquired a residence in Illinois in time to cast a ballot against Lincoln. Hayes and Garfield were "dark horses," that is, they were nominated, not for their outspoken championship of noteworthy measures, but because the prominent figures in the party so split the convention vote that only politicians of the second order could be chosen. Cleveland had been sheriff of Buffalo county, mayor of Buffalo, and governor of New York but he had given little thought to national questions and with genuine feeling distrusted his capacity to fill the office of President. Harrison's chief asset was his descent from William Henry Harrison, the hero of Tippecanoe. Not one of these men was elevated to the presidency because he had formulated and defended in the theater of national politics a large or definite program of measures and policies. Indeed it was the very leaders associated with positive ideas and practices in the House and Senate who were deemed by party managers unavailable for a national campaign.

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Surface indications afforded by party platforms, official orations, and statistics of presidential elections did not, however, accurately reveal the political state of the Union in detail. The people were not as contented with the operations of party captains as superficial appearances seemed to imply; nor was the triumph of the Republicans entirely unmixed with bitterness. It is true that they carried every presidential campaign in this period except two and, saving two brief interruptions, commanded a majority in the Senate continuously; but they were by no means fortunate in the popular congressional tourneys. In that sphere—the lower range of federal politics—they lost more elections than they won.

Between the restoration of the last southern state in 1870 and Bryan's first battle twenty-six years later, the Democrats triumphed in eight of the twelve contests for the possession of the House of Representatives. And through all those years the Republican directorate was made still more nervous by the agitations of recalcitrant members on the left wing of the party, especially by the spokesmen of the agrarian West where the original union of capitalism and agriculture effected in Chicago in 1860 was attacked, first by the Greenbackers and then by the Populists. In short, in the lower ranges of politics, nearest the electorate, the old currents of agrarian and labor unrest continued to run as before the Civil War, now sluggishly, now swiftly, with the ebb and flow of business prosperity.

Although that armed conflict and the prosperity associated with it in the North for a time obscured former economic antagonisms and silenced insurgency in many quarters, what seemed to be a political peace was after all only a partial truce. The philosophy and sentiments of Jackson's farmer-labor party never vanished completely and when, in the garnering of the war's aftermath, the high prices of agricultural produce collapsed—while the interest and principal of

farm mortgages remained as before—and industrial workers were compelled to face severe wage reductions, historic schisms reappeared so plainly that all could see them. Everywhere among distressed farmers and suffering laborers in the cities, advocates of change and apostles of revolt once more raised their voices against the prevailing order of the rich, if not the well-born. In the councils of both established parties, in independent agitations, and especially in elections to the House of Representatives, where the popular influence more easily became effective, the spiritual descendants of humble Jacksonian leaders made their voices and their creeds count in the tussles of political life.

If most of the restless politicians who came to the front in this new age could find comfortable quarters and occasionally official berths in the left wing of an accredited party, there were always extreme innovators content with nothing less than a complete declaration of independence; and from 1872 forward at each successive presidential election one or two minor parties appeared: Labor Reformers in 1872; Greenbackers in 1876 and in the two following campaigns; United Laborites in 1888; and Socialists and Populists in 1892. In every case leaders of these factions made their appeal to farmers and laborers unhappy about their share in the annual output of wealth. Even the Prohibitionists who advanced a presidential candidate in 1872 on a single issue soon found themselves making professions of faith on economic matters and finally hopelessly split into petty fragments over the currency question. But none of the minor parties ever succeeded in establishing a permanent organization among farmer-labor constituents. The Greenbackers whose vote in the congressional elections of 1878 rose to the million mark and the Populists who fourteen years later cast more than a million ballots for their presidential candidate were equally powerless to effect a revolution in the American two-party system.

Against all efforts of new factions to get a firm foothold on the political stage many forces operated. As such in-

surgents usually rose in periods of economic depression, so they were generally overwhelmed by returning tides of prosperity. Subsisting on temporary distress and having no spoils of political preferment on which to maintain a skeleton army of officers in lean years, their capacity to resist adversity was pitifully inadequate to the demands of party warfare. Often their most princely leaders fell under the lure of comfortable jobs in the departments at Washington; Terence V. Powderly, for example, head of the Knights of Labor and once the terror of respectables gathered over their tea cups, was at last brought into the fold and lived to a ripe old age on a government salary. Others, less prominent, were frequently accommodated in state and municipal offices.

This process of attrition was also hastened by concessions from one or both of the canonical parties. True to the traditions of Jackson, the Democrats always made special efforts, particularly in congressional elections, to win votes in farmer-labor circles, while stalwart Republicans were sometimes stained green or red according to the favorite color of the current independency. Blaine, for instance, was accused by righteous eastern papers of wanting to inflate the currency for the benefit of farmers and McKinley was an ardent bi-metallist in his early days. Nor were the oblations from regular shamans always perfunctory. From time to time significant pieces of legislation were granted at state capitals and grand overtures were made at Washington, for reasons patent and unavoidable. As a matter of fact, in a country so closely divided between Republicans and Democrats all political leaders had to walk warily; a few thousand, nay a few hundred, votes shifted here and there meant the gain or loss of the presidency with all the honors, profits, and emoluments thereunto attached. So the astute managers of independent fragments were occasionally able to wrest substantial discounts from the harassed and anxious directors of the main spectacles and, still more prophetically, to set the issues for the coming decades.

Whatever their fortunes as organizations or political traders, the third parties as a rule included in their professions of faith certain large assumptions and a number of concrete items. Orthodox rebellion always required from them of course a condemnation of both old parties. "We denounce," exclaimed the United Labor party in 1888, "the Democratic and Republican parties as hopelessly and shamelessly corrupt and by reason of their affiliation with monopolies equally unworthy of the suffrages of those who do not live upon public plunder." The Greenbackers broke a lance on the august Senate of the United States, declaring it to be composed "largely of aristocratic millionaires who according to their own party papers generally purchased their elections in order to protect the great monopolies which they represent."

While condemning the major parties and their practices, the sectaries advanced from time to time specific articles of salvation. Collectively their programs embraced standard elements: the earliest possible extinction of the national debt —that ancient bugbear of Jeffersonian Democracy; the abolition of the national banking system—after the fashion of Jacksonian Democracy; the substitution of notes issued by the government—awakening echoes as old as 1765; the unlimited coinage of silver as well as gold to enlarge the volume of currency—a new statement of the ancient plan for easy money; the reduction of the tariff particularly on articles bought by farmers—a return to the state of things on the eve of Lincoln's fateful election; the regulation of railway and other public utility rates by government action—a departure from Democratic *laissez faire* for obvious reasons; the recovery of public lands from railway and other corporations that had been negligent in observing the law—to be turned over free of charge to farmers and laborers; inheritance and income taxes tapping the wealth of those who had come to the top in the struggle for existence—lightening the taxes on goods consumed by the masses; the popular election of United States Senators with a view to chang-

ing the economic composition of that body; woman suffrage as an act of tardy justice in keeping with the national creed; the defense of labor against the use of the injunction and military force in time of industrial disputes; and certain pieces of social legislation, such as the prohibition of the contract labor system and the exclusion of Chinese coolies. To such professions of faith must be added of course the larger generalities of the Socialist Labor party which made its appearance on the national stage in 1892 with a declaration that "man cannot exercise his right of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness without the ownership of the land and tools with which to work."

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If these proposals, which seemed so revolutionary when first advanced in "thunders on the left," found little or no favor in the upper sphere of American politics during this period, if they were not approved by Presidents, Senators, or Federal Judges, they were none the less popular in the lower range, in congressional elections and legislative debates. In fact, the record of orations delivered in the House of Representatives shows a continuous division over economic issues along the lines of the cleavage which existed in Jackson's day, often without respect for the symbols of established parties.

In that "people's forum," under various guises, the old struggle of farmers and laborers to get a larger share of the golden stream which flowed from industry was waged with all the rancor that had marked the controversies in the middle period and the Hamiltonian age. It is true that the battles usually ended in smoke; the contest over the Mills tariff bill in 1888, for example, evoked a flood of speeches which if printed in full would occupy at least twenty massive volumes and yet modified not a line in the statutes; but it was the debate, not the lawbook, that revealed the prevailing tempers of the multitude.

If the English parliamentary system had been in vogue in the United States, the Democratic masses that dominated the House of Representatives for sixteen out of the twenty-four years between 1872 and 1896 would have ruled the upper works—the Senate, the President, and the Judiciary—as well as the chamber of loquacity and effected more than one radical change in the Jacksonian direction. Under the American system of checks and balances, however, they could do little more than elect spokesmen to give vent to their feelings on the tariff, trusts, railways, currency, and other economic issues involved in the distribution of the annual national income.

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In these circumstances nothing disruptive could be done in the way of tariff reform. With the power of the federal government often divided between the two parties and with both organizations suffering from vexation on the wings, it was difficult to move the rates up or down. There were, to be sure, reductions in duties in 1872—quickly offset by increases—and there was another revision in 1883 when the Republicans, finding the treasury loaded with a surplus, decided to forestall action too sweeping on the part of the opposition. But Calhoun's historic doctrines had not a ghost of a show among the directors of the upper range of federal politics.

When the Democrats won the presidency and the House of Representatives in the election of 1884 and after long debates put a tariff-reduction bill through the lower chamber, their measure was promptly killed by the Republican majority in the Senate. Then emboldened by a swing of the political pendulum, the advocates of protection under the leadership of William McKinley tried an upward push. This new champion, as his biographer states, had become "the guardian angel, in the halls of Congress, of the industries of the country. . . . His father and grandfather were both manufacturers of iron, an industry which depended heavily

upon the protective tariff," and his district was full of industries that "had been started under the fostering care of protective duties." Carefully engineered by the "guardian angel," the bill of 1890 bearing McKinley's name carried the rates to a point far above the Civil War tariffs.

Against what they were pleased to call the Republican levy on their toil, importing merchants, angry planters, and discontented farmers now made a great outcry and in the elections of 1892 the Democrats captured both the executive and legislative departments. On the assumption that they had at last a clear mandate from the country, their left wing leaders in the House of Representatives drove through a bill that frightened manufacturers more than any tariff measure since the crisis of 1857—a project putting sugar, lumber, coal, iron, and wool on the free list while subjecting the duties on cotton, woolens, and linen to severe cuts. Going still further, they imposed a tax on the incomes of the rich for the avowed purpose of easing the burdens of the masses. Amplifying the sentiments of their proposed statute, the Democrats, in supporting the measure, made speeches that sounded like echoes from the tomb of Calhoun.

Exultant over their victory, they laid the fruits of their labor before the Senate, transferring the business to the higher sphere of American politics. When the performance was concluded in that chamber, the result was a measure—the Wilson bill of 1894—that resembled the design of McKinley rather than the patterns of McDuffie and Walker. Completely disappointed with this outcome, President Cleveland, who had now advanced to the point of declaring that "a tariff for any other purpose than public revenue is public robbery," refused to sign the bill, allowing it to become a law without his approval. Soon afterward a congressional inquiry into the pressure of interests on specific schedules spread an unsavory odor over the whole affair, convincing the left-wing Democrats that a revolution would have to be accomplished in the upper realm by establishing the popular election of United States Senators. This revision of the

work handed down by the Fathers was to be achieved in time.

If little could be done with the tariff by champions of reduction, still less could be accomplished in the enterprise of forcing down what the Populists called "the annual tribute levied by the trusts upon the people of the country." Although the directorates of both parties, in formulating national platforms, were either silent or inscrutable on the issues afforded by the new economic leviathans, the left-wing factions, true to form, were both vociferous and assertive. They filled acres of print with denunciations of corporate wealth and they offered a prescription which they deemed a remedy for the disease—the dissolution of all great industrial associations into competing parts, cutting prices for consumers.

In fact they were able to frighten the right wing into concessions with reference to this proposal and to force through Congress, in 1890, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act which, in impenetrable language, forbade all combinations in restraint of foreign and interstate trade. As a plain-spoken Senator from Connecticut remarked, no one knew what the bill would do to the trusts, but a majority agreed that something must be flung out to appease the restive masses.

In the general attack on corporate wealth which ran true to Jacksonian formulas, the managers and owners of railways came in for more than their share. They had made swollen fortunes in building, operating, and manipulating systems of transportation; they had granted rebates and privileges to favored persons and corporations; and they had fixed freight and passenger rates with an eye to large returns. By obvious methods of learning and reasoning, western farmers reached the opinion that the railway companies had received doles too generous from the government, had fallen into the hands of promoters bent on quick profits rather than efficiency, and were in fact heartless enterprises engaged in garnering "all the traffic would bear."

By the same logical route they arrived at the conviction that the shippers of grain were the chief tributaries to the strong boxes of the "railway magnates," especially in the West where "the long haul" was the significant feature of transportation.

From idea to action the road was not long. During the general upheaval of the seventies, farmers, already extensively organized in benevolent lodges known as Granges, managed to capture the legislatures of several states, notably Illinois, Wisconsin, and Iowa, in campaigns waged largely on railway issues. Once in possession of the local strongholds they enacted laws fixing rates for carrying freight and passengers and charges for warehousing grain, thus making known their determination to use political weapons in the contest over the distribution of wealth.

Immediately a shrill chorus of rage arose from the ranks of railway security holders. Speaking for their interest, the editor of the New York Nation, doubtless regarding rate regulation as an unforeseen tendency of democracy, declared such legislation to be in principle "confiscation, or, if another phrase be more agreeable, the change of railroads from pieces of private property, owned and managed for the benefit of those who have invested their money in them, into eleemosynary or charitable corporations, managed for the benefit of a particular class of applicants for outdoor relief —the farmers. If . . . we are going back to a condition of society in which the only sort of property which we can call our own is that which we can make our own by physical possession, it is certainly important to everyone to know it, and the only body which can really tell us is the Supreme Court at Washington."

For a time, that is, until competent adjustments could be made in the personnel of the judiciary, that eminent tribunal failed to make the expected answer. In fact in the first cases presented for hearing, it upheld the local rate legislation against the most vehement pleas of skilled railway lawyers. It refused, however, to sanction state laws hampering the

course of interstate commerce, thereby forcing the farmers to carry their agitation to Washington.

At the national capital, as indeed in their own communities, the agrarians received aid and comfort from manufacturers and business men of the middling order who had suffered from rebates, secret rates, and other discriminations at the hands of the railway companies. In a grand rush this powerful economic combination carried through Congress the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887—a measure couched in uncertain terms which were soon hopelessly buried in the glosses of the Supreme Court and rendered practically innocuous to those who had invested their money in railways.

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In this endless contest over the annual output that flowed from mill, mine, and farm, the battle over the currency loomed far larger than did the struggle over tariffs, trusts, or railways. This was entirely natural. From the uprising of Daniel Shays, indeed from colonial times to the latest hour, debt-burdened farmers with their eyes fixed on the volume of currency had sought to control it to their own advantage. If it was enlarged in generous proportions through the agency of a government in their hands, they could expect rising prices and the easy discharge of their obligations in interest and principal. About this reasoning there was no mystery.

On the other hand, capitalists who held mortgages and bonds drawing a fixed rate of interest were equally concerned over the amount and character of the money in circulation If the volume was restricted and the basis sound, they could count on receiving their interest and principal in dollars of the same purchasing power as those they had originally lent to their debtors. If, however, the volume was contracted or at all events not made adequate to the swelling currents of business, so the theory ran, prices would fall and the bondholder would reap the advantage of a return in dollars of

a greater buying power than those originally lent. There was no mystery about this exploit in logic either.

So the one party held that the government itself should issue all money and make the volume generous, if not immense; only on mathematical measurements did the gentlemen of this school have differences of opinion. With kindred inferences the other party looked favorably upon a steady currency, or at least one not too expansive, and declared that the emission of paper notes should be confined principally to national banks for the benefit of those who invested their money in that form of business enterprise. Whatever the intrinsic merits of the respective arguments, it was made manifest that in the struggle over the distribution of wealth a considerable stream could be deflected one way or another through the use of the government's power over the issue of money.

Until the eve of the Second Revolution, as we have seen, the party of easy money, with varying fortunes, had waged a contest that was on the whole highly gratifying to its leaders. The national banking system had been destroyed a second time and state banks were issuing currency with a more than generous regard for the requirements of the occasion. Then in a moment victory was snatched from the agrarians and all aspects of public finance transformed. During the Civil War, as noted above, the Republicans in Congress wiped out state banks of issue by one stroke and established on their ruins a national banking system. At the same time, however, the exigencies of war, as often happens in such cataclysms, made it imperative for the national government itself—still compelled to be tender to agrarian interests—to float immense quantities of paper money, not founded on gold, known as "Greenbacks." Thus, in spite of protests from advocates of sound money, the currency was inflated, prices were enhanced, and the northern farmers could rejoice.

When the internecine struggle was over, however, grave questions arose as to the future of this paper money. Was

it to be kept on its fiat basis, maintained in its existing volume or enlarged on the original principles? Was it to be ultimately cancelled or placed on a metallic basis? Naturally the agrarian section gave one answer; the investing section another, the latter with increasing influence in party councils. After a long and bitter struggle, Congress enacted in 1875 a law providing that, at the end of four years, the legal tender notes then outstanding should be redeemed in specie when presented to the treasury in sums of not less than fifty dollars. "Now we know," remarked a political wag, "that our redeemer liveth." The captains of business enterprises and the financiers heaved a sigh of relief. "By five o'clock," noted the Secretary of the Treasury on the day when resumption began, "the news was all over the land and the New York bankers were sipping their tea in absolute safety."

This news about the bankers happy at tea was by no means pleasing to the debt-burdened farmers who saw in resumption an act that forced them to yield a larger share of produce in paying each coupon due on their mortgages. With no little heat, therefore, they refused to accept the verdict as final and cast about for another method of attaining their ends. Fortunately for them there was upon the carpet at that very moment a second phase of the same issue, namely, the free coinage of silver into dollars.

In this matter also, legal as well as economic points were involved, for the Constitution gave Congress power to coin money and evidently contemplated the use of gold and silver. On this theory Congress had operated for many years without ever being able to get into the gold and silver coins the exact proportion of precious metal necessary to keep them circulating equally. If the gold in a gold dollar exceeded in market value the silver in a silver dollar, the former was hoarded and the latter alone used in business. If the balance tipped the other way, silver went into hiding and gold held the field. Frustrated by this problem in higher accountancy after more than one attempt to reach a precise

poise, Congress stopped the coinage of the standard silver dollar altogether in 1873, just as new mines were being discovered in the West and the volume of the world's silver was rising to an unprecedented level. For one reason or another the price of the precious white metal was now borne steadily downward until by 1890 silver was worth in gold only about half the price it commanded twenty years before.

This course of events led the advocates of easy money, defeated on the resumption issue, to begin a desperate fight to restore the silver dollar by compelling the federal government to adopt the free and unlimited coinage of silver at its old ratio to gold, sixteen to one, the proportion in force when the so-called "crime of '73" was committed. In making their demand, they denied that there had been an actual decline in the value of silver and alleged that in reality gold had risen because it had been given a monoply in the mints of all the leading governments of the world.

Applying the argument, they contended that the contraction of the currency—the elimination of silver and the adoption of specie payments for Greenbacks—had in effect lowered the price received for all products of labor and in that way had increased the real income of all who held mortgages, bonds, and other investments yielding a fixed return. With persistent reiteration they pointed out that the holder of such securities had been able to buy less than half a bushel of wheat in 1865 with each dollar of interest received and then, in the course of years, without any labor on his part, had seen his coupon dollar rise to the purchasing power of more than a bushel. In the meantime intense business depressions had added to the misery of the farmers during those troubled decades and when the crisis of 1893 arrived, their desperation, especially in the heavily mortgaged sections of the West and South, reached the breaking point.

A matter of such acute economic strife inevitably became a prime issue in the political arena, raising up advocates of free silver in the councils of both parties, especially in the

left wings. Naturally most of them came from the West and South—from agrarian districts far removed from the seats of the mighty; but even in the East some of the political observers thought they saw a certain justice in the plaintive argument of the farmer. Blaine, with the presidential aspirant's feeling for the temper of the West, once declared that the single gold standard would be ruinous for all forms of property except investments yielding a fixed return, and McKinley, who was later to march to battle for gold, clad in righteousness, was a bi-metallist until he was shown the rescript of those who directed his party. In fact, there was no lack of moderate men who believed that the gold standard was too narrow, tending to enrich the rich while bringing adversity to debtors of every class.

By 1878 those who held this view had become so numerous that the silver faction mustered a majority in the House of Representatives and, notwithstanding obstacles put in its way by a Republican Senate, carried a bill providing for a huge monthly purchase of silver to be coined into standard dollars and given a legal tender quality, even though lower than gold in value. Amplifying this measure, the same faction later enacted additional legislation requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase a certain amount of silver monthly for coinage and issue for it notes redeemable in either metal at his discretion. But in spite of these half-hearted efforts to placate the agrarian faction, silver with some fluctuations continued its downward course, or to use the language of the bi-metallists, "gold went soaring to the sky," making the circulation of the two metals on a parity increasingly difficult.

Opposed to inflation in any form, President Cleveland hastened the oncoming crisis by insisting, during his second administration, on the redemption of silver notes, as well as all other paper, in gold, though not legally required to do so, making it impossible to keep an adequate gold reserve in the federal treasury. Then powerless to stem the current which he had himself helped to set in motion, Cleveland

adopted the policy of selling interest-bearing bonds for the purpose of bringing gold to the reserve; only to see the precious metal brought in by bond sales immediately withdrawn by bankers in exchange for notes, creating a vicious circle. In the language of the silver orators, the President of the United States was as clay in the hands of New York bankers directed by J. P. Morgan; in the language of reputable economics both the politician and the financier bowed to natural laws.

This spectacle aroused deep interest in Congress. The populist faction demanded that, at least, the bond sales should be thrown open to the general public instead of being negotiated behind closed doors with the gentlemen of high finance—a petition which was granted, after considerable uproar, and with decided advantage to the government. Encouraged by this concession, the radicals then went on to urge that the existing law providing for the redemption of notes in either gold or silver be enforced and that the two metals be freely coined at the old ratio of sixteen to one, notwithstanding the disparity in their market price. To this extreme proposal, the conservatives replied by calling for the total repeal of the silver purchase acts and by condemning free silver as a form of confiscation made at the expense of bondholders and creditors in general. Beset on both sides by determined sectaries and forced to make a choice, Cleveland threw in his lot with the party of "sound money." And supported by right-wing Republicans, he induced Congress to erase from the statute books the troublesome provisions for the purchase of silver, bringing to a sudden end the business of selling bonds to get gold.

For this action, Cleveland was immediately denounced by partisans of the left wing as a traitor to the Democracy, a supine servant of high finance, the storm of criticism raging with increasing force when it became perfectly clear that the repeal of the silver clauses would bring no permanent relief to the panic-stricken country. In fact with the passing months, the intensity of the business depression deepened

and the falling prices of farm produce or, as the radicals contended, the rising value of gold coupons heaped still greater treasure in the chests of creditors. All over the South and West where the sound of the sheriff's hammer was heard thumping off the sale of farms and stock to meet mortgages foreclosed, farmers' families, driven from their homesteads, piled maledictions on the heads of those who sat comfortably veiled at the feast. The flame of popular wrath licked the very doors of Congress.

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Meanwhile in the dreary wastes of the industrial cities another cyclical paralysis was sending regiments of men and women into the streets unemployed and embittered, adding the discontent of the working classes to the unrest of debtor farmers. Falling wages exasperated labor and this in turn involved Cleveland's administration. The Pullman strike, we have seen, culminated in the dispatch of federal troops to Chicago by the President, armed intervention in the contest, and the imprisonment of the trade union leader, Eugene V. Debs, for disobeying a blanket injunction issued by a district judge. In vain did Debs invoke the Constitution and the right of trial by jury. The Supreme Court at Washington answered his appeal by declaring that in injunction cases a federal judge could issue orders, command the arrest of offenders, try without jury, and sentence to prison at pleasure; drawing down upon that puissant tribunal the wrath of organized labor.

During the very same year, the protection of the same Constitution was invoked by gentlemen in high places who objected to paying the new federal income tax laid upon them by Democrats and Populists in 1894. On their behalf, the Hon. Joseph H. Choate, who had recently steered John D. Rockefeller through the sinuosities of legislative inquiries, was employed to defend the rights of those who received large portions in the annual distribution of national wealth. In an eloquent plea the advocate warned the judges

that it was "now or never"; that the "communist march" must be stopped; that property demanded immediate and unconditional security in its rights. After some vacillation a majority of the Court came to agree with the eminent counsel and, looking into the sacred letter, found indisputable justification for blocking the communist march. "The present assault upon capital," said Justice Field in his opinion, "is but the beginning," such a fearful beginning that, in his judgment, it promised the arrival of a terrible day on which boards of walking delegates would be fixing taxes for the rich. The very thought was shocking to the judicial conscience and five of the judges united on rulings that substantially destroyed the income tax law.

A pæan of approval greeted their solemn determination —at least in certain quarters. "The wave of the socialist revolution had gone far," exclaimed the editor of the New York Sun, "but it breaks at the foot of the ultimate bulwark set up for the protection of our liberties. Five to four the Court stands like a rock." If the figure of speech was somewhat awry, the news was good. Equally jubilant, the editor of the Tribune saw, in "the influence behind this attempt to bring about a communistic revolution in modes of taxation," an un-American and unpatriotic effort to destroy domestic industries in the interest of foreigners—foreshadowing the day when the responsibility for such untoward incidents could be ascribed to the Russian Bolsheviks. "Thanks to the Court," the editor gravely continued, "our government is not to be dragged into a communistic warfare against the rights of property and the rewards of industry." In this light the incident gleamed from one angle.

But there was dissent. Four judges out of nine, looking just as carefully into the Constitution, failed to discover there the general justification so clearly visible to the majority of their brethren. One of the doubters, Justice Harlan, was venturous enough to remark that the decision was without warrant and calculated to give to "aggregated wealth"

a position of favoritism as objectionable as the dominion of the lawless. And the populistic press, supported by some metropolitan journals, including the New York World, flayed the majority of the Court in language that seemed horrible to those who had so recently received the benefits of its thoughtful protection—to say nothing of the old Republicans who but dimly remembered what they had said forty years before when the same Court had rendered the Dred Scott decision so pleasing to the slavocracy. In the West, Governor John P. Altgeld, in keeping with his principles, declared in so many words that the income tax judgment was on all fours with the Dred Scott opinion and that the Supreme Court and the other branches of the federal government were dominated by capitalists in 1895 just as they had been by slave owners before the revolution of 1861.

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That a great campaign of education or a foreign war, or both, were required to allay the distemper of the time was now apparent to persons of conservative inclination. The Populists had polled more than a million votes four years before and were making impressive gains among the masses of the Democratic party, disclosing an unflagging discontent with the empire of business enterprise which promised embarrassments for those at the center of things. Forewarned by flashes on the horizon, the directors of the Republican party made ready for the domestic fray by choosing the gold issue as the central theme and the protection of industries and the Constitution as the other grand object of desire.

At this juncture Marcus A. Hanna, a retired business man, weary of the routine of the counting house and enamored of Warwick's rôle, entered the lists in full panoply. By a liberal expenditure of money, judicious publicity, and an early management of Negro politicians from the South, he made William McKinley the man of the hour. On the

otherwise stainless shield of his hero there was only one fleck: McKinley had voted in Congress for the free coinage of silver and was widely known as a bi-metallist. But by prudent negotiation that conviction was overcome, and McKinley was nominated as the Republican candidate for the presidency on a platform favoring the gold standard and opposing the free coinage of silver except by international agreement. With the gravity that was his wont McKinley now appealed to the country to support him as the foe of the whole populist program—"that sudden, dangerous, and revolutionary assault upon law and order."

When the Democratic convention met in Chicago the nerves of the politicians in attendance were taut with excitement. For months the agrarian radicals of the West and South had been seeking delegates of their own kind and their labors had been crowned with success. Even the opening prayer of the vast assembly vibrated with "sympathy for our toiling multitudes, oppressed with burdens too heavy for them to bear." Every roll call, every vote revealed a triumphant majority for the left wing.

In vain did the faithful old guard on the right seek to stem the tide. David B. Hill of New York, whom the cartoonists loved to picture with a feather in his hat, labelled "I am a Democrat," marched into the arena, looking more like Robert G. Ingersoll's plumed knight than Blaine ever did, and with fitting eloquence stormed against free silver, income taxes, and criticism of the Supreme Court. Senator Vilas of Wisconsin stretched the tension almost to the breaking-point when he hinted at a possible repetition of the atrocities which had stained the French Revolution and with dark solemnity warned the convention that "in the vastness of this country there may be some Marat unknown, some Danton or Robespierre." But the gentlemen of the right addressed ears that were deaf, appealed to hearts that were as flint.

The climax came when William Jennings Bryan, "that Tiberius Gracchus of the West," as he was called, flung

the gage full and fair in the face of the enemy, naming defiantly those for whom he spoke—the wage laborer, the country lawyer, the cross-roads merchant, the farmer, and the miner—Andrew Jackson's farmer-labor cohorts—and summoning them with the zeal of Peter the Hermit to the silver standard, that waved above his head, in a fateful battle against the plutocracy. "It is for these that we speak," he said. "We do not come as aggressors. Ours is not a war of conquest. We are fighting in defense of our homes, our families and our posterity. We have petitioned and our petitions have been scorned. We have entreated and our entreaties have been disregarded. We have begged and they have mocked when our calamity came. We beg no longer; we entreat no more; we petition no more. We defy them. . . . We shall answer their demands for a gold standard by saying to them: You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns. You shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold."

Almost by acclamation Bryan was declared the nominee of the Democratic party. Cleveland was repudiated with contemptuous scorn; free silver was endorsed; injunctions in labor disputes were assailed; jury trial in such cases was demanded; and the Supreme Court was criticized for its income tax decision in language as shocking to the new guardians of the sacred covenant as that employed by Republicans in the Dred Scott affair had once been to leaders of the Democracy.

With the opposing forces sharply aligned, the great battle of 1896 was on. In due time, not far away, the country was to see a progressive income tax laid, bank notes issued on the basis of something even less material than silver, an inflation worse than that threatened by a fifty-cent dollar, a reform in the use of injunctions approved in high places, and innovations still more significant than the belligerent Democrats under Bryan's banner had yet imagined; but in the summer of 1896 all that lay beyond the sealed portals of the unknown. Now the roll of martial drums

called the country to take part in the most clearly defined struggle of economic groups since the first campaign of Lincoln.

Conscious of the real gravity of his task, Hanna, the director of Republican headquarters, as his biographer remarked, "hit the high places" in America's Via Appia, levied staggering assessments on those who feasted at the national banquet, and organized such a campaign of education, information, and effective influence as the American populace had never witnessed in all its history. Inflamed by a spirit almost as revolutionary in its intensity, Democrats on their side collected funds from the owners of silver mines and small contributions from the rank and file, and waged open and deadly war on the "plutocracy."

The rhetoric of the campaign was that of the battlefield, the pirate ship, and the cave of forty thieves. Democratic orators fumed against "English toadies and the pampered minions of corporate rapacity—the divinity of pelf." Republicans answered in kind. The editor of the New York Tribune found the inspiration of the Bryan faction in "the basest passions of the least worthy members of the community. . . . Its nominal head was worthy of the cause. Nominal because the wretched rattle-pated boy, posing in vapid vanity and mouthing resounding rottenness, was not the real leader of that league of hell. He was only a puppet in the blood-imbued hands of Altgeld, the anarchist, and Debs, the revolutionist, and other desperadoes of that stripe. But he was a willing puppet, Bryan was—willing and eager. None of his masters was more apt than he at lies and forgeries and blasphemies and all the nameless iniquities of that campaign against the Ten Commandments."

Since this was the language of cultivated and educated gentlemen, the argument of the street must be left to the imagination. Of course the magnificent passions of the occasion were sometimes refined, tempered, and clothed in economics and statistics; but on the whole the battle was waged without mercy to the bitter end. When the votes

were counted, it was found that a solid East and Middle West had overwhelmed Bryan, giving McKinley a plurality of more than half a million. The campaign of education had succeeded beyond all calculations—and there was soon to be a foreign war to clinch the results.

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The age of negation was drawing to a close. There had been seven presidential campaigns since Grant's election in 1868 and fourteen congressional campaigns. Yet when the outcome and aftermath were reckoned in terms of achievement written in the statute books, the results seemed meager in comparison with the efforts. All in all, between 1865 and 1897, there were put upon the federal law books not more than two or three acts which need long detain the citizen concerned only with those manifestations of political power that produce essential readjustments in human relations.

There were, it must be conceded, many laws pertaining to reconstruction in the South but most of these were either temporary in character or were quickly riddled by decisions of the Supreme Court and by illegal actions of white men resolved to be masters of the scene once more. In the realm of positive legislation the civil service act of 1883 imposed restraints upon the President's power over patronage so limited in scope that with the multiplication of federal functions the actual number of desirable plums for deserving partisans did not materially diminish. The interstate commerce act of 1887, hailed as a triumph of society over one branch of business enterprise, was cautiously administered by the executive department and adroitly interpreted by the Supreme Court; at the end of twenty years the act was hardly more than a scarecrow. On the open confession of those who passed it, the Sherman anti-trust law, signed in 1890, was nebulous in meaning and for ten years practically nothing worthy of note was done under its prohibitions. The income tax law of 1894, imposing tribute on accumu-

lated wealth, as already noted, was quickly struck down by the Supreme Court, standing "like a rock, five to four." If, as an apparent offset, farmers snatched a few favors in the silver purchase acts, they soon lost them all by defiant repeal. Labor received some crumbs from the table in the measures excluding Chinese coolies and prohibiting the entrance of European workmen under contract but through the wide gates of the eastern ports swift-steaming ships poured a swelling stream of unindentured labor from every part of the Old World—a stream more than sufficient to meet every need of business enterprise.

In every respect, therefore, the essential achievements of the Second American Revolution remained secure after the lapse of thirty years. On no front had there been a dangerous reaction; the tariff, the banking system, the currency sustained by the specie resumption act of 1875, and the accepted methods for disposing of the public domain stood unshaken by all the storms. Nowhere in the realm of practical politics did the philosophy and practice briefly characterized as Darwinism encounter any formidable doubters. And soon the gold standard law of 1900 was to lay the specter of Bryanism.

In this flow of things, even refractory state legislatures and city councils in the far corners of the provinces—likely to be the seats of agrarian and labor troubles—were subdued to the doctrines of use and wont prevailing in higher places, through the progressive development of the Fourteenth Amendment in the hands of the Supreme Court. When the power of local authorities to regulate the rates of railways and grain warehouses had been impugned before that high tribunal in 1876, in the famous Granger cases, a majority of the judges, whose memories yet ran back to the days of the stagecoach, upheld the sovereignty of the state, in an opinion containing the ominous line: "For protection against abuses by legislatures, the people must resort to the polls, not the courts."

Profoundly perturbed, but determined not to be thwarted

by any such ratiocination, utility corporations kept up the fight, allowing scarcely a year to pass without raising a new issue involving the right of state and municipal governments to regulate their rates and services. In learned briefs and prolix arguments, counsel for these harassed concerns warned the Supreme Court with emphatic repetition against the oncoming hosts of communism and anarchy—sending through American jurisprudence echoes of the Paris Commune of 1871—and demanded that the Court stem the tide by assuming the function of passing upon the reasonableness of all menacing legislation.

Time flowed irresistibly on. Judges died. New appointments were discreetly made by the President and Senate. The law grew. At length the great goal was reached in 1889 when a railway company called upon the federal Supreme Court to annul an act of the Minnesota legislature authorizing a state commission to fix freight and passenger rates—and received from the judges an answer in words that admitted no doubt: the question of the reasonableness of rates is ultimately a judicial question requiring for its determination due process of law and due respect for the rights of property guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Thereafter the validity and effect of the acts of all state and local governments, even village councils, touching the earning powers of business enterprise, might be determined finally, not at the polls, but in the council chamber of the august Supreme Court composed of judges appointed by the President and Senate and serving for life. Unlike the statesmen of the forum, these remote authorities spoke not as men but as justices, not their will but a higher will, not the language of the street and shop but the austere tongue of juristic technology. The age of miracles had not come to an end. Indeed all things seemed possible now that jurisprudence was brought into line with the political economy of giant industry.

# CHAPTER XXIV

## *More Worlds to Conquer*

THE renewal of the Hamilton-Webster system in the field of domestic affairs after 1861—protective tariffs, sound currency, centralized banking, and federal benevolence for business enterprise—brought with it a resumption of the old solicitude for the promotion of foreign commerce. If planters had lost their lust for new soil with the forfeiture of their slaves, manufacturers and merchants still had an appetite for new markets beyond the seas and officers of the Navy were as eager as ever to sail to fame and power in the wake of Commodore Perry. Even during the engrossing struggle of the Civil War itself, as we have said, the Republican administration did not overlook its obligations abroad to its constituents at home. The Pacific railway which opened a quick route through California to the "Gold of Ophir" and the coercive policy of Seward which raised American naval prestige in the Far East foretold greater events to come. And as industry advanced with lightning rapidity after Appomattox, as the domestic market was saturated and capital heaped up for investment, the

pressure for the expansion of the American commercial empire rose with corresponding speed. Irresistible forces were mobilizing; the parallax of economic realities was becoming clear to adepts at the center of things.

Fortunately for them, the President, as manager of foreign relations and head of the Navy Department, had a fairly free hand in caring for business interests abroad—especially in distant and backward countries. Only in case he had to call upon the Senate to ratify a treaty or the House for a vote of money in aid of his efforts did he arouse any popular hostility to interfere with the onward sweep. From the election of Lincoln to the triumph of McKinley, the process had moved forward.

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On the very day that Seward took office in 1861 he faced a crisis in the affairs of Mexico—a crisis created by the effort of Napoleon III to reap advantage from a civil conflict which had been raging in that unhappy country for more than ten years. Although superficially the new contest, like all previous revolutions in Mexico, seemed to be a war between kites and crows, it really bore a striking resemblance in several respects to the social upheavals which had racked Europe for centuries.

It was in essence an economic struggle between great land owners who possessed the soil and servile peons who tilled it—an antagonism of classes sharpened by distinctions of race, the masters of the country being mainly of Spanish origin and endowed with the fierce spirit of the old war lord, whereas the serfs were Indians in blood and subdued to bondage by force of arms. As in Europe during the middle ages, the clergy in Mexico were large owners of estates, drew princely revenues from the labor of the peons in their fields, and like their brethren of medieval times, added to their incomes by fees of many kinds and earnings from the administration of ecclesiastical courts in which important cases were tried. Affiliated with the lay and clerical

landlords was a substantial body of military men pledged to uphold the ancient heritage; and between the upper strata and the lower orders stood a middle class of merchants and professional men—a class too large to be completely ignored but too small to make a successful revolution akin to the conquest of power effected by the bourgeois of France in the eighteenth century.

As in Europe, the conflict in Mexico lay, in the main, between the serfs and the middle class on the one hand and landlords, lay and clerical, supported by the soldiers, on the other. In general too it ran true to historic forms. The peons and the intelligentsia in assailing the privileges of the landed proprietors resorted to the economic and legal devices of liberalism. According to their program, the Church was to be stripped of its estates, the feudal domains dissolved into small holdings, serfdom abolished, church courts suppressed, and the power of the monastic orders broken. For autocratic rule the liberals proposed to substitute trial by jury, religious toleration, freedom of the press, popular education, and democratic government. On the other side the lay and clerical landlords, in defending their economic rights, proclaimed themselves the protectors of religion, morality, the home, and legitimacy. In its constitutional aspects the struggle took the guise of a contest over federalism and centralization. The feudal party—landowners, clergy, and military men—championed the idea of a powerful government at Mexico City; the liberal element, finding itself dominant in some of the states, laid stress on the doctrine of local autonomy. Both parties were pacific or revolutionary according to the safety or jeopardy of their respective interests.

Just previous to the opening of the Civil War in the United States the struggle of these forces for supremacy in Mexico was especially keen. It broke out in open violence with the overthrow of the liberal government which had been set up under American auspices at the close of the war over Texas and California. And it ran through alternating

revolution and reaction until brought to a temporary close with the triumph of the popular faction under the leadership of Benito Juarez, a Zapotec Indian of remarkable talent and courage. Ecclesiastical courts were suppressed, the Church ordered to sell its estates in small lots to tenants, and the liberal constitution of 1857 put into effect. Now in their turn the conservatives took up arms against law and order, making Mexico the scene of a ghastly racial, economic, and religious war, until the party of Juarez, driven to desperation, overcame the reactionaries by a Herculean rally.

With its finances thrown into disorder by this struggle, the Mexican government felt compelled in 1861 to defer for two years the interest on its external debt, much to the irritation of European investors. England, France, and Spain were especially aggrieved; for their citizens, besides holding defaulted bonds, alleged that the Mexican government owed them enormous sums on account of property destroyed, relatives killed or injured, and private debts suspended. As usual, these demands were inflated, but Mexico was not strong enough to scale them down; so Juarez was compelled to approve British bills to the amount of $69,900,000 and Spanish claims computed at $9,400,000—exactions flagrant enough to make Captain Kidd weep with envy.

Still more unsavory were the French pretensions; if there had been any humor in international finance, many of their pleas would have been laughed out of court, especially a case hatched up by a Swiss adventurer, named J. B. Jecker. This stormy petrel of speculation, in 1859, negotiated a loan with Mexico to the amount of $15,000,000; bonds bearing the face value of $16,800,000 were issued and $1,470,000 was paid into the Mexican treasury. Thereupon Jecker went into bankruptcy, became a French citizen by connivance, and called upon the government of France to help collect the face of the loan. Sensitive to the tones of the Bourse, Napoleon III supported Jecker's demands

and finally broke off diplomatic relations with Mexico when Juarez refused to acknowledge any indebtedness in excess of the sum actually received on the bonds.

No doubt all the powers engaged in pressing claims on Mexico had legitimate grievances but other motives also influenced the conduct of the governments at Madrid and Paris. The Spanish monarch, besides being interested in a return of the clergy to their former high estate, cherished a vague hope that a reunion with Mexico might be some day effected. Far more ambitious and definite were the designs of Napoleon III. Having just got his crown through a coup d'état, he felt obliged to amuse his subjects by a vigorous foreign policy and remembering the adage of his illustrious uncle to the effect that France loved glory, he sought the bauble for her first in one place and then in another until he met his fate at Sedan. In the course of his checkered career, Napoleon conceived the idea of establishing a great power in Mexico under his patronage to offset the strength of the United States and add to the prestige of his family.

Without making all his motives clear at first, Napoleon associated himself in 1861 with England and Spain in an armed demonstration against Mexico, ostensibly to collect debts. When his partners in this undertaking discovered that they could get nothing out of it and withdrew entirely from the business, he cast off all disguise. The very stars seemed to be marshalled on his side. He was relieved of embarrassing friends; the United States appeared to be on the verge of dissolution; and the mastery of the New World might easily fall to his hands. It was a glorious dream.

After pressing upon the Juarez government demands which were wholly indefensible, including the notorious Jecker claim, Napoleon ordered his troops to start the march on the Mexican capital. Though the task proved surprisingly difficult and costly, his commanders cut their way to Mexico City in the spring of 1863, summoned a council of conservatives, and issued a proclamation calling

for the establishment of a Catholic empire in Mexico. An "assembly of notables," hastily collected, then formally invited Maximilian, a brother of Francis Joseph, emperor of Austria, to assume the crown; and the sovereign-elect, aided by Napoleon and accompanied by his young wife, Carlotta, landed in Mexico hoping for a magnificent ovation.

Scarcely had he reached his new capital when the glorious dream exploded. Instead of a united nation waiting to cheer his imperial eagles and rally about his throne, he found a divided and sullen country, torn by factional quarrels, monarchists more interested in recovering property lost in the recent revolutions than in building his house upon a rock and republicans already under arms in the field. Trying the wiles of conciliation in vain, Maximilian finally surrendered control to the conservative party and ordered rebels caught with weapons shot on sight—a fatal policy that made still more precarious his dubious title. Nothing but French arms sustained his shadow authority while events inexorably paved the way for his tragic end.

From the very beginning of this episode the government of the United States had watched the trend in Mexican affairs with anxiety. At first it could do little more than deplore and regret the course of Napoleon for it was itself engaged in a life and death struggle, but, as the fate of the Union unrolled, it spoke with increasing assurance. After the battle of Gettysburg, it addressed a curt note to the French emperor and, receiving in reply an invitation to recognize his puppet at Chapultepec, it squared away for action. In 1864, Congress by solemn resolution declared that "it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchical government erected on the ruins of any republican government in America under the auspices of any European power."

The next year, after Grant's triumph over Lee, the federal government, having concentrated troops on the Mexican border, politely but pointedly called on Napoleon to withdraw his soldiers from the western hemisphere. In

making this request, the State Department did not rest its case on the moral mandates of the Monroe Doctrine; it simply informed the emperor of the French that any attempt of a foreign power to erect a monarchy in Mexico was a menace to the people of the United States and it stood ready to say so with guns if necessary. Thus halted in his imperial game, the emperor of the French had to beat a retreat with as much grace as possible. As soon as the last French regiment withdrew from Mexican soil in 1867, the republicans in the capital seized the reins of power, captured Maximilian, tried him by court martial, and executed him. Carlotta, who had shared in his adventure and had outshone him in the arts of negotiation, lived on in Europe for more than half a century, insane from grief over the scenes of the Mexican tragedy.

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While removing the foreign menace from Mexico, Secretary Seward was revolving in his mind a project for acquiring Alaska from Russia. He had long believed that this territory was necessary to the extension of the American empire in the Pacific and he was afraid that it would, if neglected by the United States, fall into the possession of England. Happily for Seward's purposes, the owner of the coveted domain, the Tsar, occupied at the moment with a Slavic drive to the south which might bring him again into collision with the Mistress of the Seas, was also thinking of the possible loss of Alaska, and on due consideration he authorized his minister in Washington to negotiate the sale. On an evening in March, 1867, when Seward was playing whist in his home, the Russian official called to announce this news and to suggest the completion of the transaction on the following day. "Why wait till tomorrow, Mr. Stoeckl? Let us make the treaty to-night," said the American Secretary with alacrity; and sometime before dawn the document was completed and signed.

This preliminary out of the way, the next thing was to win the approval of the Senate and induce the House of Representatives to appropriate $7,200,000 to pay the bill of purchase. Without difficulty the upper chamber was managed but certain members of the lower house saw only foolish extravagance in the purchase of "a vast area of rocks and ice" at a time when the country was groaning under an immense war debt and still had millions of acres of undeveloped land in the West. Only by skillful negotiation sweetened by bribery was the money wrung from the national legislature and the treaty of transfer duly executed, adding to the American estate an area twice the size of Texas. Thus Seward, who had in 1860 forecast the march of events, beheld within seven years the realization of his plan for carrying the flag to the Arctic and pushing American dominion along the outlying islands up to the very gates of the Orient.

With equal zest Seward labored to fulfill his dream of expansion in tropical waters. Through the good offices of the Navy Department he negotiated a treaty for the acquisition of Samana Bay in Santo Domingo, another for the purchase of the Virgin Islands from Denmark, and a third assuring American control over the Isthmus of Panama; but the Senate, to his chagrin, refused to approve his agreements and the House of Representatives expressed its unwillingness to appropriate money for such undertakings. So Seward passed out of the State Department with his structure of empire commenced but unfinished. The southern planters, now that slavery was gone, had lost their fervor for expansion in Latin-America, and it required more time to educate the left wing of the Republican party to the imperialist view.

Unabashed by this setback, President Grant, coming to office in 1869, decided to see what he could do in imperial matters. Indifferent to Seward's defeat, the Navy Department had again asked for a base at Samana and local circumstances seemed to be more favorable to the consum-

mation of the project. At this moment the little republic of Santo Domingo was suffering from one of the periodical revolutions that had long vexed it; and taking advantage of the occasion, President Grant sent down a personal agent to sound the ground. Just what happened is not clear but when the curtain was raised this unofficial assistant emerged with a treaty providing for the annexation of Santo Domingo to the United States. It had been negotiated, it was explained, with a gentleman who bore for the time being the title of President of the Republic of Santo Domingo. Duly signed and sealed, the document was sent to the Senate with Grant's cordial approval.

To the amazement of its sponsors, the air of Washington was soon made heavy with charges and counter-charges. In the heat of the argument, it was alleged that the Dominican president who had signed the treaty was only a puppet held in office by American naval power and that at the bottom of the transaction lay nothing but naked aggression at the expense of a weak and helpless country. Though able replies were made on the other side insisting on the formal correctness of the procedure, the scheme for annexation was rejected by the Senate, amid much uproar.

Still convinced that his policy was sound, Grant continued until the end of his second administration to urge on his party expansion in the Caribbean. In his last regular message to Congress in 1876, he lamented the interference of the Senate with his designs on Santo Domingo and said that, had his first stroke of policy been approved, "the soil would soon have fallen into the hands of the United States capitalists." That was frank, to say the least, but the country at large was unresponsive and the United States capitalists for the moment had many other places for the profitable investment of their surplus.

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Not in the least discouraged by the defeat of his Caribbean policy, President Grant turned his imperial glance

upon the fair lands of Samoa, a tiny archipelago in the southern Pacific on the route from Honolulu to Australia. Those distant principalities, inhabited by untutored tribes, had been made known to America long before by merchants, missionaries, and whalers from New England; and in 1872, the year of Grant's second election, as if by accident, Admiral Meade of the United States Navy, while cruising in the South Seas, discovered a strategic center for sea power in the island of Tutuila. Without difficulty the enterprising officer secured from a native prince a treaty granting the United States a naval base at Pago Pago.

When the Senate at Washington, failing to appreciate the delicate diplomatic action, ignored the document, President Grant, pressed by "certain highly respectable persons," sent out a confidential agent, Col. A. B. Steinberger, a Quixotic gentleman with a past, to investigate the Samoan problem on the spot. With Gilbertian humor the redoubtable Colonel fomented a revolution upon his arrival, made himself prime minister, and placed the islands under American protection. When, once more, the Senate turned a cold shoulder on a tiny bit of humanity laid at its doorstep, a second uprising followed in Samoa, the American flag was boldly hoisted above the official thatch in the native "capital," and a high chief, Mamea, moved by some mysterious impulse, made a tedious and expensive journey to the banks of the Potomac. By princely artifices, accompanied by local aid, he at last obtained in 1878 a treaty which, among other things, ceded a part of his country to the Great White Father.

Before many moons had passed, troubles appeared in the offing. The Germans in Samoa, already enjoying the lion's share of the local trade and industry, redoubled their efforts to extend the blessing of Teutonic culture to the entire collection of islands, while their competitors, the English, ever mindful of business opportunities, likewise started a feverish expansion of their economic operations. In the meantime, the natives commenced to quarrel over the pre-

tensions of rival princes who had been aroused, abetted, and supplied with ammunition by their foreign friends.

For ten years mighty disputes and petty wars were waged over the "royal claims" of half-naked aborigines, over consular jurisdiction, and over such issues as the theft of some pigs belonging to an American half-caste known in the records by the name of Scanlon. During these lordly disputes, the Germans favored "King Tamasese" and the English, supported by the Americans, bolstered up "King Mataafa." There were protests and counter-protests; flags were hauled up and pulled down; national honors were insulted and apologies were demanded. Eventually things came to such a pass that the three great powers involved—the United States, England, and Germany—decided to bring their armed might to bear upon the tempest in the Samoan teapot. Their battleships were riding sullenly in the chief harbor of the islands and the air was tense with bad temper when an awful hurricane burst upon them like the wrath of God, destroying every vessel save one lone English steamer that managed to escape to the wide sea. After this calamity, the three governments concerned agreed to a truce and in 1889 arranged for a tripartite protectorate over the Samoan group.

If the high contracting parties hoped to establish peace in Samoa by this agreement, they were quickly disillusioned. The native king whom they made secure in his hut, far from being content with his estate, was highly incensed by the budget plan which allotted him an income of ninety-five dollars a month while assigning six times as much to a Swede employed under Christian auspices to administer justice in the kingdom. Local chieftains, excluded from the throne by the settlement, were still more unhappy. Though the revenue of the crown was small, they coveted the treasury as well as the title and they tried again and again, with the aid of alien adventurers, to wrest the tinsel throne from its lawful owner by armed revolts. In the fighting that accompanied their efforts, cruel deeds were committed by the

white soldiers employed to suppress them, adding anguish to Samoan misery. Without avail did Robert Louis Stevenson, then gradually dying at Vailima, protest against atrocities, perhaps with a certain tenderness to British concerns, and plead for peace.

As a matter of fact the invaders to whom Stevenson appealed were themselves torn by jealousies as bitter as those of the island natives—except when engaged in putting down uprisings against common authority. Their merchants struggling for the petty markets, their capitalists buying up native lands, their missionaries saving souls for the hereafter, their consuls sparring for fine diplomatic points, and their naval officers punctiliously watching with eagle eyes for imperial advantages filled the foreign colony in Samoa with gossip, intrigue, and rancor. So from one incident to another, events dragged on until the Spanish-American War when the seizure of the Philippines lifted the veil and revealed America as a world power to the esoteric circles of the domestic hinterland. Now ready for positive action, the Senate of the United States, ratified in 1900 a treaty disposing of Samoa. Tutuila and a few islets came under the Stars and Stripes; Germany got the remainder; and England was satisfied with concessions elsewhere —until the German heritage fell to her in 1919 as a fruit of the war for democracy. Thus by a procedure which seemed aleatory to some and inexorable to others, American suzerainty was established far away under warm southern skies. Probably not one citizen in ten thousand was aware of the fact but those who assumed the duty of taking thought for to-morrow knew full well the nature of the new obligations.

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In this sweep of Manifest Destiny across the Pacific, it was inevitable that the Hawaiian Islands should be brought into the fold. American relations with those islands had opened in Washington's administration. When the Colum-

bia, the first ship that carried the starry flag around the globe, rode into Boston harbor in 1790, it brought a Sandwich Islander to astound the Puritans. How their mouths gaped as Captain Gray turned out in state to call on Governor Hancock, escorting up the street the strange guest garbed in his helmet and cloak of flaming red! Into the ken of the Yankee trader swam a new opportunity to sell goods.

Soon afterward bold seamen, already accustomed to rounding the Horn, trafficking in furs along the west coast of America and trading skins in Canton for tea, silks, Chinaware, and nankins, put the newly discovered islands on their commercial routes—first as a stopping place on long voyages and then as a source of sandalwood so desired by the Chinese. From the closing decade of the eighteenth century onward, their trade with Hawaii prospered. In 1822, sixty New England whalers, while scouring the seas from Behring Straits to Tierra del Fuego, called at Honolulu; two decades later four hundred whalers cast anchor there in a single year.

In connection with the coming and going of many ships sprang up a brisk local traffic followed by an invasion of foreign immigrants. New England merchants opened stores; capitalists organized bands of workmen to cut sandalwood; and often a sailor, weary of the lash and salt pork on shipboard, deserted his command, fled into the interior, and settled down with a native wife to a softer life under genial skies. Among the motley throngs came also the fishers of men, the first vanguard of Congregational missionaries landing in 1820 to prepare the way for a conquering church militant. Hence, in the course of time an American colony grew up in Honolulu; warehouses, saloons, shops, residences, and steeples in the New England style rising beside the thatched huts of the villagers. With the Americans came Europeans of many nationalities, Chinese in their everlasting search for a new breathing space, and later the indomitable Japanese already too congested in

their narrow home. It was soon made patent that a struggle for possession of the islands was to engage the diplomacy of three continents.

The physical setting for this play was both weird and charming. Although the islands revealed their volcanic origin in the jagged mountains thrown against the skies and seemed like barren rocks from a distance, the appearance was deceptive. The larger members of the group, especially Oahu, the seat of Honolulu, were dotted with rolling fields and narrow niches of fertile soil. A semi-tropical sun and a misty rainfall brought forth a luxuriant growth of fruits and vegetables with little labor, while adjacent seas yielded fish in abundance.

Into this picture, the Hawaiians whom the white men found in possession of the little paradise fitted with strange exactness. Primitive in their culture, they wore scanty clothing adapted to the climate, and lived in a tribal state under a warrior-chieftain called by a stretch of courtesy the king. They were simple in heart and unvexed by literacy; if they lacked the virtues of civilization, they were fortunate in escaping most of its vices. And yet the idyllic picture drawn by sentimentalists was not altogether without blemishes. The masses were in fact bent to earth under a remorseless servitude; women were degraded almost to the level of the beasts in the fields; and the whole population was occasionally thrown into distress by intertribal wars.

Whatever their merits in the way of civilization, the Hawaiians could not possibly hold their own in a contest with pushing Yankees, thrifty Chinese, and tireless Japanese. Though they were converted to Christianity and taught to read and write, economic competition, whisky, and disease cut them down like grain before a sickle. And in the process the whites got control of nearly all the land in the kingdom, overcoming the cupidity and resistance of the dusky proprietors by the lure of money and pressures of various kinds. By 1890, most of the crown domain had been alienated by native statesmen and their "advisers";

more than half the real estate was owned by foreigners; and about two-thirds of the personal property was in alien hands—the Americans leading the British and the Germans in the extent of their holdings. At the end of five more years, the Hawaiians owned less than one-third of the land and only six per cent of the capital invested in commerce and industry. It was then boastfully claimed, perhaps with some exaggeration, that two-thirds of the sugar business belonged to Americans, many of whom were sons of missionaries, who had chosen the way of Dives rather than the thorny path of Paul.

Thus after a hundred years of promotion the land and the resources of Hawaii had passed under the direction of foreigners. In spite of the royal government maintained in the "palace" at Honolulu approximately five thousand whites, mainly Americans, were the real masters of eighty thousand natives, Chinese, and Japanese. In short, the fate of the Hawaiian Islands was already sealed. They were to become an imperial province inhabited by Orientals and directed by white capitalists, operating under a contract labor system more efficient than the old plantation methods of Virginia and South Carolina. It was equally manifest that the American flag would soon follow American economic supremacy.

Indeed as the interests of its citizens had multiplied in the islands, the government of the United States, in its upper range, had given increasing attention to the business of drawing them within its sphere of influence. More than once the State Department served notice on foreign powers to beware of treading on its preserves. In 1851 Admiral Du Pont, an out-sentinel of the American Navy, reported home that "the Hawaiian Islands would prove the most important acquisition we could make in the whole Pacific Ocean—an acquisition intimately connected with our commercial and naval supremacy in those seas." In 1875 a treaty with the ruler of Hawaii included a pledge on his part not to alienate any territory except to the United States;

and twelve years later a supplementary treaty gave Americans exclusive use of Pearl Harbor. Henceforward the State Department and the Navy kept their eyes even more firmly fixed on the star of destiny. During Cleveland's first administration, Bayard, the Secretary of State, outlined the policy of his office in this vein: "to wait quietly and patiently and let the islands fill up with American planters and American industries until they should be wholly identified in business interests and political sympathies with the United States. It was simply a matter of waiting until the apple should fall."

The maturing stage was hastened by the enactment of the McKinley tariff bill in 1890. That measure, while removing the duty on raw sugar imported into the United States, compensated domestic farmers and manufacturers by giving them a handsome bounty on the output of their fields and mills, producing on competitors in Hawaii an effect that was immediate and ruinous. Already the growth of the beet sugar industry in the United States had caused a depression in the islands and the McKinley law deepened it into a genuine distress, a calamity which pinched with special severity American owners of Hawaiian plantations and mills, occasioning a loss estimated by the minister of the United States at approximately twelve million dollars a year. "Unless some positive action of relief be granted," he said, "the depreciation of sugar property here will go on. Wise, bold action by the United States will rescue property holders from great losses."

There were, of course, other grounds for "wise, bold action." It was said that the native monarchy was corrupt, that better roads and sanitary arrangements were needed, and that Pearl Harbor should be fortified by the United States—an undertaking that would contribute to national defense and assist in a pecuniary way American contractors and merchants in Honolulu. Still it was mainly sugar that precipitated the crisis. "What do you think were the causes of the revolution?" asked the American commissioner after-

wards sent into the islands to conduct an inquiry. "Simply two cents a pound on sugar—to get some treaty or some arrangement with America," laconically answered a sugar planter from Lanai.

On top of the economic calamity induced by the McKinley bill came difficulties in local politics. The very next year after the passage of that measure, the Hawaiian Queen, Liliuokalani, gave the tree a shake which helped to bring down the ripened fruit. Having acquired in her youth a hatred for missionaries and foreign invaders, she started a policy of exclusion when she came to the throne in 1891. In keeping with her theories, she overthrew the constitution of 1887 which gave generous rights to aliens—rights wrung from her predecessor by substantial pressure—and then sought by various means to restore "the good old days," adding a ceremonial insult to the economic injury done by William McKinley.

Replying brusquely to the reactionary policies of the Queen, the foreigners in Honolulu, mostly Americans, fomented a revolution and upset her tottering throne. In the course of this revolt, American marines were landed from a warship conveniently at hand, a provisional government was erected, and the flag of Washington and Lincoln was hoisted by the United States minister, J. S. Stevens. These things safely accomplished, a commission composed of four Americans and one Englishman—to give it an international character—was immediately sent to the White House to seek annexation. On arrival there, the envoys were cordially received by President Harrison and within a few days a treaty adding Hawaii to the American empire was laid before the Senate.

There it rested when Harrison left office on March 4, 1893, surrendering control over foreign affairs to President Cleveland, head of the party founded by farmers and mechanics in the time of Andrew Jackson. Hearing that all the proprieties of international courtesy had not been observed by the American minister in Honolulu, the Presi-

dent dispatched the Hon. James H. Blount to the scene to investigate and report. After making a searching inquiry, Blount came to the conclusion that the American minister in Hawaii and certain associates of his nationality were the real authors of the upheaval which ousted the Queen.

In a final memorandum the Commissioner stated that the revolutionists had disclosed to Stevens in advance all their plans and had received in return assurance of protection. "They needed the troops on shore to overawe the Queen's supporters and government," ran the document. "This he agreed to and did furnish. . . . The leaders of the revolutionary movement would not have undertaken it but for Mr. Stevens' promise to protect them against any danger from the government. . . . Had the troops not been landed no measures for the organization of the new government would have been undertaken." Emphasizing the alien character of the coup d'état, Blount went on to say that, had the foreigners in the islands been excluded from voting, the plan for annexation would have been defeated "by more than five to one." If, as Stevens asserted, "politics" was involved in the Commissioner's inquiry, there was no uncertainty as to the real character of the revolution.

On receiving the findings of the Commission, Cleveland was much embarrassed. He was a bit awkward in dealing with ironies which European chancelleries could lightly turn into pleasantries; but he plunged into the current, instructing the new American minister at the capital of Hawaii to negotiate in a friendly spirit with the deposed Queen. When, in accordance with his orders, the envoy called at the royal establishment, he found Her Majesty obdurate, fully determined to get her throne back, to cut off the heads of the "traitors" who had overthrown her rule by violence, and to confiscate their property.

A painful pause ensued. The Cleveland administration, desiring to be just to the intransigent sovereign and yet unable in the nature of things to surrender American citi-

zens and property to her tender mercies, resorted to a policy of delay until the Queen, finally persuaded that everything would be lost by insistence on what she was pleased to call her "rights," came to terms, promising amnesty and full pardon to the participants in the recent rebellion. By that time it was too late.

On July 4, 1894, an appropriate day, the party of revolution in Honolulu, having resolved not to lose by diplomacy what it had won by action, declared the independence of the Hawaiian republic and as a sovereign state sought recognition by the powers. Faced with this stern fact, Cleveland put aside the original idea of saving the primitive monarchy and, after a month elapsed, cordially greeted the new nation, to the utter consternation of the moralists who had thus far applauded his course. After all, its government had been in existence more than a year; it had kept order—with the assistance of American forces; and reasoning from events, Cleveland thought it entitled to recognition "without regard to any of the incidents which accompanied or preceded it," thus summarily dismissing the ethical questions that had formerly vexed him. Secretary Bayard's fruit had fallen and it was to be picked up in due season: the Hawaiian Islands were to be annexed to the United States when the Spanish War made Manifest Destiny a little more manifest to the American nation.

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If circumstances produced a vigorous foreign policy in Mexico, the Caribbean, Samoa, and Hawaii during the years that followed the overthrow of the planting aristocracy, the affairs of Europe on the whole, by way of contrast, called for suavity and moderation. American citizens had little or no money invested in European enterprises and for nearly half a century there were no disturbances in the Old World which seriously jeopardized American commercial interests in any quarter. It is true that more than forty

wars were fought in this period by various European powers, but most of them were brushes on the frontiers of expanding empires in Africa and Asia—British, French, German, and Italian.

Even the graver Franco-Prussian War of 1870 failed to ruffle the academic calm of the State Department; for during its course neither party assailed American commerce by ruinous blockades or reprisals and at no time did the balance of power seem to be disturbed by the shock of battle. In any event the people of the United States, remembering the recent attempt of Napoleon III to establish an empire in Mexico and sympathizing, in the main, with Germany, saw no ground for intervening in the struggle or traversing the verdict. Generally speaking, American newspapers rejoiced in the downfall of Napoleon and looked upon the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany as an act of justice, taking in this matter the same view as the London Times.

In its necessary dealings with European powers during this period the government of the United States, therefore, had little reason to make radical departures. On various revolutionary occasions it simply recalled the sentiments of former days: long ago the American public had cheered the Greek revolt against Turkey; and Louis Kossuth, fleeing from the wrath of Vienna, had been cordially received by applauding multitudes, by Daniel Webster as the Secretary of State, by the President, and by the houses of Congress. The traditions still lived and it was easy to refer to them. When, for example, Napoleon III was overthrown in 1870, President Grant recognized the third French republic within forty-eight hours. Again when the Spanish monarchy was upset by revolt three years later, our minister at Madrid, on instructions from the State Department, paid his respects to the new republic the day after its proclamation, only to be chagrined by its early death.

All this was true to form. Catholic influence in Washington had as yet reached no substantial proportions and

in none of the revolutions was the principle of private property impugned; at any rate in these acceptable convulsions no American investors lost any large sums of money. Moreover as a matter of fact the several gestures to revolutionary movements in Europe were platonic in character. When, for instance, Paris, London, and Vienna asked Secretary Seward to join in a formal protest to the Russian Tsar against his cruel treatment of the Poles after their uprising in 1863, the Secretary declined to intervene, remarking in passing that, while American institutions, founded on the rights of man, were the hope of revolutionists everywhere, our influence should be moral rather than physical. The number of Russian Jews in the United States was still small.

Other interests, however, other manners. When in 1880 the great powers of Europe held a conference about the division of the Morocco estate, the government at Washington gladly accepted an invitation to join in the deliberations and the Senate ratified the settlement devised by the diplomats. An American representative four years later shared in the discussions of the Berlin Congress which dealt with the economic affairs of the Congo Free State and the trading rights of other countries within the territory of that anomalous corporation. Though fair beginnings in international coöperation under the auspices of a Republican President moving in the higher ranges of observation, these adventures, especially participation in the Berlin conference, were harshly attacked by spokesmen of the left wings in the House of Representatives; and President Cleveland, wearing somewhat gingerly the mantle laid aside by Jackson, flatly advised the Senate in 1885 not to ratify the Berlin agreements. When a second assembly was summoned on the same subject at the German capital, he declined to do more than permit American agents to appear as observers and the Senate merely ratified the conventions respecting slavery and tariffs. It was thus made evident that the impacts of domestic partisanship were to be felt in the realm of

foreign affairs even if politics was supposed to stop at the water's edge.

Though Cleveland shrank somewhat from formal association with European governments, he seemed to welcome an opportunity to give Great Britain some curt instructions on the Monroe Doctrine. Relations with that country were running smoothly when he assumed office the second time in 1893—unmarred for twenty years by any untoward incident. The hostile feelings aroused by the negligence of the British government in allowing the construction of confederate cruisers in British ports during our Civil War had been allayed. It is true that England at first disclaimed responsibility in the matter but, eventually induced by the unremitting insistence of Washington to approve a project for arbitrating the issues, she accepted the decision of the high court agreed upon—the Geneva Tribunal of 1872; and paid with a gracious bow the lavish award to American claimants in spite of her legitimate objections to some aspects of the decree. In this manner the controversy came to a peaceful ending and the conversations of the two governments returned to the formal amenities of diplomacy.

Not until the summer of 1895 was the placid current broken by another clash of any moment and this new brawl, for such it was, arose over a collateral issue: an appeal from Venezuela for assistance in a dispute with London about the western boundary of British Guiana. Asserting in its memorandum that England was in fact trying to extend her dominions in the New World, the government at Caracas maintained that it was entitled to claim protection under the shield of the Monroe Doctrine. Regardless of the merits of the argument, the plea fell on sympathetic ears in Washington, inducing the Secretary of State, Richard T. Olney, in July, 1895, to make upon London a demand that the quarrel be submitted to arbitration—a demand couched in the language of a decree rather than an invitation and accompanied by remarks of a magisterial

quality which, if they had come from the English foreign office, would have raised a furor in America. "The United States is practically sovereign on this continent," Olney informed England, "and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or good will felt for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized state, nor because wisdom and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable against any or all other powers."

The pretensions of this manifesto, clothed in diction not unfamiliar in London, brought from the English government a direct reply denying the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine to the matter in question and declining to arbitrate the issue. Then, applauded by belligerent sections of the populace, not excluding large Irish contingents in New York and Boston, President Cleveland entered the lists. In a message inviting Congress to create a commission for the purpose of ascertaining the truth in the boundary controversy, the President announced in vivid language that it would be the duty of the United States "to resist by every means in its power, as willful aggression upon its rights and interests," the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands which, "after investigation, we have determined of right belong to Venezuela." Lest there be some doubt as to the strength of this resolve, the President served general notice that war was better than "a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor."

To the surprise of every one who watched the course of events, the British foreign office, evidently impressed by Cleveland's determination and knowing that the aid of the United States might be needed in a coming conflict with Germany, did not meet the President's message with a coun-

terblast. On the contrary when the American commission began work, the English government, knowing that its case would brook daylight, courteously replied to all requests for information on the boundary question and in the end agreed to arbitrate the whole controversy.

As things now turned out, this concession required no great sacrifice for, when the matter was finally reviewed by an impartial tribunal, it was found that the British claims in South America were, on the whole, well-grounded. So the affair closed happily for all parties. England got her land. Cleveland had the pleasure of vindicating his version of the Monroe Doctrine and pulling the Lion's whiskers a bit in the bargain. Moreover, he made it obvious to the world that, while he could not set the seal of his approval on transactions of dubious correctness in Hawaii, he was no pacifist; he was prepared to have American soldiers make the supreme sacrifice to prevent "wrong and injustice" in this hemisphere.

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An opportunity to apply the high principles announced by President Cleveland in this case was also offered in a still graver controversy not as far from our shores as Venezuela. At the very moment when the quarrel with Great Britain was becoming acute, another one of the periodical revolutions that had long plagued Spain broke out in Cuba —the usual uprising of peons on the land and working people in the towns against the Spanish upper classes sustained by church and state. The immediate and efficient cause of the revolt was an economic crisis.

For several years the chief industry of the island had been the cane sugar business and it had been suffering from the increasing competition of beet sugar manufacturers in Europe and the United States, the output of European beet sugar alone rising from two hundred thousand tons in 1850 to nearly four million tons in 1894. And instead of offering relief to her Cuban planters in their deepening distress,

Spain forced them to endure discriminatory tariffs on their imported manufactures, tariffs that maintained at a high figure the prices of their purchases while their buying power in terms of sugar was being diminished—all for the plain purpose of keeping business in the hands of Spanish merchants. In its extreme application, this colonial policy resulted in the carriage of goods from the United States to Spain, the payment of handsome profits to local traders, and shipment back across the ocean to Cuba. Only prosperous planters exploiting virgin soil for a strong market could bear such a heavy burden and Cuban planters were far from prosperous when the last decade of the nineteenth century arrived.

The breaking point in this strain came with the passage of the Wilson tariff bill at Washington in 1894. Ardent reformers in the House of Representatives, as we have seen, without reckoning on the bloc of high protectionists in the Senate, had planned to put sugar on the free list but, under the leadership of Senator Gorman of Maryland, cane-sugar Democrats, beet-sugar Republicans, and tariff warriors of the McKinley discipline united in forcing through a bill that placed duties on low grade sugars and "compensating rates" on refined sugars. In its effect on the Cuban sugar business, the Wilson law was ruinous; taken in connection with Spain's tariff policy, it spread swift disaster among Cuban planters and their laborers, a process explained by the American minister to Spain in two sentences: "There can be no doubt that the economic crisis which followed that event *(i.e.,* the passage of the Wilson bill) precipitated the present revolution. When exposed without mitigation to two systems of hostile tariffs, at a time when the price of cane sugar had been reduced by competition to a very low point, the Cuban producers threw up their hands in despair and the bands of laborers thus deprived of work were the first to swell the ranks of the insurgents." The next year, 1895, all Cuba was aflame with revolution and the usual atrocities were committed on both sides, the

intensity of the contest making them more numerous and more horrible than ever. Almost immediately a Cuban junta of agitation was established in the United States to carry on propaganda and to purchase on shaky credit, at high prices, American munitions for the insurgents.

Substantial interests were now rudely disturbed. American trade with Cuba was practically destroyed by the paralysis of economic life in the island and American investments in Cuban plantations and mills were being wiped out by war and pillage, thereby furnishing abundant fuel for the moral fire kindled by the sensational press in the United States and the revolutionary committee on public information. It was true that there were crimes equally hideous to be discovered in many other parts of the world at the time but none were so widespread; none were so near to American shores; none could command such generous resources for the manufacture of opinion. In accordance with the nature of the case, the Cuban revolt had not advanced very far when a shout for American intervention on behalf of an oppressed people began to run up and down the land.

To this outcry President Cleveland paid no heed, assuming for the government an attitude of correct neutrality and denying to the insurgents the status of belligerents. Enlarging upon this pacific policy, he sought to bring the revolution to an end by officially tendering the services of the United States in mediation—an offer which Spain declined with a polite hint that her gratitude would be forthcoming if the Americans would cease aiding the rebels with money and munitions in violation of international law. Winning few supporters at home by his program of peace and rebuffed by Spain in his effort at conciliation, Cleveland, now repudiated by his party on the silver question, relapsed into the position of a passive observer of Cuban affairs, remaining in that attitude until the close of his term.

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On its return to power in 1897 under the leadership of McKinley, the party of business enterprise gave a new tone to American foreign policy. In their national platform of the year before, the Republicans had declared in favor of using influences and good offices to give peace and independence to Cuba and had taken note of the fact that Spain was unable "to protect the property or lives of resident American citizens," referring to economic interests which included more than fifty millions in invested capital, sixteen million dollars worth of damages done, it was alleged, to American citizens, and a trade reaching approximately a hundred millions annually.

Between the summer of 1896, when this Republican manifesto was issued and the inauguration of the McKinley administration, affairs in Cuba went from bad to worse. Correctly gauging the pressure of property in certain American circles and bent on ruining Spanish landlords, the insurgent general, Gomez, made a fine point of destroying sugar plantations. In retaliation the Spanish general, collected men, women, and children from the areas of disturbance and concentrated them into wretched camps where they died like flies. Horrors succeeded horrors. And when transmuted into American news, they made the blood of gentle folk boil, thereby affording opportunities of which William Randolph Hearst, not hitherto regarded in polite society as a special apostle of righteousness, made the most in editorials and in headlines of lurid carmine; while his rival journalist, Joseph Pulitzer, fishing for more profits, also fumed and stormed over the plight of the poor Cubans. Here was a combination of economic interest, appealing humanity, "good journalism," and popular tumult which drove the United States steadily toward war.

By two spectacular events, one of them a tragic verity, the torrent was hurried on. In February, 1898, the Hearst papers published under great headlines a letter written by the Spanish minister at Washington in which contempt was expressed for President McKinley—a letter stolen from the

mails. Thereupon a tempest raged for several days over the "insult to national honor," forcing an apology from Spain and the recall of the offending diplomat. Hard upon this episode came the destruction of the battleship Maine, in the harbor of Havana, bearing to death two officers and two hundred and fifty-eight members of the crew in a terrific explosion. Though the cause of the disaster was unknown, it was ascribed by the American public to the malice of local Spanish officials. In spite of the fact that the government of Spain was more than solicitous in its attempts to do the proper thing in the circumstances, no note of apology or condolence, no appeal for arbitration could rise above the shrill popular cry, "Remember the Maine," which ran from shore to shore in America, from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico.

Meanwhile McKinley was pursuing a course that bore all the outward signs of studied restraint. He protested with dignity against the atrocities of Spain in Cuba and received promises of reform, assurances that the cabinet at Madrid, eager to avoid a war that could have but one end, was prepared to make every concession permitted by Spanish public opinion. Yielding to his importunities, it assured McKinley, early in April, 1898, that it was ready to suspend hostilities, call a Cuban parliament, and grant a generous local autonomy, thus complying substantially with every demand that the President had made. Reinforcing this pledge, the American minister in Spain, General Woodford, cabled McKinley about the same time that, if Congress would agree to a settlement, the Madrid government was willing to grant any autonomy which the insurgents would accept, even complete independence for Cuba or a cession of the island to the United States.

In short, the President knew that Spain had offered to surrender as unconditionally as popular sentiment would warrant, but he was beset by the war party calling for extreme measures. "Every congressman," exclaimed a Representative from Maine, "has two or three newspapers

in his district—most of them printed in red ink . . . and shouting for blood." Many of McKinley's advisers were equally bent on a resort to arms. "McKinley had no more backbone than a chocolate éclair," was the taunt Roosevelt flung at him. Overwhelmed by such pressure, the President surrendered such pacific intentions as he had entertained and, without making public the latest concessions from Madrid, sent a militant message to Congress, on April 11, 1898, declaring that his efforts were brought to a standstill and the issue was in the hands of Congress.

War was now inescapable. With lightning speed a resolution authorizing the President to use the armed forces of the nation against Spain went through the House of Representatives, the advocates of peace and mediation being swept aside in a whirlwind of passion. In the Senate, however, the war resolution encountered a brief check at the hands of a few Populists who suspected that it was a signal for conquest under the guise of service; but they were unable to do more than force the adoption of a supplement disowning all such subterfuges—a proposition to which the Republican sponsors, having proclaimed the conflict a war for liberty, could hardly demur.

In its final wording the resolution announced the independence of Cuba, called upon Spain to withdraw from the Island, authorized the President to use armed forces to carry the resolve into effect, and disclaimed any "disposition or intention" on the part of the United States "to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over the said Island except for the pacification thereof." Porto Rico, lying peacefully near by and the Philippines lying far away under Pacific skies, apparently did not come within the ken of the Populists. On April 19, 1898, the United States was at war, triumphantly and gloriously, with the most decrepit and powerless imperial nation in all Europe.

The conclusion was foregone. The Navy, owing in no small measure to the alertness of the Assistant Secretary, Theodore Roosevelt, was ready for the trial by battle.

Within two weeks Commodore Dewey had shattered the enemy's fleet in Manila Bay and rung the doom of Spanish dominion in the Pacific. On July 3, the Spanish ships that had crossed the Atlantic in safety under Admiral Cervera were destroyed, while attempting to escape from Santiago, by American vessels in charge of Admiral Schley. On July 17, Santiago, invested by American troops under General Shafter and shelled by American ships in the offing, gave up the forlorn struggle. A week later General Miles landed in Porto Rico, adding that pearl to the American empire. In August General Merritt and Admiral Dewey carried Manila by storm.

The war with Spain was at an end; its consequences were at hand. Defeated and helpless, Madrid now begged for peace through the good offices of the French ambassador in Washington, M. Cambon. Upon official inquiry at the White House, the mediator reported that the victorious power was "resolved to procure all the profit possible from the advantages it had obtained," but in the circumstances he advised Spain to accept her fate. With the preliminaries out of the way, Spain agreed in a protocol signed on August 12, 1898, that Cuba should be independent, that Porto Rico and an island in the Ladrones should be ceded to the United States, and that the Philippine Islands should be held under American authority pending the final settlement. After all, the resolution of Congress declaring war had not applied the self-denying ordinance to any territory except Cuba. So that the provisional enlargement of the American empire was not out of harmony with that historic manifesto.

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To suppose that the State and Navy Departments of the United States were at that point unconscious of the economic and strategic utility of the Philippines, especially in view of American operations in the Pacific for a century past, is to imagine that they were lacking in the sophistica-

tion commonly displayed by the Anglo-Saxon peoples on such occasions. Yet it would be a mistake to say that all Republican leaders were solidly united on annexation, that the country was fully informed about the matter, or that the development of an imperial mind through the press and political speeches had reached an acute stage. As a matter of fact, in his message of December, 1897, President McKinley had declared that "forcible annexation . . . cannot be thought of, by our code . . . would be criminal aggression." It is true he later remarked that "when the war is over we must keep what we want," but the orientation of the masses called for discrimination and caution. Even late in the autumn of 1898 when the American commissioners sailed away to Paris to meet the Spanish diplomats at the peace table, they received from McKinley no positive instruction as to the fate of the Philippines and were compelled to wait several weeks for final orders in that relation.

On this account it is sometimes said that the directors of American affairs in the upper range of politics had no intention in the beginning of using the war for the liberation of Cuba as a pretext for the enlargement of the American empire. That the yeomanry of the domestic hinterland had any such purpose in mind in the spring of 1898 is hardly to be supposed; nor is there any reason for believing that all who sat at the President's inner council table had at the time any such definite imperial design. And yet the managers of the federal administration did not merely wander without effort in "the wide, gray, lampless depths of human destiny." It would have been possible to drive Spain out of the western hemisphere without waging war on her in the Philippines, but for efficient reasons the strategists in Washington, long before the outbreak of the conflict, decided upon another course. They knew very well that for more than half a century American naval officers and merchants, familiar with the Far East, had coveted Oriental bases to serve as points of support for martial adventures and commercial enterprise. If they had ever referred to

the earlier chapters of American history, they must have learned that the flag had once been hoisted over Formosa, not far away from Manila, and that Commodore Perry had, in a moment of enthusiasm, seized the Bonin Islands off to the northeast.

That a number of active politicians had early perceived the wider implications of a war with Spain is evident from the letters and speeches of the time. On September 21, 1897, several months before the sinking of the Maine, Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, wrote to Senator Lodge that, in case of a collision with Spain, "our Asiatic squadron should blockade, and if possible take Manila." In May of the next year, Lodge informed Roosevelt that substantial land and naval forces were to be sent to the Philippines and that there was no need for hurry about Cuba. "Porto Rico is not forgotten," he added, "and we mean to have it. Unless I am utterly and profoundly mistaken, the Administration is now fully committed to the large policy that we both desire." In July, the Senator confirmed this impression when he discovered that McKinley evidently wanted to hold the Philippines but was "a little timid about it." He also cited the seizure of Guam as proof that the administration "expects to hold on to the Philippines." A month later he found McKinley apparently hesitating but still he expressed the hope that "they will at least keep Manila which is the great prize and the thing which will give us the Eastern trade." Just what was going on in the bottom of McKinley's mind is not entirely plain but soon afterward he announced his conviction that America should retain all that had been won by the sword.

The intellectual and moral methods by which he resolved his perplexity the President later explained to some of his Methodist brethren in a brief address. "I walked the floor of the White House night after night," he said, "and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guid-

ance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way—I don't know how it was, but it came. . . . There was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed, and went to sleep and slept soundly." Of course he was fully alive, as he said on another occasion, to "the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship cannot be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade."

So, in the end, as Secretary Hay cabled the peace commissioners, the President could "see but one plain path of duty—the acceptance of the archipelago," compelling Spain to surrender the islands in return for a gratuity of twenty million dollars. Anticipating the exalted strain that later characterized President Wilson's appeal to the nation, McKinley declared in 1898 that the war had brought new duties and responsibilities "which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization."

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While certain German journalists read the phraseology of annexation with an amused shrug, Englishmen appreciated the quality of sincerity which made it ring true to the Anglo-Saxon mind. Among the royal family our ambassador at the Court of St. James's found "nothing but hearty kindness and—so far as is consistent with propriety—sympathy." Joseph Chamberlain, that arch apostle of British imperialism who was soon to play a high rôle in the war with the Boer republics in South Africa, unable to contain his joy when he heard of America's challenge to Spain, declared in a public address that an armed conflict, terrible as it was,

would be cheap "if, in a great and noble cause, the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over an Anglo-Saxon alliance." And he said privately to Ambassador Hay that he did not "care a hang what they say about it on the Continent," meaning, significantly enough, the French and the Germans. "If we give up the Philippines it will be a considerable disappointment to our English friends," the American Ambassador wrote home after the fighting was over.

While Henry Adams, recalling the days of the Civil War when his father, as American minister, had been a hundred times humiliated in London, coldly remarked on reading Hay's exuberant notes that "the sudden appearance of Germany as the grizzly terror" had "frightened England into America's arms," the Republican administration was more than grateful for the sympathy and kindly solicitude of the English. Irrespective of the explanation for the new affection, the United States enjoyed the benefit of England's benevolent neutrality during the war and her cordial patronage during the conclusion of the peace.

German imperialists, on the other hand, in their natural ambition to acquire spoils of the kind that had made the British empire fat, pursued a policy which strengthened the Anglo-American entente, and in after years came back to plague them. As soon as McKinley began his diplomatic sparring with the Madrid government in 1897, the Kaiser became excited over the dangers to "the monarchical principle" likely to flow from a war between Spain and republican America. Grieved to observe what he described as "the overseas covetousness" of the United States, especially as it promised to interfere with his own, he tried to work up a European combination to save Spain from an armed attack. Austrian sympathies were readily enlisted. The Pope was approached and, after canvassing the ground, the Holy Father instructed Archbishop Ireland, who enjoyed the confidence of McKinley, to visit Washington and "work diligently with the President" in the interest

of peace—and the salvation of the decrepit Catholic monarchy. England, for obvious reasons, was cold to the Kaiser's project. It cannot be denied that the English ambassador in Washington did finally join in the collective appeal of the diplomats to McKinley in behalf of peace but his government showed no spirit of coercion.

When at length all the Kaiser's efforts failed and war was declared, the Teutonic press on the whole continued to favor Spain, thereby driving the United States still closer to the British system. In fact German newspaper comments, widely circulated in this country by the guardians of the Anglo-American entente, stirred up so much ill-will toward Berlin that the American ambassador on the spot, Andrew D. White, had to make special efforts to allay the irritation while the war was in progress.

Immediately after Admiral Dewey's smashing victory at Manila, the German foreign office was again aroused to feverish activity and expectation, especially as the government of the United States had apparently disclaimed all intention of making forcible annexations. Over a report from the German consul in Manila to the effect that the Filipino revolutionists had rejected the idea of an independent republic and would probably offer the throne to a German prince, the Kaiser became positively inflamed. Appreciating his inability to defy England, he proposed that London be sounded, suggesting to Lord Salisbury through official channels that "the fat spoils" be shared in some measure between the two empires.

Bluntly informed by the British government in reply that the United States would resent any interference with the settlement of the Spanish estate and at almost the same moment warned by his consul in Manila that an Anglo-American understanding had been reached in the Philippines, the Kaiser still remained hopeful. As late as July the German ambassador in Washington was instructed that "His Majesty, the Emperor, regards it a principal object of German policy to leave unused no opportunity which may

arise from the Spanish-American war to obtain maritime fulcra in East Asia." And by way of reinforcement the American ambassador in Berlin was also presented with a statement showing the amount of spoils that would be satisfactory to the Kaiser. Awaiting eventualities, German warships were held in Philippine waters.

Thoroughly familiar with German intentions and already approaching the shadows of the impending World War, the English foreign office countered the German thrusts at every turn. On July 28, 1898, Ambassador Hay cabled from London that England preferred to have the United States keep the Philippines, thus indicating that the Kaiser was balked in all projects for dividing the plunder. When the armistice terms were announced in August, the hopes of the Berlin government were seen to be crushed and during the ensuing peace conference at Paris its spokesmen were genially circumspect. Asked by Spain for aid in overcoming the "ever-growing covetousness" of the Americans, the German ambassador politely declined to intervene—no doubt with a sardonic smile, for "covetousness" was a strange word to use confidentially in diplomatic circles. Nevertheless in the hurly-burly Germany did manage to effect a secret arrangement with Madrid for the purchase of Yap and two other small islands in the Far Pacific, a pitiful reward for earnest labors which must have amused the directors of the British Empire. Concerning such minor things they cared little. The stage was being cleared for a larger imperial spectacle than the world had yet seen and at the prodigious dénouement the United States government was to remember ancient favors well.

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When the program of annexation was completed and the treaty of peace with Spain was laid before the Senate of the United States for ratification, a bitter opposition arose, particularly among the Populists and Democrats, aided and

sustained by a few Republicans of the old school, led by Senator Hoar of Massachusetts. The country was also divided into quarrelsome factions. Andrew Carnegie, the great peace advocate who had so recently issued a new edition of his Triumphant Democracy, was indescribably hurt by the swing to imperialism; according to John Hay, he really seemed to be "off his head." Many other idealists, who accepted literally and at face value the Declaration of Independence, insisted that just governments derived their powers from the consent of the governed, that ruling conquered provinces was contrary to the genius and spirit of American liberty, that the Constitution did not authorize the processes of the proconsul. On the other side answers were made by logicians more supple in their imagination. Able Senators of the new direction, such as Beveridge of Indiana and Platt of Connecticut, saw Manifest Destiny once more written vividly on the western sky and spoke with moving eloquence about our high and sublime mission in carrying the torch of civilization and Christianity around the world.

After weary days of fretful argument, the champions of empire were still unable to muster the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate and President McKinley was visibly worried: perhaps after all the vision which he had seen on his knees in the White House at midnight was to be blotted out by politicians. But at this crucial juncture when all seemed lost, William Jennings Bryan, the New York Tribune's "wretched, rattled-pated boy" appeared in the arena and for some strange reason, by dint of much persuasion, induced several Democratic Senators to change their minds and carry the treaty with its program of annexation, by the narrow margin of one vote, thus saving William McKinley from a defeat akin to that which befell Woodrow Wilson two decades later. To facilitate the operation, a little sop was thrown to liberals in the form of a resolution to the effect that the policy to be adopted in the Philippines was an open question. It was still open—at least

until the Republicans, once freed from the Democrats and Populists tearing at their flanks, found a voice in which to answer it.

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The year that saw the establishment of American dominion in the Caribbean and the Far Pacific also witnessed the conclusion of the little drama in the Hawaiian Islands, a finale played by McKinley according to instructions from the Republicans who elected him. In their platform of 1896 they had called for a "firm, vigorous, and dignified" foreign policy, one which would guard "all our interests in the Western hemisphere," amplifying their creed by a plain declaration that the Hawaiian Islands "should be controlled by the United States." Informed by this specific article of faith and fortified by a mandate in the election that admitted of no dispute, McKinley, shortly after his inauguration, laid a treaty of annexation before the Senate only to have it defeated by Democratic maneuvering under the two-thirds rule. A year elapsed. Then Dewey fired at Manila another shot "heard round the world" and the impatient Republicans, tired of what they deemed factious opposition, resorted to the expedient of annexing the Hawaiian "republic" by a joint-resolution which required merely a majority in both houses—the same procedure used by the Democrats to annex Texas in 1845.

In every respect the debate on the Hawaiian resolution ran true to form. At the outset the Republican view was tersely expressed by the chairman of the House committee on foreign affairs: "The importance of the question lies first of all in the necessity of possessing these islands for the defense of our western shore, the protection and promotion of our commercial interests, and the welfare and security of our country generally." Equally characteristic was the Democratic reply: the revolution had been effected by chicane; annexation was being fostered by American speculators who had purchased $5,000,000 worth of Hawaiian

bonds at thirty cents on the dollar; the passage of the resolution meant the assumption of all or a large part of this inflated paper by the government of the United States. The plea of naval defense was flouted as nothing but the professional rhetoric of the professional imperialist. "We are told," said the Democratic spokesman, "that we need these islands as a strategic base in military operations. All the admirals, rear-admirals, commodores, generals, colonels, majors, and captains say so. How does it happen then that we have gotten along splendidly for one hundred and nine years without these volcanic rocks? If we did not need them when we were only three millions strong, why are we likely to perish for the want of them now that we are seventy-five million souls?"

In their counter-blast by way of replication Republican orators declared the Hawaiian Islands necessary to the defense of the Philippines which in turn were necessary to the defense of American interests in the Far East. After all, besides the strength of their arguments, the Republicans had a majority in each house, so the Hawaiian Islands were formally annexed by a joint-resolution adopted on July 7, 1898. Then under the stimulus of business enterprise, the American residents entered upon an era of marvellous prosperity; the native population kept on declining; the multiplying Japanese and Chinese continued to till the soil either as laborers on plantations or as the masters of small holdings; and the city of Honolulu, with its paved streets, its electric lights, and other urbanities of civilization, became one of the garden spots of the Pacific.

## CHAPTER XXV

## *The Gilded Age*

IF the era of triumphant business enterprise witnessed a continuance of the old strife between financial and industrial interests on the one side and agricultural and labor interests on the other, which had characterized the middle period giving substance and color to its culture, the struggle now presented novel features, both quantitative and qualitative. It was on a scale more vast, stretching across a continent; its participants were augmented in numbers and strengthened by additional resources; its course was unimpeded by the pressures of a slave-owning aristocracy; its technical instruments for productive and intellectual operations were infinitely more varied and flexible; and the rhetorical discourses associated with the contest were embroidered by new logical, scientific, and factual designs.

Above all, the masters of great urban wealth now dominated the social plain. Statisticians could only roughly estimate the strength of the spreading plutocracy and the size of its share gathered from the golden flood, but, according to one guess, there were only three million-

aires in the United States in 1861 and at least thirty-eight hundred at the lapse of thirty-six years. If the calculations of the economist, Charles Spahr, be accepted, one-tenth of the American people owned nine-tenths of the wealth by the end of the century. Though precaution suggested doubts about all such reckonings, two facts remained indisputable: the richest class in America was composed of those who owned factories, mines, railways, and urban property, not the possessors of plantations and farms; and the swiftness of their accumulations outrivaled all previous achievements in the history of lucre.

In another respect the Second American Revolution, thus described in the parabola of riches, differed from its prototypes in other lands and ages. True to historic rules, of course, the recruits for the plutocracy came up from the ranks of small farmers, artisans, petty traders, and day laborers, but they did not rise slowly in the midst of a society dominated by patricians and they did not retain their former masters as ornaments after destroying all superior authority. From the beginning, the capitalists and the planters had been separated by wide geographical boundaries, and when the war was over there was hardly enough left of the planting aristocracy, if it ever deserved that name in a strictly cultural sense, to give a decided tone to its own section. So the new bourgeois, who spurted up into wealth and power with the ruin of the slave owners, were not curbed by surviving members of an older order who could serve as models in matters of restraint, taste, scorn, and drawing-room procedure. Except for a few select segments on the Atlantic seaboard, the new age of American culture was without form and void; the young plutocracy had yet to acquire canons of propriety and æsthetics. Unchecked by classical traditions, unhampered by the contempt of strong upper classes, and not yet disciplined into culture by generations of leisure, it attacked its problems of living unusually free from customary repressions—emancipated from the inferiority complexes of European peasants and merchants.

Yet, after all, these departures from European traditions were somewhat superficial and temporary. Fundamentally, the American bourgeois were fairly true to classical types and even to contemporary models abroad. Rome had her *novi homines,* France her *nouveaux riches,* Spain her *ricos hombres,* and England her *nabobs.* In one deep-rooted instinct, the plutocrats of all lands were alike, resembling for that matter potentates in church and state of every age and every civilization: they loved color, glitter, pomp, and display. Why be rich if one could not throw off the mantle of obscurity? Why have the substance of power without the shadowing glory? What are the pleasures of display without admiring and applauding masses to impress? These were emotions as old as the days of Pericles and the members of the American plutocracy, of the same clay as their predecessors, presented the same psychological reaction to munificent circumstances.

Since they could cut their coupons and cash their dividend checks anywhere, they gravitated to the places where gorgeous objects could be had for money and shown to gaping multitudes, the bravest of the socially venturesome migrating to the most powerful center of accumulation, New York City. "Into the mighty cities of the East," wrote one of their number, "there moved an ever-growing army of those who had gathered from the mines of California, from the forges of Pittsburgh, from the forests of Michigan, from the metalled mountains of Montana, wealth beyond the dreams of Midas." On their arrival in a metropolis, they advertised their advent in the most obvious manner by erecting palaces, buying art, and giving social exhibitions. Along the streets, avenues, and boulevards where the birds of a feather flocked together, rose châteaux of French design, mansions of the Italian renaissance, English castles of authoritative mien—a riot of periods and tastes—with occasionally a noble monument to the derivative genius of some American architect trained in Europe and given freedom to create. As in old Yedo of the Tokugawa era,

merchants and artisans assembled to serve the daimios and samurai under the frowning castle of the Shogun, so on all sides of the new American plutocracy swarmed maîtres d'hotel, shopkeepers, artists, writers, lecturers, art dealers, musicians, tutors, beggars, and lackeys—a motley array of the high and the low bent on sharing the crumbs that fell from Dives' table.

Housed in a grand style, like the great of old, the American captains of business enterprise poured out their riches in the purchase of goods. As the new men of Rome in Cicero's day, more acquisitive than creative, despoiled Egypt and Greece of their treasures, so the plutocracy of the United States ransacked the palaces, churches, abbeys, castles, and ateliers of Europe for statuary, paintings, pottery, rugs, and every other form of art. Even the Orient was forced to yield up graven goddesses of mercy and complacent Buddhas to decorate the buildings of men absorbed in making soap, steel rails, whisky, and cotton bagging and to please the women who spent the profits of business enterprise. The armor of mediæval knights soon stood in the halls of captains of industry whose boldest strokes were courageous guesses on the stock market or the employment of Pinkerton detectives against striking workingmen; while Mandarin coats from Peking sprawled on the pianos of magnates who knew not Ming or Manchu and perhaps could not tell whether their hired musicians were grinding out Wagner or Chopin. Grand ladies, who remembered with a blush the days when they laundered the family clothes, shone idly resplendent in jewels garnered by a search of two hemispheres. European tutors were imported to teach the "new people" and their offspring "parlor and table etiquette," music and "appreciation," as Greek preceptors had served Roman families in the time of Cicero. European artists were brought over to design and decorate for them as the artists of Athens were summoned to beautify the homes of Trimalchio's contemporaries. Private libraries of the "sets," rare editions, and rich bindings

were quickly assembled in job lots to give tone to establishments—a diversion that afforded gratifying appearances of culture with none of its laborious penalties. Almost buried in a deluge of alien goods, the vestiges of colonial taste, which though derivative had become acclimatized, survived only in rural districts, North and South, out of the range of the grand plutocracy.

Having discovered that they could buy palaces and import them to America, sticks, stones, carvings, and tiles, the *novi homines* assumed, by no means without respectable sanction, that they could buy their way into "the best families" of two hemispheres. On the eve of the Civil War there had been many "seasoned clans" on the eastern seaboard, some of them dating their origins back a hundred years or more, and boasting of ancestors who had served as preachers, judges, warriors, and statesmen in colonial times, in the heroic epoch of the Revolution, and in the momentous age of the new republic. Able to hold their own socially, if not politically, these select families had absorbed with facility the seepage of rising fortunes that gradually oozed into their ranks—until the flood of the new plutocracy descended upon them. In that crisis all who were not fortunate enough to multiply their estates had to be content with genteel poverty or surrender to the owners of riches reeking of the market.

The possessors of gold now thundering at the social gates would not be denied entrance; they demanded admission to charmed circles, just as the English invaders of New Netherland in the seventeenth century had demanded recognition from the old Dutch burghers and patroons. Some of the newcomers, frankly offering money bags as credentials, were able to work magic by skirting along the edges of prudence. If in groups especially choice, social arbiters demanded references—character witnesses, so to speak—leaders of the storming party engaged genealogists to trace their lineage as far back as William the Conqueror, if need be, in that way furnishing many good dinners to the starve-

lings of Grub Street who worked in the London heraldry records.

Thus by one process or another amalgamation was effected and new varnish softened by the must of age. As the landed gentlemen of England had on various occasions saved their houses from decay by discreet jointures with mercantile families, so many of the established people of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore escaped the humiliation of poverty by judicious selections from the onrushing plutocracy. This matrimonial transaction was not as vexing as society editors imagined, for the smell of cod, soap, hides, tallow, and spices was on most of the sea-coast fortunes and association with the new railway princes and smelter kings was not very fantastic after all. The one source of serious anxiety was the fact that there were not enough old families to go around; the struggle had to end in the triumph of lucre. "We are all descended from Adam," laughed Mark Twain, reëchoing the shot of Petroleum V. Nasby—"We are all descended from grandfathers."

New times, new manners. In the leisurely days before the telephone and the express train, merchants, even though devoid of classical training, often took pride in knowing something of books and matters of the spirit. The father of Henry Cabot Lodge, for example, according to the memoir of the son, attended to the duties of citizenship, read history, and loved Shakespeare, Gray, Pope, Southey, Cervantes, and Scott, presenting, in the light of a misty past, a strange contrast to "the modern and recent plutocrat" who "knows nothing of the history or traditions of his state and country and cares less." When farmers and village artisans, who had suddenly acquired bulging purses, invaded the social arena, they could not help bringing with them the atmosphere of the market place and calling attention again to the earthly sources of culture. At the dinner-table and in the drawing-room they could not ignore what they knew at the desk, so, as Frederick Townsend

Martin recorded, tales of the conquests made by hard cash constituted the staple conversation of ladies and gentlemen in the gilded age.

Even the casual chatter of the idle moment was colored with the verbiage of trade. When Martin once remarked to a railway magnate during soft days on the Florida coast, "How lovely the earth is! I wonder if Heaven will be more beautiful than this scene," he received in reply: "Well, Fred, I guess I'll have no use for Heaven unless there are railways to be constructed there." Far away in New England, Lodge confirmed Martin's lament. "I was taught in my youth," he wrote gravely, "and vigorously taught, that it was not good manners to discuss physical ailments in general society and that it was the height of vulgarity to refer to money or to what anything cost, whether in your own case or in that of other people. I now hear surgical operations, physical functions, disease and its remedies, freely and fully discussed at dinner and on all other occasions by the ingenuous youth of both sexes. Money is no longer under taboo. One's own money and that of one's neighbors is largely talked about, and the cost of everything or anything recurs as often in polite conversation as in a tariff debate."

Yet there was development among the possessors of riches as everywhere; and soon some of the older families, assisted by the more supple or more discreet among the later arrivals, determined to attain distinction through organized exclusiveness. Since there was no legalized aristocracy into which Dives could be compelled to win his way by purchase, politics, cajolery, or philanthropy, it was necessary to resort to a kind of dictatorship. It was by this process that a portion of the plutocracy of New York was brought for a time under the sway of a social sovereign, Mrs. William Astor, capable of setting a fashionable standard for the city and thus for the nation. The founder of the house had come over as a penniless immigrant at the close of the eighteenth century but had quickly laid the basis of

a family fortune by operations in furs, hides, and real estate, making it possible for his children to work wonders in the cultural line.

At last when the queenly heiress by wifely right assumed the reins in New York society, she had all the material substance required for her rôle. She wore regal jewelry and wore it regally; she erected a court and selected its courtiers —limited to four hundred because that was the number which her ballroom would comfortably hold; she had heralds to announce her activities, a public dazzled by her splendor, and newspapers, as eager as any court gazette, to make known her magnificence to those that sat in outer gloom. Moreover, she was ably assisted by a southern gentleman, Ward McAllister, the last Beau Brummel of his school. Thus conditioned, her experiment was successful beyond all hopes for many years—indeed until the invasion of "steel barons, coal lords, dukes of wheat and beef," described by Mrs. John King Van Rensselaer, broke the floodgates at the close of the century. But by that time the dictatorship had won recognition abroad; it had paved the way for the leaders to ascend into English society; and it had won titles for many of the high participants.

In its social aspirations, the American plutocracy inevitably turned to Europe. For a brief day after Appomattox it looked as if Paris under Napoleon III and Eugénie was to prescribe the modes of elegance and splendor for the western world, as in the age of Louis XIV, but the downfall of the Second Empire in 1870 put an end to that régime. Precedence then passed to the court of London. "Venus Victrix," wrote Martin in his society chronicle, "dowered with loveliness and dollars, set forth to conquer England." Though the timid had prophesied an early frost, the victory was simpler than the most ambitious had expected; for they had not read in advance the history of the British peerage from James I to Victoria.

With extraordinary swiftness a wedge was driven into the English line in 1874 by the marriage of Miss Jennie

Jerome, daughter of a Wall Street broker, and Lord Randolph Churchill. There had of course been earlier conquests; Miss Bingham, daughter of a rich Philadelphia merchant in Washington's time had married Alexander Baring, later Lord Ashburton, but that leap into the nobility had been by accident rather than carefully nourished design. It was the marriage of Miss Jerome that broke the ice, for her exploit was quickly followed by other international matches. The daughter of a railway king married a descendant of the hero of Blenheim; a granddaughter of a daring speculator in stocks and gold wedded a French count; the Leiter millions of Chicago were merged with the estate of Lord Curzon, that "very superior person." Finally the conquering power of the almighty dollar was completely demonstrated when William Waldorf Astor shook the dust of the United States from his feet, invaded the British Isles, acquired an English peerage by the usual method, and landed in the House of Lords among a host of English cotton spinners, soap magnates, tobacconists, journalists, and successful brokers.

Building town houses, buying art objects, and twisting into European society by no means exhausted the energies of the plutocracy now merging with the "old families" of fifty or a hundred years' standing. Its members, sated with ordinary things, sought amusement in Lucullan feasts and often in bizarre pranks borrowed from the underworld. For what an over-fond memory called an age of "plain living and high thinking" they substituted an age of "high living and plain thinking." As one of their number recorded, "in spite of ourselves we drifted into a period in which idleness became the fashion. . . . It was the poison of idle wealth. . . . It came at first like a little spot upon the body of man. Quickly it spread from limb to limb and part to part, until, in the fullness of time, it was a leprosy, following the body of society almost from head to foot."

Animated by fantastic passions, this idle set supplied

amazing sensations to the public in the ample days of Cleveland and Harrison. At a dinner eaten on horseback, the favorite steed was fed flowers and champagne; to a small black and tan dog wearing a diamond collar worth $15,000 a lavish banquet was tendered; at one function, the cigarettes were wrapped in hundred dollar bills; at another, fine black pearls were given to the diners in their oysters; at a third, an elaborate feast was served to boon companions in a mine from which came the fortune of the host. Then weary of such limited diversions, the plutocracy contrived more freakish occasions—with monkeys seated between the guests, human gold fish swimming about in pools, or chorus girls hopping out of pies.

In lavish expenditures as well as in exotic performances, pleasures were hungrily sought by the fretful rich delivered from the bondage of labor and responsibility. Diamonds were set in teeth; a private carriage and personal valet were provided for a pet monkey; dogs were tied with ribbons to the back seats of Victorias and driven out in the park for airings; a necklace costing $600,000 was purchased for a daughter of Crœsus; $65,000 was spent for a dressing table, $75,000 for a pair of opera glasses. An entire theatrical company was taken from New York to Chicago to entertain the friends of a magnate and a complete orchestra engaged to serenade a new-born child. In a burst of sentimental benevolence a family of destitute Negroes in the South was suddenly dowered with riches, garbed in luxury, and placed in a gorgeous house.

Unable to temper his culture with refined patience, a copper king turned connoisseur overnight and bought a complete museum of art. As if to put a climax to lavish expenditure, the Bradley Martins in 1897 gave a ball in New York that dazed the entire western world. "The interior of the Waldorf Astoria Hotel," according to a member of the family, "was transformed into a replica of Versailles and rare tapestries, beautiful flowers, and countless lights made an effective background for the wonderful gowns and

their wearers. I do not think that there has ever been a greater display of jewels before or since; in many cases the diamond buttons worn by the men represented thousands of dollars and the value of the historic gems worn by the ladies baffles description. My sister-in-law personated Mary Stuart and her gold embroidered gown was trimmed with pearls and precious stones. Bradley, as Louis XV, wore a court suit of brocade. . . . The suit of gold inlaid armor worn by Mr. Belmont was valued at ten thousand dollars."

When described with journalistic gusto in the daily press, this grand ball of the plutocrats astounded the country, then in the grip of a prolonged business depression with its attendant unemployment, misery, and starvation, and called down upon the heads of the host and hostess a shower of invectives from the populist newspapers, which even the plea that the ball was given to help the poor by stimulating trade could not avert—a shower that increased until the sponsors of the ball sought refuge abroad.

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Housed in the back streets and alleys behind the symbols of riches and power lived the urban masses who washed the linen, dug the trenches, served the wheels, and watched the forges for Midas and Dives. Whether the styles of Queen Anne or Louis Quatorze ruled along the boulevards made little difference to Mary, Tom, Dick, and Harry at the rear. With scarcely any direction other than that given by avid real estate speculators and greedy landlords, the tenements of the poor stretched and sprawled forward and outward in haphazard fashion, devoid of beauty, comfort, or health—made worse by the incoming hordes of Europe who pressed of necessity into the cheapest districts already cursed by squalor, dirt, and disease. Where literary effort fails to describe, the reports of the tenement house commission in New York may complete the picture.

History seemed to be repeating itself. Ancient Rome had its proletarian quarters; London, Paris, and Berlin their slums. Nero's House of Gold rose near the waste of dark tenements in which his subjects of the artisan and slave classes lived. The courtiers who hovered around Louis XVI wrested their incomes from the gnarled hands of burdened peasants; Queen Victoria drew revenues from rack-renting in London misery; Diaz decorated Mexico City with money wrung from wretched peons. As Calhoun remarked, somebody had to pay for culture.

In a general way, of course, there was nothing new about the juxtaposition of mammon and poverty in American cities but there were features in the situation that distinguished it from the urban life of other civilizations. Especially striking was the fact that the masses in the great cities of the United States were not slaves or the submerged offspring of slaves; neither were they the descendants of twenty generations of urban starvelings. They were free men, a large portion of whom had wandered into the cities from the farms bearing with them the notions fitted to rural economy; others had come straight from the fields of Europe. Even the oldest of American cities were new by comparison with those of England or the Continent. They had no traditions of royal patronage, noblesse oblige, or princely æsthetics. The feudal nexus had been dissolved; the cash nexus substituted.

Now the cash nexus pure and simple was the outstanding characteristic of social relations during the gilded age in America. On the plantation of the old South, the laborers were housed near the residence of the owner; their living quarters, whether comfortable or wretched, were known to the members of the planter's family; sickness was looked after and old age supported, at least in a way, authentic records telling us of many generous masters and mistresses who carried heavy burdens of human management. In contrast, the industrial labor which served the plutocracy housed itself, clothed, fed, and took care of itself as best it

could on the wages received. Its living quarters stood apart from the seats occupied by the captains of industry, even if sometimes only a stone's throw from the boulevards, and families of the new lucre might live their entire lives without catching a glimpse of the districts in which their servants, immediate or remote, dwelled, reared their children, and passed from the scene. Commenting on this sharp separation of classes, Henry Cabot Lodge declares in his memoirs that not until the great fire of 1872 in Boston destroyed acres of tenements rendering their occupants utterly homeless, did he have any knowledge at all about how the other half of the world lived. And yet, though there was poverty in American cities, stark and galling enough to blast human nature, there was no proletariat in the Roman sense of the word.

Among the American working classes, all save the most wretched had aspirations; there was a baton in every toolkit. The public schools which flung wide for all the portals to the mysterious world of science, letters, and art opened the way for the talented to rise into the professions—at least that of politics. No tokens of garb, tongue, accent, or grammar marked them off as hopelessly from the upper ranges of society as the English cockney was separated from superior persons of Rotten Row. Brawny boys were constantly climbing upward to riches and circumstance; Patrick O'Riley of the saloon gang, who became Patrique Oreillé in Mark Twain's caricature of the passing show, was no mere creature of the imagination. There was misery enough no doubt; there were occasional outbreaks of political unrest which seemed to indicate a class upheaval, such for instance as occurred during Henry George's New York campaign in 1886; there were strikes longer and bloodier than ever before; there were a few hole-in-the-corner anarchists who compared the assassination of Garfield with the murder of the Tsar, Alexander II; but there was no multitudinous, grim, sodden, submerged industrial mass beaten to the status of permanent servitude. Cer-

tainly the majority of the craftsmen were not political pariahs; they could vote; and they had to be treated with wordy respect by statesmen and politicians.

In fact, the party machines that governed Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and many lesser cities responded, at least in minor matters, to the will and desire of the working classes, rather than to the whims of the plutocracy—one of the strange ironies of the situation. Though the reformers fumed and raved, the hated political bosses were in truth, as that cool observer, James Bryce, quietly remarked, buffers between the rich and the poor, buffers who taxed the one to keep the other in good humor. The political levies and sometimes the flagrant corruption to which party managers resorted were chiefly for the purpose of acquiring the funds necessary to "take care of the boys," that is, to amuse them with balls, outings, and picnics, to supply them with clothing and funds in hard times, and to lend them money on occasion. Naturally there were brokers' charges on the collections but these were small as compared with the cost of riots and revolutions.

Expanding its functions, the political machine, hated of the righteous, also performed another service of mediation; it provided an avenue by which the humblest could get his grievances before the municipal government. It did more. It opened careers to ability. Many a ditcher, blacksmith, or trade union official, marked off from his fellows by shrewdness and will, was lifted by his party organization into a municipal berth, furnished what seemed to be a princely salary, and garbed in the frock coat and top hat of political respectability. Of course in all the operations of this character keeping open the channels between the classes, the saloon—the workmen's club—lent its assistance to the politicians; while the associated trades of the liquor industry, gambling and prostitution, were frequently made to yield their tribute to the cost of the general spectacle. No doubt the scene was far from pleasing to

æsthetes and there were occasional outbursts of moral indignation against the party bosses but caution in that respect was exercised even by the highest and best. National elections could not be carried without the help of ward managers and their superior officers; many fine old families and at least one of the most fashionable churches in New York City drew large rents from slum tenements not fit for swine.

Besides the political outlets through which the surplus energies of the urban working classes found an easy vent, were other opportunities for relieving the tension induced by poverty and mechanical routine. The Catholic Church, with its gorgeous ceremonials and its sublime consolations for suffering and wretchedness, followed the poor everywhere, building edifices in the grayest and gloomiest wastes of the great cities. If its hierarchy gave sharp orders and insisted on adequate tribute, it none the less offered to the humblest and meanest a cordial welcome and a psychic pleasure that were not found in the cold orthodoxy of middle-class Protestantism. For that service the Salvation Army with drum and tambourine could tender but a feeble substitute.

More numerous and more continuous in operation, however, were the commercial "palaces of entertainment." For those who found little release in religious worship, and for some who did, were provided gaudy and lively amusements organized and managed on mercantile principles. Vaudeville shows, prize fights, circuses, dime museums, and cheap theaters, like the spectacles of ancient Rome, kept countless millions happy in penury, not at public expense, as in Cæsar's day, but at the expense of those who enjoyed them and to the advantage of those who owned them. Indeed, tickling the urban masses—creating popular tastes and standards of culture—now became one of the large and highly lucrative branches of capitalistic enterprise.

Into this business all the feverish passions of money-making were thrown, in efforts to arouse one sensation after

another to sustain box-office receipts. The Paris "can-can" was imported in 1872, becoming quickly a high favorite and bringing heavy revenues into the pockets of promoters. Whole armies of scribblers were kept busy plotting hair-raising melodramas based on love, suicide, rum, and murder. "Cheap and nasty" were the watchwords of the new festivity and nothing could break their spell. The few aspiring actors who tried to "refine" the "thriller" met the same revolt which had long before defeated soulful Roman playwrights and had outraged contemporary improvers of the London music hall. Sothern, in his autobiography, relates that some reformers who tempted fate in New York were compelled to play behind meshed nets to protect themselves against eggs, vegetables, and other evidences of resentment hurled at them by the audience.

Into this grand game of amusing the multitude, P. T. Barnum, whose career had begun in 1835, entered with joy in spite of his advancing years and repeated threats of retirement. After experimenting in New York with museums containing "curiosities" of every sort from "roaring baboons" to "interesting relics from the Holy Land," Barnum joined his talents with two other entertainers and in 1871 launched the "Greatest Show on Earth" which was hauled on trains from city to city to divert the crowds, rural and urban. Nothing of the kind had ever been seen in western civilization and its success was stupendous.

Taking his cue from this venture, "Buffalo Bill," Colonel Cody, who had been fascinating audiences of eastern "tenderfeet" with desperate Indian melodramas, startled the country in 1883 with his "Wild West Show" portraying life on the plains—Indian fights, buffalo hunts, desperate brawls, and stagecoach robberies. For years it was a national rage. Then it was transferred to London where royalty and costermongers went equally wild with delight over its boisterous and exotic scenes, demonstrating that, after all, the tastes of the American democracy, in some respects at least, were not so far removed from those of the Victorian era

in England, either in the higher or the lower ranges. Nor was that astonishing, for aged journalists could easily recall that, nearly half a century before, the great Queen had been pleased to entertain P. T. Barnum and Tom Thumb. A little entertainment seemed to make the whole world kin.

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Between the urban masses with their circuses and prize fights and the plutocracy with its "palatial" mansions and its social aspirations stretched a wide and active middle class engaged in professional, mercantile, and clerical pursuits. It was within this group that the early Puritan characteristics of thrift, sobriety, and self-denial appeared to survive and unfold in the most natural fashion. It was into this class that sons and daughters of old colonial stock made their way by the thousands from farms and mills as their places were taken by the aliens who surged into the country to do the "rough work."

Whether the members of this order were the possessors of superior Nordic talent, as some said, or advanced by climbing upon the backs of untutored immigrants, as others argued, their cultural operations beyond question set the central pattern for the future in America. They were predominant in the schools, colleges, and professions. They supplied the higher politicians and makers of opinion—statesmen, journalists, and literary craftsmen who figured conspicuously in the run of intellectual interests. Members of this class also formed the backbone of Protestant Christianity. They set the taste in art and letters throughout a large area of the American landscape.

Often they appeared to be, in the imagination of their spokesmen, the entire American public. "I would rather address a Methodist audience than any other audience in America," once remarked President Roosevelt. "You know for one thing that every one there is an American. . . . Next to the Methodists I prefer to address Episcopalians. They are all American likewise, usually representing the

higher or else the lower social class. The Methodists represent the great middle class and in consequence are the most representative church in America. I think the Methodists and the Episcopalians increase more rapidly than any other churches in this country. They appeal to the genius of our institutions more than any other denominations. . . . The Catholic church is in no way suited to this country and can never have any great permanent growth except through immigration for its thought is Latin and entirely at variance with the dominant thought of our country and institutions."

In the main this great middle class met the requirements of Aristotle's golden mean. Though members of its upper ranges, fired by the ostentatious display of the plutocracy, crowded the hotels at Saratoga Springs and Long Branch, bought the cheaper seats at the Horse Show, attended the opera, and made "the grand tour" of Europe, the large majority was composed of people who possessed only moderate incomes or were in fact struggling along on the margin of subsistence to maintain appearances—hard-working husbands and pinching wives fighting desperately to keep their heads above water, support their sons in college, and marry their daughters into a better status. While the plutocrats built their palaces, this class filled the land with Italian, Tudor, French, Gothic, and castellated villas and cottages, large and small, which still rear their bizarre fronts beside the modest structures of earlier times. If the occupants of this social order could not buy Rembrandts with gleanings from lucky strikes in "the Street," they could often afford Winged Victories in replica for their mantels. If they could not rival copper kings in the purchase of whole art galleries, they could at least buy pianos, wax flowers, steel engravings, four-dollar opera tickets, statuary, Browning's poems, dyspepsia, and lawn tennis—to use the list of a contemporary.

Those who missed a college education or were unable to spend their summers in Europe found some satisfaction for their spiritual cravings in the "polite magazines," lec-

ture courses, and various schemes for popular adult education of the better sort. "The Concord School of Philosophy and the religious and ideal assemblies at Chautauqua have developed into what we are accustomed to call 'institutions,' " gravely explained the New York Times in 1880. "A few years ago they had not been heard of or had attracted the attention of only a small and interested circle. They have now passed from experiment to success. They seem this year to have reached the full maturity of vigor and to have taken on a national character. Philosophers from beyond the Mississippi are lecturing at Concord and men and women from all over the country give and receive instruction in the groves at Chautauqua. . . . If we were a sluggish-minded people or imbued with a pedantic spirit, we would show nothing like this. . . . To a great extent knowledge sought at these academies is for its own sake. Our young and new nation has at length reached a point where a portion of its people can leave practical questions to pursue purely intellectual questions having no relation to dollars and cents. That is a mark of growth!"

It was after lecturing to comfortable and excellent people at Chautauqua that William James heaved an immense sigh of relief as he escaped into the freight yards at Buffalo where the noise, grime, and jar of reality broke the monotony of moderation, purity, and median lines of thought. Nevertheless it was this respectable middle class that in the main sustained the churches, filled the colleges with sons and daughters, supported the "clean" press, kept alive foreign and domestic missions, supplied the sinews for the anti-saloon movement, backed the Women's Christian Temperance Union, and, according to Matthew Arnold, carried the burden of American civilization in the gilded age.

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Except in some of the mountain regions of the South, the aspirations of the middle class were on the whole joyously

emulated by the agricultural masses and by the merchants of tiny villages who throve upon local trade. Though constituting, even at the end of the nineteenth century, a majority of the population, farmers and small-town folk, with respect to the tendencies of their cultural life, were drawn into the urban vortex. Handicraft arts which once gave distinction to European peasants and small-town artisans had never flourished to the same extent in the United States and with the advance of machinery those that had been introduced in earlier times practically disappeared.

So while the farming population supplied the middle class with a large number of leaders in politics, business, education, and religion, it threw up no dominant group of its own, evolved no culture peculiar to the soil comparable to that created by the European peasantry—consisting of music, dancing, folklore, costume, and mythology—and it received scant aid or comfort from the upward climbers who deserted it for the cities. If on occasion it furnished savage critics of the plutocracy and made noisy disturbances in the political sphere, it took its general ideas, tastes, and tones largely from the press, pulpit, and publishing modes directed and supported by the middle class. Composed largely of landowners, actual or potential, it had few ties of sympathy with the propertyless urban proletariat—except such as came from a mutual dislike for the "malefactors of great wealth." Limited in income to a meager margin of surplus, it found the qualities of thrift and temperance virtues as well as necessities.

The planting division of the agricultural population that had previously sent many haughty rulers to the national forum, although able to create a Solid South, could not retain its social prestige after the destruction of its economic and political supremacy. It had never been an aristocracy formed exactly on the European model for, deprived of the rights conferred by entails and primogeniture, it had been constantly diluted by invaders from the yeomanry. While it had furnished many

statesmen, orators, and military officers in the days of its glory, it had produced relatively few writers, painters, sculptors, inventors, or scientists. Its culture was largely that of leisure, bought with the surplus of slave labor—conspicuous and lavish expenditure on articles of refinement made elsewhere. It had never possessed a social capital such as the landed gentry of England enjoyed in London or the daimios of Japan in Yedo. It must be conceded that in the days of slavery New Orleans and Charleston in particular had just pretensions as centers of taste but, after the Second Revolution spread disaster among the ranks of the planters, those cities turned more and more to trade.

A few southern orators continued to protest against the sacrilegious conduct of the deserters who, "ignoring the elevating influence of heroic impulses, manly endeavor, and virtuous sentiment, would fain convert this region into a money-worshiping domain; and careless of the landmarks of the fathers, impatient of the restraints of a calm, enlightened, conservative civilization, viewing with indifferent eye the tokens of Confederate valor, and slighting the graves of Confederate dead, would counsel no oblation save at the shrine of Mammon." But such reproofs buttered no parsnips. Survivors among the planting aristocracy and their children now moved into the towns as leaders of business enterprise or strove to place their estates on a money-making basis. When Senator Benjamin Harvey Hill made his memorable address before the University of Georgia at Athens in 1871, he raised his eloquent voice without apology in behalf of applied science, urging the people to develop the practical "facilities by which to retain the possessions they occupy." He advised them not "to pine away or fret to exhaustion for imaginary treasures hopelessly lost" but rather to "reach out their hands and gather richer treasures piled up all around them." The land of Calhoun was being assimilated finally to the realm of Yankee ingenuity.

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Within the ranks of the several classes so deeply affected by the progress of business enterprise, women found the direction of their cultural concerns also changed by the drive of economic forces. Among the plutocrats, it was they more than the men who set the pace in the new vogue of "conspicuous waste." Among the working classes, the women who labored for wages got a certain amount of money they could now call their own and by their expenditures helped to give a trend to taste, at least in mass production. In the middle orders, especially the more prosperous ranges, thousands of women, escaping completely from the grind of factory, office, and kitchen, secured leisure and means for reading, traveling, and social undertakings. Supplementing these economic resources was the system of inheritances which, by giving wives and daughters control over large estates, set many of them free to follow their whims, to patronize artists, musicians, lecturers, and writers as few had done heretofore—except in the case of queens and other ladies of high degree—to indulge in amateur excursions on their own account. Under various pressures therefore the gravity of women's interests steadily moved from the center of the family outward toward the periphery of that circle where it merged into the larger humanities.

On the left of the feminist movement, the leaders, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, who had launched their revolutionary cause before the Civil War, took up once more the strategy of the battle for equal suffrage after the slavery question was settled. Far on the right, less concerned with matters of historic status, a host of women in a great zeal for self-culture in arts and letters formed a club movement which unwittingly prepared the way for political action on a national scale. The Sorosis of New York, founded at the home of Jane C. Croly in 1868, called forth a thousand imitations, covering the land with Monday Clubs, Rainyday Clubs, Browning Societies, and Shakespeare Coteries, expanding the market for magazines, prints, books,

and musical instruments in swiftly widening rings. Then local societies were united in state federations, women imitating the politicians, the Knights of Pythias, and the Elks in making excursions away from home to great assemblies of their kind, which like men's conventions furnished more or less news for the press. Finally, in 1889, a national union was effected by the formation of the General Federation of Women's Clubs, which drew within its fold a multitude of organizations with varied aims.

Once federated on the national scale, club women began to take a broader outlook. Though timid in discussing questions long reserved for the masculine mind, though inclined to stick tenaciously to their cultural program, they could not successfully resist the beat of opinions that thrummed on every side of them. Little by little, self-centered groups, bent on improving their personal standards of refinement, found social and political questions seeping into their papers and debates. While they kept on patronizing polite letters and the fine arts in a genial fashion, their intellectual interests drifted out into the broader and deeper streams of national life and opinion.

By the opening of the new century, American women had broken down the walls of the traditional sphere. "When I read in the paper and heard in the Club that a dozen women of great wealth were standing along Broadway handing bills and encouragement to the girl shirtwaist strikers of last winter, I was not a bit surprised," wrote a diarist member of the plutocracy as the century turned. "It is just what you might have expected. Nowadays I can hardly go to a reception or a ball without being buttonholed by somebody and led into a corner to be told all about some wonderful new reform. It is perfectly amazing, this plague of reform, in its variety, in its volume, and in the intensity of earnestness with which it is being pushed." Seed sown in the distant middle period had, in the more favorable conditions, sprung up many fold.

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Mingling with the social ferment created by these changing domestic forces were surging currents of opinion borne into America from Europe by cables and by books—above all by home-coming travelers and scholars increasing in numbers as steamships multiplied and passenger rates declined. Among the imported scientific theories of the age were two clusters of ideas which immediately turned the course of thought in the United States. The first, closely related to the old warfare between science and religion, had Darwinism as its center.

Although the Origin of Species was published in 1859 it was not until the Civil War had blown over that the full effect of the doctrine was felt in America and it was not until 1871, during Grant's administration, that the Descent of Man sprang detonations which shook from top to bottom the traditional concept of human origins. After that explosion, the fire spread. In the age of Garfield and Cleveland, Bellamy and Henry James, the evolutionary strife was carried deliberately into the theological camp by Thomas Henry Huxley, furnishing for Robert G. Ingersoll in the United States the kind of ammunition that Voltaire had given Paine a hundred years before.

Associated with Darwinism, but far more disconcerting for the defenders of "permanent institutions," was the synthetic philosophy of Herbert Spencer which applied the evolutionary concept to ethics, politics, economics and ceremonials in general—thus fulfilling the prophecy made by Emerson in the middle period. If uncertainty hovered over the Darwinian account of organic evolution, there was no doubt about the general doctrine of social development: the career of mankind, as now revealed by the sociologist, opened in a remote past far beyond the limits of Eden's chronology and was marked by many steps leading away from primitive savagery to modern civilization. While the mutability of species was still awaiting indubitable proof, the mutability of customs, beliefs, and institutions was demonstrated with a wealth of evidence that could not be

controverted. If Spencer's personal antagonism to socialism, his invincible preference for "anarchy plus the police constable" was assuring to the leaders in the American acquisitive process, his broad theory of social evolution was ruinous to any perfection of wisdom, even though embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, and it offered the starting point for dynamic speculation in every department of thought and action.

Certainly nowhere in the world was Spencer's work more cordially received than in the United States. Admirers in America gave him several thousand dollars in 1866 to help in the prosecution of his studies; the sale of his books was larger here than in England; and the Popular Science Monthly, founded by E. L. Youmans, afforded the English philosopher an audience that was astounding in its range and enthusiasm. Suffused with the optimism dominant in New World life, Spencer's theories were employed to fortify at every point the idea of progress that had been so potent in earlier years.

Of a different character and yet strongly supporting the concept of progress were European achievements in natural science during this epoch. No previous age had given to mankind so many discoveries of utility in its war on disease and pain or made so many revelations as to the constitution of matter and force. From 1860 to the end of the century, the years were crowded with intellectual triumphs of the first order. Pasteur by his work in bacteriology and by his invention of serum inoculations proclaimed an effective war on devastating plagues. In the same field, Lister revolutionized surgery by the application of antiseptics, striking down at one blow the black horror of blood poisoning. Complementing these victories, though of wider implications, were the labors of Crookes and Roentgen which produced the X-ray apparatus so useful in surgery, medicine, and dentistry. Quickly following the discovery of the X-rays by Roentgen came the epoch-making stroke of Professor and Madame Curie in extracting radium

from Austrian pitchblende, which opened a new era in physics. By the close of the century, Marconi had begun the emancipation of telegraphy from cables and wires. These exploits, coupled with the feats of countless other workers in many fields, brought about nothing short of a revolution in the scientific outlook of the Old World.

To a Europe now fired with a glowing curiosity about everything past and present, flocked a host of American students in search of wisdom. Owing to peculiar circumstances, most of them went to Germany to school. The ancient universities of England, still under the dominance of clerical and classical traditions, had no equipment for advanced research and as yet extended scant welcome to American students. France, long in confusion after the downfall of the second Empire, presented no special attractions either. On the other hand, the universities of Germany greeted American graduate students hospitably and conferred the degree of doctor of philosophy upon those who complied with the requirements for that honor. The response from the United States was in keeping with the generosity of the German welcome. In all the German institutions of higher learning, American college graduates were soon pursuing advanced studies in science, economics, history, theology, and classical literature and acquiring habits of independent research that transcended the restraints of current conventions. On their return home, these young doctors taught the progressive philosophy of Hegel, the socialistic economics of Wagner and Schmoller, and the historical methods of Mommsen and Gneist. At last, American colleges and intellectual interests, as far as they were affected by collegiate discipline, felt the shock of critical inquiry and the impact of ideas wholly foreign to the heritage handed down by the theological educators of the middle period.

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In the religious life of America during the gilded age

there were also novel developments, apart from the influence of new social opinions upon theology and ethics, namely, the remarkable growth of the Roman Catholic Church and the rise of the Christian Science movement under the inspiration of Mary Baker Eddy. The first of these departures in historic American tendency—continuing the beginnings of the middle period—was due of course to the steady influx of immigrants from Catholic regions of Europe rather than to any marked revulsion of religious sentiment among original Protestant stocks. But whatever the prime cause, it gave a new cast to culture and shifted the balance of ecclesiastical power within American society. By 1890, the Catholics possessed a majority, or at least a plurality, of the Christian communicants in thirteen states; twenty years later the number of such commonwealths had increased to eighteen, mainly the industrial sections with large factory and mining populations.

This spectacular growth of Catholicism, though it amazed some defenders of the inherited order, was really welcome to many Americans of colonial descent who were now recoiling before the advance of radical ideas and scientific thinking. Priests of the Catholic denomination were found in practice to have, as a rule, a moderating influence on strikers and labor agitators; and often a Protestant capitalist, such for example as James J. Hill, looked to the Catholic hierarchy for support in the maintenance of law and order.

Moreover the large right wing of the Protestant clergy, engaged in sustaining the accepted dogmas of their respective denominations, were happy to reckon the Catholic clergy among their allies in throwing up bulwarks for the faith. If the more intellectual among the latter exercised great discretion in dealing with scientific discoveries and opinions, it remained a fact that the Catholic Church was no more willing to surrender the Bible and Virgin Birth than the most invincible Baptist or Presbyterian of the southern highlands. Besides, the Catholics had before them the

plain instructions of the Syllabus of Errors issued by Pius IX in 1864, stigmatizing as false the doctrine that "the Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile himself to, and agree with, progress, liberalism, and civilization as lately introduced." In the presence of a common foe, the ancient enemies found themselves comfortably enlisted in the same campaign.

Additional recruits for the struggle against what appeared to be materialistic tendencies in natural science were drawn from the adherents of the new sect founded, in 1866, by Mary Baker Eddy of New England, home of Transcendentalism and mystical visions of varied types. The creed was not entirely original but it was emphatic in its dissent from the dogmas of the naturalists. "There is no life, truth, intelligence, nor substance in matter," wrote Mrs. Eddy. "All is infinite Mind and its infinite manifestation. . . . Matter is mortal error. . . . Man is not material; he is spiritual." For the serums of Pasteur and the antiseptics of Lister, believers in Christian Science offered the healing balm of religious conviction; in accord with their Catholic contemporaries they proclaimed their faith in the existence of miraculous powers capable of giving sight to the blind, strength to the cripple, health to the sick, and courage to the faint in heart.

Making a wide appeal to the middle classes, they were soon able to build up rich and flourishing congregations all the way from Boston, the seat of the Mother Church, to San Francisco at the Golden Gate, to say nothing of congregations in Europe, Africa, South America, the Orient, and islands of the seas. Though the practice of the sect forbade "numbering the people," estimates made by students at the end of the century placed its membership above that of many important denominations claiming ancient origins. Moreover the teachings of the Christian Scientists affected the thinking of other Protestants, including doctors of medicine, who, without denying the efficacy of material cures for human diseases, recognized the power

of the mind over the body. And the creed also got into the new psychology—the latest religion of skeptics.

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Notwithstanding the growth of Catholicism as the number of immigrant workers increased and the rise of Christian Science, especially among the comfortable middle classes, the general process of secularization wrought by business enterprise, technology, and natural science, so vigorously advanced in the middle period, now hurried forward with a quickened pace. As in the earlier age, leadership went to the inventors: Charles Brush, Peter Cooper Hewitt, Charles P. Steinmetz, and Thomas Edison in electricity; George Pullman in sleeping car construction; George Westinghouse, creator of the air-brake; George B. Selden, Charles E. Duryea, R. E. Olds, and Elwood Haynes, builders of automobiles in the seventies and eighties; James Oliver, inventor of the chilled plow; Samuel P. Langley, Glenn H. Curtiss, and the Wright brothers in aeronautics; Ottmar Mergenthaler, William Bullock, the Hoes, Tolbert Lanston, and Henry A. Wise Wood in the arts of typesetting and printing; Christopher Latham Sholes, a pioneer in the development of typewriting machines; Alexander Graham Bell in the sphere of telephonic communication; Hannibal Goodwin and George Eastman in photography; and Edward Muybridge and C. Francis Jenkins in motion picture production.

Nearly every year between the close of the civil conflict and the end of the century witnessed some signal achievement in the realm of applied science. In 1865, Bullock built in Philadelphia the first continuous web-printing press. In 1866, cable communications with England were opened under the indomitable captaincy of Cyrus W. Field. In 1867, John F. Appleby exhibited the working model of his self-binding reaper. In 1868, the Sholes typewriter was put to commercial use. In 1869, Westinghouse took out the initial patent for his railway air-brake. In 1870, H. H.

Marvil invented a machine for making fruit and berry baskets. In 1872, Edison announced his duplex telegraph which made it possible to send two messages over the same wire at the same time. In 1875, G. F. Swift built the first refrigerator car. In 1876, Alexander Bell sent his historic telephone message by wire. In 1877, Edison heard "Mary had a little lamb" on his phonograph. In 1879, Selden applied for a patent for a gasoline carriage. In 1880, Edison built an electric railway at Menlo Park. In 1886, Mergenthaler's linotype machine rang out the coming doom of typesetting by hand in the great newspaper offices. In 1887, a vestibule train was put on the tracks by Pullman. In 1888, A. N. Hadley patented his corn cutter and shocker. In 1891, Strowger formed a company for the manufacture of automatic telephone exchanges. In 1892, Bell opened telephonic communication between New York and Chicago. In 1893, Henry Ford tested his first automobile on the road. In 1894, Jenkins gave a motion picture show with his new machine at Richmond, Indiana. In 1895, Elwood Haynes drove a motor car through the streets of Chicago. In 1896, Langley's airplane flew three thousand feet. In 1897, Lanston's monotype machine was patented. In 1900, Henry A. Wise Wood began making stereotype plates by an automatic process. In 1901, the Wright Brothers completed their first glider.

All along the frontier where machine industry came into contact with the natural world, constant experimenting was creating a new social climate for men of bench and forge. The era of the cloistered inventor was drawing to a close. In every branch of science a host of searchers was at work; news of strange undertakings flew about on the wings of the winds; two or three persons often applied simultaneously for the same patent. Frequently American achievements were so closely paralleled in Europe that it was hard to apportion honors among the competitors of two hemispheres.

As the collective character of advancing technology be-

came more marked, coöperative plans were deliberately adopted with a view to promoting systematic inquiry and discovery—"the invention of invention," contrived by the Germans, becoming the outstanding feature of American enterprise. In 1876, Edison, for instance, established with his own earnings a huge laboratory at Menlo Park in New Jersey where he assembled a body of experts and began to create machines on a wholesale principle. By the opening of the twentieth century, the General Electric Company had ceased to rely on sporadic outcroppings of genius and had organized the work of invention on severely methodical principles under the leadership of competent masters. Technology was passing into a social phase of apparently limitless possibilities.

In pure science, a field separated by indistinct boundaries from that of applied science, American work in general, as during the middle period, took the form of painstaking and important researches in every field—biology, chemistry, physics, botany, geology, and astronomy—now supported however on a more extensive scale by large endowments. No epoch-making discoveries comparable to the work of the Curies, Pasteurs, and Roentgens of Europe were made, a fact of peculiar significance, but nevertheless descriptive and analytical studies were pursued with zeal and intelligence. Geological surveys, botanical expeditions, the collection of specimens, the foundation of great institutions, such as the Natural History Museum of New York established in 1869 and the Columbian, later the Field, Museum of Chicago in 1893, the construction of laboratories, and the publication of articles in technical journals all marked a steady progress in the exploration of the natural world.

In this onward movement there was developed a body of technically competent scientists equal in talent to the same class of workers in Europe. In the domain of ethnology, Lewis H. Morgan, a Rochester lawyer, did work of permanent value, his accounts of Indian tribes and his extraordinary book on Ancient Society producing a deep impression

on the social thought of the Old World and the New. Besides making him a recognized master at home, the original researches and publications of James D. Dana, the Yale geologist, won for him the Copley prize from the Royal Society of London, the Wollaston medal from the London Geological Society, and honorary degrees from Munich and Edinburgh. In 1895, the Institute of France paid tribute to American genius by electing Simon Newcomb, the astronomer, to membership after he had already received the Copley prize, degrees from leading universities, and the Huygens medal from Leyden for the best work done in his science for a period of twenty years. The achievements of Samuel P. Langley in solar physics and Henry Draper in photo-chemistry revealed high powers of penetration and imagination, placing them both among the outstanding figures of their era in America and Europe. As head of the Smithsonian Institute, Joseph Henry, generally conceded to be "the foremost American physicist" of his time, pursued his restless inquiries in many directions, and continued to make original contributions to electrical science, meteorology, and acoustics until his death in 1878 at the ripe old age of eighty-one.

In the same class of creative spirits, perhaps a little higher in the galaxy, was Josiah Willard Gibbs, who, after studies in Paris, Berlin, and Heidelberg, began in 1871 his thirty-two years of service as professor of mathematical physics at Yale University. By accomplishments of a superior order, he won for himself a position of commanding importance in the international republic of science. Competent experts hailed him as the founder of "a new department of chemistry"; his illuminating papers were translated into French and German; he was greeted by the celebrated Ostwald as the "founder of chemical energetics"; and in 1901 the Royal Society of London awarded him the Copley prize as "the first to apply the second law of thermodynamics to the exhaustive discussion of the relations between chemical, electrical, and thermal energy and capacity for

external work." A critic no less severe than Henry Adams put Gibbs on the "same plane with the three or four greatest minds of his century."

That phalanx of scientists who sought some kind of key to the riddle of the universe as a matter of course had their task cut out for them in the gilded age by the revolutionary work of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer. By no equivocation could America escape the mental challenge of these English thinkers; every student of philosophy and the natural world had to declare allegiance or dissent, at least with respect to general principles. As we have already seen, Asa Gray, a leading botanist of the preceding period, early expressed his approval of the evolutionary thesis and began to champion it in the public forum.

Before Gray retired from Harvard in 1873, John Fiske, a more popular writer and speaker, without special training in natural science, took up the cudgels for Darwin and Spencer and with the aid of his friend, E. L. Youmans, led the fight all along the line on the tenacious Miltonic hypothesis of creation. This militant campaign Fiske started at Harvard in a series of lectures delivered in 1869-71, later incorporated in his Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, a work which quickly ran through many editions. Terrific was the burst of fury which greeted Fiske's first assault; newspapers and clergymen made vehement protests; and the Lowell Institute would not allow the "agnostic" to deliver his message to its select body of thinkers. Unshaken by the opposition and cordially supported by Charles W. Eliot, the new president of Harvard, Fiske went on with his crusade, steadily gaining adherents, especially after he began to emphasize the possible reconciliation of the Spencerian theory with the ancient concept of a personal God. By the end of the century, evolution in a variety of linguistic patterns stretching from the defiant skepticism of Huxley to the genial Christian theories of Drummond had become thoroughly naturalized in the United States with widespread influences in every branch of mental activity.

The secularizing process stimulated by Fiske and his colleagues was advanced by scientific writers who made direct frontal attacks on theological traditions. In the course of this paper war, John William Draper, the eminent chemist, choosing the instrument of historical exposition, published in 1862 a survey of the intellectual development of Europe which treated the clergy and their allies after the cavalier fashion of Buckle; and twelve years later Draper brought up new artillery—a version of the conflict between science and religion. The schism which Draper created was afterward widened by Andrew D. White, who crowned his labors in 1896 with a great work on the warfare between science and theology in Christendom. After that day there were few thinkers in higher university groves, who accepted without fatal reservations the simple epic made immortal by Milton. Indeed science was now so enthroned in America that it became a kind of dogmatic religion itself whose votaries often behaved in the manner of theologians, pretending to possess the one true key to the riddle of the universe.

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Upon religious concepts and Christian ethics, especially in Protestant circles, the influence of scientific thinking was immediate and emphatic. Although the ponderous theologian, Charles Hodge, in presenting his view of Darwinism in 1874, declared that "a more absolutely incredible theory was never propounded for acceptance among men," President McCosh of Princeton, whose orthodoxy was flawless, boldly undertook to reconcile a kind of evolutionary doctrine with the Christian idea of God. The theory, said McCosh, "makes God continue the work of creation, and if God's creation be a good work, why should he not continue it?" Thus given a high recommendation, the evolutionary view of the universe soon permeated Protestant theology everywhere except in the intellectual hinterlands of the country.

Also disconcerting to the theologians of the old school was the contemporaneous development of higher Biblical criticism—an examination of the authorship, textual composition, and plain meaning of the Bible in the cool light of historical science. "In every department of Biblical study we come upon errors," exclaimed Charles Augustus Briggs, one of the most cautious of the new scholars; for his temerity he was convicted of heresy and suspended in 1893 from the Presbyterian ministry. Nevertheless he found a home in the Protestant Episcopal Church and a generous hearing throughout the country. Within a few years his doubts about the inerrancy of the Bible had become commonplaces in all the theological schools that paid any attention to the voice of reason.

In spite of the fact that the clergy who disagreed with the conclusions of the higher critics declared them more damaging than Ingersoll's popular lectures on the mistakes of Moses and ancient conceptions of Hell, the process of scientific invasion and historical research could not be stayed by any verbal fiat. In every quarter insistent issues simply had to be met. Preachers of all schools, disturbed by the steady secularization of intellectual interests, were compelled to face the dilemma of losing doubters by sticking fast to old creeds or losing their creeds in trying to keep up with the sweep of science, philosophy, commercial amusements, and acquisitive obsessions. The reconciliation of religion with the new science called for supreme abilities.

While the Catholic Church was able to escape in some measure the dissolving effects of this intellectual movement by falling back upon traditions older than any version of the Bible, all the Protestant denominations that did any reading or thinking were forced to make new reckonings. Of their religious convictions the very center and support was the Bible, especially the King James version, and as advancing science questioned its astronomy, biology, ethnology, physics, and historical canons, there was no choice except surrender or answer. Consequently those who refused to

throw overboard their heritage cast about for buoys of various shapes and materials.

In meeting the mixed array of disturbing doubts now set afloat, the heroic Briggs freely declared that "the religion of Jesus Christ is not only the religion of the Bible, but the religion of personal communion with the living God." Among the Protestant masses at large, those who paid any heed to such perplexities probably found their state of transition very well described in the amazing scheme of liberation devised by Professor William N. Clarke of Colgate. "I have described the change," he wrote, in his Sixty Years with the Bible, published in 1909, "by saying that I passed on from using it in the light of its statements to using it in the light of its principles. At first I said: 'The Scriptures limit me to this'; later I said: 'The Scriptures open my way to this.' As for the Bible, I am not bound to work all its statements into my system; nay, I am not bound to work them all in; for some of them are not congenial to the spirit of Jesus and some express truths in forms which cannot be of permanent validity."

Equally troublesome to the theologians was the new philosophy imported from Germany, principally by college professors. Owing to their extraordinary growth in the gilded age, American universities afforded economic support for a numerous class of intellectual workers not connected with the churches on the one hand, as in colonial times, or with the substance of industry on the other—a class of workers to whom the anomalous title of "educators" was given. In these circumstances philosophy, natural and theological, once the monopoly of the clergy, passed gradually into the hands of secular newcomers.

Among the pioneers of this group, William T. Harris stood preëminent. During a long life devoted to educational work, he sang the praises of the profoundest German thinkers, above all of the kingly Hegel, who though religious in outlook were primarily secular in interest. In 1867, Harris founded in St. Louis the Journal of Speculative

Philosophy, which for a quarter of a century promoted contemplative studies and encouraged young American scholars, such as Josiah Royce, Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, to employ their talents in examining cosmic problems from the earthly side. While plunging into the secular current, Harris had no desire to affront the theologians. He constantly assured them that genuine philosophy supported rather than undermined the grand doctrines of Christianity; but in practice the results were not exactly as prophesied.

It is true that Royce, by the performance of marvelous intellectual feats, managed to stay within the hazy bounds of authentic religion, but Peirce, James, and Dewey swung gradually over toward the mathematical and scientific wing. And in the end philosophy, which in America had hitherto served as the handmaid of theology, deserted her employer, showing in the eighties and nineties an independence that bordered on insolence, at least as things were mirrored in the minds of the former initiates. It was then too late however for theologians to recover the chairs of philosophy established in the leading universities and filled by laymen in correspondence with the intellectual trend.

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While theology was being forced to reform its verbal modes under the stimulus of science and secular philosophy, Christian ethics had to reckon with the thundering facts of the new economic order and with all the varieties of social thinking thrown up so profusely in the conflict of capital and labor. In reality, by reason of its Oriental emphasis on things of the spirit, an emphasis natural enough among a people lacking in material goods and living on the margin of subsistence, Christianity ran counter to the acquisitive drift in American life. If the ethics of the historic faith continued to satisfy pulpit and pew in many rural regions, doubts and quandaries certainly appeared in

the great centers of industry, wealth, and poverty, particularly as the blows at Pittsburgh, Homestead, and Pullman came ringing through study walls.

While T. DeWitt Talmadge went serenely on preaching salvation in another world as the chief aim of man, a number of lesser lights in the clerical profession began to hunt through the words of Jesus for pertinent truths applicable to capitalists and workingmen engaged in a desperate struggle over the possession of worldly goods. Turning also to the illuminating experience of England, they read the writings of Kingsley, Ruskin, Maurice, Carlyle, and Ludlow. After much searching of hearts, a small group, calling themselves Christian Socialists, came together in Boston, under the inspiration of W. P. D. Bliss, in 1889, and put forth an American declaration of faith, asserting that "the control of business is rapidly concentrating in the hands of a dangerous plutocracy" and that "the teachings of Jesus Christ lead directly to some specific form or forms of socialism." Small as their circle was, the range of their influence, as events later proved, was wider than it was thought to be at the moment.

Many a clergyman who did not accept with a whole heart the radical creed of the Boston party was caught in the drift of current social thinking and borne along part of the way. At the Rochester Theological Seminary, Walter Rauschenbusch, recasting his scheme of reasoning in the light of Christian Socialism, frankly placed social service above pious profession. "This high task of making human life and human society the realization of the Father's loving will for his children; this is the real substance of the spiritual life, of which the services and devotions of the church are but outward forms." At the Chicago Theological Seminary, the industrial implications of Christianity were given frank recognition in the establishment of a chair in Social Economics which was filled by Graham Taylor, fresh from the Hartford Seminary, where he had been emphasizing, in the terms of religion, the collective obligations of the new

epoch. In Ohio, Washington Gladden, though opposed to Socialism, flayed the plutocracy in scorching words and pleaded for a mild form of municipal ownership and state control that looked like anarchy to the philosophers of the full dinner pail. Beyond the Mississippi, George D. Herron, from his chair of Applied Christianity at Grinnell College, preached a gospel of "social redemption" which turned scores of Methodist clergymen from the traditional themes of card-playing and dancing to the conflicts of the market place. With growing insistence it was asked in nearly every quarter whether Christianity had any message for thinkers who were trying to construct a fairer order or at any rate to reduce the frictions of the lucrous game.

This new Christian interpretation of human obligations, combined with the study of ethics, bore practical fruit in the college settlement movement—that social adventure of the eighties. The original attempt to bridge the gulf between rich and poor, by establishing residential centers in slum areas, was made at Toynbee Hall in London under the influence of Samuel A. Barnett, a clergyman of social leanings in the Church of England; and from that English experiment, Stanton Coit, who founded the Neighborhood Guild in New York in 1886, drew direct inspiration. It was with emphasis on religious sentiments that Professor Vida Scudder, of Wellesley College, appealed for student volunteers to break down the barriers between the classes, called for "a new Franciscanism" to overcome the brutality of the acquisitive process, and gave unstinted service to the settlement movement. In opening the Hull House amid the dreary industrial wastes of Chicago in 1889, Jane Addams likewise ascribed no small part of her initiative in the enterprise to "the impulse to share the lives of the poor, the desire to make social service, irrespective of propaganda, express the spirit of Christ—an impulse as old as Christianity itself."

Whatever the dominant force behind this effort to cross the social divide, it exerted, beyond all question, a direct and

immediate influence on American thinking about industrial questions and on the course of social practice. It is safe to say that few economists grew to maturity in the gilded age without some association with a college settlement where first-hand contacts with labor could be made. In fact the contribution of the institution to the education of the middle classes was perhaps greater than its services to the poor; for one of its prime functions was to interpret to the boulevards and avenues the life and aspirations of the factory quarters. Moreover through the practical experiments of such agencies fresh approaches were revealed to workers tackling the problems of urban misery. For instance the value of organized district nursing was concretely demonstrated by the Henry Street Settlement of New York under the direction of Lillian D. Wald.

With no exaggeration did Robert Woods, the experienced Boston leader, declare in his survey of thirty years that the college settlement had brought representatives of the working class into conferences affecting the whole community; that it had provided the first laboratory for the study of the immigrant question; that it had revealed to the prosperous the life and problems of the poor; that it had promoted realistic studies, social surveys, kindergartens, free libraries, recreation, the enforcement of industrial and sanitary codes; that it had waged war on the sharpers who played upon the weakness of the masses; and had effected a union of forces against the more flagrant abuses of American industrialism.

Indeed, any search for the origins of social practice in the United States meets at some point the work of settlements. One example will illustrate the wide range of their activities. It was the residents of Hull House who led the first effective fight against child labor exploitation and sweat shops in Illinois. It was one of this group, Florence Kelley, who, on the basis of first-hand experience, suggested to the state bureau of labor an investigation into these long accepted evils. The inquiry was made. A legislative committee appointed to examine into the state of affairs in Chicago

held meetings at the Hull House. Members of that institution were selected by organized labor to coöperate in the formulation and enactment of protective legislation. Under this pressure was passed "the first factory law of Illinois, regulating the sanitary conditions of sweatshops and fixing fourteen as the age at which a child might be employed." Immediately afterward, Mrs. Kelley was appointed the first factory inspector, given a staff of deputies, and put at the task of enforcing the law, with the aid of another Hull House resident, a young lawyer, who helped in prosecuting violators of the factory act reported by the inspectors. This was the beginning of a long career of service on the part of Mrs. Kelley in promoting better standards of industrial practice and in educating consumers with respect to responsibilities to the producers of their goods. It was no accident that Jane Addams, head of Hull House, stood with Theodore Roosevelt at Armageddon in 1912 when the plutocracy was challenged in the name of "decent government and fair play."

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Changing industrial processes, ostentatious riches, novel adventures of the scientific spirit, and new interpretations of Christian duty ran deeply into political opinion, economic doctrine, ethics, and esthetics. As the plutocracy shot upward into power and fame above the low levels of the social plain, it naturally became the target of criticism on every side. Farmers and industrial workers who enjoyed neither the hope nor the possibility of great fortune, old families of talent and lineage who were content either through choice or necessity with modest estates, the shattered aristocracy of the South that clung to the rhetoric and philosophy of the manor house, the middle classes which had a taste of wealth with irritation rather than emancipation—all took a less rosy view of the economic universe than millionaires fresh from business victories surrounded by their admiring retainers.

Centuries before, in the momentous decades of ancient Rome when new men swollen with the proceeds of commerce and speculation astounded the Eternal City by their luxurious display, plebeians and patricians of seasoned stock united in expressing anger at self-centered, vulgar parvenus and anxiety for the safety of the state. Cato the Elder, offspring of a farmer, Cicero of dubious origin—probably artisan—and Juvenal, descendant of a freedman, concurred with the flower of the landed aristocracy in the belief that lovers of great riches and effeminate luxury were a menace to morals and patriotism. In similar fashion, during the uprush of the plutocracy that followed the Second American Revolution, those who for one reason or another garnered no huge stakes from the lucrous game were moved by doubts and misgivings as to the future of the republic. Labor leaders, like Powderly and Gompers, and agrarian champions, like Peffer, Simpson, and Bryan, joined thinkers from other realms, for example, Emerson, Lowell, Henry Adams, Lodge, and Roosevelt, in expressing the conviction that there was something alarming in the drift of American affairs.

In no contemporary documents can the direction of such opinions be traced with more precision than in the writings of Henry Adams, who, after serving as secretary to the legation in London, carefully studied and observed the course of American economy until his death in 1918. In his early years, Adams said, he struggled in a half-hearted way against "State Street, banks, capitalism altogether, as he knew it in Old England or New England," but in the end he gave up the battle, confessing defeat. "A capitalistic system," he wrote in 1893, "had been adopted and if it were to be run at all, it must be run by capital and by capitalistic methods; for nothing could surpass the nonsensity of trying to run so complex and so concentrated a machine by southern and western farmers in grotesque alliance with city day laborers, as had been tried in 1800 and 1828, and had failed even under simple conditions." A few

years later Adams warned his countrymen that in the end they would have to choose between the pessimism of European politicians, religious reaction, and the communism of a labor dictatorship.

Henry Adams' bosom friend, Henry Cabot Lodge, the successor of Webster in the Senate, though regarded in radical quarters as a spokesman of the plutocracy, entertained fears scarcely less poignant. He declared that he could not be "oblivious to the darkest sign of all, the way in which money and the acquisition of money by taking it from some one else through the process of law seems in the last analysis rampant in every portion of the community, and at the bottom if not at the top of almost every proposed reform, every political issue, and every personal ambition." In 1913, he openly confessed his uneasiness at "the gigantic modern plutocracy and its lawless ways" and even more uneasiness at the restless desire of the populace to escape hard labor and to despoil Dives of his pecuniary rewards. All society, all art, all letters, all manners, the distressed statesman saw afloat in an age obsessed by money and amusement.

Less guarded than the Senator from Massachusetts in his verdict upon the gilded age was another offspring of old stock, Theodore Roosevelt. As early as 1897, before he loomed large upon the political horizon, Roosevelt, writing to Lodge about a municipal campaign, exclaimed: "The really ugly feature of the Republican canvass is that it *does* represent what the populists say, that is, corrupt wealth. . . . Both Platt and Tracy represent the powerful, unscrupulous politicians who charge heavily for doing the work—sometimes good, sometimes bad—of the bankers, railroad men, insurance men, and the like." Later experience confirmed him in this analysis of politics. In explaining to Sir Edward Grey the campaign of 1912, he declared with evident feeling: "We had against us . . . ninety-nine per cent at the very least of the corporate wealth of the country and therefore the great majority of

the newspapers. . . . We were fought by the Socialists as bitterly as by the representatives of the two old parties and this for the very reason that we stand equally against government by a plutocracy and government by a mob. There is something to be said for government by a great aristocracy which has furnished leaders to the nation in peace and war for generations; even a democrat like myself must admit this. But there is absolutely nothing to be said for government by a plutocracy, for government by men very powerful in certain lines and gifted with the 'money touch,' but with ideals which in their essence are merely those of so many glorified pawnbrokers."

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In spite of all this concern about the course of events in America during the gilded age there appeared no social philosopher competent to survey the society from top to bottom, plot the trajectory of plutocratic ascendancy, or interpret the sweep of things in the large. Of course, the socialists were active in obscure corners offering the gospel of Karl Marx in pamphlets and brochures, but they produced no critique of the capitalist procession in America worthy of more than a passing glance. Disgruntled populists, deprived of planting leadership and finding no clergymen or college professors to write for farmers as they had once written for slave owners, did nothing but pepper Mæcenas with bird shot.

Perhaps the first approach to a critical diagnosis that made a rift in American complacency was Henry George's Progress and Poverty, published in 1879, a trenchant volume drawing the deadly parallel of riches and misery, sun and shadow; proposing to apply to the complexities of the capitalist order a physiocratic doctrine of the eighteenth century in the form of a single tax designed to absorb unearned increment in land values and strike at the root of gross inequalities of wealth. By his livid description of the

carking desolation spread under the high noon of American prosperity and the assurance he displayed in prescribing a remedy, George sounded a new note in American criticism. Within a decade, he became famous at home and across the seas; radicals and trade unionists in New York tried to elect him mayor; owners of factories patronized him—he offered no disturbance to their economic operations. In England and Ireland he was hailed as a conquering hero, and, owing to the acuteness of their land problem, made a profound impression on current economic opinion. Through countless channels, George's ideas filtered out into varied types of American thought, helping to make the country at least dimly aware of the social question; but the single-tax creed bore little fruit in legislation and gave no serious qualms to the managers of politics.

In a different vein, but with effects on complacent opinion almost as subversive, was James Bryce's American Commonwealth issued in 1888. For the first time since the days of de Tocqueville, a philosophic foreigner, in this case an Englishman, had surveyed the whole American tableau, if, as someone remarked, "over the rim of a champagne glass," and described it with elaborate precision. Hitherto, most of the books on American government had dealt with the subject in the terms of pious constitutional fiction; but Bryce laid bare the anatomy and morphology of politics—rings, bosses, frauds, machines, intrigue, and chicane. It was devastating, especially that part of it written by a young professor at Columbia University, Frank J. Goodnow. Though Bryce did not speak in the language of a medical man or offer specifics for the ills he exposed, his book made a sensation among those who, to use Ruskin's phrase, had sat with joyful faces at the banquet table—blindfolded.

Before their serenity was completely restored, they were given a more violent shock in 1894 by a volume from the pen of a fellow-countryman, Henry Demarest Lloyd, bearing the pointed title, Wealth against Commonwealth. For a long time Lloyd had been studying closely the methods

used by the giants of capitalism in disposing of petty competitors. In 1881, to the distress of respectable readers, he published in the Atlantic Monthly a merciless attack on the Standard Oil group. After devoting more laborious days to amassing data, Lloyd then opened a general campaign, using the records of judicial trials and legislative inquiries to convict capitalists of the crimes usually ascribed to those inclined, like Napoleon, to neglect minor conventions in the pursuit of major aims. Some of his evidence was sedulously controverted; yet there was enough truth in his sweeping indictment to spread among the mighty much trepidation over the safety of their institutions. Doubtless the effect of Lloyd's arraignment would have been more terrifying if he had not offered social democracy as the answer to the questions raised by his analysis—a particular solution no more palatable to the American middle class than the doings of John D. Rockfeller's South Improvement Company.

Upon the members of the plutocracy at large, the criticisms of Henry George and of Henry D. Lloyd made no very lasting impression; though, as time moved on, a few of them began to manifest doubts more or less philosophic. If none followed the Christian injunction to sell his goods and give to the poor or emulated the example of the Grimké sisters who, freeing their slaves, took up abolition, one at least, Frederick Townsend Martin, gave his whole class a terrible lashing in a book, called The Passing of the Idle Rich, published in 1911. "It is strange to me," he said, "and it always has been strange to other men who have studied those things, that a plutocracy can be so long maintained; for a plutocracy, of its very nature, is the weakest possible form of government. It lives either by force or fraud. It lived in Rome before the days of Marius by force alone; and the lower orders of Rome were slaves. It lived in Paris before the Terror by a combination of force and fraud. . . . It lives in America by fraud alone; and what may we say of the people of this nation that permit it to

live? . . . Today we are studying the sources of our wealth, finding out for ourselves the real price paid by humanity to give us the privilege of the social life which we and our fathers have enjoyed." Thus the American leisure class was invited to turn in upon itself, inspect its economic position, and consider its place in the general social structure. Naïve acquisition and enjoyment were coming under the scrutiny of sophistication.

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A counter-reformation, as always, followed the assaults of the critics. The capitalist system, in which the plutocracy flourished, like every other social organism, had to evolve a scheme of defense and, as things turned out, the task of justifying to man his own handiwork fell mainly to the economists in the universities that sprang up like mushrooms as the gilded age advanced. At Yale, William G. Sumner vindicated in lecture and treatise the economics of Manchester so acceptable to captains of industry eager to be left alone—at least in domestic affairs if not in the matter of tariffs. At Columbia, John Bates Clark, in his Philosophy of Wealth and later in his Distribution of Wealth, showed with a lavish display of learning and logic that on the whole the capitalist system worked for justice, rough-hewn, but still justice; to put his system in more severe terminology, each factor of industry, particularly capital and labor, is rewarded in the main according to its contribution and thus business enterprise partakes of even-handed equity. Under the terms of a gift from a wealthy manufacturer, the Wharton School established in 1881 at the University of Pennsylvania was expected to expound the protective tariff as a highly praiseworthy economic device. All that was needed to make the circle complete was another Calhoun to celebrate the theme: "Capitalism a Perfect Good!"

That task, however, proved impossible; for academic economics was not at bottom altogether unified by any such

simple faith. When viewed closely from the standpoint of business enterprise, it showed cracks and flaws in its retaining walls. If Professor Sumner rained resounding blows on the heads of trade unionists, who, as he thought, were trying to make water run up hill, he also struck out at the beneficiaries of protective tariffs and commercial imperialism, taking his canons from the Cobden-Bright school without reference to the peculiar problems of the American order. Even more disturbing to "sound economy" was E. B. Andrews, who, at Brown University, in the old home of Federalism, upheld the heresy of free silver until for reasons of weight he was compelled to transfer his scene of activity to the Middle West. In the same institution, Lester F. Ward declared that the social process was highly dynamic, jarring perceptibly the solid structure of orthodox economics built on concepts essentially static in nature. Though far more radical in the import of his teachings, Ward managed, by refraining from meddling too much in practical affairs, to keep his chair to the end.

In other halls of learning the crucible was bubbling. At Johns Hopkins and later at Wisconsin, Richard T. Ely, who had studied among the Germans their strange mixture of feudalism, cameralism, and capitalism, known as social economy, expounded a critical and constructive creed that looked to the elect like the threat of socialism. Indeed, his teaching made such a furor that a legislative investigation was held and peace was not restored until it could be shown that his frightful doctrines were merely a mild brand of "reform." About the same time John R. Commons, after amazing academic experiences, began to introduce the learned world to organized labor as an inevitable accompaniment of capitalism. In 1899, at the turn of the century, Thorstein Veblen printed the Theory of the Leisure Class, a merciless analysis of bourgeois reputability, the first of a long series of ironic books from his bewildering pen.

Evidently social criticism had crept into scholarship. In-

deed, university teachers were openly proclaiming that science had nothing to do with bolstering up or assailing any social order; its business, they said, was the search for truth—that corroding acid more disruptive to prevailing modes than any force except the discovery of new ways to easy profits. In other words, the creed of unrestrained acquisition was growing soft. When the American Economic Association was founded in 1883, under the presidency of General Francis A. Walker, it boldly engraved on its shield the devices of science rather than the dogmas of any static concepts. And before long younger members of the society began to play havoc with general economic theory by making innumerable concrete studies of taxation, railways, trusts, labor unions, wages, profits, panics, and other details in the progress of business enterprise, with little or no reference to any exigencies of capitalist defense.

While masculine economists occupied themselves with capital, interest, land, profits, labor, and wages, a feminist leader of no academic pretensions, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, half as advocate and half as prophet, demanded and received a national hearing on the relation of women to the new order of things. After a season of lecturing, she published in 1898 two works, one in prose, called Women and Economics, and another in verse, entitled In This Our World. With much ingenuity and a great deal of humor, she propounded the thesis that woman was enslaved by tradition and could only regain her primitive vigor and creative power by securing complete economic independence from "the nearest male relative by birth or marriage." So stirring was her analysis of historic reverence for "the holy stove" and so clarion was her call for freedom in mind and labor that a new school of feminist thinkers was raised up in America and Europe which sent reverberations as far afield as awakening Japan. Moreover, the system of cooperative living, with its enlarged leisure for women, which seemed when proposed by Mrs. Gilman a utopia more chimerical than Bellamy's romance, proved to be in the

hands of real estate promoters the soundest economy for urban development. Though shocking to defenders of inherited matrimonial institutions, the idea of economic independence for women, if extremely difficult to define in practice, was continuously illustrated by the multiplication of women wage workers in industry, by new adjustments in marital relations, and by a constant increase in the number of divorces granted at the instance of discontented wives. Concepts which had been broached as revolutionary in the early days of the republic or even in the middle period became commonplaces at the close of the gilded age.

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The general process of bringing ideas into closer relation with changing circumstances was also aided by the rise of a school of "scientific historians," who, like the economists, were largely sustained by the colleges and universities. Before the nineteenth century closed a revolution had been started in the spirit of historical research and composition; the old romantic craft, ornamented by Bancroft and Prescott, had passed away; and an army of doctors of philosophy, trained in Germany or in the new American institutions of higher learning, had taken the seats of the mighty. Announcing as their slogan the dictum of Ranke that it was the business of the scholar to see the past as it actually was, they invaded every important field in a critical mood, challenging respectable dogmas with a rudeness that alarmed the amateur guardians of national traditions. In 1884, the American Historical Association was founded, followed eleven years later by the publication of the American Historical Review. Before long the collection and interpretation of materials passed largely into the hands of professional workers who, unlike Bancroft, made no claims to special knowledge concerning the ways of God and in theory at least were committed to the search for mundane truth. In due course this change in the affairs of Clio was to bear strange fruit.

For the time being, however, historical writing in "the grand style" remained largely in the hands of men who dropped into the business more from accident than design. Indeed most of the ambitious work of the period was done by students who had little or no connection with the schools, at all events as professors. A great history of Lincoln in ten volumes was written by his former secretaries, Nicolay and Hay. A practising lawyer, Henry Harrisse, of French origin but a graduate of the University of South Carolina, achieved monumental results by researches in the period of discovery and exploration. From his office in the Harvard library, Justin Winsor issued huge volumes of narrative and critical history which still stand as staples in the studies of scholars. Another son of Harvard, Francis Parkman, continued with increasing success his series on the struggle of England and France for the possession of North America. And his neighbor, John Fiske, turning from cosmic philosophy, retold the early period of American history with no little literary skill—discarding the canons of his master, Herbert Spencer, in favor of interesting episodes and actions. With a decided penchant for realism, two grandsons of John Quincy Adams, Charles Francis and Henry, finding political careers closed to them, devoted their high talents to works presenting significant phases of national culture.

If no one followed in the footsteps of Irving and Motley, European themes were not wholly neglected. In Philadelphia a prosperous business man, Henry C. Lea, more than made up for the general indifference of his contemporaries. Retiring from commercial affairs with a competency in 1880, he indulged himself in his affection for mediæval studies, and published, eight years later, a great history of the Inquisition, which was followed by other works in the same field. With a more practical purpose in mind, Captain Alfred Mahan, at the Naval War College, employed history to stimulate interest in enlarging the Navy at the very moment when American capitalism was looking for

more worlds to conquer. In rapid succession he turned out volume after volume on the influence of the sea power in destiny, visibly impressing the governing classes of England and encouraging the German Kaiser to redouble his efforts in naval construction. Although the secrets of social evolution in the United States received little attention from such masters of the grand style, the materials for that more or less esoteric inquiry were being heaped up in the modest brochures and articles which flowed from the pens of professional students.

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For imaginative literature, as for history and other factual subjects, the conditions favorable to creative work, already rich in the middle period, were intensified by the economic development of the gilded age, multiplying the demands of the market, schools for training, and facilities for the nurture of hereditary power. Now the makers of novels, stories, poems, and essays had a larger and more varied audience—with the shift of industrial and population centers into the West, the absorption of the South into the machine process, the expansion of urban civilization, the multiplication of literates through the public schools, the opening of colleges to women, and the general extension of the middle-class area of comfort and leisure. In magnitude the demand of this continental audience could be measured according to financial terms: the annual output of book and job presses was approaching a hundred million dollars at the end of the century, a sum greater than the national debt of Washington's day, which croaking pessimists thought the people of America could never pay.

In response to this enormous demand for literary wares was called forth a corresponding body of workers possessing fair technical competence, among whom occasionally appeared a personality hailed as a genius—how and why no one can exactly tell. No doubt, as Edwin L. Clarke proves

in his study of American letters, heredity has been an important factor in the production of talent: during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sixty-eight families conspicuous for literary power furnished nearly one-sixth of the one thousand leading American authors. But this is not the whole story. In those select families, nurture—the climate of books and learning, the occupations and conversations of parents and adult friends—was an element to be placed in the scales with heredity. Any way, among the distinguished literary families, only a few heirs-apparent were writers of the first magnitude. More pertinent to intellectual evolution in the large are Clarke's conclusions respecting the whole group of authors under survey. He shows that "in proportion to numbers, families in comfortable circumstances had produced more literary children than had families living in poverty"; that birth into the more fortunate social classes had given ability exceptional opportunities to secure advantageous training; that the richest and most dissident religious denominations had brought forth the largest numbers of authors; that the stimulus of the cities had fostered creative work; and that, as the education of women advanced, they had become more prominent in the world of letters.

If the economic development of the gilded age increased the demand for imaginative literature and enlarged the supply of competent writers, the social conflict of the period furnished stirring themes for their versatile pens. By the authors of the first rank who rose above purely local portraiture—authors of the quality of Mark Twain, Whitman, Lowell, Hay, and Howells—the great questions of national destiny which perplexed statesmen and economists were proclaimed, hinted at, etched or shown through a glass darkly according to mood and circumstance. In Letters as well as in orations, editorials, and treatises were reflected the deeds of industrial captains, the doings of the plutocracy, the clashes of capital and labor, the schemes of reformers, and the protests of the agrarians. Nearly every

line written by Walt Whitman after 1865 mirrored some aspect of the immense and varied economic processes of America, the hopes and doubts that ran with them.

> Race of veterans! Race of victors!
> Race of the soil, ready for conflict! Race of the conquering march!

Whitman cried triumphantly in the hour of the great peace. But in his Passage to India written five years later the exultant note was somewhat subdued to an inquiry about the inner meaning of the rush and roar.

> A worship new, I sing;
> You captains, voyagers, explorers, yours!
> You engineers! you architects, machinists yours!
> You, not for trade or transportation only,
> But in God's name, and for thy sake, O soul.

One year more and acrid doubts had begun to corrode the poet's confidence: "I say that our New World democracy, however great a success in uplifting the masses out of their sloughs, in materialistic development, products, and in a certain highly deceptive superficial popular intellectuality, is, so far, an almost complete failure in its social aspects, and in really grand religious, moral, literary, and esthetic results. In vain do we march with unprecedented strides to empire so colossal, outvying the antique, beyond Alexander's, beyond the proudest sway of Rome. In vain have we annexed Texas, California, Alaska, and reached north for Canada and south for Cuba. It is as if we were somehow being endow'd with a vast and thoroughly appointed body and then left with little or no soul."

Whitman's humorist contemporary, Mark Twain, fresh from Missouri, Benton's old agrarian stronghold, was equally outspoken in condemning the achievements of American Mammon—at least until prosperity and his wife took the edge from his wrath temporarily. When in 1871 he and Charles Dudley Warner surveyed the ground for a novel of their time, they decided that the title, The Gilded Age, covered their view of the scene; and, under that head,

which we have used from their coinage, they portrayed the social structure from top to bottom. In the guise of fiction they displayed the new plutocrats, ignorant in mind and vulgar of tongue, assuming the airs of the grand style; a raw, rough, uncouth nation obsessed by the acquisitive passion; a scrawny country of villages striving to rival New York and Chicago with the aid of congressional plunder; corrupt politicians, municipal, state, and national, given to high sounding verbalism and low pillage; the roaring mobs of great cities fed on murder and scandal by a sensational press—an unlovely mess without beauty and prospect of taste. In a similar vein James Russell Lowell, when called upon in 1876 to write a centennial ode, blew a blast against rings, bosses, and plunderers which aroused a storm of objections among the super-patriots. Taken to task for his bitterness, Lowell asked: "Is ours a 'government of the people, by the people, for the people' or a Kakistocracy, rather for the benefit of knaves at the cost of fools?"

In spite of Lowell's strictures on American society, the industrial magnates of Chicago invited him to deliver his mind before them in a public address, and on his arrival they tendered him a magnificent reception; one so gorgeous in fact that it inspired Eugene Field, then a young journalist in the western metropolis, to comment on Literature and Riches and shoot a few barbed shafts at the local exponents of culture. With much gusto he quoted Varro's lines about patronage in a gilded age long buried:

> Mæcenas is a model host,
> Who o'er his viands nice,
> Is wont to name each dish and boast
> Its quality and price.

Then in a burst of merriment he declared that "the mantle of the most luxurious, the most fastidious, and the most refined of the grand old Roman times" had fallen, so to speak, "upon the shoulders of the representatives of Chicago wealth and culture. . . . It is understood that the private dinners given to Mr. Lowell during his stay here

have called for an expenditure of not less than forty thousand dollars. Yet there are carping critics who say that Chicago is not a great literary center!"

In a flare of whimsy Field called himself the Chicago Dante, "bard of pork and lard," and with the capricious comments that filled his column in the Chicago Daily News, one of the pioneers of these modern literary channels, he continually mingled quips on lucre and respectability, which carried a flow of humor that was both gentle and careless, for the pageant evoked in him no Puritan wrath. He was no bigot; if every day's calendar of events drew his attention to irritating things, it awakened in him no rancorous bitterness. When a great circus came to Chicago, for example, he linked the episode with the appearance in London of a new edition of Sappho: "As the cage containing the lions rolled by, the shouts of the enthusiastic spectators swelled above the guttural roar of the infuriated monarchs of the desert. Men waved their hats and ladies fluttered their handkerchiefs. Altogether, the scene was so exciting as to be equalled only by the rapturous ovation which was tendered Mlle. Hortense de Vere, queen of the air, when that sylphlike lady came out into the arena of Forepaugh's great circus tent last evening and poised herself upon one tiny toe on the back of an untamed and foaming barb that dashed round and round the sawdust ring. Talk about your Sapphos and your poetry! Would Chicago hesitate a moment in choosing between Sappho and Mlle.Hortense de Vere, queen of the air? . . . If it makes us proud to go into our bookstore to see the thousands upon thousands of tomes waiting on customers, if our bosoms swell with delight to see the quiet and palatial homes of our cultured society overflowing with the most expensive wall papers and the costliest articles of virtue; if we take an ineffable enjoyment in the thousand indications of a growing refinement in our midst—vaster must be the pride, the rapture we feel when we behold our intellect and our culture paying the tribute of adoration to the circus."

In a similar light, other phases of the American spectacle in the gilded age passed under Field's genial review—splashes of color taken from it appearing in his "Culture's Garland; being Memoranda of the Gradual Rise of Literature, Art, Music, and Society in Chicago and other Western Ganglia" collected in the year 1887. Nothing escaped his wit, not even the practices of village statesmen. When, for instance, a crowd of Illinois politicians set out on a junket to New Orleans at public expense, he wrote a "fake" telegram from "Blue Cut, Tenn.," stating that "the second section of the train bearing the Illinois legislature to New Orleans was stopped near this station by bandits last night. After relieving the bandits of their watches and jewelry, the excursionists proceeded on their journey with increased enthusiasm."

Harping upon the same string, two other funmakers of the gilded age—as yet unchecked by the deadly standardization of the machine and unoppressed by the monetary morals of the counting house—took special note of the follies in current political economy. Under the lackadaisical bantering and uproarious explosions of Artemus Ward often lay piercing observations on the paradoxes of the American republic. During the tense days of the Civil War, Lincoln had found relief from his agony in the absurd humor caught by Ward from the life of the trains, canal-boats, and small towns of the Middle West and in the shrewd comments of the satirist on the acquisitive instinct in politics. When, in a joke, Ward described the swarms of office-seekers who descended upon Lincoln at Springfield, when he attributed the disastrous defeat at Bull Run to a rumor of three vacancies in the customs house at New York, he reached deeper down into the substance of popular conventions than any of the long-faced pretenders would ever admit. If Stanton could not see the flash of the rapier, his once-snubbed chief was fully able to appreciate it.

In a far wider range of daring and with a surer grasp of details, Peter Finley Dunne, speaking in the language of

"Mr. Dooley," depicted the American process as he saw it at the end of the century. With sparkling laughter he exposed the theories, conceits, lies, and corrupt practices of his time, displaying such rich humor that he received storms of applause from the generality as well as the scoffers. His phrase "the Supreme Court follows the election returns" —a doctrine that might have cost a professor his chair— was greeted with vociferous cheers and passed immediately into current coin among people who would brook not the slightest disrespect for that great tribunal, who certainly would not admit that human passions ever interfered with the consultation of the divine auspices. Fully as popular was his casual remark that a law which looked like a stone-wall to a layman was a triumphal arch to the eye of a corporation lawyer. His three words on Roosevelt, "alone in Cuba," were worth a volume on that warrior's official claims to distinction in the Spanish War. With a touch of the same severe irony, Mr. Dooley discoursed on imperialism in the Philippines, "irradyatin' civilization," selling men's shirtings to the "natives iv neighborin' Chiny"— "with a holy purpose in our hearts, th' flag over our heads, an' th' inspired wurrud iv A. Jeremiah Beveridge in our ears." If Dooley's version made no votes for the anti-imperialists, it at least relaxed the tension of the "moral overstrain."

With kindred stress, the transformation of the social order which arrested the thought of poets and humorists struck into the pages of the novelists, furnishing themes and drives for countless tales—and money and leisure for rising above the eternal commonplaces of the humdrum. As in the days of the early republic and in the middle period, writers of fiction, who did not flee to other countries or devote their talents to the portrayal of local scenes and characters, arrayed themselves from right to left on the issues of the social conflict that ran through the gilded age like a livid scar; though none ventured a whole-hearted defense of the plutocracy. Perhaps the best vindication of raw capitalism was

the Breadwinners, a novel on the great railway strike of 1877, written by John Hay, who was in time to become a high Republican politician, a trusted associate of Marcus A. Hanna, the accomplished diplomat of William McKinley's imperialism.

For the poignant middle class of seasoned families, equally distressed by the doings of the plutocrats and the vulgarisms of democracy, spoke Henry James. The grandson of a millionaire, a whole generation removed from the odors of the shop, and granted by good fortune a luxurious leisure, James steered his way into a more rarefied atmosphere, normally as the sparks fly heavenward. In a loftier altitude he found many superior people "cultivated" in taste, languid in habits, and desirous of elegant manners if they had not fallen heir to them in a natural way. Of such upper class persons and for them, James wrote most of his novels, using the crude, rising, bourgeoisie of America to emphasize the prettiness of the English landed aristocracy which had subdued even its latest cotton-spinning recruits to some accord with manorial taste. Possessing an assured income from fixed investments, he took time in his writing to evolve a meticulous and fine-spun style, one so vague and so intricate that it moved even his brother, William, the pragmatic philosopher, to explode in a letter to the novelist: "Say it out, for God's sake." Accustomed by his position to the society of people not wholly engrossed in business, James found a home in England, where at last, during the World War, he renounced his American citizenship and became a subject of King George.

Somewhat in the same fashion that more versatile genius and more powerful improvisor, Francis Marion Crawford, after drawing a picture of Boston politics in 1884, fled from the "thin and vulgar life of America" to the mellow civilization of Italy, where he devoted his talents to exploiting European scenes and personalities. Though such withdrawals were alarming to patriotic Americans and soothing to the nations thus classed as more exquisite, the practice

was by no means new among literary people. Byron, Keats, Shelley, and the Brownings seemed to prefer Mediterranean to English culture; Heine enjoyed his days in Paris more than in Hamburg or Düsseldorf; Turgeniev died in the capital of France though he might have returned to Russia.

To the left of the center were the most penetrating makers of fiction. There Mark Twain belonged, by birth and by nature, retaining in his mental make-up to the end of his days some of the twists of Missouri's agrarian democracy; though apart from occasional thrusts at "privilege," particularly in the Yankee at the Court of King Arthur, he attempted no general analysis of American society after the merciless scrutiny of The Gilded Age. Turning aside to safer themes, he left to his less gifted and milder-mannered friend, W. D. Howells, the task of discovering fiction in the roaring vortex. Like Twain, Howells was from an old agrarian region; born in Ohio, he knew the frontier; in his youth he had cut trees, plowed corn, and dug potatoes. It was by sheer force of mind that he made his way into the higher economic stratum where, as a boy from the soil, he encountered the frost of culture two or three generations old, giving him a shock that vibrated through his tale of The Rise of Silas Lapham.

Early drawn into the struggle of labor against the plutocracy, Howells not only wrote of that conflict and its antithesis, the Socialism of Altruria, but he descended into the forum to champion the right as he was given to see it—even to protest against the execution of the Chicago anarchists as "a grotesque perversion of law," knowing full well, as he said, that his action was distasteful to "the immeasurable majority of the American people." If his wrath never burned to high heaven and his stories of the times, realistic as they were, marked no epoch in American letters, there was no doubt about the locus of his soul in the curve of the American economic alignment.

Still to the left of Howells, at least in the baldness of their fictional structures, were two writers of the period far

more dogmatic in their style. Accepting the machine system at face value Edward Bellamy wrote a frank novel of Socialism, Looking Backward—the first American utopia of the industrial age, glorifying science and invention as the savior of mankind from the curse of nameless and unhonored drudgery. With an extraordinary swiftness it caught the imagination of the whole country, led to the formation of a short-lived Nationalist Party, and gave to the hard Marxism of the German Socialists a deep tinge of American sentiment. If Bellamy's furor soon died away in the storm of the generality, his influence on social thinking was never lost. Of a different order but radial to the same center, was The Bomb written several years later by Frank Harris. In none of Zola's terrible descriptions of Parisian degradation, was the devastating brutality of modern poverty, a root of industrial revolt, more accurately presented than in this picture of Chicago slums, a tale of social unrest in the submerged wilderness of that ruthless city.

Intense as was the pulling power of the machine vortex, drawing sections and provinces into one simple crucible, the great majority of the popular novels turned out in the gilded age derived their substance from geographical peculiarities and ancient triangles. After writing one national novel, The Gilded Age, Mark Twain portrayed life on the Mississippi and in the West, a life that was peculiar to the New World in many ways, and made a few excursions into European scenes, ending in bitter doubts about all so-called eternal values. In the Hoosier Schoolmaster, Edward Eggleston etched with deadly accuracy a poor white community in the Indiana of pioneer days; and afterward tossed off occasional pictures of the frontier that was passing. From the Old South came the voices of Joel Chandler Harris, who made the southern Negro to laugh and weep in his pages, and of George Washington Cable, who, with rare sympathy, caught the spirit of his particular section, notably New Orleans. In the far North, Sarah

Orne Jewett saved pictures of fading New England, while Margaretta Deland reflected in John Ward, Preacher, the sinking flickers of religious passions that still divided families. From the Pacific Coast to New York and London, Bret Harte carried the roar of the mining camps; and in the pages of Helen Hunt Jackson's Ramona the dying years of Mexican California were clearly painted.

So rich indeed was the harvest of this period that a present-day critic, Carl Van Doren, reviewing the whole gamut of American fiction, is persuaded that the decade between 1880 and 1890 produced more good novels than any similar span in American history. Why so many of them perished quickly, like the grass that is cut down and withereth, must be left to those who preside over the battle of the books. Perhaps, however, mass production in letters as in pig iron, the pressure of publishers for new stocks to sell, and the dynamic drive in American economic evolution account for most of the oblivion that overtook them.

Whatever may be the arbitrament of time in this matter, it can be safely said that the best selling books of the gilded age were of a different order. In that uproarious era, the American masses cherished what a clever writer has called "dime-novel theories of the world." They were not interested in esoteric, impersonal, futurist or vortical speculations. They were obsessed by the concrete, personal, primitive, material zest for life—for a life that was to last but a brief moment until the free land was occupied and the waste places were conquered by man with his machines, his codes, his arts, and his standardized reputations. In every respect the epoch was distinguished by what John Hay called "the restless haste and hunger which is the source of much that is good and most that is evil in American life."

So in those epic days, while the women and girls of the middle class throve on Godey's Lady's Book and Bok's Ladies' Home Journal, the men and boys consumed tons of "thrillers" that represented almost without exaggeration the adventures in tragedy, lust, hot passion, mystery, and

riches which were indigenous to the soil of the New World. For every copy of Howells' Traveller from Altruria or Henry James' Portrait of a Lady that was sold in the marts of trade, doubtless a thousand copies of Buffalo Bill's desperate deeds, Diamond Dick's frantic exploits, and Beadle's blood-curdling jeopardies were consumed by the men who, with the consent of their wives, governed the country in the gilded age and by the boys who were to possess the future.

That other branch of imaginative literature, the drama, ran true to the laws which governed fiction. There were heavy borrowings, as always, from Europe, while the themes evolved in America often corresponded with ceremonial usage. Yet it is significant that two of the most conspicuous dramatists, Bronson Howard, styled the "dean of American drama," and James A. Herne, creator of American types, were both deeply affected by the economic processes that were swirling around them. Capital and labor, the amusements and diversions of the plutocracy, and the disasters of frenzied speculation formed underlying patterns for Howard no matter how thickly he overlaid them with French persiflage and conventional entertainment. That affection for nearness to the soil which marked the spirit of Howells was also in the drive of Herne's work. A student of Darwin and Spencer and deeply impressed by the economic tragedy portrayed in Henry George's story of progress and poverty, Herne tried to reach down into fundamentals. Still, for every one of these efforts motivated by an intense reaction to the substance of American life, came a thousand plays adapted from European writers and designed for those who took especial pride in being cosmopolitan or who preferred technique to strife; a thousand more or less refined melodramas for the middle classes; and a thousand blood-curdlers, like Nellie the Beautiful Cloak Model, for the proletariat, "at popular prices."

Perhaps this was to be expected, for one of the striking facts of the gilded age was the conquest of the theater by

business enterprise and the organization of dramatic production on a trust basis. The cost of management, the expansion of the market with the rise of new cities all the way to the Pacific coast, and the enlarged opportunities for profit conspired to place theaters like newspapers in the hands of men economically competent. In these circumstances, the old-fashioned stock company, organized by one or more actors or actresses, free to produce plays that suited their fancy and directly dependent on the earnings of the box-office, steadily gave way before the theatrical manager who supplied the capital, searched out the national market, selected his own plays with reference to potential earnings, and chose his own stars. Like the industrial capitalists who frequently climbed from the boiler room or the clerk's desk to the direction of industry, these theatrical magnates often rose from the position of boy ushers taken from the streets, through libretto writing, to the high adventure of production and management. By 1900, the theatrical trust had the drama as firmly in its grip as the oil trust had the petroleum business.

In both cases there were some independents and many protestants, but their operations were confined to side eddies in the main current, and to criticisms of the victors. It was alleged, for example, that the new type of manager stifled both acting and playwriting; to which the defendants replied that they were hungry for signs of genius and found them not. Considered on its intrinsic merits, the discussion which raged was much like the old controversy over the advantages of French academies and English literary anarchy. In any event, the theater, as it always has been, was subdued to the forces that were uppermost in the world of business—and philosophers were unable to break the whirling circles of cause and effect.

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For the fine arts as for imaginative literature, the economic and social setting of the gilded age provided specific

conditions of development. The mounting riches of the plutocracy, the growing wealth of the middle classes, and the construction of public buildings and monuments expanded the market for painting and sculpture.

While the market was being extended, ways and means for artistic aspirants to secure technical training were multiplied. The passage to Europe was made easy and inexpensive; more Americans than ever before could study under the best teachers of the Old World and see the originals of great work from the historic past. Meanwhile, the facilities for stimulus and training at home were enriched and drawn more closely to those of Europe. At the celebration of the centennial of independence in Philadelphia in 1876, a great display of European, Oriental, and American paintings, sculpture, porcelains, and textiles gave the general public its first chance to get a glimpse of the world's masterpieces.

From wider interests of this nature sprang, during that decade, museums of the fine arts, such as the institutions in Boston and New York, under the inspiration of professional and business leaders, with the support of popular subscriptions and municipal grants. Within a few years, it was a mean city indeed that could not boast of a public art collection, or at least an occasional exhibition. In connection with the museums and independently as well, centers of instruction in the fine arts rose on every hand in bewildering confusion; the new high schools, spread all over the country from Maine to California, were adorned with reproductions of classic art which students were set to copying with such skill as they could command. And so out of the unknown masses emerged a host of men and women to use the brush, pencil, and chisel in response to an enlarging market that was offering inducements for a professional career. These were the substantial and realistic forces which helped to shape the progress of the fine arts in the era that followed the Second American Revolution.

The weight of power was, therefore, on the side of imita-

tion rather than creative feeling. Both the plutocracy that patronized and endowed the arts and the democracy that took its cue from striving respectability shrank from daring innovations. To them the common life of fields, factories, workshops, and commercial cities seemed to furnish no inspiring themes for grand strokes. So the owners of great riches, clinging to representations of the displays and ceremonials of popes, kings, and queens, instructed their clients to adhere as closely as possible to the authentic canons of the old masters, whatever their imagery, technique, or inspiration. In the same mood, committees of state legislatures and city councils, when choosing schemes for the adornment of public buildings, selected murals of stainless knights, fair ladies, and idealized nudes, ordering acres of such decorations from European and American ateliers.

As yet there was no seasoned security of the kind that immemorial inheritance brings. Neither was there any eager searching of the future to call into being a revolt against the scholasticism of art comparable to that raised in the realm of reason against the scholasticism of religion and learning. Instead, a powerful pressure was brought to bear on American artists to restrain their natural emotions and remain content with their pale imitations of classical form, forgetting that Michelangelo's Moses, could it have been copied with a skill equal to that displayed in the original, would have been almost as incongruous in a land of roaring industry as a placid Buddha cunningly fashioned after the Daibutsu of Kamakura. The pall of unreality hung heavily over stimulus, training, and product. Sargent's Dogma of Redemption, painted for the Boston Public Library, seemed strange in the old home of Unitarianism in an age when Harvard was governed by Charles W. Eliot, a serene skeptic, trained in chemistry rather than dialectics. A very climax of formalism was reached by John W. Alexander when, in a great mural, he personified Pittsburgh as a man in medieval armor receiving a crown from a modern high school girl stripped to the waist.

But within these limitations, work of undoubted competence was produced by some American artists. There was a polished finesse and steel-like accuracy in the portraits of the lords, ladies, and rich bourgeois that sprang into phantom life under the brush of John Singer Sargent. In fact those who took their rulings from London had every reason to rejoice in American achievement. Sargent received commissions from England's oldest and richest. Abbey was chosen to paint the official picture of King Edward's coronation; Whistler's Carlyle was cherished in London as well as Boston, Kansas City, Walla Walla, and Rushville; and American canvases hung in the gallery of the Louvre.

If the formalism of standardized painters, museums, schools, and academies, European and American, seemed absolutely rigid at a casual glance, appearances were in some measure deceptive. Everywhere in the period were artists who knew that, try as they would, they could not by imitation reach in the same modes the heights of the originals handed down by the masters. The very comparison of ancient, medieval, modern, and primitive art, Western and Oriental, made possible by the museums, had a dissolving effect in time upon the pure classicism inherited from Mediterranean antiquity. Even the iron discipline of the schoolmen itself produced an antithesis in the minds of refractory students who, as Voltaire cast off the regimen of his Jesuit teachers, were galled by the yoke of tradition. Moreover, artists were human beings subject to the impact of ideas from contemporary science, industry, and politics. They read books and newspapers. They could not by any route escape altogether the shock of democratic doctrines which shook thrones and established orders in Europe during the nineteenth century and brought on the débâcle that closed the drama of the World War. If America seemed relatively calm after 1865, the Europe in which so many American painters received their early training was seething with popular ferments, later intensified by the communist uprising in Paris in 1871.

In this intellectual effervescence new concepts of art flashed out in all parts of the Old World, sending vibrations even through the gates of Japan so recently opened to Occidental influences. Common things of common life now thrust themselves deeper into the realm of the arts. In France, Millet put aside the admonitions of his master to paint in immortal form the simple peasants he had known in his youth when he himself toiled in the fields; it was no accident in æsthetics that the first sum of money which set him on the path to freedom came, in the revolutionary year of 1848, from the Socialist, Ledru-Rollin, who was soon to flee from France to the life of an exile.

Similar revolts occurred in other quarters. "Ideal nudes" gave way gradually before genre painting and sculpture. "Realism" and "sincerity," so potent in fiction, became watchwords for wide circles of artists, as for scientists and students of mankind. "It is the effect of sincerity," wrote Manet, the leader of French dissidence in 1867, "to give to a painter's works a character that makes them resemble a protest whereas the painter has only thought of rendering his impression." This was an insurgent note in art. Whether intended as a protest or not, "impressionism" represented the rise of a new school of painters, with right and left wings, who ignored many rules of the disciplinarians, even though its chief masters were all children of the galleries, and flung upon their canvases anything that interested them. The spirit of this revolt against the schoolmen was surging up in Europe when, in the gilded age, American youth rushed there in such numbers to study.

To the ateliers of the French impressionists many of these aspiring young Americans drifted, though not always to remain enchained. William Morris Hunt, George Inness, and John La Farge, for example, were profoundly stirred by the new school, and brought back to the United States the devotion of reformers. In 1878, the American Academy, which had continued to uphold the older and more rigid standards of excellence since its foundation, was challenged

by a new organization known as the Society of American Artists, headed by La Farge. Though the rebellious association did not succeed in keeping all its members firmly attached to its canons of faith, it did produce a movement of realism in æsthetics akin to the scientific movement in philosophy which drove scholars away from cloisters and historic models to the world of nature and experimentation.

While democratic currents were thus modifying the themes and emphasis of painting, in spite of the classical schools, science was also affecting the arts. Physicists had long been breaking substances into their component parts; so a few artists taking a cue from this operation began to use the spectrum in their quest for a better understanding of light. They worked in the laboratory, they studied the writings of Helmholtz, Chevreul, and Rood. They went far in their examination of the relations of line to line, plane to plane, angle to curve, and the kinship of the hues and colors in nature.

Among the Americans who took this scientific tack, La Farge accomplished the most striking results. In the opinion of Henry Adams, La Farge had the most complex American mind of his day; at least he was both sophisticated and primitive; both mediæval and modern; both American and European—able "to burn incense at enough shrines" to give him a claim to universality. To this mental equipment, he added the spirit of the artisan, for he worked in his own glass factory to create by experimental methods windows that would rival the stained glass of old. Though custom laid a heavy hand upon him, there was in his work a faint adumbration of the freer impressionism to come.

If, however, a search is made in the welter of color and form and imagery that flowed from the brushes of the artists trained abroad for a distinct note of American dynamics, it will hardly be found, so strong was the grip of formal tradition conserved in the museums and taught by the men of the schools. Through the thick layer of that imported culture, the passions and ideas which characterized

American life in the gilded age could seldom break. Rather did they find expression in the work of men less subjected to the discipline of the masters—in the paintings of Winslow Homer, Alexander Wyant, Albert Ryder, and Ralph Blakelock, none of whom spent long formative years under the iron rule of authority. Certainly Winslow Homer was close to the substance of the United States. Born of American parents in New England, he came to art through apprenticeship to a lithographer and sketching for Harper's Weekly, achieving recognition by the sheer strength of his genius. Knowing nothing of the luxurious salons supported by the plutocracy, he became absorbed in the primal struggle of man with nature; he painted sailors, fisherfolk, workmen, and farmers in their setting of land or sea—mankind and nature all of one element wrapped in the mystery of life. Of the same vagrant type was Wyant, the son of an Ohio farmer-carpenter; though sadly deficient in technique, he revealed in his American landscapes the instinct of the creator. More romantic and subjective but equally independent in expressing his own vision was the third of this group, Ryder, whose best work displayed, as a critic observed, the "obscure, elusive quality that is to painting what Browning is to poetry." Away on the wings still more to himself was Blakelock, a weird and formless spirit, untutored, simple friend of nature and companion of Indians, whose subtle play with color and feeling for the esoteric kept him ever aloof from the successful clients of the plutocracy.

In the kindred art of sculpture were betrayed the same obedience to classical traditions and signs of a movement nearer to the heart of American culture. The acquisition of riches, the growth and rivalry of cities, and the quest for respectability expanded the market until there was an almost unlimited demand for busts of the rich, for soldiers' and sailors' monuments, for grand decorations at successive national expositions, and for ornamental attachments to public buildings. The result was a profusion of products by both men and women, nearly every section of the country

making contributions. Saint-Gaudens though born in Ireland was reared in New York; Daniel Chester French was a native of New Hampshire; Bissell was a Connecticut boy; Barnard, a son of Pennsylvania, spent his impressionable years in Muscatine, Iowa; Gutzon Borglum was born in Idaho; Niehaus was a son of Cincinnati. Geographical divisions as well as history furnished the themes of sculpture: the Far West gave Indians and hunters; the Civil War, generals and privates.

Here and there flashed out evidences of an emancipation from mere imitation, especially as allegorical extravaganzas sank slowly, but steadily, in public favor, as statesmen lost their Roman togas and put on frock coats and trousers. Near the end of the century, a still freer drift appeared in the recognition accorded to the power of common life—the strength of labor, the art of the machine, the protean might of industry. With full authority could Lorado Taft say in 1903, that "where once was indecision and a timid leaning on the past, there exists today a valuable nucleus of artistic consciousness. The American sculptor no longer puts himself deliberately out of touch with his time, but endeavors to be a part of the life about him. He realizes that, in order to exert an influence, his art must speak no alien tongue, but must follow the vernacular of his day and race."

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Fortunately for the future there was a growing recognition that the fine arts and industry, put asunder by the machine, must be somehow reunited. Even the old Puritan antagonism to gauds, which had long lingered among men of substance grown rich through the exploitation of the New World, began to relax before the necessity of improving designs with a view to holding the market for textiles and other commodities. In time it became evident that commercial art was shut up in no water-tight compartments, that it must depend for its growth upon nourishing the

higher forms of imagination. But the captains of industry, faced by domestic and foreign competition, at first found little help from the somewhat exclusive masters of the fine arts and little encouragement from the directors of museums filled with classical treasures.

Driven to other expedients in their efforts to relate industry to beauty and imagination, they turned to the established educational system near at hand; in 1870, Massachusetts, the home of the textile industry, made drawing compulsory in the public schools. This innovation was followed three years later by the foundation of a Normal Art School to train teachers of art—a movement which the Centennial Exposition of 1876 helped to make national. Organized immediately afterward, the Philadelphia School of Industrial Art set an ambitious example that was observed from all the segments of the educational field. By the end of the century every state had one or more normal schools offering instruction, of a kind at least, in the fine and industrial arts. Accordingly as the handicrafts, such as they were in this country, declined, "technically competent" training began to take the place of apprenticeship discipline to supply industries with new patterns, figures, and colors, much to the horror of those esthetes who had forgotten, if they had ever learned it, that in great creative periods there had always been a vital relation between the crafts and the arts.

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If meager results were accomplished in the fine and industrial arts as a whole, certainly one branch, often disowned by its relatives, showed distinction of the first order. That was the graphic arts. The magazines founded by commercial publishers, the newspapers run on business principles, the processes of engraving created by the technologist, and the market daily enlarging with the spread of literacy called for genius to illustrate stories, editorials, headlines, and political rhetoric. In this field the American

temper flowered with prolific skill, perhaps because it could here be more natural, nearer to the realities of life as it throbbed from day to day in the conquest of a continental domain. Certainly it was the graphic talent which drew closest to the events, ambitions, passions, hopes, and interests that made up the passing show of the gilded age. It was from the pictures of the illustrators liberated from the formalism of anatomy, grammar, and patterns of logic, that life and action stared with the starkest verity, reflecting the spirit of American civilization more powerfully perhaps than the written word.

For example, the age of the Civil War, the Credit Mobilier scandals, and the Tweed Ring was immortalized in the defiant cartoons of Thomas Nast whose Tammany Tiger survived the devastations of time. The New York World's concept of the battle between the democracy of mechanics and farmers and the plutocracy of the Goulds and the Vanderbilts was made vivid in the horrible black and white lines of "Belshazzar's Feast" hurled at Blaine in the campaign of 1884. Homer C. Davenport's cartoons of Hanna, covered with dollar marks, expressed the passions of Bryan's "crown-of-thorns" speech with more deadly accuracy than the words of the orator and clung to the popular imagination when the echoes of his eloquence were as silent as the tomb. On the other side the portraiture of Bryan and Altgeld in the fustian and grinning terrorism of anarchy struck deeper into the memories of their foes than all the pointed and rabid rhetoric of editors and reporters.

The same market that gave support to the cartoonist gave sustenance to the general illustrator, in spite of the steady encroachment of photographic reproduction upon the field of engraving. Winslow Homer got his start toward fame when he was commissioned to make sketches of Lincoln's inauguration for Harper's Weekly. The wide social orders that read the Ladies' Home Journal saw their ideal of femininity projected in the American girls drawn by Charles Dana Gibson. Humanitarians of the middle class who

founded social settlements dropped tears on M. A. Woolf's sketches of lowly life in a great city and the children of the "mobility." It was for the publishers of books and magazines that Howard Pyle, Frederic Remington, Howard Chandler Christy, Joseph Pennell, and Mary Cassatt drew, painted, limned, and etched all phases of national life and interest, some of their work revealing a vibrant power.

While Whistler was finding inspiration in Venice and London, Pennell beheld through the eye of imagination not only European life but the course of American business enterprise; with a sure hand he portrayed the elements of modern industry—mechanics, steel, labor, energy, mass production, and power. Had they not said in olden times that to labor was to pray and did not Calvin Coolidge say that the business of America was business? It really required no uncanny vision for Pennell to serve as the prophet of the future rather than an imitator of a past that was, at all events, dead. Nor was it a mere accident that novel representations of womanhood and child life wrought upon the mind by the social changes of the gilded age now took their place beside the conceptions of the schoolmen who copied canvases of the middle ages.

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On the course of musical development, the economic and imitative factors so powerful in the realm of the fine arts during the gilded age exerted still stronger pressures. Riches gave patronage and endowments; prosperous middle classes the wide market. It was a banker of State Street, Henry L. Higginson, who assumed, in 1881, the task of supporting the Boston Symphony Orchestra and who, by relieving it of anxiety over box-office receipts, enabled it to devote its talents to pure art, unvexed by the distractions of American competition. From the plutocracy of New York City came the money to build, in 1883, the Metropolitan Opera House, planned with reference to the social aspirations of

the rich who held the parterre boxes. It was the rich ironmaster of Pittsburgh, Andrew Carnegie, who gave to that city a great music hall, equipped it with a fine organ, and added a generous fund to provide free concerts for the people. In other places also millions were poured out of the earnings of industry for concerts, operas, schools, and conservatories, just as thousands had been poured from the coffers of the princely and clerical landlords of Europe for musical production. And to the endowments and gifts of the rich was now added the patronage of the multitude—a patronage which came mainly from the women of the middle class given leisure by the surplusage of prosperity and drawn in their quest for diversion, reputability, or inspiration, to the charms that inhere in music.

Indeed, women played a dominant rôle in American musical history during the gilded age. Millions of daughters thrummed and strummed in parlors while pinched mothers washed dishes and hard-pressed fathers toiled at trade, happy to purchase at any price the signs of good breeding and "accomplishment" or to carry the training forward to flower on the concert stage or in operatic performance. Women constituted the major portion of the audiences at concerts and the opera, furnished most of the students who in turn sustained the teachers, bought the printed music and the literature on the subject, subscribed to the trade journals, themselves became teachers of music, and talked the art in season and out. And some of the women won high honors as musicians as well as patrons. For instance, Mrs. H. A. Beach received an open and generous recognition at home and enjoyed the distinction of having her work rendered by important artists in London, Berlin, and Paris. "I do not think," said Walter Damrosch out of his wide experience, "that there has ever been a country whose musical development has been fostered so exclusively by women as America."

To the sway of riches and women was added the pressure of business enterprise—market, organization, and mass pro-

duction—so potent in that age. Already well started in the middle period, the manufacture and sale of musical instruments by the millions became an important branch of industry; pianos and organs were made by the trainload and sold on the installment plan, like sewing machines, by smooth and loquacious salesmen, until an instrument stood in nearly every home that had risen above the margin of subsistence. Improvements and inventions put novelties in the field besides. Whatever was profitable to business was praiseworthy in culture. With a passion for organization akin to the aggressiveness of instrument manufacturers—and certainly not without an eye to salaries and fees, promoters spread all over the United States the forms and methods of musical education recently established in Europe. Indeed, in some respects Europe was outdone in this relation; at every stage from the kindergarten to the university, instruction in music received an official recognition in the American academic system, and was given a more extensive and elaborate equipment than in the Old World.

With characteristic energy, efforts were made time and again to produce the most gigantic music festivals, establish the biggest orchestras, and assemble the largest number of devotees. As if to announce the booming era of prosperity and the full dinner pail, a chorus of ten thousand voices and an orchestra of one thousand pieces celebrated at Boston in 1869 the close of the Civil War by a festival of peace given under the direction of Patrick S. Gilmore, an Irishman from Dublin. Apparently discontented with this paltry effort, Boston did honor to peace a second time in 1872, with a chorus of twenty thousand and an orchestra of two thousand members. Determined to surpass his first effort, Gilmore now had artillery reinforcing the strains of voice and instrument; firemen pounding fifty anvils to give a realistic ring to the Anvil Chorus of Il Trovatore; German, French and English military bands mingling their notes with the roar of native talent; and forty thousand people listening and clapping their hands. On this occasion

Johann Strauss and Franz Abt were shown how a great nation could render their music when it set about the task. With the same genius for organization which produced such mammoth festivals, the energy of the country found expression in countless music conventions, societies, guilds, teachers' associations, schools, lectures, concerts, recitals, quartettes, quintettes, orchestras, and choral associations from shore to shore. Americans demonstrated their willingness to attend musical conferences with as much enthusiasm as party assemblies and meetings of fraternal orders.

In this musical furor, as in the promotion of the fine arts, Americans leaned heavily on European guidance, at least during the early stages. With the timidity of a new people suddenly released by economic prosperity from drudgery but conscious of a deficiency in technical training, musical aspirants naturally turned to the reputable masters, making a rush to the conservatories of the Old World that paralleled the rush to the galleries and studios of the European centers of art. Moreover, the immense American market for teachers, conductors, and directors, protected by no such tariff as sheltered the manufacturers of steel and cotton goods, drew Europe's leading artists of voice and instrument to the American field of exploitation. This alien invasion was augmented by the German migration of the early seventies bringing with it, as a by-product, a veritable flood of music lovers to join clubs and assume leadership in organization.

After all, teaching, directing, and selling had been old trades in music as in the other arts. From time immemorial artists had shifted with the market from one country to another, from one patron to the next, as necessity or mood directed; so the European musicians who flocked to America to pursue their trade were merely following accredited practices. Even stars of magnitude were lured by the earnest solicitation of Americans who offered substantial remuneration. For example, Dr. Leopold Damrosch, having made a brilliant success at Breslau, was brought to

America by the Arion Society of New York in 1871 to serve as its conductor; and Wilhelm Gericke was enticed from Vienna by Higginson in 1884 to conduct the Boston Symphony.

Confronted by European influences wherever they turned, the American composers who won highest distinction in the era—among whom were John K. Paine, George Chadwick, Edward MacDowell, Horatio Parker, and Arthur Foote—were almost completely subdued to the music of the Old World. They produced works which won the applause of both hemispheres, overcoming the stigma of the province; but they could hardly be called American in anything but birth.

Against the alien musical dictatorship there were from time to time nationalist waves of protest, but with little or no avail. America had nothing distinctive to say in music. There was no rich heritage of indigenous folk song to serve as the base of elaborate and sophisticated superstructures; attempts to utilize Indian and Negro strains yielded slight results, for those exotic notes were also foreign to the white composers who sought to handle them. Equally unsuccessful were efforts to strike chords common to all American life. They evoked no divine response such as came to the music masters of Europe working with the unities of racial states—Slav and Latin, Celt and Teuton; royal families—Hapsburg and Romanoff, Bourbon and Hohenzollern; and ecclesiastical hierarchies—Roman, Russian and English. That MacDowell could command the respect of the best critical opinion abroad proved that somewhere in the vast continent slumbered the fire of genius but at no hour in the gilded age did a flame illuminate the heavens.

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On the form and spirit of journalism the triumph of business enterprise and technology laid a heavier hand than on the arts. Established newspapers, such as the New York

Evening Post, which had been founded to represent and promote commercial interests, continued to meet oncoming issues with appropriate phraseology, and Charles A. Dana lived until 1897 to protest in the editorial column of his Sun against offenses of "impersonal journalism"; but the days of somber dignity and caustic wit were passing fast. Inventors had so revolutionized printing, engraving, and typesetting that it was no longer possible for an impecunious printer, such as Horace Greeley, to found and develop a metropolitan daily as an organ of opinion. Large capital was now necessary to provide the great mechanical outfit, purchase the requisite literary and artistic talent, and provide the worldwide news service demanded by the age. At the same time the enormous growth in commercial advertising and the reduction in the price of newspapers inevitably made editors more and more dependent on those who manufactured and sold goods. Daily journalism, therefore, became a branch of machine industry. Without advertising no great paper could thrive; without circulation advertising was not forthcoming; without a wide appeal no extensive circulation could be obtained.

Given these conditions, acquisitive sagacity was not long in realizing that it paid to champion, amuse, and entertain the urban masses, and in due time a new type of newspaper undertaking that function burst into the streets. The designer of this departure was Joseph Pulitzer of Magyar-German-Jewish descent, a restless, driving, erratic editor who forged to the front in St. Louis during the seventies as owner of the Post-Dispatch. In 1883, Pulitzer went to New York, bought the World from Jay Gould, and opened what his foes called the era of "yellow journalism."

Though some critics imagined that the enterprise was nothing more than a sensational pandering to the tastes and passions of the mob, that rough judgment betrayed neither insight nor discrimination. The World in Pulitzer's hands had a social program that pleased the lower middle classes and workmen who enjoyed no large taxable incomes, a pro-

gram that was strangely clear-cut for a land fond of resounding platitudes. For instance, it declared an open war on the plutocracy, on Martin's "idle rich." On the third day of his reign, Pulitzer wrote irately: "There is the aristocracy of Central Park. The low Victoria, adapted to exhibit boots, stockings, and skirts as freely as hats and shoulder wraps. . . . There is the sordid aristocracy of the ambitious matchmakers, who are ready to sell their daughters for barren titles to worthless foreign paupers. . . . The new World believes that such an aristocracy ought to have no place in the republic—that the word ought to be expunged from an American vocabulary." By way of starting the extinction, Pulitzer proposed that the government should tax luxuries, inheritances, large incomes, monopolies, and privileged corporations, reduce the tariff to a revenue basis, reform the civil service, and punish political corruption. "This is a popular platform of ten lines," he added. "We recommend it to the politicians in place of long-winded resolutions."

Having announced a spirited campaign against the possessors of swollen fortunes, the World proclaimed itself "the organ of a true aristocracy—the aristocracy of labor—the man who by honest, earnest toil supports his family in respectability," thus drawing the lines of its class appeal so plainly that none could mistake its animus. But, of course, Pulitzer's paper could not be sustained by intense reformers alone. To secure and hold the necessary circulation, it made use of innumerable devices to catch the fancy of the populace—cartoons, comic cuts, elaborate news service, expert reporting, and costly special articles; and it exploited to the utmost limit the tragedy and comedy of contemporary life, in all its component elements of sex, society, crime, perversion, love, romance, and emotion generally. Nobody and nothing were spared in the quest for a thrilling subject to furnish the pretext for towering head lines. Thus a new journalism was born of the changing social conditions and the changing technology of the printing industry. The

*populi* were to be entertained while the *ordo equester* was being bated and taxed. Cicero, as well as Catiline, would have understood the transaction.

Before Pulitzer had gone far on his uncanny way, a formidable competitor arose in the person of William Randolph Hearst, son of a California railway and mining millionaire, who, like Cæsar before him, had found his ambitions cramped by the limitations of his class. After toying for a time with the San Francisco Examiner, Hearst went to New York in 1896, bought the Journal, employed Arthur Brisbane, past master of the galvanic arts, and outdid Pulitzer in all the tricks of the sensational game. The same appeal to the masses he intensified and made more vivid and violent; the same apparatus of large type, red strips, flaming headlines, crude drawings, and cartoons he employed with more cleverness and profusion. Reaching out for "the man in the street and the woman in the kitchen," he gave them what he thought they wanted. While flaying the plutocracy to the measure of their anger, he gratified their natural curiosity about "superior persons" by recording the doings of the idle rich with meticulous detail.

Within a short time these new methods cut a wide swath in American journalism. Fastidious citizens who prided themselves on their moderation attributed this result to national depravity, but that was a hasty view of the matter. No small part of the success achieved by the yellow press was due to its fierce denunciation of flagrant abuses passed over in silence by timid editors who fancied themselves more respectable. The severest critic could hardly deny that the sensational editors of the eighties and nineties, by resorting to merciless attacks and repeated exposures, contributed powerfully to the improvement of the methods pursued by American capitalists and politicians. They also aroused the interest of unknown millions never before reached by the daily newspaper, thereby making a contribution to the democratic process. They likewise nourished patriotism; Hearst probably did more than any single private citizen to

bring on the Spanish-American War; and Pulitzer supported the same cause with loyal fervor, convinced, as he said, that it would boost his circulation. At any rate, whatever its merits or demerits, the yellow press rose and flourished in the gilded age preparing the way for the cheap illustrated daily which sank its tentacles still deeper into the strata of the faintly literate.

In the sweep of this enterprise, Pulitzer was finally outclassed; before the nineteenth century closed, he became milder in manner, departing so far from his early theories that he was prepared to support for the presidency Admiral Dewey, a brave warrior but a naïve politician, wholly innocent of social or economic opinion. Perhaps the wiser editor remembered from what quarter Cæsar drew his loudest cheers; perhaps his constituency was growing more prosperous and respectable.

For the middle classes, with their left wing touching the proletariat and their right the plutocracy, was also created an appropriate journalism—a periodical type which in the ordinary course of events called for no such capital outlay as a metropolitan newspaper. There was in fact a large, if somewhat bewildered, army of editors who refused to surrender to the methods of the strong characters in the economic conflict—to figures of Homeric proportions like Jay Gould, Jim Fisk, and J. P. Morgan. These editors of milder emotions, the intelligentsia of the gilded age, sought to apply historic ethics to the changed situation. The Independent, for example, a religious weekly founded in 1848, when committed to the direction of Henry Ward Beecher in 1861, announced that it would "assume the liberty of meddling with every question which agitated the civil or Christian community." Combining the powerful editorials of George William Curtis with the staring cartoons of Thomas Nast, Harper's Weekly assailed scandals of the Credit Mobilier age. Bent on still more purist designs, E. L. Godkin founded The Nation in 1865, as a critical weekly, and for thirty years poured broadsides into the

corruption and vulgarity of the plutocracy. But when his editorials were carefully analyzed, it was evident that he was mainly pleading for better manners—the manners of a well-ordered bourgeois society not subject to the swift and rude changes in technology so characteristic of the times. In any event, as soon as the western agrarians made their populist assault upon the perquisites of railway bondholders in the seventies, Godkin showed that he could be as firm and harsh as the Wall Street Journal in sustaining the authenticity of the acquisitive process.

To meet the demands of the great democracy of the median orders now rising into literacy through the ministrations of the public schools, new popular magazines entered the field. For the women came the Ladies' Home Journal; started in 1883 under the shrewd management of Mrs. Cyrus Curtis, it opened the modern phase of its career six years later when Edward Bok took the helm. Casting aside the severe formalism of Godey's earlier offerings, this journal now united "polite" literature of a kind with a skillful treatment of the humblest domestic arts, thereby answering all the imperious requirements of the woman in the kitchen who aspired to ultimate liberation in the parlor. "The great heart of the people" was reached; their response was a circulation running above a million.

Deeply as this downward thrust penetrated, it left a great majority of the literates of the United States still untouched. In the country districts and small villages especially were multitudes of men as well as women whose ambitions soared above the local weeklies with their community gossip—men and women a bit interested in "the big doings of the big world." Clearly here was an alluring opportunity for business enterprise and it was grasped by S. S. McClure who, as a peddler of pots and pans in the Middle West, had come early in life to grips with the strong common people dwelling in the Valley of Democracy. From first-hand experience McClure learned that the staid Atlantic Monthly, with its longing for a more exotic culture

than the one available, could not transfix the imagination of the farmers and storekeepers who bought his wares. They and their wives and children wanted gleams in their gray lives.

Sensing the nature of this higher longing the clever itinerant merchant laid McClure's Magazine before the multitude in 1893, giving the people safe fiction, sprightly stories about great folks, and lively pictures of the passing pageant in general. Within three years his journal had a circulation greater than the combined list of three of the noblest older monthlies. Vivid lives of Napoleon and Lincoln, told serially by Ida M. Tarbell, brought enthusiastic purchasers from the byways and hedges. Portraits of actresses (as yet somewhat garbed), generals, politicians, athletic heroes, prize fighters, and statesmen (American and foreign) lifted dull domiciles into the realm of "interesting people and things."

When once the trick was turned, other magazines, taking their cue from McClure, changed their nature; while many new ventures of a similar type were made in quick succession, assuming such democratic names as the Cosmopolitan or Everybody's—until the newsstands and mails fairly groaned with garlands of pictures and romances. In this vein the editors of the new direction ran prosperously until the passions of the Bryan revolt against the plutocracy, calling for critical nutriment, set them furiously at work on the business of "muck-raking" the rich and the politicians, a performance that made a tremendous uproar and yielded golden returns for a season. Silenced eventually in this diversion by weariness, consolidations, the resentment of their victims, and radical fright, the traffickers in popular interests began to offer the masses "literary goods" which reflected the social and economic proprieties of American life, praising Dives and pointing the easy way to riches and fame.

Even the peculiar brand of humor hitherto characteristic of America came under the sway of business enterprise.

The success of popular laugh-producers, such as Artemus Ward, Bill Nye, and Petroleum V. Nasby, proved that "there was money in it." If jokes could be sold from the platform, they could be sold in print; so Puck was founded in 1877, Judge in 1881, and Life in 1883. In such commercial undertakings, matters unpleasant to powerful economic elements in the great democracy were usually avoided, the caustic wit which European weeklies applied to the thin cuticle of current reputability being one phase of Continental culture not widely imitated in the United States. Rather was it the Mormons, undertakers, mothers-in-law, Jews, and woman-suffragists that enlisted the energies of the professional humorists who wrote weekly stints for the "funny papers." After all, customers who had dimes and quarters for the magazines wanted the soothing jocularity of satisfaction, not the acid drops of skepticism, and consequently the broad jest and hearty roar of the frontier which had often pierced to the fundamentals of the social process sank down to the drollery of contentment, preparing the way for the light Ford witticisms of the machine age to follow.

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Organized learning, also, in spite of its classical heritage and its theoretical insulation from practical affairs, was reconstructed from top to bottom in the great age of riches, business, and science. The growth of national wealth now made funds available for the multiplication and improvement of the public schools. Seventy million dollars were dedicated to this purpose in 1871; at the end of the century the annual amount had risen to more than two hundred millions. Transformed into human equivalents this increased outlay meant a steady reduction of illiteracy, notwithstanding the handicap imposed by the growing Negro and immigrant population; in 1880 the percentage of illiterates stood at seventeen; twenty years later at less than eleven; and in 1910 at below eight. In this development,

the rural education described in Eggleston's Hoosier Schoolmaster disappeared even from the remote mountain districts of the hinterland.

With the improvement of the common schools went an expansion of public education to meet the new demand of the artisans, farmers, and the lower middle classes for a bridge over the gulf separating them from the college. Concretely, this expansion took the form of multiplying high schools, institutions supported by taxation and designed to serve parents who, while relieved from the necessity of putting their young children to work, could not afford to send them to private academies. When Lincoln was inaugurated there were only about one hundred public high schools in the country; by 1880 there were eight hundred; at the opening of the new century the figure had passed six thousand. Though there was some grumbling among labor leaders about the shares of revenue allotted to the respective divisions of the educational system, patrons of high schools were strong enough in politics to force a steady development in this upper range.

The influences which promoted the high school were also effective in establishing new state universities, especially in the West, and in enlarging the plants already in the field. At the end of the period all but nine or ten of the states offered, in addition to free elementary instruction for the masses, a regular program of free education extending through the high school and college. Thus the monopoly of the higher learning, once enjoyed mainly by the prosperous, was punctured at the expense of taxpayers; its academic facilities were made generously available to that portion of the people who either had a margin of economic surplus or possessed special talents and energy. So thousands of youths, who in the older days or in contemporary societies elsewhere would have remained at the plow or the loom, squirmed their way into the middle class as lawyers, doctors, writers, teachers, and professional workers of every kind. Especially did girls take advantage of the new op-

portunities, flocking in increasing numbers to high schools and colleges—in this fashion augmenting the independence of women and enlarging their empire over national culture.

Supplementing the great outpouring of public funds for education were huge gifts made to colleges and universities by those who had won high stakes in the contest for riches. Such gifts, of course, were not unknown in earlier times; the famous merchant, Stephen Girard, on his death in 1831, had left two million dollars for a boys' college in Philadelphia; but his example was not widely followed at the time. Indeed there were in the middle period few millionaires with handsome surpluses to throw at the feet of learning; but with the triumphs of the gilded age vast supplies became available for that purpose.

The epoch had hardly begun when Johns Hopkins, a Baltimore merchant, set a precedent in American opulence by dedicating his fortune to the foundation of a new university which was formally opened in 1876. In the next decade, the American Baptist Education Society, finding its college at Chicago dying on its hands, appealed to the grand seigneur of the Standard Oil principality, John D. Rockefeller, for help, receiving in acknowledgment the first of his lavish gifts which later grew into a total of more than twenty millions. In the meantime the older colleges, taking advantage of the suggestion thus offered, began to collect large tribute from the favored disciples of Plutus besides smaller sums from those less fortunate in the acquisitive process—with results astounding in their range. At the end of the century the private colleges and universities of the United States had endowments yielding revenues approximately equal to those derived from public funds by the state institutions of higher learning.

One grand outcome of this development in higher learning was the practical emancipation of colleges and universities from clerical dominion, excepting of course the realm ruled by the Catholic hierarchy. The new state universities and women's colleges prepared primarily for secular

avocations, not for the church, and it was only natural that laymen rather than preachers should direct their affairs. As the flood of gold rolled into the chests of the various colleges of religious origins, the power of the clergy in management correspondingly declined. Depending no longer, save in some freshwater districts, upon collections taken up by local parsons in connection with levies for domestic and foreign missions, college administrators paid less and less attention to the thunders of the pulpit. Appealing now to the leaders of business enterprise for endowments, they drafted men of money into the service of collegiate direction until at the end of the century the roster of American trustees of higher learning read like a corporation directory.

In the transaction havoc was played in the neat little scheme of classical discipline transmitted by the theologians. Having immense sums at their command, many of the older colleges, such as Harvard, Columbia, Yale, and Princeton, branched out into universities in the German style, sometimes overwhelming their once glorified academies with graduate and professional schools. Scarcely anywhere could the new intellectual interests banging at the gates be denied.

Paralleling in time the revolution in administration were drastic changes in the requirements of the clients; for in ever-increasing proportions students who frequented the halls of higher learning demanded "subjects" which prepared for business and secular professions. In any case, from the thoughts, interests, and aspirations of youth reared to trade, the flowing periods of Greek and Latin poets and orators were far removed. Finally the dissolving processes were accelerated by the growth of natural science as a theme of collegiate instruction—a growth inseparable from machine industry resting immediately upon the practical findings of physics and chemistry. Thus by a multitude of forces quite beyond the will of any group of persons, large or small, or the conscious desires of a nation profoundly

religious in its professions, the theological and classical atmosphere of learning was dissipated in Protestant quarters. Religion, of course, remained but not as the lodestar of higher studies. The revolution could be easily grasped by comparing a baccalaureate sermon of Timothy Dwight with one by Arthur T. Hadley.

If a date must be fixed for the beginning of this secular upheaval, it may very well be 1869, four years after the death of Abraham Lincoln, when Charles W. Eliot, a young chemist, was made president of Harvard College. Exercising the firm will associated in popular opinion with business enterprise, he swept out of the institution most of the old-fashioned teachers whose minds and methods belonged to the eighteenth century. He then called in young men fresh from European experience, shattered the classical prescriptions for graduation, and inaugurated an elective system from which the students could select almost at pleasure their own program of studies.

The idea was magnificent—in complete harmony with the catholic spirit of the modern science, constantly widening its borders to include new dominions. At the same time, the scheme was incidentally well fitted to the spiritual requirements of rich men's sons who now flocked to the seats of higher instruction. Under the old compulsory plan, as Lodge once remarked, "a certain amount of knowledge, no more useless than any other, and a still larger amount of discipline in learning were forced on all alike. Under the new system it was possible to escape without learning anything at all by a judicious selection of unrelated subjects taken up only because they were easy or because the burden imposed by those who taught them was light." When Professor Henry Adams asked one of his pupils in the new régime what could be done with the education imparted, he was surprised, he said, to receive the answer: "The degree of Harvard College is worth money to me in Chicago."

So the destruction of the narrow but formidable classical plan produced extraordinary results. On the one hand,

it enriched the curriculum with the new sciences, natural and humanistic, and was accompanied by a multiplication of the opportunities offered to those competent to make use of them. On the other hand, it eased the preparatory strain on the plutocracy. The old system, whatever its faults, was both democratic and disciplinary, if desiccated and narrow; only boys, rich or poor, who could work set problems and read set lines were admitted and graduated. Under the new system there was more flexibility; those who enjoyed the leisure born of wealth could more easily enter and more easily remain to the end. Thus two causes were served.

Less than a decade after the initiation of Eliot's experiment at Harvard came the opening of the Johns Hopkins University at Baltimore. Everything about the procedure breathed the secular spirit of the business age. The endowment was bestowed by a man of affairs; laymen, not clergymen, ruled the board of trustees; and scientific research in its higher ranges was announced as the dominant feature of the institution. An avowed champion of agnosticism, Thomas Henry Huxley, plumed knight of the Darwinian battle then raging throughout the world, delivered the inaugural address. The devout were shocked when they heard that the new seat of learning was opened without clerical benediction. "It was bad enough to invite Huxley," lamented one parson. "It were better to have asked God to be present. It would have been absurd to ask them both." But in spite of the lamentations of the clergy, the new institution, by its insistence upon graduate work and advanced research, set the model for higher learning in the United States for nearly a quarter of a century—in fact until many colleges had transformed themselves into competing universities.

This secular tendency, strong as it was, did not completely meet the requirements of business enterprise. Graduates of "literary" colleges were usually superficial in their equipment; lacking the precision, the knowledge of material things and forces, the mathematical ability, and the labori-

ous habits essential for efficient results in machine industry. They were accused, though not always justly, of being "too cultural" in their aims if not in their achievements. In any case the exactions of the machine process demanded a type of education which only technical schools could supply. A few lines from the chronicle of the era illustrate the rise of a new power in the world of learning: the Columbia School of Mines was opened in 1864, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Worcester Polytechnic in 1865, Lehigh University in 1866, Stevens Institute in 1871, the Case School of Applied Science in 1880, Rose Polytechnic in 1883, and the Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute in 1889. To this development of private endowments, the operations of the Morrill Act, which inaugurated in 1862 the policy of granting federal lands in aid of industrial and mechanical education, gave additional velocity. By the close of the era technical discipline was becoming a fundamental part of the American system of education and a sharp distinction was being made between the training of those who were to direct the material modes of industry and those who were to manage its finances, sell its bonds, and distribute its goods.

While this was the general situation, it would be a mistake to imagine that the whole bent of education in the gilded age was toward luxury on the one side and technology on the other. If the widened elective curriculum allowed the sons and daughters of the rich to flit lightly through the academic course, if it merely prolonged infancy for multitudes with little brain capacity, it likewise offered to those who cared for learning opportunities of incomparable richness to acquire it, in a hundred fields closed to all former generations of college students. Wholly new departments of instruction were organized and opened freely to those who loved knowledge for its own sake. Physics, chemistry, and biology received a prominence that had once been accorded only to Greek and Latin. Art, music, and letters were recognized by the creation of separate chairs and then special departments to handle their many phases.

Social studies crept into colleges and universities, usually through the back door, through history, moral philosophy, or law, it is true, but once in, they stayed and received more generous treatment. In 1880, eight years after Professor Sumner began to thunder on sociology at Yale, the Columbia faculty of political science was organized with divisions of history, economics, and public law. Not to be outdone by allied and associated kingdoms, philosophy proceeded to shake itself loose from its theological bondage and to divide into departmental sectors. The Philosophical Review founded in 1892 followed up the work begun twenty-five years earlier by the Journal of Speculative Philosophy in voicing critical opinions concerning traditional doctrines and in 1890 the graduate school of philosophy was opened at Columbia.

In the course of academic events, pure science, freed somewhat from purposes immediately practical, received an increasing support. By 1899 it was possible to organize an American Physical Society for the promotion of that speculative type of inquiry which promised nothing but intellectual rewards—this, as its first president said, "in the midst of a world which gives its highest praise, not to the investigator in the pure ethereal physics which our Society is formed to cultivate, but to one who uses it for satisfying the physical rather than the intellectual needs of mankind." It was this spirit which Andrew D. White, president of Cornell, voiced when he declared the allegiance of his institution to "this zeal for truth as truth, this faith in the good forever allied to the truth."

The satisfaction of that zeal, in every field, called for special training. For some time that discipline was largely supplied by American graduates of foreign universities. Indeed the direction of higher learning in the United States during the gilded age was to an amazing extent in the hands of teachers who had acquired their knowledge and technique in Germany. It was not until the last decade of the epoch that domestic graduate schools were able to supply an an-

nual grist of scholars large enough to meet the demands of colleges for teachers and deans. But whether trained at home or abroad the doctor of philosophy finally managed to take the place of the doctor of divinity so effectively that a habit of respect for scientific method, minute research, and objective thinking became well established in academic groves, by the turn of the century.

If, as sometimes alleged with good reason, the change frequently substituted for a generous interest in the important, a passion for the insignificant, at all events many of the rhetorical approaches beloved of clergymen, literary historians, and professors of belles lettres were badly damaged in the operation. On the whole, society gained even though the study of literature and the arts suffered more than one grave injury at the hands of mechanicians wearing the garb of cap, gown, and hood. Certainly a large number of the crude acquisitive assumptions which ran current among masses and classes in the gilded age received in the universities a calm analysis which was destined in time to work havoc with the commonplaces of reputability. By 1900, the cloud was as big as a college president's hand.

In such an era, while the spirit and method of collegiate instruction were in process of revolution and while women were pushing intrepidly from the kitchen and nursery into every corner of economic and cultural life, it was impossible for men to retain their age-long grip upon higher learning. In fact educators, who scanned the horizon in the fermenting days of Andrew Jackson, had then begun to discover that the masculine dominion over colleges could not be preserved forever. And it was fitting that the first important experiments in co-education should be made in the Valley of Democracy. Oberlin invited women to share its facilities on the day of its opening in 1833 and Antioch, under the benign sway of Horace Mann, followed that example twenty years later. The state universities of Utah and Iowa, established in the middle period, proclaimed equality in the beginning. During the gilded age the wedge was

driven deeper and deeper into the old monopoly. State universities in the North, one after another, abandoned the policy of exclusion: for illustration, Michigan in 1870 and Wisconsin definitely in 1874. Private institutions soon began to pursue the same course: Cornell was opened to women in 1872; the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1883; and Chicago University in 1892. A few of the older colleges that could not break so suddenly with custom made a compromise by establishing annexes for women: Barnard College was thus founded in 1889 at Columbia and Radcliffe in 1894 at Harvard.

Meanwhile colleges designed exclusively for women were springing up in the East where their demands met no such generous response as in the state universities of the West. It had long been the dream of leaders among the women, such for example as Mary Lyon, founder of Mount Holyoke, to have colleges of their own amply endowed and equal in standards to the best of the institutions for men. The new day so longed for dawned in 1865 when Vassar College, financed by a rich brewer of Poughkeepsie, was opened with much ceremony, setting a contagious object lesson. Within five years Wellesley and Smith in Massachusetts had been chartered. In 1885, Bryn Mawr in Pennsylvania received its first class of young women. Besides making entrance examinations obligatory and severe, Bryn Mawr offered in a few branches graduate work comparable in quality to that at Johns Hopkins or Harvard.

In the realm of professional education, the feminist advance was not as rapid. It is true that the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Cornell University both offered engineering instruction to women but the law and medical schools of the first rank refused to capitulate. In 1865, women could secure medical instruction at only a few places in the country and at the end of the century their position in that respect was hardly improved. Though law was also somewhat obdurate, at the close of the epoch several high-grade institutions offered them legal training. As

a matter of fact, among the thousands of girls who crowded the colleges, relatively few desired to study engineering, medicine, or law; it was teaching, letters, and the arts, that attracted the majority, thus promoting the transfer of supremacy in questions of culture and taste to feminine hands.

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Inevitably the fervor for popular education, fanned into a glow by enthusiasm for democracy, touched also the advanced guard of the Negro race. Northern whites who in the old days had opposed slavery felt under some obligations to aid in the process of lifting the freedmen from their slough of illiteracy. The requirements of industry and agriculture, in transformation under the sway of machinery and science, called at least for the spread of the rudiments of learning among those who were to work in shop and field. But if the reasons for change were cogent, the task of educating the Negro was infinitely difficult.

In the first place there was a patrimony of inveterate opinion to overcome, to say nothing of the force of inertia. Before the Civil War, teaching slaves to read and write was a crime in some parts of the South; and in the North the repugnance to Negro education was almost as intense as the hatred for abolition. When, for instance, it was proposed to found a college for colored youth at New Haven, Connecticut, the citizens and the municipal authorities of the town made an angry outcry, declaring officially that the project should be resisted by all lawful means. When in 1833 Prudence Crandall admitted a few colored girls to her boarding-school at Canterbury in the same state, she was attacked by a mob and then imprisoned under a special law making it a crime to admit Negroes to any institution of learning. In other places in the North, the opposition was almost as fierce; but in spite of it all the number of primary schools open to the colored race was steadily increasing when emancipation put a new face on the whole problem.

It was too much to expect the southern states, impoverished by war and traditionally negligent of education for the masses, white or black, to assume at once the immense burden of educating the freedmen. In the circumstances the responsibility rested quite as much on the North as on the South and to some extent northern philanthropists attempted to discharge that obligation. A considerable part of the fund given by George Peabody in 1867 to the cause of southern education was granted to Negro schools and fifteen years afterward John F. Slater of Connecticut dedicated a million dollars to "the uplifting of the lately emancipated people of the South." Northern capitalists also came to the help of Booker T. Washington who opened in 1881 with local aid an institution at Tuskegee for training Negro students in the arts of self-help.

Such gifts, splendid as some of them were, did not of course touch more than the fringe of the problem. The main burden of educating the Negro fell upon the southern taxpayers who assumed it with perhaps as much alacrity as could be expected in the circumstances. By the close of the century, they could show large results, at all events in a relative sense. According to the best estimates, forty years after emancipation, at least one-half of the Negroes in the United States were reported as able to read and write. Moreover the number of schools for higher learning, such as Howard University and the Hampton Institute, had multiplied and the leaders of the colored race could secure in their own institutions, to say nothing of other colleges now open to them, an efficient training in the arts and sciences.

During this intellectual advance the old-fashioned Negro preacher gradually lost his prestige. Historically he was "a descendant of the medicine man of the African clan" and when Christianity was added to his spiritual equipment, he was possessed by a strange medley of beliefs. In the plantation days he had been, as Du Bois says, "the healer of the sick, the interpreter of the unknown, the comforter of the sorrowing, the supernatural avenger of wrong." After

emancipation, the colored preachers, as masters of a technique that gave them power over their race, grasped the reins of authority among the helpless communities of freedmen, proclaiming a gospel of equality according to the Scriptures and adding to their ecclesiastical functions the art of political manipulation as soon as the suffrage was thrust upon them. Though some of these preachers were educated, the great majority were at the time, little, if any, above their parishioners in knowledge and understanding.

But as the general level of Negro culture rose above the primitive conditions of slave days, the sovereignty of the pulpit declined. With the spread of secular education, the multiplication of institutions for technical training, and the increasing prominence of science in the curricula of the schools, telling inroads were made on the kingdom of "singing and shouting parsons." "Dey ain't no Holy Ghos in it at all," cried one of them on examining the contents of the new program. And in a sense he was right. The change flowed logically from the conquest of learning by practical interests and the direction of the Negro's mind to the white man's major concern—the acquisition and enjoyment of goods. However rigid might be the social discrimination, therefore, it was no longer possible to erect water-tight intellectual barriers between the two races. For weal or woe the Negro race, in its varying shades and types, was a part of the American economic system—a fact which no linguistic flourishes could obscure. The forces of the age beating pitilessly upon the whites were also driving colored men and women before the storm.

# CHAPTER XXVI

## *Imperial America*

WITH the growing economic surplus which sustained the colorful and exuberant culture of the gilded age ran an increasing pressure for foreign markets and investment opportunities. And since America was now fairly out upon the imperial course, all the interests and ambitions usually associated with that form of human activity, centering in the captain's quarters in the upper sphere of politics, conspired in a cumulative fashion to hold the ship of state steadily in the chosen way. McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge occupied the presidency in due succession, according to the chronology and accidents of politics, without making any sensational changes in the sailing charts throughout the years of their service.

The Republicans inherited a sanction of tradition from Webster, Seward, and Grant; so McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft, finding no difficulty in adhering strictly to the policies outlined in the doctrine of Manifest Destiny, applied the creed from time to time as new occasions carried new duties. Although the Democrats, goaded by Bryan's agrarian

faction, were committed by their platform principles to a return upon the course, Wilson in fact made no revolution in the practices bequeathed him by his Republican predecessors, at least, in this hemisphere. If he granted the Philippines a larger autonomy and looked coldly upon capitalist expansion in China, he bore down with special vigor in the Caribbean, adding the Danish Islands by purchase and valuable protectorates by an energetic use of the navy. If Harding and Coolidge sought to give formal legality to operations in Central America and the Caribbean generally, they were resolute in restoring imperial authority over the Philippines and in warning Japan against open excursions in China and Siberia where economic opportunities imposed moral mandates upon the American government.

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In laying out his sailing directions with respect to details after the peace was formally concluded with Spain in 1899, McKinley had to study dangerous reefs and foggy headlands, for obstacles lay on every side. The social order in Cuba was disturbed; the Philippines were in open revolt against American authority; legal uncertainties clouded the status of the conquered provinces. And to make prudence still more cautious, the opinion of the American nation on the policy of annexation was not yet clearly developed and registered. In short, the government at Washington was in a position akin to that of the Roman Republic in 242 B. C. at the end of the Punic War.

Viewed from any angle the first of the problems before the administration, the Cuban question, presented thorny phases, especially to politicians disposed to be fastidious. Boldly before them in resplendent diction, stood the solemn resolution of Congress passed by the advocates of the attack on Spain, under Populist pressure, vowing before all the world that the United States had no intention of exercising any sovereignty or jurisdiction over Cuba except to restore peace. And yet if the government of the

island was transferred without restraint to the insurgent peons and proletariat, that gloated triumphantly over the old Spanish ruling classes, would landed property and capital be safe? The question was by no means academic. Everybody knew that the revolutionary junta in Havana was in a bad temper, decidedly inclined to deal in no mincing way with the local Spaniards who, besides remaining loyal to Madrid in the recent social war, had all along sneered at the pretensions of the populace. If things came to a dangerous pass on the withdrawal of the United States troops, the interests of American business men in the island as well as the estates of the old rulers would be in serious jeopardy. The situation was delicate, involving both honor and necessity.

Out of this perplexity, an ingenious Senator, O. H. Platt of Connecticut, discovered a way, by evolving a set of principles which restricted the relations of the Cuban government with foreign countries, limited its debt-creating power, forced it to concede certain coaling stations for the American navy, and proclaimed the right of the United States to interfere in insular affairs, whenever necessary, to protect life and property. To the purists in Congress this looked like a violation of the solemn pledge made a short time before, but in spite of their objections the new doctrines were incorporated in an annex to the army and navy appropriation bill of 1901—hence the name Platt Amendment—and the Cubans were compelled, after they had made an impotent gesture, to embody the self-denying ordinance in their new constitution. Thus the substance of American control was assured while the trappings of sovereignty were handed over to the independent republic.

Within five years, that is, in 1906, President Roosevelt found it expedient to intervene, under the Platt decretal, establish a military régime, and restore local formalities, at considerable expense to the Cubans. Although he ordered a withdrawal as soon as matters were running smoothly, Cuba was given to understand that she received

freedom, sovereignty, and independence, as written in the terms of the bond, subject to a moral mandate.

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The Philippine problem was still more complicated. Discontented elements among the natives had been on the verge of an armed revolt in 1898 when the war between Spain and the United States broke in upon their plans. At the opening of this crisis the leader of the insurgents, Aguinaldo, receiving an invitation to join the American forces in overturning Spanish dominion, threw himself promptly and heartily into the fray, taking it for granted, without warrant, so the Americans claimed, that his native islands would receive their independence at the close of the war. But whatever the basis of his hopes, he was doomed to disappointment; for in the end a new alien power was substituted for the former authority of Spain.

When the news of this change in masters reached Manila, a certain tension appeared in Filipino quarters. In circumstances that are clouded by obscurity a war broke out in February, 1899, between the American troops and the forces of Aguinaldo. According to official reports, it seems that four native soldiers, on approaching an American outpost, failed, possibly through a misunderstanding, to obey the command of the sentinels to halt. The result was more shots heard round the world. Since the officers of the native high command were absent at the moment and the number of the advancing men was small, it is hardly probable that the Filipinos then had in view a general assault upon the American lines. Indeed the eagerness with which Aguinaldo afterward begged for a truce lent color to the opinion that no aggressive movement was then intended.

As soon as the first native blood was shed, American military authorities on the spot absolutely refused to parley and widened the incident into a general conflict. After some serious fighting in which American forces were easily

victorious, the struggle settled down to a guerilla war which lasted for nearly three years. In the course of this confused contest, atrocities were committed by the native soldiers and apparently repaid with compound interest; in fact in such a struggle it proved exceedingly difficult to observe the etiquette of civilized combat. So by heroic efforts and a generous use of what the Americans called "the water cure," the insurrection against the dominion of the United States was put down, at the expense of many lives and about one hundred and seventy-five million dollars.

News of this imperial process, filtering home in spite of a rigorous military censorship, evoked some discontent among old-fashioned Americans. Senator Hoar of Massachusetts, assuming that the Declaration of Independence was a part of the Republican creed, openly declared in the upper chamber that there was not a supporter of the war within the sound of his voice who, if he were a Filipino, would not fight for liberty just as the Filipinos were fighting and would not despise them for doing otherwise. In a towering rage, Mark Twain dipped his pen in vitriol and wrote a savage article on civilizing and Christianizing insurgents by the use of the rifle and the water cure. Senator Tillman of South Carolina laughed loud and long. "Republican leaders," he exclaimed, "do no longer dare to call into question the justice or the necessity of limiting negro suffrage in the South. . . . Your slogans of the past—brotherhood of man and fatherhood of God—have gone glimmering down through the ages!"

To such criticisms replies equally direct were made. With righteous indignation, McKinley and his advisers denied that there was in the Filipino war any analogy whatever with the American struggle for liberty in 1776. To them the very mention of Aguinaldo and Washington in the same breath was nothing short of sacrilege; while praising the insurgent army of 1899 for resisting American dominion was worse than quixotic; it was akin to treason, to lending aid and comfort to the enemy.

Turning then to concrete issues, they pointed out the difficulty inherent in giving self-government to seven million people scattered on hundreds of islands and ranging in culture from primitive hill-folk to polished urban dwellers. They scouted as fanciful Hoar's program for immediate peace, the recognition of independence, friendly assistance in establishing self-government, and an invitation to the powers of the world to join in assuring continued freedom to the insular republic. In short, the McKinley administration could see no solution of the problem except that of conquest, to be followed by the slow and orderly development of education and local autonomy under American tutelage.

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Given this difference of opinion over the imperial adventure the Philippine question became a leading issue in the campaign of 1900. On their part Republicans faced it squarely. By acclamation they renominated McKinley, author and defender of the forward course. Ignoring dissenters in their ranks, they vowed that there was no other choice than pacification by war; that responsibility for the peoples freed from Spain fell upon the United States as an outcome of victory; that "it became the high duty of the government to maintain its authority, to put down armed insurrection, and to confer the blessings of liberty and civilization upon all the rescued people." With a view to enlivening their campaign the Republican managers sent their candidate for Vice-President, Theodore Roosevelt, popular "hero of the Rough Riders," through the country in a tempest of oratory and ovation, flaying as "mollycoddles" the softlings who opposed Manifest Destiny. On the other side, the Democrats, still under the spell of Bryan, nominated the Commoner again and made imperialism an issue comparable in gravity to trusts and free silver.

In the contest that ensued, the methods and passions of 1896 were revived. Once more Hanna took charge of

the Republican campaign chest and, as Hay said, by crying "Wolf, Wolf" all summer, wrung adequate revenues from the leaders of business enterprise. Through fear or financial necessity, Bryan was now called the enemy of empire as well as property. Even Hay, a man with good claims to sophistication, denounced the Democratic candidate as "a frank anarchist," darkly hinting that "nobody knows what Jack Cade may do." Nor was invective of this type spared by Democrats. Scorning the moral pretensions of their opponents, they declared that "a greedy commercialism" had dictated Philippine policies and that the effort of the American army to restore law and order was "a war of criminal aggression."

On the merits of this debate, the popular verdict was conclusive, for the election returns gave McKinley a majority over his rival far in excess of that won four years before, commanding him to hold his place on the captain's bridge. Rejoicing in this vindication, he had just given the order for full steam ahead when a tragic fate overtook him. While attending the Buffalo exposition in September, 1901, McKinley was shot in cold blood by an anarchist, and died at the home of a friend a few days afterward. In an instant even the harsh voice of partisan criticism was hushed; the whole nation united in paying tribute to the virtues of the dead President as he was laid to rest amid the strains of his favorite hymn: "Nearer, My God, to Thee." The principal author of the new course was dead but his policies, according to the announcement of his successor, Theodore Roosevelt, were to be continued "absolutely unbroken"—a pledge soon redeemed by an energetic prosecution of the war on the Filipino insurgents to a victorious finish.

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After American supremacy was assured by arms, came the task of establishing political institutions for the provinces. With respect to that subject, too, President Roosevelt re-

ceived from his predecessor full guidance. Shortly after possession had been wrested from Spain, a commission of distinguished citizens was sent out to study economic and social life in the Philippines and to report findings pertinent to the adoption of a final policy. On the basis of that inquiry a second commission headed by William Howard Taft was placed in temporary charge of civil affairs, pending the ultimate extinction of the military régime. Early in 1900, in an organic law for the government of Porto Rico, Congress had demonstrated that American imperial ideas were to be tempered somewhat by democracy—certainly by a larger measure of self-government than any of Spain's colonial provinces had ever enjoyed in their centuries of development or any of the peoples conquered by the imperialist powers of contemporary Europe had ever received. Provision was made for a governor and six cabinet heads appointed by the President and Senate; and for a local legislature of two houses, one chosen by popular vote and the other composed of the department chiefs and five other persons selected at Washington.

With such directions already in hand, President Roosevelt had no difficulty in formulating projects for the administration of the Philippines. In his first message to Congress, he laid stress on the problem and in 1902 an organic law for those islands was duly enacted. Five years later, after peace was fully established, after a census was taken and preparations formally made, elections for the popular branch of the legislative body were held and the new system was duly installed. The Philippine government then consisted of the governor and a civil commission, which also acted as the upper chamber of the legislature, chosen by the President and Senate, and a lower house elected by popular vote.

In thus determining the fate of the new possessions, Congress, operating under a Constitution which contained no express provisions respecting imperial provinces, had to face some legal questions never encountered before in exactly the same form. One of these, the most perplexing,

was summed up in the popular query: "Does the Constitution follow the flag?" Among adepts in public law nothing but an affirmative answer seemed possible for, according to time-honored judicial precedents, Congress was clearly restrained in the government of territories by the provisions of the Constitution—in any case by the clauses establishing freedom of the press, trial by jury, and other formulas of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. But it was obvious to every one that such refined notions of American policy, though well known to high-class Spaniards, could not be lightly applied to primitive people in tropical islands. Doubtless the Sultan of Sulu had never heard of Magna Carta.

An awkward pause therefore occurred among the lawyers until the Supreme Court, in a series of decisions known as tht "Insular Cases," cut the knot, or rather discovered that the obstacles were really not in the Constitution after all. The way was smooth at last. Though in the most important case four of the nine judges dissented and the five who formed the majority differed in their reasoning, this incident, if tormenting to precisionists, made no lasting impression on the populace. Its conclusions, the genial Mr. Dooley no doubt fully expressed in the passing remark that "the Supreme Court followed the election returns." At all events Congress was authorized to go forward on the hypothesis that in governing the dependencies it could do anything that did not violate a "fundamental" part of the Constitution, that is, prove too brusque for the judicial conscience. When a Philippine editor went to some lengths in questioning the beneficent intentions of the American administration, he was quickly shown by the Supreme Court that under the First Amendment to the federal Constitution no specious pleas for license could be made.

The years that followed the creation of the new system witnessed no serious revulsion in policy. Regarding its mandate as secure, the Republican administration continued the progressive application of its educational and economic policies in the colonial possessions. The Democrats, in each

succeeding presidential campaign, repeated in varying form the criticisms of 1900. On the constructive side their general idea was to give Porto Rico the legal status which had been accorded to the older continental territories since the enactment of the Northwest Ordinance and to grant independence to the Philippines "as soon as stable government can be established." When at length under the administration of President Wilson, the Democrats finally got a chance to test their theories, Congress, by an act passed in 1917, provided that the upper house of the Porto Rican legislature should be made elective and the natives were given a larger share of the local offices. In 1916 Congress solemnly resolved that the Philippines should become independent, when the time was ripe, and made a promising gesture by granting the islands an elective senate. As in Porto Rico, lucrative and important posts hitherto reserved to Americans were bestowed upon natives and the management of finances was allowed to slide into their hands.

Instead of bringing harmony in the Philippines, these concessions merely fired anew, as was natural, the ardor of the independence party and moved the local legislature at Manila to repeat its resolve in favor of an immediate separation from the United States. They also worried American interests in the islands, both financial and industrial, inspiring them to make vigorous demands in Washington for a stern Philippine policy. For a few years it seemed as if a crisis might come any time but in due course President Wilson passed out of office and it was discovered that his acts of grace were not beyond recall. In any case, they did not prevent General Leonard Wood, sent out by President Harding to serve as governor, from bringing the ship to an even keel again in 1921.

For American consumption it was then reported that only a few politicians and agitators desired independence, that the withdrawal of American power would leave millions of helpless wards to the tender mercies of local satraps. To

the Filipinos, it was gradually revealed that the Wilson rainbow was a mirage and that the American people, or at least the plurality of those that took the trouble to cast their votes, desired no reversal of the imperialist policies adopted at the opening of the century. As the years passed preponderance in the commerce and industry of the islands shifted steadily from native to American hands and the possibilities of rubber culture became poignantly evident, making Manifest Destiny doubly appealing.

In the illuminating language of a telegraphic dispatch sent from Baguio, the summer capital of the American administration, in September, 1926, to reinforce the coming report of Carmi Thompson, a member of the Harding-Daugherty group of Ohio statesmen sent by President Coolidge to collect information, "If we withdraw from these fertile tropical islands, strategically located at the Orient's gateway, we would have to relinquish our position as an Asiatic power. Without the Philippines as a commercial and military base, it is said, we could not enforce the open door policy of equal trade opportunities for all nations in China, could not issue [sic] the limitless economic opportunities sure to accompany the awakening of the East, and could not wage war effectively to protect our interests. The argument advanced to support this contention is that the Philippines strategically are the only place available to the United States as a base. The Philippines are a part of a group of islands from Japan on the north to Borneo on the south, which form a screen across the Pacific to the coast of Asia, constituting the door to the future possibilities of the Far East. As long as America holds this strategic position, it is argued, she will remain a powerful factor in the Orient's economic and international life."

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The seizure of the Philippines, by providing a splendid base for economic operations in the Far East, brought nearer

to fulfillment an old dream of American imperial statesmen. In Lincoln's day Seward had declared that the United States ought to command the empire of the seas and that the vast Pacific basin was to become the chief theater of world events in the coming years. With inflexible tenacity, in his relations with the Orient, he pursued as Secretary of State the policy of the "open door," although he did not invent that clever phrase to catch, if not inform, the public imagination.

As we have shown, he coöperated with other western powers in forcing Orientals to throw wide their gates to commerce. With Seward's approval, American naval officers joined in bombarding the Japanese town of Shimonoseki in 1864 in retaliation for hostility displayed by local lords. With his sanction, the American representative in Tokyo united with the agent of Great Britain in compelling Japan to accept a commercial convention which, as Payson J. Treat well says, kept her "in bondage to British commercial interests for nearly half a century." In accord with these measures, Seward also proposed to France common action in punishing Koreans for murdering French missionaries and American traders who had insisted on going where they were not welcome. If the State Department and the Navy could have found adequate support in Congress, the American flag would have been hoisted in Eastern waters long before the Philippines were wrested from Spain in 1898.

But it took some time for the country at large to see the spheres of usefulness early discovered by the men in high posts of observation. Indeed the tariff policy introduced by Seward's party colleagues helped to relax temporarily the early economic interest in Pacific imperialism. Well protected by high duties on competing goods, American manufacturers commanded for many years after 1861 an immense and growing market at home and, until that was saturated, felt no overpowering need for more foreign trading facilities.

Meanwhile other imperial powers were aggressively busy in the Orient—waging war on China and parceling her ancient dominions among themselves. In southeastern Asia, France tore away an immense estate. Intrenched at Hong Kong in command of the Canton trade and aided by their banking operations at the treaty ports, the English gathered in a lion's share of the Empire's commercial business. At the close of a victorious war on China in 1895, Japan annexed Formosa and would have taken more if Russia, Germany, and France had not intervened. Two years later, Germany, offering as a pretext the murder of a missionary, seized Kiao-chau and brought the whole province of Shantung under the sway of her administrators. The very next year, Russia wrung Port Arthur from China on a lease and secured the right to build a railway through Manchuria to Harbin, connecting with the Trans-Siberian line. Not to be left out of the feast in the North, Great Britain then laid hold of Wei-hai-wei, a strategic port lying between the new bases seized by the Germans and Russians.

While these things were being done, European capitalists were lending money to the tottering Chinese Empire, acquiring exclusive rights to build railways in different parts of the country, and annexing most of the mineral resources within reach of tidewater. In this fashion China was divided into "spheres of influence" and when finally American merchants and capitalists, having saturated their home market, as they thought, turned to distant places for new opportunities, they found themselves hampered at every turn by grants and monopolies in rival hands.

At this very juncture there occurred in China an uprising against aliens, known as the Boxer Rebellion. For a long time the conservative leaders in Peking had looked with dismay on the course of events—their religion assailed by Christian missionaries, their government attacked by revolutionary advocates of democracy, their lands divided among foreign powers like "meat flung to tigers." From the capital, dismay spread to the illiterate masses, causing secret

societies of patriots, known as Boxers, or "fists of righteous harmony," to spring up in all quarters. And when enough materials for an explosion had accumulated, an omen of a coming storm was flashed on the sky near the close of 1899 by the murder of an English missionary in Shantung.

In the summer of the next year the crash came. The German minister, on his way to the imperial palace to protest against the conduct of the Chinese, was killed in the streets of Peking and violence broke out on every hand. Terror-stricken, the foreigners in the capital fled to the British legation, threw up defenses against besieging insurgents, and sent forth a call for help that rang throughout all Christendom, uniting the great powers in a relief expedition to Peking. After many lively squabbles over precedence and spoils, the associated forces finally occupied the capital, freed the imprisoned aliens, and pillaged shops and palaces. Brought thus to its knees, the imperial government of China was forced to pay a huge indemnity for the murder of foreigners and the destruction of their property, compelled to make abject apologies, and required to erect in Peking a monument in memory of the German minister.

In the invasion of China and the settlement that followed, the United States government took an active part. Indeed the Boxer Rebellion afforded it an excellent opportunity to bring to the notice of the world its own special policies and claims. Having established a strategic base in the Philippines, the McKinley administration had already given thought to the promotion of American interests in China—or at least in that part of the country not yet seized by foreign powers and their enterprising capitalists. By a little economic analysis it easily discovered that, unless the United States was to join in the dismemberment and demand a share of the territorial spoils, American business men could only hope to get their part of Chinese trade by checking the greed of others. In short, the obvious remedy was an "open door," that is, the maintenance of Chinese national

unity and the establishment of equal trading privileges for all foreigners—saving, of course, the acquired rights already won by aliens. With the advantages of such a program clearly in mind, John Hay, as Secretary of State, had addressed a note to the great powers in 1899—before the Boxer outbreak—asking them to adhere to the doctrine of restraint and equality.

Taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the Boxer negotiations, Hay again invited the other governments concerned "to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese empire." Since the only alternative seemed to be a scramble among the victors that might end in a world war, the American formula was accepted in theory. "The moment we acted," said Hay, "the rest of the world paused and finally came over to our ground; and the German government, which is generally brutal but seldom silly, recovered its senses and climbed down off its perch." Besides this friendly gesture, the United States, finding its share of the indemnity wrung from Peking far in excess of the damages incurred, returned the remainder to China in the form of a fund dedicated by secret negotiations to the education of Chinese students in American schools.

In this manner the American government demonstrated to the powers that, while it had profited from British aggression and treaty-port rights, it would not approve any more seizures of Chinese territory or any more monopolies within the boundary of that ancient Empire. Though devised with realistic and practical ends in mind, the policy of the open door also had a lofty moral flavor, pleasing to Chinese, missionaries, anti-imperialists, and pacifists alike. At the same time it gave American economic interests in the Far East about all the guarantees that the

state of popular sentiment at home warranted. "We do not think," laconically remarked Secretary Hay, "that the public opinion of the United States would justify this government in taking part in the great game of spoliation now going on." That was the heart of the matter. President McKinley was personally willing to take a hand in the carving up of China, if it was to come about, but feared that the hinterland of America was not yet fully indoctrinated with any such view of Manifest Destiny.

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With the high sanction of the open-door policy, Secretary Hay and his successors under Roosevelt and Taft bent their energies to the work of securing for American citizens equal trading privileges in all parts of China and equal opportunities for investment in the development of railways and natural resources. In particular they gave continuous attention to the economic penetration of Korea, Manchuria, and Mongolia, thereby coming into collision with Russian enterprise. "I have been thinking a great deal about Manchuria," wrote Senator Lodge of Massachusetts to Roosevelt on May 21, 1903. "Our trade there is assuming very large proportions, and it seems to me we ought to take very strong grounds. . . . I have had letters from Lawrence where some of the mills make cotton goods which go to Manchuria, urging the strongest possible action and then demanding that a fleet be sent. . . . It is the same way with the cotton mills of the South and much the same with the flour interests of the Northwest, who send a great deal of flour to China."

If, however, American capitalists who owned cotton mills and flour mills thought the problem of possessing the trade of northern China was simple and could be solved by dispatching a fleet of battleships, they were mistaken. Politicians knew better; for, taking a longer and broader view of the matter, they discovered that the business of exploit-

ing Chinese resources involved a vast network of international rivalry and called for finesse in diplomacy as well as saber-rattling. Even the most obtuse among them saw at the opening of the twentieth century that Russia, backed by French capitalists, was for the moment a menace to all the other powers eager to extend their economic operations in North China. With the terrific pressure of a glacier the Muscovite was bearing down toward the ice-free waters of the Asiatic coast.

In the presence of this gigantic force, it was the part of discretion for the administration at Washington to make common cause with other governments in the quest for a counterpoise against the Tsar in the Far East. To President Roosevelt the elements of the situation were perfectly visible. As he well knew, England, threatened by Russia on the Anglo-Indian frontier and in China, had entered into an alliance with Japan in 1902, and had made friendly overtures to the United States during and since its war on Spain. Meanwhile Japan had already begun an economic invasion of the mainland by way of Korea.

Given this state of affairs, sympathetic coöperation with these two countries seemed to Roosevelt the only possible choice, and when in 1904 the economic contest between Russia and Japan on the banks of the Yalu ended in a resort to arms, he immediately served notice on France and Germany that, in case they entered the affair in support of the Tsar, he would "promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary on her behalf," fully confident all the while that the English government "would act in the same way." This, of course, meant war for the United States if either France or Germany refused to heed the warning. In substance it also meant that the government at Washington was not willing to allow the rich resources of northern China to fall under Russian monopoly sustained by French capitalists.

Happily for Roosevelt, the fortunes of the Russo-Japanese conflict favored his program. It was his supreme

wish to prevent either party in the contest from winning an absolute dominion over all northern China; while the French, English, and American bankers who floated the loans of the warring countries were equally anxious to see their respective principals escape from their war with ability to pay what they owed. When, at length, the contestants in the struggle approached bankruptcy without reaching a decision, financiers served a stop notice on their debtors and closed their purses. Caught in this economic trap, Japan then turned to Roosevelt for help and received it. After discreetly sounding the ground in Europe, the President acted as mediator, with a fine flourish bringing the representatives of Russia and Japan together at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in the summer of 1905. There the compromise which the President desired with reference to American interests was reached: Japan got Russia's rights in Port Arthur, Dairen, and the South Manchurian Railway, but she won no indemnity to repair her impoverished treasury. So the two belligerents faced each other weakened and divided and northern China was still without an absolute master.

Continuing this policy of balancing the powers in the Far East, Roosevelt opened secret negotiations, in the summer of the Portsmouth conference, with Japan and England for the purpose of upholding order in the Orient. Though personally in favor of a regular alliance, he said that the Senate would never approve it and that he "might as well strive for the moon." So he had to be content with sending an emissary to Tokyo and making a simple agreement with the premier of Japan recorded in a highly confidential memorandum.

In this secret convention, Japan on her part undertook to respect American dominion in the Philippines; while the President of the United States agreed on his part to accept the establishment of Japanese dominion over Korea by force of arms, thus setting the imperialist ventures of one country over against kindred enterprises of the other.

At the same time, Roosevelt's emissary in Tokyo assured the Japanese premier that the people of the United States were "so fully in accord with the people of Japan and Great Britain in the maintenance of peace in the Far East that, whatever occasion arose, appropriate action of the government of the United States, in conjunction with Japan and Great Britain, for such a purpose, could be counted upon by them quite as confidently as if the United States were under treaty obligations." "In fact it is a Japanese-Anglo-American alliance," blurted out a well-known Tokyo publicist on hearing by an underground route of this secret agreement. Such it was, at least while Roosevelt was in the White House, although the people of the United States knew nothing about it until Tyler Dennett, finding the document among the President's personal papers, made it public in 1924.

While Japan was willing to subscribe to peace in 1905 when she was on the verge of bankruptcy, she had no intention of allowing American business enterprise to snap up the rich prizes recently wrested from Russia at a cost of so much blood and treasure. As an evidence of its resolve, the Japanese government refused to permit the American railway Napoleon, Edward H. Harriman, to make the Manchurian railway a part of his "round the world system" and it also politely declined to allow Jacob Schiff, its New York financial backer in the war with Russia, to revive that project a year later.

Indeed, on seeing formidable American interests at work in their special preserves in northern China, both Japan and Russia quickly forgot their recent hatreds, composed their quarrels, united to protect their winnings—and to gain more. Together they held the key to the situation. Japan controlled lower Manchuria through her mastery of the strategic railway and Russia was strong in upper Manchuria and Mongolia where the Chinese Eastern Railway, under her sovereignty, offered connections with Vladivostok and the Trans-Siberian line. Policing their long stretches of track with trained soldiers and fixing the freight rates for

the entire region with reference to their requirements, the two powers virtually occupied northern China and were in a position to exploit for their own benefit the vast undeveloped country at their very doors.

In an effort to break the grip of Japan and Russia on Chinese territory, American capitalists proposed, and the Department of State attempted to secure, the "neutralization" of the important railways described above—an action designed to open the whole district to American enterprise. During this operation steps were also taken in 1910 to float a large Chinese loan through banking houses in the United States on the understanding that the money was to be used in developing, among other things, railways and commerce in Manchuria. At this juncture, the Russian foreign office learned, through French sources in Washington, that Secretary Knox, in supporting the loan, proposed to have an American supervisor put in charge of the disbursement, therewith in effect setting up American political influence in Peking and Manchuria.

Frightened by the news, St. Petersburg and Tokyo, now convinced that the open-door policy was in reality a subterfuge to cover an American invasion of their Chinese property, started negotiations looking to advantages in their mutual concerns; and in a series of secret conversations and treaties, made public only after the Bolsheviki threw open the Tsarist archives in 1918-19, united in protecting each other's interests. Frankly flouting the open-door creed, they divided Manchuria into spheres and promised to assist each other in case of an armed conflict with any other power aiming at political supremacy in China—solemn agreements referring without question to the United States since England was bound to Japan by a treaty of alliance and was apparently fully aware of the Russo-Japanese understanding.

Chinese affairs were undoubtedly taking a serious direction when there came a slight release of the tension under President Wilson. Determined, he said, to free the federal

government from the dominion of financial and industrial interests, he turned a cold shoulder on proposals to continue in the Orient the forward policy pursued by Roosevelt and Taft. In fact, he expressed his hearty sympathy with the popular party in China which had overthrown the empire in 1912, announced its resolve to shake off alien interventions, and tried to establish democratic institutions in the oldest civilization in the world. To show that his sympathy was more than nominal, Wilson seized an opportunity then before him to give a practical demonstration. At the very moment, American bankers were coöperating with foreign financiers in arranging a Chinese bond issue, known as the "consortium," or five-power loan, a venture to be made secure by a firm grip upon specified revenues, administered under semi-official direction. Confronted by a request to approve this project, Wilson refused to endorse it on the theory that it was an effort of "high finance" to control the destiny of the Chinese people.

While expressing his interest in an "independent" China, Wilson also made a friendly overture to Japan. In 1917, he authorized his Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, to make an agreement with Viscount Ishii, the Japanese ambassador, recognizing that "Japan has special interests in China." Though the language of this understanding was as elusive as moonshine, it was taken to mean that Japan was to have a freer hand in promoting her concerns on the mainland. At any rate, it was received with delight in Tokyo and with consternation in Peking. To the American minister in China, Paul S. Reinsch, it was a shocking surprise. He had long been complaining to the State Department about the neglect of American interests in that country and the Lansing-Ishii understanding proved to be the last straw for him. In a short time he resigned with ill-concealed disgust at the cautious and timid policy of the Wilson administration in the Orient. The truth was that the President confined his active participation in imperialism to one sphere, the Caribbean, where the opportunities were

less dangerous and the effective use of the Navy, in promoting law and order, was far easier.

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The annexation of Porto Rico and absorption of Cuba under Republican auspices had been merely a prelude to the transformation of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean into an inland sea of the United States. In the nature of things, to use the language of diplomacy, the region was a part of the American empire; for a lion's share of the commerce with nearly all the islands scattered between the Bahamas and Trinidad had been readily gathered into American hands. Even British and French traders could not resist the pull of the powerful market in the United States; while the combined efforts of Britain and Canada could not make water run up hill. On the mainland also, in Mexico, Central America, Colombia and Venezuela, American business enterprise marched from one victory to another.

Political as well as economic processes favored the development of American hegemony. In those places where European powers did not keep order, there were periodic uprisings against the titular governments, revolts often purely factious, sometimes the efforts of honest men to oust corrupt and tyrannical adventurers, occasionally the outcome of a failure to appreciate the merits of foreign investors. Regardless of their source, they were always disturbing to business interests, particularly to the holders of local bonds. As a rule the outstanding obligations of Latin-American republics were large for the pertinent revenues. In fact they were generally inflated to a high pressure; for at each uprising the debts of the defeated party were added to those of the victors, thereby preventing any such magnificent repudiation as had occurred when the government of Abraham Lincoln triumphed over that of Jefferson Davis in the Second American Revolution. It required, accordingly, no sweeping derangement of the social order in a Latin-

American country to fetch down a high structure of finance.

In every crisis the government of the United States was involved, and given new occasions for assimilation. Besides being pledged under the Monroe Doctrine to prevent European powers from occupying more territory in the western hemisphere, even in the honest performance of collecting debts, it was continually besieged by American bankers and business men to help them save endangered revenues. At no time did it feel inclined to say that it would neither allow European governments to succor their nationals among the bondholders nor make any movement itself on their behalf. If the duties imposed by the necessity for action were slight, the mere presence of American battleships in the offing might enable bankers to take possession of customs houses and effect amicable settlements of debts by negotiations. If, however, local leaders refused to listen to the voice of warning and forced the landing of American marines, a limited warfare sometimes had to be waged on the basis of presidential orders to the Navy Department. And yet in no case did the parties of interest feel constrained to invoke the constitutional provision vesting the power to declare war in the Congress of the United States. As things turned out, American economic and political sovereignty was steadily advanced in the Caribbean without breaking the legal peace of the western hemisphere or disturbing the party of pacific intentions in the domestic hinterland.

A brief illustrative chronology hints at the process. In 1903, Germany was compelled by a threat of force from President Roosevelt to withdraw from Venezuela and submit certain financial claims to arbitration. In 1905, Roosevelt, by executive action, took over the customs houses of Santo Domingo and stationed war vessels in Dominican waters to give point to the argument. Under the Platt amendment, he interfered in Cuba in 1906, giving the natives a convincing proof that American warnings against disorder were to be respected. By a formal treaty ratified by the

Senate of the United States, the pecuniary protectorate over Santo Domingo was made regular in 1907. The next year Secretary Knox broke off relations with the President of Nicaragua; a little later an American warship served notice on local contestants for power that there was to be no fighting in Bluefields—"thus protecting the preponderating American and other foreign interests," as the State Department in Washington put it. In 1911, on the suggestion of New York bankers, a treaty was negotiated with Honduras, extending American authority over that republic; though ratified by the United States Senate, it was rejected by the native authorities.

During the same year an American warship was sent to Nicaragua, a loan arranged, and a treaty drawn, reciting "the benevolent intentions" of the United States and putting the customs into the hands of a presidential appointee. When, in spite of three urgent messages from President Taft, the Senate declined to ratify the agreement, marines were landed in Nicaragua and business was restored to a normal course. In 1914-16, a treaty with Nicaragua was at last adopted ceding a canal strip and naval bases to the United States in return for three million dollars in cash to be expended largely for American goods in coöperation with American authorities. In 1915, the marines carried the flag into Haiti and established American suzerainty there after killing more than two thousand natives who, for one reason or another, got in the way of the operation. In 1916, Admiral Knapp—"to maintain domestic tranquillity"—took possession of Santo Domingo and declared that "republic" subject to the military government of the United States. In 1917, the Virgin Islands were purchased from Denmark. In 1920, the American navy was employed in helping to stabilize Guatemala. In 1921, after some American marines had smashed the office of the *Tribuna* in Managua, for printing critical articles, the minister of the United States requested the local Nicaraguan government to set apart adequate space outside the capital

for drill grounds, a dance hall, and a moving picture theater to be used by American forces and also to designate special liquor saloons for their convenience. In 1923, the national assembly of Panama approved a large loan for highway construction to be secured by investments correctly placed in New York City. In 1924, the American marines once more came to the aid of public order in Honduras. In 1927, the marines were again in Nicaragua. Such was in brief a partial chronicle of what Secretary Knox called "dollar diplomacy."

The series of events here recited were accompanied by no expressions of ill-will on the part of the American government. On the contrary, Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge all agreed that, in this connection, there was nothing either sinister or ungenerous in the purposes of the United States. Wilson was especially emphatic on this point. Speaking cordially of the Latin-American countries, he said: "We must prove ourselves their friends and champions upon terms of equality and honor. . . . We must show ourselves friends by comprehending their interests whether it squares with our interests or not."

Harding was also solicitous in the matter of fraternal relations. Thinking that, perhaps, there had been some needless severity in the treatment of the countries to the south, he declared that he would never permit any officer under his authority to "draw a constitution for helpless neighbors in the West Indies and jam it down their throats at the point of bayonets borne by United States marines." Undoubtedly Coolidge agreed with the Republican platform of 1924 which asserted that "new sanctions and new proofs of permanent accord have marked our relations with all Latin America." It could not be said, therefore, that the steps which indicated the march of Manifest Destiny were taken with reference to any deliberate or frank design of empire.

In fact, each of the numerous incidents in the extension of American authority over the Caribbean was marked by

colors and episodes peculiar to the occasion. For that reason, the bare chronicle of the forward movement as a whole fails to give a correct impression of the higher law in its specific application. To gain an insight into that phase it is necessary to examine somewhat minutely an entire chapter of contingencies, and for the purpose of illustration the case of Haiti offers a sufficient revelation. That little island republic became the scene of revolutions and assassinations as soon as it cast off the yoke of France in 1803 and at all times thereafter showed an evident need for law, order, good roads, sanitation, education, and industrial progress. But the southern planters who ruled the United States in the middle period of national expansion, although they were ready to raise the flag over good land fit for cotton culture, shrank from relations too cordial with a spot where slaves had made a successful revolution and were trying to govern themselves. Moreover, their successors at Washington, the masters of business, were also largely indifferent to the requirements of Haiti as long as domestic enterprise—even farm mortgages—yielded ten or fifteen per cent or happy negotiations with the federal land office brought larger returns on smaller risks. But at the end of the century, when the southern slavocracy had moldered in its grave and the pecuniary equipment of the United States had been well rounded out, there arose a marked solicitude about the welfare of Haiti.

In 1902, one of the periodical rebellions that had plagued that small republic sent it swimming within the range of American kinetics. Turning for aid to the United States, the Haitian government floated a loan in New York at twelve per cent and invested large sums in ammunition at two or three times the usual price. Unabashed by these commitments, American munition makers showed an equal interest in the revolutionary forces fighting for "liberty" and sold them instruments of destruction, also on profitable terms. Observing the scrimmage from afar, European capitalists tendered their good offices with the same devotion

to both parties, everyone of them knowing, as the American minister on the spot remarked with casual directness, that the civilized powers concerned would make the Haitians pay all bills no matter which side won in the civil war. Now, among the countries involved in this crisis, none was more anxious than the German Empire. German merchants controlled about nine-tenths of Haiti's foreign trade and showed a concern in local affairs that was artistically proportioned to the flow of goods. In the press of things, they were able to place a loan of half a million at thirty-five per cent interest and later they managed to float a smaller issue of three hundred thousand dollars which yielded a net sum of about half that amount to the Haitian treasury.

Naturally vexed by this precocity on the part of the Germans and fearing utter discomfiture at the hands of their rivals, American business men began to display great consternation, the State Department sharing their fear. Although an American company had got important railway and land concessions and although the National City Bank of New York had gathered in much of the Haitian debt on terms presumably not adverse, it was thought that the American share of the local proceeds was entirely too small. Moreover, there were irritations connected with an affront to national honor; open discrimination was shown by Haitians against some American citizens of Syrian origin who had been very active in bringing local trade into American hands. And this annoyance was augmented by an untoward incident, arising from an attempt of the Haitian president to seize the gold reserve in the local national bank, a design foiled by the intervention of American marines, and the transfer of the treasure on an American war vessel to New York, where it was safely deposited at a low rate of interest, leaving the government of Haiti to clamor loudly for a return of the funds.

Since it was now evident that the friendly concern of the State Department in Washington must take a more practical form, President Wilson sent commissioners to Haiti

charged with the task of persuading Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, president of the republic, to accept the benevolent protection of the United States. At the same time American bankers served notice on him that no more loans were to be expected without adequate guarantees, placing him in a real dilemma. Procuring aid from Berlin was out of the question, for Germany, in the toils of war, was blockaded by an invincible sea power. Neither was assistance from France forthcoming; that country, far from indicating a desire to help President Sam out of his pinch, dispatched a naval force to his republic to protect French lives and property.

Given this signal for action, the government of the United States, in the summer of 1915, ordered Admiral Caperton, in command of the good ship, Washington, to Haitian waters, just in time to learn that President Sam, enraged by the turn of events, had ordered the murder of more than a hundred prisoners and had been himself assassinated in retaliation. Visibly disturbed by such cruel deeds, the Admiral directed his marines to seize the local political theater and some blood was shed in the operation, but not enough to cause a declaration of war by Congress. Competent directors now being in charge, martial law was instituted under American auspices and the Haitian national assembly was permitted to elect as president, General Dartiguenave, a candidate acceptable to Admiral Caperton and apparently disposed to coöperate with American representatives on the ground.

At all events, as soon as he was installed, the General signed a treaty with his new friends. In the preamble, the document stated that it was the desire of the "High contracting parties . . . to confirm and strengthen the amity existing between them by the most cordial coöperation in measures for their common advantage." According to the terms of the bond the United States was to use its good offices in developing the agricultural, mineral, and commercial resources of the little republic, to name engineers

whose advice was to be binding in the management of the said resources, to take over and administer the customs of the republic, and to select the financial adviser charged with directing the fiscal affairs of the local government.

Thus, in a single stroke, the United States undertook to promote private enterprise and safeguard the public finances upon which large bond issues afloat in the United States rested for security. With the restraint that characterized Clive's course in India, the American administration refrained from annexing Haiti; indeed this would have been inconsistent with Wilson's lofty declaration of two years before to the effect that this country would "never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest." In this spirit the Senate ratified the Haitian treaty of amity in the spring of 1916.

It is due to historical accuracy, however, to say that this assistance from the United States was not unanimously approved by the citizens of Haiti. Indeed, no little dexterity and some show of force were required to secure a ratification of the treaty of amity by the local congress. Moreover, in the lapse of five years the American troops on the spot felt impelled to kill more than two thousand natives. Though most of the victims were called "bandits" by the military and naval agents of the United States, some of them were probably actuated by resentment at the "alien invasion." In fact a number of foreigners joined the natives in deprecating the new course in Haiti. An American missionary who had spent years in the tiny republic took it upon himself to protest indignantly against the conduct of the American authorities and would not be silenced even after he had been thrown into a dungeon. An American real estate speculator in Haiti also lodged charges against the marines and the gendarmerie; shortly afterward he was murdered. Although no political significance was attached to these incidents, they certainly revealed a measure of discontent with the order of things established under the auspices of the United States.

If all the Haitians shot and murdered deserved their fate, it was none the less evident that many who survived the process of pacification were not entirely pleased with the new régime. In any case, when attempts were made to develop the agricultural resources of the interior in conformity to the provisions of the amity treaty, it was found necessary to use force in holding natives at the task of roadbuilding. Moreover, local orators and editors, according to American reports, conducted such an "agitation against the United States officials who are aiding and supporting the constitutional government of Haiti" that vigilance dictated the suppression of newspapers and public meetings and the institution of trial by court martial.

In connection with the land question, local discontent was particularly marked. By the old constitution of Haiti land ownership was restricted to natives, thus handicapping by a legal barrier American business leaders, impatient to get at the work of developing the agricultural resources, as stipulated in the treaty of amity. With a view to removing this obstacle to "the advance," a new constitution, omitting the objectionable clause, was framed by skilled draftsmen in Washington and submitted to the Haitian assembly for approval. At this point the wrath of disgruntled natives, who resented the alien invasion as bitterly as Californians resented the intrusion of the Japanese, broke all bounds, giving the assembly such a fright that it did not dare to agree to the constitution proffered by Washington. Defeated in its desire to proceed with respect for the forms of law, the American administrators now dissolved the legislature, instructed the marines to drive out recalcitrant members by force, and decreed that the revised constitution, authorizing alien corporations to hold land in Haiti, should be submitted to a popular referendum under American military supervision.

At the election, held with due regard to formalities, sixty-three thousand votes, according to the returns, were cast in favor of the proposal and two or three hundred

against it—a ludicrous outcome that induced some wag to suggest that American marines had put in the negative ballots merely to avoid the specious appearance of enthusiastic unanimity. Indeed the transaction was so indecorous that Americans at home, hearing of it, added their demur to the remonstrances of the natives. In a short time, Senator Harding, campaigning for the presidency, joined them in declaring that if elected he would never jam constitutions down the throats of his West Indian neighbors at the point of bayonets borne by marines.

Soon after Harding entered the White House, a number of prominent citizens presented to his Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes, a petition against the activities in Haiti to which the chief executive had adverted while a candidate. In response to the appeal, the Secretary, with that judicial calm which always characterized him, declined to be hurried into a complete reversal of policy by stories of atrocities and by indictments of American banking interests; that, he thought, would be sacrificing to sentiment an opportunity "to promote the tranquillity and well-being" of Haiti. Support for that view now came from other directions.

A senatorial committee, headed by the Honorable Medill McCormick, witty son-in-law of Marcus A. Hanna, after a long inquiry reported that, in spite of the unfortunate things done under the Wilson administration, the emergencies of the occasion required the United States to continue its work of instituting a local government "as nearly representative as might be" and coöperating with the Haitian authorities for "the development of the Haitian people." Grave moral responsibilities had been incurred and national honor, as well as many minor things, bade the United States carry out the terms of the treaty of 1916, namely, "to confirm and strengthen the amity" existing between the two republics—one small and harassed by poverty, the other great and magnanimous.

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The growing interests of the United States in the Caribbean made inevitable the fulfillment of an age-old dream—a canal across the Isthmus of Panama to shorten by thousands of miles the ocean passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific. By military and commercial men the hour of realization was announced. In a dramatic manner the naval advantages of the waterway had been emphasized during the Spanish war when the battleship Oregon made her tedious voyage around the Horn while the nation waited anxiously through many weeks for news of her safe arrival. Manufacturers and merchants complaining of high railway rates across the continent, steamship companies engaged in coastwise trade, and Gulf cities hoping for a livelier traffic through the Isthmus let their desires be known in the lobbies at Washington.

Obviously the time had come to beat down the barriers that nature had lifted between the two oceans—barriers that had stood in the way of European peoples since the days of Magellan. But neither Colombia nor Nicaragua, the two nations that owned potential routes, could command the wealth or the engineering skill required for the Herculean undertaking. French capitalists, under De Lesseps, the hero of Suez, had attempted it only to meet disaster. Evidently the task belonged to the United States, whose increasing needs demanded the canal and whose preponderant position in the Caribbean would not permit any other great power to assume the work of constructing it.

Many difficulties, however, stood in the way of beginning the project. First of all was the Clayton-Bulwer treaty drawn up with Great Britain in 1850 at a time when the latter possessed a larger stake in Central America than did the United States. In that agreement the two powers had made a pledge that they would seek no exclusive control over the canal route and bound themselves to coöperate in encouraging any private capitalists who might undertake to build the waterway "for the benefit of mankind." About the terms of the contract, there was no

doubt; it contemplated a joint enterprise. If, therefore, the United States was to do the work alone, especially through government agencies, courtesy, if nothing more, required a new arrangement with Great Britain. After much diplomatic skirmishing, this international adjustment was effected by the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901, abrogating the old agreement and thus removing one stumbling block from the path.

Other problems, even more troublesome, yet remained for solution. Should the Nicaragua or Panama route be chosen? Apparently a scientific question, it involved other considerations. To speak concretely, the old French company still held a concession from Colombia authorizing it to build a waterway through Panama; it was bankrupt; a large part of its stock had passed at a nominal figure into the hands of American speculators; and its rights were to expire in 1904 unless some action was taken under them. As the months passed without any decision on the question of the route, the anxiety of the American promoters who held the French securities drove their lobby in Washington to redouble its efforts to force the hand of Congress.

In a little while the momentous verdict was rendered. Notwithstanding the fact that two federal commissions, advised by experts, had recommended the Nicaragua route, Congress in 1902 approved the purchase of the French company's Panama claims at a figure not above $40,000,000. At the same time it provided that a canal strip should be bought from the republic of Colombia, adding that, in case this could not be done, the Nicaragua route was to be chosen. In conformity to these instructions, President Roosevelt immediately negotiated a treaty with Bogota granting the coveted zone to the United States in return for a promise of $10,000,000 down and an annual rental.

At that point proceedings were brought to a sudden halt. The Colombian senate demanded a large increase in the cash payment and, failing to get it, unanimously rejected the treaty, thus blocking President Roosevelt, who

was impatient to get at the enterprise, frightening the speculators in the old French company whose year of doom was near at hand, and irritating the people of Panama eager to taste of the prosperity that the canal would naturally bring. It was patent that if a long delay was to be avoided, the forms of legality would have to be breached.

And in this emergency two stormy petrels of revolution, Dr. Manuel Guerrero, a Panama conspirator, and Philippe Bunau-Varilla, a French adventurer, deeply involved in the intrigues of the French canal company, realizing that the hour had struck, hurried to the United States to raise money for an upheaval in Panama and to gain assurances of protection from the federal government in case such a revolt could be engineered. Bunau-Varilla saw Roosevelt in the White House and visited Secretary Hay in the State Department. Though he got no official guarantees he at once sent word to the strategists in Panama that American war vessels would stand by them in an uprising against Colombia. After the ships arrived, the revolution broke out, American troops were landed, one Chinaman was accidentally killed, and the independence of Panama was proclaimed on November 3, 1903. Within three days President Roosevelt recognized the new republic as a member of the family of nations. Within a few weeks a treaty was negotiated between the interested parties, in which the independence of Panama was guaranteed and the United States granted the right to construct a canal across the Isthmus in a return for a cash payment and a deferred annual rental.

"If I had followed traditional, conservative methods," said Roosevelt, "I would have submitted a dignified state paper of probably two hundred pages to Congress and the debate on it would have been going on yet; but I took the Canal Zone and let Congress debate; while the debate goes on the Canal does also." In these few words, the transaction was neatly described by the chief actor in the drama.

Having thus cut the legal knot by one swift blow, the administration at Washington pressed rapidly forward

toward its goal. The forty million dollars allotted by Congress was paid in full to the French canal concern, rewarding in a heaping measure those far-seeing American capitalists who had invested heavily in the defunct French company and had argued their cause so effectively in the lobbies of Congress. At last, after a tedious, ardent, and expensive campaign, they could breathe freely once more. Extraordinary in every respect, the incident did not pass, of course, without arousing the customary uproar in the newspapers, but the storm raged for only one brief moment; then, borne on the wings of forgetfulness, the affair dropped into the archives with the Star Route episode and the Yazoo land fraud.

One lobby at least was now out of the halls of Congress and other questions could be considered somewhat on their merits. How was the work of building the canal to be supervised? Following a long wrangle between Congress and the President, a curious compromise was reached; Congress insisted on commission management but Roosevelt finally made George W. Goethals master of ceremonies and reduced the other members of the canal board to the status of advisers. "A board is a long, narrow and wooden thing," Goethals is reported to have said. How was the menace of deadly tropical diseases to be overcome? They had mowed down the employees of the French concern like grain before a sickle and it was perilous to touch even the border of their kingdom. So the aid of science was invoked and Dr. William C. Gorgas won a brilliant victory in the name of preventive medicine. What kind of canal was to be built? The debate on that point also covered reams of the Congressional Record but it was decided eventually to overcome the grades by a system of locks instead of cutting a sea-level channel. How was the work to be done: by private contractors or by public enterprise? It was at length agreed that the government should employ the labor, buy the materials, and do the work directly.

In the spring of 1904 the "dirt began to fly," as Roosevelt

put it in his pithy language. Nine years later, after overcoming formidable obstacles—labor, engineering, and sanitary—the directors of the enterprise united the waters of the Pacific and the Atlantic. Science, capital, technology, skill, and toil had wrought a miracle greater than Balboa could have conjured up in his imagination when four hundred years before he first saw the South Seas from the isthmian heights. In 1914 the new waterway was open to the commerce of the world.

Before the work was done the question of the tolls to be charged for the use of the canal was brought up for decision. Though apparently simple, it involved delicate relations with England and many vested economic interests besides. In specific phrases, the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, which released the United States from the stipulations of the old coöperative agreement, provided that the canal should be open to the vessels of all nations on equal terms. While on its face explicit, the nature of the pledge, under the drive of acquisitive talent and political passion, became a subject of debate in Congress and throughout the country.

It was said on the one side that the promise was unmistakable and the obligation was binding in law and conscience—exactly the same rates should be charged to all vessels, American and foreign. On the other hand it was urged that American ships engaged in coastwise trade did not come within the scope of the equality clause, that the original treaty had been wrung from the United States merely because Great Britain had planted her flag in Central America in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine, and finally that the Hay-Pauncefote understanding was not a contract at all but a unilateral declaration on the part of the United States which could be modified at pleasure. On these lines the debate ran for many months, the railroad and the steamship lobbies vigilant in directing the fight. Duly impressed by the arguments in favor of discrimination, Congress passed and President Taft signed in 1912 a bill exempting

American coastwise ships from the charges imposed on foreign bottoms.

To this action England objected at once and with increasing emphasis voiced her protest as the time for the opening of the canal drew near. Confronted by a categorical demand from London and compelled by the revolution in Mexico to reckon with English interests there, President Wilson, on whose shoulders the business now fell, was placed in an embarrassing position, especially since the platform of his party contained a clear pledge against the repeal of the tolls law and the usual elements were vociferous against "bowing the knee to England." Nevertheless, in the spring of 1914, the President went before Congress and asked for a reversal of the action taken under his predecessor, basing this request on the ground that the statute transgressed the treaty with England, was indefensible economically, a violation of explicit promise. Then having in mind the Mexican problem, he added in cryptic language: "I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the administration. I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence if you do not grant it to me in ungrudging measure."

Amazed by this appeal, some Democratic congressmen declared that they would not "truckle" to Great Britain, in any circumstances, while others took refuge in rejoicing over the chance to abolish what they called Taft's "tribute to the American shipping trust." When the hot debate over the proposal died down and the whip of executive leadership was applied, Congress yielded, repealing the tolls law of 1912 and substituting a schedule of equal charges for all vessels of all countries.

The only serious problem now left for solution was the renewal of cordial relations with the republic of Colombia from whose side Panama had been so suddenly and so unceremoniously torn by revolution in Roosevelt's administration—a task of reconciliation gladly undertaken by President Wilson. After some skirmishing, his Secretary of

State, William Jennings Bryan, reached an understanding with Bogota in a solemn treaty expressing regret that the Panama incident had marred the friendship of the two countries and binding the United States to pay twenty-five millions to the government of Colombia as a balm for its wounded feelings. When published, this document was greeted with a chorus of wailing and derision among Roosevelt's friends. It was a shameful confession of error and wrong-doing, they said; an affront to American honor; a symbol of folly and weakness; "sheer blackmail," as the Colonel put it himself. Under the influence of such arguments the Senate refused to approve the treaty, and the incident appeared to be closed.

Shortly after things came to this pass, the news leaked into the lobbies of Congress that there were rich oil fields in Colombia, that American capitalists were losing a fine harvest of profits on account of the ill-will cherished in Bogota. Something had to be done, therefore, to rectify the wrong to business enterprise. So indignant friends of Roosevelt swallowed their wrath while a bargain was struck. The express apology was dropped, saving American points of propriety; the pecuniary balm was retained, conciliating Castilian pride; and in 1922, during Harding's administration, the treaty was finally ratified. Senators who had earlier opposed it rose on the floor and freely confessed that for economic reasons they would do a thing which a short time before had been called "a stain on the national honor." And they did it, thus assuring American hegemony in Colombia.

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In the very midst of the advance on the Caribbean a revolution occurred in Mexico, raising in many parts of the United States a call for a similar forward policy beyond the Rio Grande. That there was a real basis for such a demand could not be denied. For nearly fifty years American capitalists had been steadily increasing their investments in

Mexico, reaching, at the opening of the twentieth century, a total of more than half a billion dollars. During that long period local conditions had been especially favorable to their enterprise. In the intrigues which followed the expulsion of the French and the execution of Maximilian, one of the Mexican military leaders, Porfirio Diaz, managed to raise himself to the presidency and established social order. Except for an interregnum of four years, he occupied the executive palace from 1876 to 1911, enjoying for practical purposes dictatorial powers. From the first to the last Diaz gave American capitalists a cordial welcome, encouraging them to build factories, bestowing upon them generous mineral rights, and helping them to acquire immense sections of arable land.

His generosity, it seems, outran his discretion. At least it was alleged that, in disposing of natural resources, Diaz violated the Mexican constitution of 1857, under which he nominally ruled, and that many of his grants to promoters were tainted by fraud. While such assertions were hard to prove, the history of the public domain in the United States and the respect shown by American prospectors for the law in the premises lent color to the charge that Diaz had been negligent if not worse. Moreover, the ethical notions of such men as E. L. Doheny and the Hon. Albert B. Fall, who operated in both countries, indicated that it must have been difficult for even the most scrupulous officials in Mexico to avoid hazards of various kinds in disposing of their national estate. In any case it was largely owing to American enterprise that Diaz was able to collect enough taxes to meet his obligations, pay his soldiers, and keep himself in the saddle.

To the foreigners operating under his beneficence, Diaz was "the strong man" who knew how to rule Mexico in the only possible way, namely by physical violence, but in truth underneath the outward calm were smoldering embers liable on the slightest disturbance to spurt up in jets of fire. Viewed from any angle, the land question which had vexed

the country for more than a hundred years offered materials for an explosion. If anything, conditions were worse because greedy landlords, aided by pliant judges, had steadily enlarged their estates at the expense of the small holders—to speak plainly, by stealing village property. To the grudges of the Indian peons were now added the grievances of organized labor. The development of railways, mines, factories, and oil wells called into being a large body of industrial workers, recruited mainly from Indian sources and under the Marxian formula open to revolutionary suggestions. In the same economic process the number of "intellectuals" was also increased, especially among the people of mixed Spanish and Indian stock, and liberal support was found for a movement against the iron dictatorship of the "president."

All the while Diaz sat serenely on his volcano, doing nothing to postpone impending calamity. He adopted no effective measures for lifting the peon out of the age-old state of degradation or for raising the standard of life among the industrial masses. A large part of the revenues from foreign enterprise he spent upon grand buildings, boulevards, and plazas in Mexico City: attempting among other things to outdo Paris and New York by erecting a marble opera house, the finest in the western hemisphere. Such was the social "order" which Diaz and his American advisers thought "solid": at the top a small luxurious plutocracy headed by a hard, unimaginative autocrat; at the bottom a semi-servile mass, agrarian and industrial, sunk in the depths of poverty and poorly prepared for any concerted action save passionate revolt.

Unfortunately for those foreigners who built their castles in Mexico, Diaz was not immortal and as the shadows of his years lengthened, that fact was poignantly realized. Even before he was ready to relax his grip, Mexican politicians began to talk of dividing his estate and at length in 1911, after he had passed beyond the span of four score years, his dictatorship was broken by a revolution that set

in motion a swift train of startling events. To the place of Diaz dethroned by this uprising was elevated a mild liberal, Francisco Madero, with many followers of dubious ambitions. Two years later Madero was murdered in cold blood and a military adventurer, General Huerta, came to the helm with a flourish that led business enterprise to hail him as the "strong man," so heartily desired again.

Taking a practical view of the issue, European governments, especially those whose nationals had money invested in Mexico, quickly recognized his authority and made ready for a return to prosperity; but President Wilson dashed their hopes by withholding his support and by lending aid to Mexican liberals in arms against the new régime. In 1914, Huerta was in turn driven out of power and an opposition, headed by Carranza and Villa, rose to the top, only to divide over spoils and policies. In the fighting that ensued Carranza slowly gained the ascendancy and seemed in a fair way to get the battered ship of state into seaworthy condition when he was murdered in 1920. At this stage, another combination, under Obregon and Calles, got the symbols and substance of authority over a people worn out by a decade of revolution, disorder, and economic distress.

The tangled story of these troubled years yields to no simple hypothesis. There was a substantial basis for rebellion in agrarian and industrial discontent, but it was often exploited by bandits and other adventurers. There was a natural enthusiasm for fair play in the opposition to foreign capitalists, but jealousy was often mixed with patriotism in the movement to cast off their supremacy. Cynics said that the fighting was merely a contest between the Spanish and the Mestizos over the right to rob the Indian but that easy version of the revolution ignored idealistic elements among the upper classes. For, although Diaz had done practically nothing to prepare the people for self-government, there was in Mexico a democratic ferment which could not be utterly despised. If any evidence was needed it could be discovered in the constitution of 1917—an amazing docu-

ment betraying a sincere desire to promote popular education, to safeguard the public domain from private rapacity, to create freeholds by the dispersion of great estates, to limit the power of the Church in politics, and to raise the standard of living for industrial workers. Indeed the instrument exhibited a humane radicalism too bold for the government at Washington.

During the course of events that followed the overthrow of Diaz, the government of the United States, in common with interested capitalists, faced many thorny diplomatic questions. When the first revolt broke out, President Taft promptly warned those concerned that American lives and property must be respected but he made no effort to uphold his warning by a display of martial prowess. When Wilson took up the reins, he informed the Latin-American states, in a startling speech delivered at Mobile, that they were now about to witness one of the miracles of the modern world—emancipation from the dominance of foreign capitalists. So explicit and so frank was this announcement that it puzzled foreign offices everywhere, causing Sir Edward Grey, the English master of the diplomatic art, to wonder whether Wilson was not actually planning something unusually subtle in the interest of American promoters.

In truth it was President Wilson who was confused. He could not allow matters in Mexico to follow their own course; neither could he bring himself to intervene effectively at any time—a policy called "watchful waiting," meaning in practice many things besides quiescent observation. As a matter of fact President Wilson more than once took an active part in Mexican quarrels. By refusing to recognize General Huerta he made certain the downfall of that adventurer. On a point of national honor he landed marines at Vera Cruz in 1914 and waged a petty war without asking Congress to declare it; after several American marines and many more Mexicans had been killed without effecting a decision, he accepted in the premises the mediation of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the "A.B.C." powers. On some

occasions Wilson placed an embargo on arms for export to Mexican belligerents; at other times he lifted it. About the merits of the contestants in Mexico his opinions varied. For many months after the expulsion of de la Huerta, he refused to recognize Carranza; finally he accorded that favor only to inflame Villa, to whom he had once lent some countenance. Then, after Villa in impotent rage had invaded New Mexico on a murderous expedition in 1916, Wilson dispatched American troops to capture the offender, dead or alive, on Mexican soil, a task in which they were engaged until February, 1917, without success and at a cost of more than $130,000,000. After the opening of that year, the President was too deeply occupied with world affairs to devote serious attention to oil, revolution, banditry, and politics in Mexico.

Left practically to her own devices Mexico then drifted from one desultory fight to another until the murder of President Carranza in 1920 again aroused at Washington a lively interest in events across the southern border. Compelled now to act upon the question of recognizing the dead man's successor, Wilson's Secretary of State, Bainbridge Colby, took a firm stand in support of the customary political sacraments declaring that, as the price of lawful friendship, Mexico must show respect for American lives and property, pay damages for American losses in the revolution, and abrogate decrees that were confiscatory in nature. In vain did Mexicans point out that the United States had not paid for the property of foreigners destroyed in the Civil War which raged on its own soil from 1861 to 1865. In vain did they urge that many "objectionable" decrees were aimed at restoring property illegally obtained by foreign concessionaires. Whether or not such arguments were pertinent or ingenuous, they had no effect on Washington. Still it was one thing to inform the Mexican government that it must pay and repair; another thing to collect and enforce.

Somewhat astounded at interminable delays and fruitless

negotiation, observers who had watched American progress in the Caribbean during this period naturally wondered why the Wilson administration did not swiftly apply in Mexico the principles of law and order which it enforced so summarily in Haiti and Santo Domingo. Doubtless, the question could not be lightly answered but some things seemed relevant. The Caribbean countries were tiny republics. Within their boundaries operations could be executed by the Navy under presidential orders alone—without requiring the approval of Congress. Once on the spot American authorities could establish martial law, censor dispatches, and manage affairs with military decorum, awakening no outcry in the United States to embarrass the administration.

In the case of Mexico matters were not so simple. Besides having about fifteen million inhabitants, Mexico was so large in area and so close at hand that a few marines could not seize it quietly, set up a pliant government, and restore the normalcy of Diaz. On the contrary an effective occupation of Mexico meant a war of such proportions that the President could hardly wage it without an express declaration by Congress, at least without giving the legislative branch of the government some information on the subject. Moreover a movement of troops on so extensive a scale would have attracted public notice in the United States, arousing, perhaps, obstructive hostility in many directions. Certainly it would have evoked angry assertions to the effect that the invasion of Mexico, even though nominally undertaken in behalf of general welfare, was in truth designed to benefit the oil and banking fraternities. Indeed, against just that eventuality the American Federation of Labor, for example, was defiantly on guard, maintaining continuous relations with the labor movement below the Rio Grande and taking a positive stand against intervention.

Nevertheless materials for a crusade in favor of forcible mediation also lay at hand. American lives had been destroyed, the flag desecrated, and historic claims of the Catholic Church, especially to property rights, flatly rejected by

Mexican revolutionists. By the summer of 1919 claims against Mexico for half a billion dollars in damages had been filed with the State Department mainly by oil groups, to say nothing of the demands of financiers distressed by the sight of unpaid coupons piling up and Mexican bonds sinking lower and lower. Responding to these forces as the helm to the compass, Republicans in the Senate, having acquired a majority in the election of 1918, created a sub-committee of the committee on foreign relations, with Senator Albert B. Fall as chairman, for the specific purpose of making an investigation into the Mexican situation. In obedience to instructions, the sub-committee held hearings, formulated American demands on Mexico, and advised a military occupation of the country if compliance was not forthcoming.

Immediately after this ominous action came the election of Senator Harding to the presidency and the elevation of Senator Fall to a seat in his Cabinet. Pleased with the new outlook American investors in Mexican oil, powerfully organized, now prepared to realize some of their long-delayed expectations; while bankers and owners of Mexican bonds, also well-knit together in eastern strongholds of finance, presented rights and claims both huge and valid. It was accordingly assumed in various quarters that there was to be a restoration of American property in Mexico by force of arms if necessary; certainly the materials for propaganda were abundant and inflammable. But the Republican administration refused to answer Fall's demand for money or war. If it displayed firmness, it also showed patience; instead of rattling the saber, it sent a mission to Mexico City and accorded recognition to the hard-pressed Obregon-Calles government in exchange for promises respecting American claims. Contrary to the predictions of cynics, the resolution and the martial power displayed in the Caribbean were not employed in this instance; and Seward's dream of incorporating the Mexican republic in the United States once more failed to materialize.

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With respect to Latin-American affairs, the procedure of the United States government naturally involved many references to the Monroe Doctrine—all sorts of issues in the name of that early manifesto. Did the Doctrine strictly forbid all attempts of European powers to add new territories in this hemisphere? As interpreted by President Polk long before the Civil War it did not even call for a strong protest against the extension of British dominion in Central America. As interpreted by President Cleveland half a century later the same creed commanded the country to go to war on England if necessary to prevent her from occupying territory to which she had at least some historic claim.

Did the Monroe Doctrine compel the government of the United States to intervene when European powers sent battleships to Latin-American countries to collect debts for their merchants and investors? The records give two answers. When in 1859 Great Britain proposed a naval demonstration at Vera Cruz to collect debts, the Secretary of State said on that occasion that the United States assumed "no right to sit in judgment upon the causes of complaint which Great Britain may prefer against Mexico nor upon the measures which may be adopted to obtain satisfaction." Again in 1897 a similar position was taken when the German imperial government sent war vessels to Haiti, demanded an indemnity of thirty thousand dollars for a subject imprisoned as the result of a curious part in a wrangle involving approximately twenty-five cents, and called for an apology satisfactory to German national honor. In this affair also the State Department at Washington declined to interfere or to assume the duty of protecting its American neighbors from "the responsibilities which attend the exercise of independent sovereignty."

But that was an echo of a dying age. By the dawn of the new century, the investments, claims, and hopes of American capitalists in the Caribbean region had mounted so high that no quarrel could now arise between a European

power and Latin-American governments without drawing the attention of Washington forcibly to the existence of positive interests—besides vague responsibilities under the Monroe Doctrine. As the needle the magnet, so public policy followed the course of economic events, and it so happened that the German Emperor felt the first shock of the reverse drive.

When in 1901 Germany, Italy, and England united in a naval demonstration against Venezuela with a view to collecting bills presented by their citizens, President Roosevelt sprang upon the stage with alacrity, proposing arbitration as a means of settlement. England and Italy adopted the suggestion, but Germany, it appears, waived aside the proposal in a haughty manner. Thereupon the President called the German ambassador to the White House and told him in plain English that unless his imperial master consented to pacific proposals, Admiral Dewey would be ordered to Venezuelan waters with full authority to act. A week passed and no answer came from Berlin. Roosevelt then served notice on the German ambassador that within a specified time American battleships, already coaled and cleared, would sail for the scene of trouble, a hint sufficient. With seemly grace the Kaiser agreed to a judicial inquiry, receiving from the President a nice compliment on being "so stanch an advocate of arbitration." Such, at least, is the story as told by Roosevelt himself long afterward without supplying any documentary support from official sources.

Successful in this episode, Roosevelt gave the screw another turn in applying the Monroe Doctrine to a similar crisis in Santo Domingo. When certain European powers threatened armed intervention there on behalf of their citizens, the United States, besides objecting to the procedure in accordance with the Venezuelan precedent, traveled beyond the confines of that incident. It did not even suggest arbitration; it seized the bankrupt republic, adjusted its assets, and ordered a settlement of its bills—not without appropriate consideration for American investors, some of

whom had acquired Dominican bonds on favorable terms. Before long, as we have seen, American hegemony was spread far and wide in Latin-America.

Although the government of the United States made it plain, in the course of the forward movement, that it did not rely for moral sanctions on the Monroe Doctrine alone, a great deal was said about that historic creed during those adventurous years. Roosevelt warned all the parties involved that wrongdoing, disorder, the lessening of the ties of civilized society, and the failure to pay debts would force the United States to exercise its international police power. That was specific. Taft, angered by the assertions of critics to the effect that the Monroe Doctrine was only a shield to cover the seizure of lands and privileges by the United States, replied that such base insinuations would not prevent this country from discharging its duty as occasions arose. That was the age of "dollar diplomacy."

It was followed by the age of "the new freedom." Soon after his inauguration Wilson, as we have said, announced in a speech at Mobile a humanistic twist to the Doctrine. Turning the tables on his predecessors, he bluntly declared that capitalists, not content with getting into Latin-American republics, were trying to dominate their domestic affairs; and he informed the world that those states were about to be emancipated and treated as friends and equals on terms of honor. That manifesto too was perfectly explicit as far as the language went, but the natives of Haiti, Santo Domingo, Mexico, and Nicaragua found difficulties in grasping its practical implications—difficulties not entirely dissipated when Charles E. Hughes, as Secretary of State, in a carefully prepared address explained that the Monroe Doctrine did not infringe upon the sovereignty of the Latin-American states or exhaust the rights and responsibilities of the United States in the Caribbean.

To various professions on the part of the Washington government, more or less official, a host of Latin-American statesmen, politicians, editors, and publicists replied that

the Monroe Doctrine was only a Yankee scheme for staking out claims and preëmpting territory until the United States was ready to seize it. From the standpoint of this school, the grand old Doctrine which was so excellent when employed to protect them against European debt-collectors was nothing but a cloak for American imperialism when used to preserve order and advance American business interests. As a matter of fact it could not be truly said that the government of the United States was operating deliberately upon a policy of imperialistic domination; for the simple reason that the Anglo-Saxon mind never did work that way. The British empire was not charted in advance by a Treitschke or a Bernhardi; it slowly broadened out from episode to incident. In a similar fashion the American empire sprang from what seemed, in the view of the Washington government, to be unavoidable concrete circumstances and specific moral duties.

Moreover, all through the official declarations of American policy ran a strong note of good-will to the neighboring countries at the south. If the mailed fist was brought down on the table in Haiti and other places with a bang, the hand of friendship was often extended too. Deeply appreciating economic opportunities to come, James G. Blaine, for example, while Secretary of State, made a special point of cultivating cordial relations with Latin-America, declaring his belief that peace in this hemisphere under the leadership of the United States was the best guarantee of commercial prosperity. Going beyond platonic professions, Blaine, with justifiable pride, called to order in 1889 a Pan-American conference, the first of the kind ever assembled on this continent, to symbolize coöperation as the new watchword. The precedent thus set was followed from time to time by similar meetings, in 1901, 1906, 1910, and 1923, supplemented by scientific, financial, labor, feminist, and educational conventions, making Pan-Americanism a mystic word.

In principal and detail, the results of these conferences

were difficult to appraise. One tangible outcome no doubt was the formation of a permanent coöperative bureau which was given the name of the Pan-American Union and housed in a beautiful building in Washington. The imponderables were less easy to assay. One competent historian, after examining the work of the several conferences, came to the conclusion that the principal fruits were "spiritual" rather than economic and substantial. In the eyes of another historian the Pan-American Union promised to substitute cooperation for imperial dominion and offered an antidote to the Pan-Hispanism which sought to redress the uneven balance of the New World by calling upon the Latin nations of the Old World for help.

With reference to practical matters, however, the government at Washington did not receive much assistance from efforts to form cultural bonds among Latin peoples or from the resolutions offered at Pan-American conferences. After all was done and said, its sources of inspiration lay in other quarters. Its ability to rely upon English support, its material strength, and its naval power permitted it to assume and discharge its obligations without aid from the Latin-American nations themselves. Indeed it could not rely upon those countries to coöperate effectively on any program, economic or political—a fact the State Department learned to its sorrow in 1921 when it gave its blessing to the short-lived Central American Union and again in 1924 when it made another attempt to bind those tiny states into a federation.

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The effect of the imperial advance in the Pacific and in the Caribbean on American concepts of national grandeur are not readily traced in the tangled record of those crowded years. In the beginning was the deed, as the poet wrote of life in general, and long afterward came the idea. So while the American flag was raised first over one place and then over another, the several acts constituted no part of a log-

ical pattern formed beforehand. On the contrary there was much confusion in the pertinent rhetorical discourses of the age. Constant dissent indicated that the country was not unanimous in approving the conquest of alien races and territories as a regular function of the federal government. The fact that a Democratic Congress declared in favor of ultimate independence for the Philippines, though withholding it for the time being, was doubtless of some significance —how much is not yet revealed by fate. The fact that Senator Harding, while campaigning for the presidency, assailed the Wilson administration for using American bayonets to shove constitutions down the throats of West Indian neighbors, conveyed the impression that he regretted such untoward incidents or at least, as his critics alleged, thought his protest in the premises likely to attract votes. In either case Harding's declaration manifested some national tenderness on the point of imperial conduct.

On the other side of the ledger, however, were many entries which implied that the populace was glad to have new colonial possessions, protectorates, spheres of influence, and moral mandates added to the American heritage. The defeat of Bryan on the issue of imperialism in 1900, the cheers that greeted Roosevelt's vigorous use of the "big stick," the rise of American prestige in the Caribbean under Wilson, and the return to stern measures in the Philippines under Harding and Coolidge bore witness to a general contentment with the course of Manifest Destiny.

Nevertheless, no philosophy of empire was worked out to systematic perfection and fused with the Constitution into the current system of ethics. Either on account of logic or Christian training, American thinkers shrank from an overt application of the Darwinian law to the struggle of nations for trade and territory. They were of course not unaware of the ancient creed, for they had heard about the theory and practice of Rome. In their school books they had read Pro Lege Manilia, the panegyric by Cicero, which summed up in a single sentence the old doctrine of might: "Do not

hesitate for a moment in prosecuting with all your energies a war to preserve the glory of the Roman name, the safety of our allies, our rich revenue, and the fortunes of innumerable private citizens." They had before them also the voluminous writings of European imperialists who scorned the more tender sentiments of liberals and frankly advocated war and expansion for glory and emoluments. "Was für Plunder!" roared General Blücher when he first viewed London from the dome of St. Paul's.

If such bald tenets made any appeal to American statesmen or editors, few traces of the fact were to be found in their professions of faith. Critics, it is true, accused the directors in high places of believing at the bottom of their hearts in such dogmas but indignant denials were always forthcoming. As a matter of record, Anglo-Saxons seldom looked upon imperial conquests so simply and so harshly as Roman and German philosophers; according to their cosmic view, there were always ethical elements to be taken into account. When Drake and Hawkins overhauled a Spanish galleon, relieved it of its treasure, and sent ship and crew to the bottom of the sea, they felt that they enjoyed, besides the rewards of their labor, the approval of the Virgin Queen and the sanction of the Protestant faith. When Clive had access to the treasure of an Indian state, he refrained from taking all of it and was delighted as well as surprised at his own self-restraint. When Edmund Burke made his celebrated speech indicting Warren Hastings at the bar of the House of Lords, in vain, he assumed that British imperial dominion was founded "not upon the niceties of a narrow jurisprudence but upon the enlarged and solid principles of state morality." A hundred years later, the poet Kipling voiced the same spirit in his lines celebrating the imperial call as a solemn command to take up the White Man's burden, to seek another's profit and work another's gain, a flame communicated to the American branch of the race. German imperialists made a fatal error, therefore, when they questioned the sincerity of the poet's sentiments

—when they failed to see that a high sense of moral responsibility could accompany security for invested capital and the conquest of smaller social groups troubled by disorders and revolutions.

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That practical considerations and humane sentiments could flourish in the same political and economic climate was abundantly demonstrated by the fact that the movement for universal peace found its strongest support among the two branches of the English-speaking empire, nowhere more enthusiastically than in America. The age that witnessed the transformation of the American republic from an association of equal and self-governing states into a consolidated system ruling distant provinces and subject races also saw the rapid rise and phenomenal growth of a propaganda to outlaw war and establish permanent concord among the nations of the earth.

During this period, local, state, national, and international peace associations sprang up with bewildering rapidity in all parts of the United States, especially in the commercial East. In 1906, the New York Peace Society was founded and the startling announcement made that Andrew Carnegie had given ten million dollars to advance the cause of international good-will which lay so close to his heart. The following year a national peace conference was held in New York, the beginning of annual sessions, and the National Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs was instituted under the leadership of Louis P. Lochner, who was later to sail in Henry Ford's peace ship, carrying the olive branch to war-worn Europe. Emulating the example of Carnegie, Edwin Ginn, a rich publisher of Boston, dedicated a part of his fortune in 1911 to the creation of the World Peace Foundation. In 1912, the American Peace Society, organized in New York nearly a hundred years before, the first of its kind in the world, fixed its headquarters in Washington and embarked upon a new career. Echoes of the agita-

tion reached the educational world where the American School Peace League was formed to push propaganda in the schools under William Lloyd Garrison's international banner: "My country is the world, my countrymen all mankind." Clergymen of every denomination took up the cry, creating the Church Peace League to work in the religious field.

Associated with these societies as members, leaders, and orators were some of the first citizens of America, including Lyman Abbott, Jane Addams, James M. Beck, Nicholas Murray Butler, Andrew Carnegie, Carrie Chapman Catt, Charles W. Eliot, Hamilton Holt, David Starr Jordan, A. Lawrence Lowell, Joseph H. Choate, Thomas Edison, James J. Hill, and William Howard Taft. On the far left wing were extremists who called for the absolute and unconditional abolition of war as a sin and a crime.

Given this membership and this support, the activities of the peace advocates were naturally varied and far-reaching. Conferences were assembled, sermons preached, researches made, propaganda carried on, literature circulated, professors exchanged among the nations, banquets held, and orations delivered. Nothing seemed more respectable than the condemnation of war as barbaric and the advocacy of peace as an enduring ideal. In the common assault on militarism men and women of widely divergent views could unite.

Perfect harmony, of course, was not attained, at first, even in the peace movement. Pro-British elements had doubts about the merits of the German-American concord; German-Americans saw portents in the Anglo-American entente; and the Irish took their historic attitude toward the latter affiliation.

In fact, in the run of the debates by these parties, the idea got about that the German Empire was no friend of international peace, and special efforts were therefore made to reassure the public on that score. Examining the charge from one angle Richard Bartholdt declared his "honest

opinion that William II is for permanent peace." After a similar inquiry Edwin D. Mead expressed the conviction that "German thought is now swinging toward a new idealism of the Kant type." By way of supplement, a distinguished German clergyman, sent over to attend an important conference in 1911, informed his American auditors that he had talked with the Kaiser before setting out and that his Majesty "took a good deal of interest in the movement for international peace." On various occasions, Nicholas Murray Butler, who was personally acquainted with William II, added his guarantees; and under his inspiration, in 1913, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Kaiser's coronation, the New York Peace Society struck a beautiful medal which it sent with an appropriate address to the master at Potsdam. As if to confirm this manifestation of faith, Andrew Carnegie, also on friendly terms with the All-highest War Lord, announced to doubting Thomases that his imperial friend was "a peace lord" and that "whatever impressions exist to the contrary are based on ignorance of the Emperor's true nature." So eventually great and good citizens all over the land came to believe that humanity was finally nearing the goal of universal peace—in spite of the Spanish-American war of 1898, the Filipino War of 1899, the Boer War of 1899, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, the Turco-Italian War of 1911, the Balkan War of 1912, and minor disturbances on the borders of expanding empires.

In truth there were a number of ostensible signs which seemed to indicate that governments were inclined to shrink somewhat from the dangerous arbitrament of arms and to favor amicable methods of settling their disputes. By enthusiasts, at least, two conferences held at the Hague, in 1899 and 1907, on the call of the Russian Tsar, were hailed as portents of the new order; although behind the scenes the diplomats of England, France, and Germany were laughing up their sleeves. At the first of these assemblies, three agreements of mild promise were reached. One of the cov-

enants provided that at any time during an international dispute, or even during war, a neutral power might, without offense, tender its good offices to contestants with a view to effecting a peaceful solution or bringing hostilities to an end. In another compact, it was stipulated that any party to a controversy might, without prejudice, call for an impartial commission of inquiry to make an investigation into the facts of the case. These two declarations were crowned with an arrangement for an international court at The Hague to which disputants might, by agreement, submit issues that could not be adjusted by diplomatic methods.

Suggestions for disarmament, however, came to nothing and the proposal for banning poison gas was rejected by the American delegates. Indeed the fatal animus of the powers was clearly manifest at the second conference when practically the only points on which concord could be reached were new rules for "civilized warfare," legal rules which were soon to be treated by them all as mere scraps of paper, incapable of restraining armed forces facing each other.

If Christendom did not agree on a program of peace, the government of the United States did in good faith testify on occasion to its general belief in pacific principles. It is true that President McKinley refused to arbitrate the Maine incident, rejected offers of mediation in the controversy with Spain, and declined to bring pressure on England with a view to drawing the Boer war to an end; but he declared publicly that "peace is preferable to war in almost every contingency." In 1903 a long-standing dispute with Canada over the Alaskan boundary was settled by a joint tribunal in London—in favor of the American claim. On the receipt of pertinent information, President Roosevelt in 1905 tendered his good offices to Russia and Japan, both near to exhaustion, and helped them bring their war to a conclusion at Portsmouth. Three years later, England and the United States agreed to submit to arbitration all questions not involving "vital interests" or "national honor," and in 1910 the two countries closed an old quarrel over

fishing rights by submitting it to judicial determination at The Hague.

Concrete projects for peace were now in the air. As if to illustrate the change of heart, Secretary Knox signed treaties with France and Great Britain in 1911 undertaking to submit all disputes to international arbitration, but his plans were defeated in the Senate by a powerful and determined opposition. The Irish and German elements bitterly attacked the proposal for obvious reasons and the representatives of several states which had repudiated their bonds opposed it because they feared that European creditors would attempt to collect through a court of inquiry. Undaunted by the fate of the Knox treaties, Secretary Bryan took up the issue when he entered the Cabinet under the Wilson administration. Displaying his characteristic zeal, he effected agreements with about half the independent powers of the earth, providing that all disputes of whatever nature should be submitted to an international commission for inquiry and that in no case should war be declared before the tribunal had made a formal report. With surprising alacrity the Senate approved these conventions, sending a note of triumph through the peace movement in America.

At this very moment the outbreak of the World War rudely dissolved the spell cast by the treaties and placed the advocate of peace in an awkward position. Overnight, these ardent apostles, once applauded as the wise friends of humanity, became the objects of menacing hostility, denounced as traitors by the Anglophiles and treated as suspects by the man in the street. Increasingly tragic became their dilemma as the cry for war intensified, reaching a climax when President Wilson called upon Congress to take up arms against Germany. By that act the die was cast, compelling all, save scoffers, to make a choice. On the left, extremists, especially those who entertained doubts about the finality of capitalist economy, still clung to peace and many of them were sent to prison as transgressors under the espionage and sedition acts. On the right, prudent plead-

ers of the cause cleared themselves of taint by ample displays of militancy, while the leading peace societies, as a matter of course, rallied to the support of the government, taking consolation, perhaps, in the thought that the war was waged "to end war." In this spirit, the Carnegie Peace Endowment announced that it could serve the ideal of its founder best by lending all its strength to the prosecution of the armed conflict to a triumphant conclusion. Occupying the middle ground, groups of liberals, such as the Union against Militarism, which had unsuccessfully opposed intervention in the European war, turned to the advocacy of "a democratic peace" and assisted in the organization of the Civil Liberties Union, a society for the maintenance of individual rights against governmental action.

When the end came, the path of the peace advocate was still strewn with thorns, particularly after the country rejected the League of Nations and took its stand in favor of an armed isolation. A strenuous apostle of peace thereupon became *ipso facto* something of a traitor in the eyes of professional patriots, the War Department, the Navy Department, and the various leagues for the support of the military establishment. Even an agency as powerful as the Carnegie Peace Endowment, gathering up the fragments after the wreck, felt impelled to move with caution. It devoted a huge sum to preparing a monumental history of certain aspects of the World War, sent generous gifts to help repair the ruin wrought by the German armies in France and Belgium, made an expression of good-will for Great Britain by contributing fifty thousand dollars to the restoration of Westminster Abbey, that great Pantheon of the Anglo-Saxon dead. Thus, after the age of empire had worn on a few decades, it became necessary to examine pacific doctrines and test categorical ethics with reference to new duties and new potentialities.

# CHAPTER XXVII

## *Towards Social Democracy*

MATHEMATICAL politicians who kept their minds on the course of empire, on tons of coal, miles of railway, and bales of cotton, at the opening of the twentieth century, had good reason for supposing that the gilded age of the full dinner pail and the unrestrained exploitation of the American estate would never pass. But unknown to them other factors than commodity output were at work in the United States. Farmers, feeling the pinch of the agricultural revolution, were becoming restive under the new application of the Hamilton-Webster creed. The growing army of industrial workers was attaining a closer solidarity. In the sphere of social reasoning, science was challenging the intellectual patterns handed down from the epoch of the stagecoach.

In a word, cumulative forces, complex and interacting, were beating upon the accepted order of things. Almost too young to be called accepted that order itself was born of an industrial transformation which touched every phase of life and labor; was indeed still in constant change under

the drive of invention, technology, and capitalist ambition. And this relentless drift in national life was strengthened by the activities of two political personalities, the most dynamic raised to high authority since the age of Andrew Jackson—Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson—statesmen who were, in the course of events, by accident rather than the intent of party managers, placed on a throne of power that Cæsar might have coveted.

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The logical starting point for a survey of these unforeseen tendencies in American democracy is a summary view of the system of acquisition and enjoyment at high noon. As already indicated, the general cast of thought and scheme of political practice in the United States corresponded for a long time to the requirements of the substantial owners of industrial property who ruled the country with the aid of the more fortunate farmers. The philosophy which they affected was Doric in its simplicity: the state and society were nothing; the individual was everything. A political party was a private association of gentlemen and others who had leisure for public affairs; its functional purpose was to get possession of the government in the name of patriotism and public welfare as a matter of course and to distribute the spoils of office among the commanders, the army, and its camp followers. How the party managed its caucuses, conventions, and committees was none of the general public's business; if leaders sometimes bought voters and marched them to the polls, they were only engaged in doing unto others what they expected others to do to them. Propriety merely warned them against atrocities.

Thus organized and directed in those good old days of liberty, the political party was in effect a standing army; if encamped in possession of the government, its officers and men lived on the fat of the land; if driven from the field in defeat, it closed its ranks, reduced the rations, and prepared with the passion of desperation to recover the lost para-

dise. When in control of a government, state, local, or national, a party could make laws and carry on administration in caucuses and cabals behind closed doors without much risk of an intrusion by the citizens—until the next election when stale issues were likely to be overwhelmed in the flood of time and events. If signs of a popular revolt did appear on the horizon, officers of opposing forces could unite with marked facility in the face of a common danger and control the polling. If necessary, elections could be held in saloons, accompanied by drunken orgies and physical violence or resort could be had to ballot box stuffing —a practice so common as to excite humor rather than indignation.

As was appropriate to the age, the grand political world was a man's world. When a few bizarre women ventured to ask for the ballot as a gift from a benevolent patriarchate, they were answered by a writer in Godey's Lady's Book in this fashion: "How many are there possessing the modesty, the delicacy, the withdrawing spirit, the gentleness of the sex, who would not rather delegate to their husbands, their fathers, their brothers, those arduous and disagreeable duties? How many, who in addition to the duties of love, of friendship, of education, of charity, all of which society imposes, would willingly assume the burden of politics? I believe, I hope, there are very few." The belief and the hope seemed well founded.

In managing his property, the individual in the gilded age was about as immune from interference on the part of the state as was the caucus. Government intervention was an evil, a violation of the inexorable laws of nature, save when practiced to preserve order, grant subsidies to railway promoters, or afford protection and bounties to manufacturers. With these subtle exceptions, the solemn duty of the state was to keep its hands off private affairs. The immense national capital in arable land, forests, water power, and minerals was to be given away or sold for a pittance without any limitations or reservations as to use or potential

monopoly. Getting a generous portion of the national spoils for nothing, the farmers saw no reason why railway corporations, lumber companies, and mining concerns should be seriously handicapped in taking their particular allotments. Though the law for seizure and exploitation was liberal in all conscience, in actual practice those who entered and occupied the public domain were none too fine in their observance of the letter and spirit—so careless in fact as to move President Roosevelt to exclaim, after reading the report of his Public Lands Commission, that the taint of fraud was everywhere in the process of alienation. While the national domain was thus being carved up and parceled out, railway companies were ruling their respective dominions with a high hand; they made mergers and combinations without restraint, granted rebates to favorite shippers, discriminated against towns and ports for a consideration, issued unlimited quantities of stocks and bonds to the gullible public in the New World and in the Old, went into bankruptcy with cheerful insouciance, and made rates based on the current principle of "what the traffic will bear."

Besides nourishing by benevolence the enterprises of capitalists, the national government was tender in imposing burdens of taxation on great possessions. In fact, it derived practically all its revenues from indirect duties on imported goods, whisky, tobacco, beer, and wine—judiciously distributed among the consuming masses. Even state and local governments, although operating on the theory that all property should be taxed alike, found it difficult to discover and list illusive stocks and bonds hidden in boxes so strong that they could not be penetrated by the eye of the shrewdest tax assessor; state commission after state commission declared that the general property tax was a farce and that the evasion of taxes on intangible securities was almost universal. In a word, nowhere did heavy income and inheritance taxes vex the lives of those closely engaged in the great game of acquisition.

Nor were they harassed by responsibilities for workers

killed or injured in their industries. A victim who lost an arm in a factory, the family of a man crushed to death in a rolling mill or suffocated in a mine had to assume the risks of the occupation; damages could be secured only when the employer was in some special sense guilty of negligence and even then as a rule only after a long, tortuous, and expensive lawsuit. Under an ancient quirk of legality, therefore, the sacred rights of property owners could not be invaded with the object of compelling them to carry the burden of their own social wreckage. According to the same canons of excellence, industrial workers, unlike the slaves of the Old South, were no charge on business when unemployed; that risk they assumed also under the beneficent laws of political economy.

The jurisprudence of the acquisitive instinct, as well as justice in general, was administered by the judicial branch of the government with circumspection. When at length it was fully demonstrated that the state legislatures were bent on establishing by law the rates of railways and other utility corporations, the courts felt compelled by the irrefragable logic of the federal Constitution, to determine in cases properly presented whether such rates were reasonable or not, that is, yielded a fair return to the owners, as guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. When the New York legislature in a reforming mood fixed the hours of labor in bake shops at ten per day or sixty per week, the Supreme Court at Washington found the act a clear violation of "the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." When another session of the same legislature sought to make it easier for a workman to recover damages for an injury sustained in industry, the high court of the commonwealth struck down the law in the name of constitutional freedom.

Such in general was the great complex of use and wont in politics and economics during the early stages of triumphant business enterprise. In this limited space, naturally, the strokes and lines are bolder and sharper than they would be

on a larger canvas admitting of shades, distinctions, and exceptions; but the essential outline of the picture, limned by the testimony of private letters and public papers, is sound and authentic. If the year of its finest perfection must be fixed, then 1880 may be chosen, exactly half way between the election of Lincoln, which sounded the doom of the planting dominion, and the end of the wonderful century. The magnificent system of acquisition and enjoyment then stood full blown without a serious fault to mar the beauty of its symmetry. Those who acquired and enjoyed pronounced it good and appeared to assume that it would last forever in its splendid form. Yet at that very moment it had already become the object of lively assaults from many directions; before the lapse of a generation it was so battered and undermined at the base that the men of the age which had constructed it imagined, perhaps with undue fright, that the solid earth was crumbling beneath their feet.

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In tracing the changes wrought by this conflict—changes that would have been called revolutionary if they had been effected all at once by some such convention as the French National Assembly of 1789—the processes of American democracy are to be observed working through our intricate federal system of government. Each separate battle in the general campaign was carried on by some active group of private citizens driving upon some particular angle, redoubt, turret, or gateway of the mighty structure thrown up by the drift of three hundred years. In a thousand obscure corners, as well as in great open assemblies, the forays and agitations were organized: in city councils, state legislatures, women's clubs, trade unions, grange conferences, reform associations, party caucuses and conventions, the Congress of the United States, the chambers and public rooms of judicial courts, executive mansions, and editorial sanctums.

Trading, bartering, and huckstering as well as fighting accompanied the operations. No statesman conceived the

minor adjustments in terms of a larger whole or foresaw the trend of destiny; no political party could claim special credit for results or escape responsibility for the outcome. Certainly no political messiah pointed the way or inspired the participants in the fray from a height seen by all. If any responsible person had mirrored to the American mind of 1880 the American system of 1927, he would have been laughed out of court. Such havoc does fate play with the little schemes of men!

Hegel's theory of history was being illustrated once more: the system of acquisition and enjoyment was calling into being its own antithesis—forces that challenged its authority and conditions that required a reconsideration of its laws and ethics. In the fullness of time, factors which had long worked in obscurity thrust themselves upward in bursts of power which could not be ignored by the most hardened man of affairs. Physical realities, always vivid enough to those who worked in shop, factory, and mine, swam at last into the ken of those whose business it was to understand the intricacies of modern society and to proclaim the right and wrong of things. Ideas born in the evolving clash of mind and matter altered the range of America's "intellectual climate," made obsolete phrases that had once contained substance and driving energy, and in due time shook themselves down into divergent patterns of thought. "Is there nothing eternal in the world?" cried a distinguished educator of the age. "Nothing except change," replied one of his colleagues.

Among the many forces that swept political activities into novel channels, none was more potent than the increasing organization of industrial workers. After the skirmishes of the gilded age, the American Federation of Labor began to make amazing strides in membership and financial power. In 1900 it could claim only 548,000 wage workers; fourteen years later the number had passed the two million mark. Outside its affiliation, but in fraternal sympathy with its aims, were the Railway Brotherhoods and in an inde-

pendent position several minor associations whose combined strength added half a million more to the total enrolled under trade union emblems. In the second decade of the twentieth century, the Federation, which had started its career in a dingy back room in New York City, dedicated an imposing seven story office building in Washington, in the presence and with the benediction of the President of the United States. On the cornerstone were carved these words: "This edifice erected for service in the cause of Labor, Justice, Freedom, and Humanity." Within a hundred years from the payment of Hamilton's last federal bond, a single great labor society, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, was in control of enterprises and banks with resources greater in extent than the total national debt which the redoubtable secretary of the treasury had funded in 1790. All these things were ponderables coming within the scope of William James' "stubborn and irreducible facts."

Equally obdurate were the changing verities in the life of American women, recorded in returns of the industrial census. By 1870, the proportion of women engaged in gainful pursuits had reached about fifteen per cent of the total; when the end of the century came, it had passed twenty per cent. At the latter date, nearly one-third of all the females over ten years of age then living in William Penn's Quaker city of Philadelphia were working for wages; while in many new industrial towns, such as Fall River, Massachusetts, more than one-third of the females were in the mills, stores, and offices. Moreover no fewer than half a million married women were wage earners in 1890 and the proportion was steadily increasing; by 1910 it was nearly one-fourth the total number of women gainfully employed throughout the country.

Evidently the system of manufacturing inaugurated by Hamilton was permanent and in 1892 the American Federation of Labor finally took official notice of the fact. In that year its president, Samuel Gompers, commissioned

Mary E. Kenney to head a crusade for the mobilization of industrial women. Of course, women had formed many transitory societies in the early days of the factory system; they had been admitted to some of the regular trade unions, local, national, and international, including the Knights of Labor, that had risen during the nineteenth century; and they had taken part in numerous battles over hours and wages. But up to this point their continuous rôle in industry had not been appreciated by most of the leaders highest in the American Federation of Labor.

The designation of an official organizer among women, marking a new phase in the American labor movement, was followed soon by the formation of the Federal Labor Union at Chicago, a similar society at Boston, and finally, during the annual convention of the American Federation of Labor in 1903, by the National Women's Trade Union League charged with the function of bringing women into the main stream of associated effort. Pledged to the organization of all workers, the League demanded equal pay for equal work, an eight hour day, the maintenance of the American standard of living, and full equality for women in the rights of citizenship. Slowly but steadily the militant crusade among women began to count in numbers and in the spread of ideas. Seven years after the formation of the League less than six per cent of the women employed in manufacturing industries were enrolled in unions as against eleven per cent of the men; at the end of the next decade the proportions were eighteen and twenty-three respectively.

Striking as were these figures, they did not tell the whole story; for the activities in the industrial field thus reported by accountants agitated a wide fringe of the middle class, carrying the strife and problems of the labor movement into circles of leisure, and aiding in the dissolution of the comfortable social thesis acquired from the gilded age. Thus energetic and persistent wage-earning women, educated women pressing into the competitive world, and rich women now enjoying the possession of property in their own

right even though married, refashioned many modes of thought handed down from the era of Millard Fillmore and James Buchanan. The kaleidoscope was swiftly turning and amazing were its new revelations.

This drift in human relations and the stream of ideas that flashed up as it swept forward, changing the social order and its intellectual imagery, naturally provoked doubts with respect to current political practices. The costly conflicts of capital and labor, the diligence of Marxians, the milder but insistent discussions of Christian Socialists, the percolations of Bellamy's utopian nationalism, and the haunting queries of academic economists unsettled the opinions of thousands who had once found peace and security in the party of Thomas Jefferson or that of Abraham Lincoln. At length in 1900 the time seemed ripe for another crystallization and a new political organization, the Social Democratic Party, was formed. It nominated for the presidency Eugene V. Debs, still smarting under the judicial lashing received during the Pullman strike, and polled ninety-six thousand votes for a general revolution.

Encouraged by the result, meager as it was, Debs and his supporters decided to put their party on a permanent basis. Adopting the name Socialist in 1901, they concentrated on the formation of local branches in the industrial regions, undertaking in the operation an active popular propaganda. In the next election, over four hundred thousand ballots were cast for Socialism; even in 1908 when Bryan drew off the lukewarm regiments, a slight gain was made; and four years later, in spite of Wilson's new freedom and Roosevelt's progressive offerings, the Socialist party more than doubled its vote. By that time it could boast that its candidates had captured several hundred offices in various sections of the country, including a seat in Congress, and were actually making inroads upon established political ceremonies.

Although there was no little difference of opinion among the Socialists, as indeed among Republicans and Democrats,

concerning the exact character of their principles and tactics, their professions conformed with fair precision to certain general concepts, more closely adapted to the actual trend of business and science than the utopianism of the middle period had been. Modern industry, they all held, necessarily creates a division of society into contending elements—the capitalist class which controls the machinery of production and the working class composed of landless, homeless, toolless people dependent upon the sale of labor for their livelihood. There is, continued the thesis, an inherent antagonism between these two classes, for each seeks to secure all it can from the annual output of wealth, an antagonism manifest in organizations of capital and labor, in industrial disputes, and in open social warfare; out of this contest the former gain security and luxury and the latter misery and poverty, while the frightful wastes of competition levy a toll on both parties to the struggle. In the realm of politics and education, the Socialists maintained, capitalism is dominant. "The capitalist class," ran their platform in 1912, "though few in number, absolutely controls the government—legislative, executive, and judicial. This class owns the machinery for gathering and disseminating news through its organized press. It subsidizes the seats of learning—the colleges and the schools—even religious and moral agencies." Then came the synthesis: the working class is becoming conscious of its position and its potential strength; it is being consolidated by coöperation, economic and political; and in the course of time it will conquer the government and seize the machinery of production and distribution.

To the middle classes this creed seemed menacing enough but to those who marched in the left wing of the Socialist movement it was tepid doctrine. Demanding something hotter, the intransigents formed in 1904 a still more revolutionary society known as the Industrial Workers of the World and announced that they would carry the struggle from the realm of theory to that of action. Inspired largely

by William D. Haywood, a western miner who was destined to have a checkered career that carried him all the way to Moscow to coöperate with the Soviet Republic after the Russian revolution, the new group of radicals proposed, after the fashion of the Knights of Labor, to build one big union of all industrial workers. With that instrument they planned to conquer the capitalist system in a series of mass strikes, accompanied by sabotage. With a burst of enthusiasm, Jack London described "the day" in his proletarian novel, Revolution.

In harmony with the law of social trepidation, these preachers of defiance created more commotion than the numerical strength of their adherents warranted, driving statesmen and politicians, ever sensitive to seismic disturbances, to display their customary apprehensions. "The labor men are very ugly and no one can tell how far such discontent will spread," wrote President Roosevelt to Senator Lodge in 1906. "There has been during the last six or eight years a great growth of socialistic and radical spirit among workingmen and the leaders are obliged to play to this or lose their leadership. Then the idiotic folly of the high financiers and of their organs such as the Sun helps to aggravate the unrest."

Replying, the Senator reported back from Massachusetts a few months later that, according to information from a trade union leader, "there was nothing to fear from the labor unions . . . but there was great danger in his opinion from the socialistic movement led by men of some education who made incendiary appeals to all laboring men. I think he is right." Startled by their findings in this relation, both the President and the Senator expressed a profound conviction that, unless strong measures were taken to curb the plutocracy and the proletariat, property in general might suffer grievous injury at the hands of the socialists and that, even in the best of circumstances, the clash of the contending forces might come to a dangerous crisis in a great political campaign. So after all it appears that the

era of the full dinner pail was not an age of static security either in economics or politics.

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One of the first dents in accepted political use and wont was made by the civil-service reformers, inspired by middle-class notions, rather than labor, agrarian, or revolutionary ideas, to attack the spoils system, the general distribution of public offices to victorious party workers. Unwittingly, perhaps, they assailed a conservative institution—one that damped the ardor of agrarian and proletarian discontent by a judicious partition of loaves and fishes and at the same time prevented the erection of a permanent government bureaucracy coveting powers and policies not entirely pleasing to industrial captains. But without inquiring too narrowly into the distant implications of their work, they condemned the practices of the spoilsmen wholesale and advocated a program of reconstruction in administration, proposing that the major portion of the public offices should be open only to persons of demonstrated fitness selected by examinations, that partisan influences should be eliminated in such cases, and that tenure should be during good behavior, not at the behest of politicians.

The group of reformers who espoused this cause was never very large. When one of their lecturers widely advertised a discourse on the subject in Chicago in 1880, he was greeted by seven or eight more or less curious auditors. But their influence could not be measured solely by numbers. Some of their strategists were writers and speakers of singular force; such for instance as E. L. Godkin, whose vitriolic editorials in the Nation made the politicians wince every week; George William Curtis, editor of Harper's Weekly, a skilled penman and magnetic orator; and Carl Schurz, a veteran of the Civil War and energetic leader in public affairs. Moreover, they kept up their campaign in season and out, in spite of the laughter of men wise in the partisan game.

For a long time of course, though they won a hearing from a select audience of citizens, they were largely ignored by the strongest political directors. In fact their foes marveled at the temerity of their agitation and wondered just "what these fellows want." Speculating on their motives, Senator Roscoe Conkling of New York, past master of the art of manipulation as then practiced, answered: "Some of them are man-milliners, the dilettanti and carpet knights of politics, men whose efforts have been expended in denouncing and ridiculing and accusing honest men. . . . They are wolves in sheep's clothing. Their real object is office and plunder. When Dr. Johnson defined patriotism as the last refuge of a scoundrel, he was unconscious of the then undeveloped capabilities of the word 'reform' "—an explosion that passed for convincing argument among the political giants of the established order.

Nevertheless the agitation over the spoils system went on, making ripples here and there on the smooth surface of orthodox custom without alarming the politicians. Such was the situation in 1881 when President James A. Garfield was done to death by a disappointed and demented office-seeker. The shot then fired rang throughout the land, echoes of the cruel deed driving into the dim and addled brain of the most hardened henchman the notion that there was something disgraceful in reducing the Chief Executive of the United States to the level of a petty job broker. Even men who had laughed with Flanagan of Texas when, with reference to dividing the spoils, he cried out at a Republican convention, "What are we here for?" could not smile at that.

Overnight what had been "snivel" service reform became popular. Within a year a committee of the United States Senate brought in a report condemning the spoils system in stinging terms. It pictured the President giving audiences to beggars and flinging offices to "a hungry, clamorous, crowding, and jostling multitude." It por-

trayed the poor congressman confronted by the spoils system at his door in the morning and haunted by it in his chamber at night; the specter "goes before him, it follows after him, and it meets him on the way."

Driven by public opinion and the necessity for self-defense, Congress enacted in 1883 a civil service law that promised a large measure of reform. In express terms the act authorized the President to appoint a supervising commission of three, not more than two from the same political party, and empowered him to extend the merit system to specified classes of federal offices. It also stipulated that admission to those branches of the public service was to be granted only to persons who passed appropriate examinations and that their tenure was to last during good behavior. Although at first only a few thousand offices were brought within the scope of the law, the number was afterward gradually increased—sometimes in the interest of efficient government and occasionally in the interest of partisans bent on making secure jobs already obtained by political influence. Within forty years the proportion of federal employees under the merit system had risen to three-fifths of the total, namely, about three hundred thousand out of approximately half a million.

The example set by the federal government was slowly followed by the states; at the opening of the new century ten commonwealths had civil service commissions. In the municipal sphere, where administration had a peculiarly vital relation to public welfare, the advance on the spoilsmen was swifter and wider in its reach; in more than three hundred cities, with varying results, the merit system of recruiting public service had been adopted by 1927.

Thus by legislation and the growth of public functions a kind of independent *imperium in imperio* was set up, composed of permanent civil servants primarily engaged in technical work. Inspired by common purposes, they began to draw together in organizations and in trade unions; to develop professional standards and take a hand in politics

themselves, introducing a new factor into the political system—a large bureaucracy offering advantages in expert service on the one side and perils to personal liberty and free experimentation on the other. As a collateral incident, party managers, now finding their supplies in the form of levies on office-holders reduced, were compelled to rely more and more on the long purses of rich men and business corporations.

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Having made this successful raid on the commissariat of the partisan armies, the "men-milliners and carpet knights of reform" demanded a change in some of the most authentic and approved campaign methods. According to election customs handed down from the early days of the republic, every voter came under the scrutiny of party captains at the polling place. Even after the use of printed lists superseded open or viva voce voting everywhere, it was a common practice for political organizations and candidates to furnish their own ballots, each machine or group choosing a distinctive color for its papers—a system from which two major evils flowed. The cost of the necessary printing was so high that, as a general thing, only party treasuries could bear the burden; hence independent candidates and factions incurred financial handicaps at the start. The custom also made it possible for party captains who distributed election papers to watch the voter from the moment he received his ballot outside the polling place until he deposited it in the box, enabling the directors of each fray to make sure that "the goods had been delivered."

In this fashion bribery was encouraged because the briber could not lose in the transaction; intimidation was fostered because secrecy was impossible. To make doubly sure, a practice known as "straight arm voting" was invented and applied: venal voters were lined up near the election room, into their extended hands brightly colored ballots were

placed, and then they were marched to the polls with their arms raised like semaphores.

Such, broadly speaking, was the second cherished institution of the inheritance attacked by the "little contemptibles" who proposed as a substitute that all ballots be furnished by public authorities at public expense and that arrangements be made for secret voting—a reform drawn from Australia. Though immediately branded by the custodians of tradition as a foreign contraption, un-American in principle, the Australian ballot was adopted with impunity by Massachusetts in 1888 and by every state in the Union except two, within twenty years. If, contrary to fond hopes, it wrought no sudden miracle in elections, it did wrest a great weapon of coercion from the hands of a hundred thousand petty captains who helped to form the nation's "will"at the ballot box.

Shifting its emphasis, discontent with the management of elections now ran deeper until it touched the very engines of party organization. According to long custom, the chief agency used by political leaders in selecting candidates and training their hosts for the capture of the government was the convention, local, state, and national, "fresh from the people," as Jackson was wont to say. Delegates to such conferences were chosen by party members at elections known as "primaries" or by subordinate assemblies made up of representatives so chosen in smaller units. In general not more than ten or fifteen per cent of the party voters attended the primaries or paid any attention to the selection of delegates; when therefore the army of party captains, office-holders, and office-seekers was counted out, the number of disinterested citizens active in political affairs was manifestly small. What was the use for untrained and unorganized individuals to oppose the swarm of professional manipulators and their friends?

So the convention, even when ornamented by dignitaries, was usually swayed by spoilsmen who received petty offices themselves, if no payments in cash, and yielded the choicer

fruits to gentlemen of more distinction, greater wealth or larger imagination. Whenever a party congress assembled, as a rule a few old and experienced managers would meet in a little room in a local hotel, choose the candidates, and write the platform while the rank and file of party members loafed around awaiting orders. In the circumstances, the voice of delegates fresh from the people was a still small voice; for men of independent minds, known to have ideas nowhere authorized by the canons of party orthodoxy, could be quickly silenced as the captains of politics drove the "steam-roller" over them when the votes were taken.

After a while, however, a number of independents sorely bruised by this ruthless procedure began to rebel. Thereupon a demand arose for the abolition of the party convention. In its place was proposed the choice of all party candidates for public offices at formal elections within the party surrounded by legal safeguards—elections known as "direct" primaries in contradistinction to ordinary primaries at which only delegates were chosen. The idea was not an innovation in local politics for under party rules county officers, especially in the Middle West, had often been nominated by this method. But imposing leaders, whose ceremonials were now rudely invaded by reformers, made a loud outcry. With tearful eloquence, they spoke of "the great representative principle" embodied in the party assembly and of the ancient virtues given to the institution by conscript fathers, as if the nominating convention was hoary with age and respectability instead of being a contrivance hurriedly created in Jackson's time by radical Democrats for the purpose of ousting the opposition from comfortable posts in the American system. In any event, the reformers gave no heed to the lament. "Abolish the caucus and the convention; go back to the first principles of democracy; go back to the people!" exclaimed Robert M. La Follette in an address to the students of Chicago University on Washington's birthday in 1897.

Under La Follette's leadership, Wisconsin six years later

enacted the first state-wide direct primary law with provisions for searching scrutiny over the election process. From this experiment, the idea swept rapidly through the West and then gradually awakened reverberations in the staid old East. In New York Governor Hughes, thwarted in a fight with a bi-partisan combination of political leaders, sought an escape in 1907, urging the adoption of the direct primary; across the river, in New Jersey, Governor Wilson, four years afterward, pressed upon the legislature the same reform.

When the first decade of the twentieth century was safely turned, two-thirds of the states were nominating candidates for most of their offices by direct primaries; in a few more years all save a handful of recalcitrant commonwealths were operating on the new basis. It is true that in the inevitable reaction two or three states, including New York, later restored the convention as an instrument for making nominations for state offices, but the recoil was not severe; perhaps because the politicians, by taking their bearings with new instruments, found navigation under the reformers' rules not as difficult as they had anticipated. Still the highest beneficiaries in acquisition and enjoyment never ceased to condemn the direct primary, because it paved the way for more lay interference with the professional interests, bruited abroad news of subtractions and divisions once made quietly in caucus chambers, compelled their candidates to spend more money openly in campaigns, and forced into the upper works of politics some of the beliefs and passions hitherto confined largely to the lower ranges.

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Reinforcing this attack on the citadels of party manipulation, the left-wing reformers, particularly those of a farmer-labor persuasion, finally decided to strike at the very structure of the government under which the American system of acquisition and enjoyment had so long flourished. To

some extent, they were moved to take this course by authentic reports on the transaction of public business at state capitals.

For a hundred years the conduct of legislatures had been notorious; even P. T. Barnum, though long accustomed to taking money for curious services, had been shocked while a member of the Connecticut assembly at the lack of good taste shown by his colleagues in pecuniary matters. At frequent intervals investigations had revealed popular representatives selling franchises and charters to private corporations, blackmailing companies into paying "hush" money, defeating salutary measures demanded in the interest of public welfare, interfering corruptly with the affairs of cities, and squandering revenues from taxation in questionable undertakings. At each new state constitutional convention, additional limits on the powers of the legislature were devised, nearly every one indicating an increased distrust of the people's chosen agents. With distressing frequency, startling revelations of lobbies, rings, and caucuses, operating behind closed doors, and dictating laws and resolutions, broke into the columns of the newspapers; and finally in 1888, that detached English observer, James Bryce, drew a picture of the system in his American Commonwealth that even caught the eye of contented respectability.

In a short time a small band of sturdy democrats offered their remedy. They proposed to transfer the ultimate power from the state legislature to the voters, that is, to vest in the people the right to suggest laws by petition and enact them directly at the polls. As a necessary supplement, they also proposed to subdue the legislature by authorizing petitioners to lay its measures before the electorate for approval or rejection. All hail, they said, to the initiative and referendum! With great enthusiasm the Populists espoused the cause; Bryan set his seal upon it in 1896; and two years later theory bore fruit in South Dakota where a combination of labor leaders and radical farmers drove through a constitutional provision establishing the initiative

and referendum. Encouraged by this adventure, a fusion of Democrats and Populists won a similar victory in Utah, though held up temporarily by the refusal of a Republican legislature to pass an enabling act putting their amendment into effect. In 1902 Oregon adopted the device; before the first decade of the new century closed, Oklahoma, Missouri, Maine, Arkansas, and Colorado had also turned to direct government for relief from legislative ills.

The progressive wave was now rolling in and larger figures, such as Roosevelt and Wilson, who had once opposed or ignored the initiative and referendum, gave their high approval to the innovation. On the other side, equally significant figures, long accustomed to defend with bold and trenchant rhetoric our immutable inheritance, saw Catiline lurking in the shadows of the polling place and caught visions of agrarians and proletarians dividing property, menacing liberty, and destroying the rights of those who had achieved success in the aleatory enterprise of acquisition and enjoyment. "It is radicalism run rampant!" cried a congressman from South Carolina. "The ultimate issue is socialism!" exclaimed President Taft.

But before the eventful year of 1912 had passed, sixteen states, principally in the West, laughing at the advice of the doubters, had assumed the risks of direct government. Then the radical current was checked; within the next decade only four more states joined the forerunners "in undermining the great and cherished principle of representative government"—Michigan, North Dakota, Mississippi, and Massachusetts. On the final reckoning, twenty states were committed to what Taft called "dangerous changes in our present constitutional form of representative government." A smaller number, eleven in all, had added to their armory of democracy yet another institution, known as the recall—a scheme which enabled the voters, by the use of the petition and special election, to oust public officers at any time during their term. Seven of these states even applied the system to judges; to employ the language of an

agonized opponent, "they proposed to submit the solemn decrees of justice to the whim of demagogues." But the great fear was hardly justified by practice, for a decade of usage failed to produce either the grave evils that had been foretold by the prophets of calamity or the drastic changes dreamed of by the apostolic Populists who brought the new engines of democracy upon the American political scene.

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In this general movement upon local institutions, the national form of government—particularly the upper works—was also assaulted. Since the state legislature was under suspicion as a law-making authority, why should it be entrusted with the privilege of choosing United States Senators to serve at Washington? Such was the pertinent inquiry made by those sponsors of direct government who now favored the election of Senators by popular vote. Indeed, a long time before South Dakota adopted the initiative and referendum, the senatorial issue had been raised, a natural outcome of the consideration given to the rôle of government in the process of acquiring and holding property.

In providing that Senators should be chosen by the state legislators, the framers of the federal Constitution had intended to establish a conservative body to represent the substantial economic interests of the country and to act as a check on "popular distempers" made manifest by the lower house. As things turned out, their plans succeeded beyond all expectations; certainly during the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the Senate was crowded with rich men, occasionally by railway and industrial barons but more frequently by their able advocates in matters of law. Some of them were political leaders of genuine talent but a majority possessed no conspicuous merits except the ownership of strong boxes well filled with securities. "I sometimes think," said Senator Lodge in 1902, "that the business man in politics is too often one who has no business there."

For the unruly sections of the populace, the reputation of the Senators was lowered by the methods through which they sometimes won their seats. Though the state legislatures nominally chose in solemn assembly, in reality the assignment was made at a party caucus held behind closed doors where pecuniary bargains were frequently consummated. Every now and then a magnate, accustomed to buying engineers, lawyers, managers, palaces, and works of art, brushed aside the decorum of constitutional propriety and bought a seat in the Senate with such disregard for the refinements of easy ethics that investigations, revelations, and alarms inevitably pursued him. Indeed from year to year the country was shocked by noisy scandals connected with the elevation of plutocrats to the august body once ornamented by Calhoun, Webster, and Clay, until eventually the weary public was led to suspect that even in unknown cases the senatorial toga had been secured by something other than high and meritorious statesmanship based on patriotic principles.

Among the Populists at least every scandal was greeted as another proof that the malady was universal, an argument in favor of requiring the election of Senators by popular vote. As a matter of fact that primitive agrarian, Andrew Johnson, foe of capitalism and slavocracy alike, nominated with Lincoln to catch votes in the South and West, had early emblazoned on his banner a demand for this reform, and, as President of the United States, had suggested to Congress, in 1868, a constitutional amendment to give effect to the idea. From time to time thereafter the subject was broached in the lower chamber and at last, in 1893, after a great influx of Populists, the House of Representatives actually passed the amendment, only to find the Senate unconvinced by the reasoning advanced in support of the scheme.

Again and again the House insisted, always to be blocked by the Senate under the influence of mighty orators, such as Senator Foraker of Ohio, later revealed as a stipendiary

of the Standard Oil Company, and Senator Hoar of Massachusetts, a man after Cato's own heart, who leveled the heavy batteries of their eloquence against the proposal "to undermine the foundations" of the most excellent existing order. Lesser lights sparkled and twinkled but the sappers and miners continued unabated their agitation for the amendment, gaining steadily in state after state as the direct primary was rapidly applied to the nomination of candidates for the Senate. Indeed they made headway so fast that by 1912 three-fourths of the Senators had to run the gauntlet of that popular fire even though, under the federal Constitution, the state legislatures nominally retained the right to elect.

From a contemptible populist storm in a teapot, the agitation had now grown to such proportions that there were signs of unwonted stirring in the Republican camp and nearly all the distinguished Democrats, following in Bryan's lone trail, were exclaiming in speeches and interviews: "Let the people rule!" By 1908, the upward thrust had become so strong that Taft, bidding for votes as the Republican candidate for President, decided to endorse the popular election of Senators in spite of the ominous silence of his party platform on the subject. Two years later Woodrow Wilson, long opposed to that radical scheme, saw the light on his path to the White House. To employ political language, the bandwagon was rolling swiftly along in a great cloud of dust with statesmen of the most cautious temper scrambling for seats beside the veteran Populists who rode on the box.

In 1912, the necessary two-thirds vote in favor of the resolution was mustered in both houses of Congress and the next year the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution, establishing the popular election of Senators, was ratified by the requisite number of states. Slowly, for better or for worse, the composition of the Senate changed, as shouting from the housetops in senatorial elections was substituted for the negotiation of the caucus. One by one

those who had wrung their hands from fear of change passed away and a new generation was taught in its books to revere as part of the sacred letter a provision which good and wise men a short time before had abhorred as treason to the principles transmitted by the Fathers. Such is the burden carried by that weary Titan, Time.

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Amid the turbulence connected with this reconstruction in political machinery, woman suffrage was once more brought out of the parlor and the academy, reviving an agitation which, after giving great umbrage to the males of the fuming forties, had died down during the Civil War. For this renewal of an old campaign a rallying command was given in the late sixties when Congress was attempting to nationalize suffrage by enfranchising the freedmen of the South and champions of the colored man were declaring that no person's civil liberties were safe without the ballot. With a relevancy that could hardly be denied the feminists now asked why the doctrine did not apply to women, only to receive a curt answer from the politicians that sent them flying to the platform to make an appeal to the reasoning of the public at large.

For the purpose of giving a concrete point to their agitation they drafted a brief amendment to the federal Constitution, in express terms conferring the suffrage on women, and they secured its introduction in the House of Representatives in 1869. With that as the symbol of their high resolve, under the leadership of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, later supported by Anna Howard Shaw and Carrie Chapman Catt, they launched a campaign destined to last for half a century before attaining its goal.

The invincible minority of women who engineered this movement concentrated their forces on two redoubts of political power with varying emphasis. From time to time they were able to raise a debate on their federal amendment

in Congress and occasionally they commanded for it a "respectful consideration," though seldom even that much honor. Discovering however that the drive on Washington brought scant results the suffragists devoted more labor to winning the ballot in individual states, each of which under the federal Constitution had the right to decide who should vote within its borders. Thus they hoped through state enfranchisement to get a leverage strong enough to move things at the national capital.

In that sphere also gains were exceedingly slow for the traditions of all the ages were against the measure. It is true Wyoming, while yet a territory, granted the suffrage to women in 1868 and as a state reapproved the innovation twenty years later but that single exception only seemed to prove the rule that politics was a man's world. For three decades the feminists beat their bare fists against granite, winning here and there the right to vote in some local elections, but awakening little more than amusement among those who sat on high political thrones.

Then the unexpected happened. Engulfed in the rising tide of populism which swept through the West in the early nineties, Colorado, Utah, and Idaho gave the ballot to women, leading the dauntless minority to announce the beginning of an immediate landslide. While their prophecy was somewhat premature, within but a few years their cause was lifted to the headlines by the militant suffragists of England striking hard blows, if not firing the customary shots heard round the world.

At last the avalanche really began to move. The progressive surge added Washington to the suffrage states in 1910 and before five years had gone, California, Oregon, Kansas, Arizona, Nevada, and Montana had completely enfranchised their women; while Illinois had given them a right to vote for President of the United States. Having now in their hands the fate of many presidential electors, Senators, and Representatives, the petitioners could no longer be scorned by the gentlemen who managed national

affairs, for a minority of feminine votes, shifted from one side to the other, might elect or defeat a candidate.

Grasping that fact with clear understanding, a group of rebellious young advocates, who had not grown up in the state campaign atmosphere, led by Alice Paul and Lucy Burns, began to organize women voters in an effort to wring an endorsement of equal suffrage from the major political parties and carry the national amendment through Congress without further delay. Henceforward no politician with his ear to the ground in Washington or his eye on federal patronage for his home town could be unmindful of women already enfranchised, however indifferent he had been in the past.

So there was an unwonted bustle even among the seared and hardened painters of political scenery. In 1916 the Republican nominee for the presidency, Charles Evans Hughes, endorsed the federal suffrage amendment in spite of the fact that his party platform gave him no authority for that action. In a similar spirit ex-President Roosevelt, who a few years previously thought the matter too trivial for mention in one of his voluminous messages on things in general, now declared it a significant issue in the campaign. Not oblivious to practical considerations, President Wilson, while he had always entertained a deep-seated feeling against every form of feminism, on chivalric grounds, as a candidate to succeed himself conquered his instinctive repugnance and praised woman suffrage in principle. But he approved it in the form of state action over which he had no direct control, not the federal amendment laid at his door.

The victory of Wilson in the ensuing election seemed to mark a set-back for the national enfranchisement of women but appearances were illusory. Other states, including the great commonwealth of New York, were soon swung into line by popular vote in the peculiar confluence of political strategy induced by the World War. This gave greater encouragement to all the suffrage associations; more power

to the conservative groups and more audacity to the militants campaigning in Washington. By picketing at the White House and by hunger strikes in jails, the latter dramatized the struggle for a nation devoted to sensations.

Words which formerly only amused the commonalty now became living facts—of which President Wilson himself took cognizance. In September, 1918, with a congressional election at hand, he went before a joint session of the Senate and the House in person to urge the passage of the national suffrage amendment, yellow with age, as a measure "vital to the winning of the war." By June of the following year, the requisite two-thirds vote was assembled and the resolution was sent to the states for ratification. After three-fourths of the commonwealths had approved it, the Nineteenth Amendment was proclaimed in the summer of 1920 a part of the law of the land. The fruit of a hundred years of agitation and social development had finally been garnered.

§

While they flowed from complex causes, the readjustments in the political machinery just described, particularly direct elections, were to some extent intended to forward the plans of agrarians and organized labor for diverting from the treasure chests of the fortunate a portion of the golden stream that poured there under the beneficence of a government which granted privileges and abstained from obstruction. It is true that, except in obscure and esoteric circles, there was little precise agreement as to the intimate essence of the political drama, if in fact it had any such metaphysical substratum. On the whole the reformers of the gilded age were eclectic in philosophy.

Perhaps a majority of the orators who inveighed against bribery in elections and sought to wrest from political managers the tools of their trade saw nothing in the struggle beyond civic purity or democratic and sex equality; observed no relation between the election of United States

Senators by state legislatures, with or without venality, and the safety of property or income. E. L. Godkin, for example, while condemning the spoils basis of conservative politics—for spoilsmen never entertained any invidious designs on settled economic institutions—was utterly amazed to learn that the western agrarians, who agreed with him when he lashed corruptors and corruption, were in fact primarily interested in cutting down railway rates by legislation, on principles which seemed to the sapient editor to involve sheer confiscation.

If, however, Roscoe Conkling's "carpet knights" and the feminists shrank from attacks on fundamental pecuniary practices, there was no doubt about the purposes of the Grangers and the Populists: the latter intended to dip their broad hands into the golden treasury of the railway kings or, to speak with due deference to constitutional forms, they planned to diminish the revenues of security holders by reducing rates through appropriate legislative action. During the tempestuous seventies they had managed to cut local railway charges in the Middle West; and, foiled by a decision of the Supreme Court in their attempts to lower rates on interstate consignments, they carried their agitation to Washington where, with the aid of other shippers, they secured the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.

Instead of taking a stronghold, as they thought, they had really deluded themselves. Within a few months the federal courts began to pare down their great statute by adverse rulings and finally the whole structure was shattered by a judicial decree declaring that the federal interstate commerce commission, instituted by the Act, had no authority to fix rates for carrying passengers and freight. That was a clean victory for the holders of railway securities, a victory that moved the commission itself, with the insistent support of shippers, to take up the gage of battle.

Year after year the commission asked Congress for power to determine reasonable rates for common carriers engaged

in interstate commerce. With evident concern it pointed out the steady increase in the economic strength of the railways through mergers and deplored their tendency to charge their customers all the traffic would bear, going so far as to assert in its 1905 report that over $100,000,000 a year was being collected from the people through increased tariffs that had no fair basis. But occupied with other matters and loath to disturb settled institutions, Senators and Representatives declined to act on the recommendations of the commission or the promptings of the shippers.

Observing their negligence in the matter, President Roosevelt finally intervened stating, in a message to Congress in 1904, that "the commission should be vested with the power, where a given rate has been challenged and after full hearing found to be unreasonable, to decide, subject to judicial review, what shall be a reasonable rate to take its place." Two years later, the House of Representatives, sensing indications of an agrarian upheaval, showed a willingness to accept the advice and the Senate, now aroused by potent forces pressing hard upon the gates, was compelled to heed the agitation.

At this very juncture, Robert M. La Follette, straight from victories over railways in Wisconsin, arrived upon the floor of the upper chamber to open his terrific barrage on the plutocracy before an audience of once languid Senators representing the old régime, thereby transforming their calm indifference into purple wrath. On one occasion the leaders of the right wing walked out just to show their contempt for his discourse, stinging La Follette to remark with prophetic gift that the seats of some members temporarily empty, would soon become permanently vacant. When the Wisconsin Senator proposed an amendment to a bill, forbidding a judge to hear and decide a case affecting a railway company in which he was personally interested as a security-holder, only three Republican Senators favored the proposal. Nevertheless, after much haggling over terms, Congress passed, in 1906, a railway bill known as the

Hepburn Act which extended the authority of the interstate commerce commission over pipe lines, express companies, sleeping car companies, and railway terminals and gave it the power, not to fix rates, but to nullify rates found to be discriminatory or unreasonable on complaints of shippers adversely affected.

Far from satisfying agrarian demands, the Hepburn Act only stimulated the progressive surge which was soon to induce a political earthquake, causing tremors that registered even on the crudest instruments for recording seismographic phenomena. When the great railways announced a general increase in rates in 1910, Congress countered by passing the Mann-Elkins Act—a measure which empowered the interstate commerce commission to investigate proposed charges before permitting them to go into effect and authorizing it to determine maximum rates on its own initiative. In 1913, the commission was instructed to establish, once for all, the "physical valuation" of the railways, as a basis for rate control. Without going into greater illustrative details, it may be sufficient to say that by these and other laws the right of railway owners to manage their property fundamentally in their own interest was seriously limited.

With their rates fixed by state and federal commissions, acting always under the eagle eyes of shippers, and with their wage schedules prescribed by trade unions, railroad companies found it impossible to increase freight and passenger charges at will to meet the rising costs of operation or to cut wages at their pleasure for the purpose of enhancing profits by reducing expenses. So, through political action in one sphere and direct labor action in another, a large and important class of American property owners suffered a substantial diminution in their incomes for the benefit of wage-earners, travelers, and shippers. In other words, by a gradual and peaceful operation was effected a transfer of economic goods greater in value than the rights shifted from the French nobility to the peasantry by the national assembly on the night of the famous fourth of

August, 1789. Reputable American historians now recorded in their books that the theory of the public interest was being substituted for the older doctrine of *laissez faire*. Apparently it pleased everybody except holders of railway securities.

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This abridgment of the incomes enjoyed by common carriers was only one phase of the general assault upon the chief beneficiaries of the prevailing system of acquisition and enjoyment. Vast as it was, the capital invested in the railroads, real and fictitious, represented the finances of only a minor portion of the complex mechanism employed in producing and distributing wealth in the United States. Indeed, the railways were simply strands of a larger network of corporate business enterprise—an enterprise impersonal in form and centralizing in tendency, that continued to occupy, with the passing years, an ever larger area of the economic field.

In the path of the rolling ball of accumulation, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, penalizing combinations which restrained trade in the sphere of interstate and foreign commerce, proved no barrier at all. The Act was vague in language and not enforced in practice. During Harrison's administration there were three indictments under the law; during Cleveland's second term two indictments; under McKinley not one. Roosevelt, although he believed and said publicly that anti-trust legislation was about as effective as a papal bull against a comet, instituted twenty-five indictments; and Taft, his successor, placed forty-five to his credit. Considering the multitude of combinations and the fact that each act in restraint of trade was an indictable offense, the prosecutions in the days of highest tension were few in number.

What is more to the point the most severe judicial decisions, if they caused a furor in the news, made small impression on the captains of industry. The latter paused

now and then to cry out against "Theodore the meddler" or to direct an editor to write a double-shotted leader on the inspiring topic of "Let us alone"; but ordinarily they had their minds fixed on things more substantial than the verbiage of the conflict.

As a matter of fact the years that followed the enactment of the Sherman law witnessed the formation of combinations on a daring scale that would have amazed the promoters of the seventies and eighties. In 1899, the Standard Oil Company took the place of the old trust; about the same time the Copper Trust and the Smelters' Trust were formed under the beneficent laws of New Jersey. The next year the National Sugar Refining Company came into existence with a capital greater than the total national debt in Washington's day; and at the opening of the new century that towering genius of finance, J. P. Morgan, completed the edifice of the United States Steel Corporation with more than a billion dollars in outstanding paper. As the chief element in these operations was the ability to float huge issues of stocks and bonds, primacy in such matters passed to large banking houses and heavy investors. So an immense collection of great and small interests was knit into a compact fabric under the management of two or three potent financial groups in New York.

This course in human events was naturally alarming to the middle classes, to philosophers of the cross-roads store and isolated factory, and to all the armchair speculators who saw a certain incongruity between political democracy and financial concentration. Inevitably also a mass of discontent accumulated among the people at large. Normal grievances were aggravated by untoward incidents which seemed to indicate a want of foresight and consideration on the part of the masters of the capitalist ceremony. For example, hundreds of petty manufacturers were frozen out by high-handed competitive methods and driven to raise plaintive voices about their vanished rights. Useless plants, offices, and mills were closed in many communities, causing

resentment among local merchants. For one reason or another the general level of prices seemed to be rising and this produced anxiety among consumers. To make matters worse, leaders in the formation of great combinations often showed an arrogant severity in dealing with those who came across their path, a quarterdeck bluntness that savored of the methods applied by stalwart characters, like Drake and Hawkins, to Spanish sea-captains who objected to being robbed in the days of the Virgin Queen.

Even the investors who relied with child-like faith on the legerdemain of financial wizards had grounds for complaints. Either through inadvertence or calculation, some of the gigantic corporate structures revealed distressing flaws in their masonry. For instance, the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railway combination, effected under Morgan's tutelage, was so loaded with stocks and bonds that it collapsed with an awful crash, spreading ruin far and wide among widows, orphans, and other security holders in New England and giving an awful shock to those who had bought common shares at a high figure in the old days of prudence. In other cases thousands of small investors who tried to partake of the feast likewise found themselves reduced to scanty fare; those enthusiasts who bought common stock at the inception of the United States Steel Corporation were fated to see their paper fall to eight and not a few perished in the hour of disenchantment. In fact when everything seemed possible to the titans, huge quantities of water had been injected into the system of corporate finance, and, except where monopoly or good fortune attended the operation, the commonalty was called upon to pay the bill. All such things awakened emotions of hurt surprise among four influential classes of American citizens: petty investors who had tried without avail to turn an honest penny; bystanders who had merely been permitted to view the lucrous combat from afar; consumers, particularly farmers and planters, who could not raise their incomes by organization and suspected that they bore some share of the expense;

and philosophic politicians who entertained misgivings about the safety of the republic.

So, as the new century dawned, a demand for more legislation against the trusts arose on all sides. Having in mind western farmers, southern planters, people of the smaller towns, and workingmen of the cities, Democratic chieftains with a radical cast of thought inveighed against the trusts as a matter of course and conviction. Socialists hailed the new giants as proof that competition destroyed itself and prepared the economic structure for the inevitable Marxian transition. Feeling the solid earth tremble under their feet, Republican leaders spoke in favor of cutting away the "evils" of the trusts by regulation. Even the astute Hanna, on whom fell the burden of collecting campaign funds in "the high places of Wall Street," thinking that the Republicans should break their reticence in 1900, approved a cautious anti-trust plank drafted by Senator Foraker for the party platform of that year. Unwittingly, therefore, Theodore Roosevelt, raised to the presidency by a stroke of Atropos, was furnished a canonical text for many prolix messages and impetuous speeches on the trust question and given the color of justification for instituting several prosecutions against corporations accused of restraining trade. His successor, Taft, pressed forward along similar lines and in 1911 actually secured at the hands of the Supreme Court a dissolution of the Standard Oil and the American Tobacco companies into several individual but friendly concerns.

Still the Democrats were not appeased. Their spokesman, Woodrow Wilson, in proclaiming the New Freedom, promised to restore the old and happy days of competition when every person with a little capital could go into business and taste the wine of liberty—and profits—for himself. So on coming to power, the Democrats proceeded to enact the Clayton anti-trust law of 1914, an elaborate measure which in letter at least threatened to tear apart all combinations large enough to control prices in their respective areas. But the mild fright that it immediately caused in

business circles was allayed in time by a decision of the Supreme Court, to the effect that so great a giant as the United States Steel Company was not proscribed by the terms of the law.

In truth, grave doubts existed in many places as to whether pains and penalties of any kind could restore the era of petty industry and unrestrained competition. Though appealing to the masses, the Democrats came to think more kindly of federal regulation; for they supplemented the Clayton Act by a bill which contemplated the control rather than the destruction of huge industrial combinations. Besides declaring unfair methods of competition illegal, the law in question created a federal trade commission and authorized it to coöperate with business men in establishing equitable practices.

As the new century advanced, intransigent hostility to great organizations of capital seemed to be on the wane. At any rate, the threat of horrible dissolution almost vanished as their securities flowed out into the hands of small investors, profit-sharing employees, savings banks, and endowed institutions. Socialistic proposals to transform the new leviathans into national property produced practically no response. Price-fixing devices, similar to those used with such effect against railways, apparently could not be brought into play against the trusts, perhaps partly for the reason that attempts of farmers to apply regulation to corporations or to break them asunder received no material support from industrial shippers as in the case of the joint war on common carriers. Neither could the trade unions get a grip on the basic industries comparable to their hold on systems of transportation, for the want, they alleged, of effective barriers against the flood of European immigrants ready to work at any price on any terms. After forty years of political campaigning therefore, the solid structure of manufacturing enterprise remained intact throughout the land.

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Far more effective than the efforts of reformers to reduce the absorbent propensities of the great industrial combinations was their attempt to check the free and easy use of the national domain which, through custom, had come to be regarded among leaders in acquisition and enjoyment as a normal part of their property. From the foundation of the republic the vast empire of land held by the government of the United States—amounting in all from first to last to more than twenty times the area of Great Britain and Ireland—had been managed on the assumption that it must ultimately find its way into private hands.

For a time, as we have noted, Congress sold arable lands at a low figure for the purpose of raising revenue, with particular reference to extinguishing the public debt, and made experiments in leasing its mineral holdings on a rental basis; but under the pressure of the agrarian democracy and business enterprise, Congress adopted more facile methods for disposing of its estate. By granting free homesteads to farmers, huge areas to the states in aid of education and public improvements, and princely domains to railway companies, it quickly stripped the government of its agricultural property. Abandoning the policy of leasing in favor of sale at nominal prices, it transferred to private parties most of its timber, mineral, stone, and waste lands. Besides alienations made in the regular course with due respect for the proprieties of the law, others were effected by fraud and chicane so daring and so colossal as to exceed the imagination of the innocent and make the brazen looting of the Tweeds and Crokers sink to the level of petty frivolity.

While the democracy of the East was attending Barnum's circuses and museums and intellectuals were discussing strictures on American culture by foreign travelers, alert pioneers and the agents of far-sighted capitalists on the distant frontier were enclosing, slashing, burning, and despoiling, without let or hindrance, national property that had been bought with the blood or the money of the whole

country. While orators were loudly praising American institutions, members of Congress and high administrative officials were continuously engaged in land speculation and it was a rare estate of generous proportions that was not tainted with irregularity in its acquisition. With feverish haste, this sequestration of the public domains went on unabated until, at the close of the nineteenth century, all the arable land had been given away and most of the timber and waste land had been transformed into private property. In such an urgency, the few scientists, who pointed out the perils bound to flow from a devastation of natural resources, could make little impression on hard-headed men of affairs acquiring and enjoying or on the vast mass of voters absorbed as ever in their fated routine.

Near the end of the saturnalia, however, Congress, almost by inadvertence, acting on the initiative of a small group of enlightened citizens, inserted in the General Revision Act of 1891 one of the most noteworthy measures of law ever passed in the history of the nation, a clause authorizing the President to set aside and withhold from sale public lands covered wholly or in part with timber and undergrowth. Thus the far-reaching principle of national ownership of forests was established by a few lines written into a general statute and pushed through Congress toward the close of a session when the faithful champions of fixed custom seem to have been asleep.

Perhaps the bill was deemed harmless as long as vast areas were still open to occupation or the matter was left to presidential discretion. In fact the law produced no radical change immediately for Harrison and McKinley were cautious in the exercise of the authority so conferred upon them and Cleveland instituted no revolution under the act. Not until President Roosevelt explored its terms were its latent powers fully realized, in sweeping decrees enlarging the forest reserves to the point where the national area withheld from sale embraced a hundred and fifty million acres, thus making conservation a national issue.

Then came of course the inevitable recoil. Individuals and companies that felt the pinch made vehement objections to the interruption of their progress. Western states, or at least the vocal and interested elements in them, declared their property and welfare in jeopardy. For good and sufficient reasons therefore Congress reversed the order of events in 1907 by declaring that no new reserves should be created without its express consent; and had it not been for Roosevelt's spirited fight, the remnants of the public domain already reserved by executive action might have been thrown to the hungry accumulators at the portals. As affairs worked out, the national forests were saved but, in the heat of the fray, it became impossible to agree upon consistent policies for the economical management of the common estate. If the doctrine of conservation had found lodgment in the American mind, the philosophy and practice of efficient use were still to be established.

After a brief revulsion against the Roosevelt policies, forward steps were taken with respect to the development of the minerals found on public lands. In the good old days, a farmer entering a homestead, a lumber company purchasing a principality, or a railway granted an empire secured title to everything below as well as above the ground. So national gifts intended to make homeowners or promote some public enterprise often made coal or oil barons instead. In such transactions there seemed to be at first nothing contrary to the public interest; such at any rate was the opinion of the beneficiaries while others for a long time gave little heed to the matter.

But in the contest over the distribution of national goods which grew sharper near the turn of the century, new views, favoring a return to the former practice of leasing, forged to the front. In response to a popular demand Congress, while legislating on the sale of public lands during Taft's administration, provided for the separation of the surface from the subsoil and reserved to the government the ownership of minerals. Expanding this idea, Congress in 1920

applied to millions of acres of coal, oil, and phosphate lands the principle of public ownership, leasing such holdings to private parties for development on a rental basis. In the same year a similar rule was adopted for the use of water power on national property, saving to cities and states the free utilization of sites devoted to public purposes.

By this halting procedure the remaining fragments of a domain once imperial in its area, fragments of no small magnitude however, were in theory at least brought under permanent social ownership. Time-honored practices approved by "the very best people" now stood condemned in the light of new policies while the federal government was called upon to devise a technique for controlling the exploitation of public property by private parties accustomed to operate under other disciplines according to individualistic dogmas. No doubt a people that elected to Congress an adventurer dismissed from a federal office for complicity in fraudulent transactions, that regarded the conviction of a United States Senator for the common crime of land-stealing as "the most brutal outrage ever perpetrated on mortal man," found it hard to summon the sacrificial courage required to administer an immense heritage for the common good; but perhaps, in reality, the task was not insuperable. In any case it was argued that, with the passing years, the scientific understanding and moral fiber necessary for the work would spring from the bosom of a democracy gradually rising to meet the need of all things. Otherwise those would administer who could.

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The idea that the power of the state belonged to the majority of the people and that it could be avowedly employed to control, within uncertain limits, the distribution of wealth among the masses was inherent in all the projects for direct government and in the legislation pertaining to railways,

trusts, and the national domain, which occupied the attention of statesmen in the new century. A similar doctrine was implicit in many proposals relative to currency, banking, and taxation advanced during the same period and, whenever carried into the sphere of practical policies, it found opposition or support according to social form. Certainly, those whose purses were well lined with the fruits of American economy saw in the exercise of power over the monetary system a utility of the highest order. To this party, the affair seemed simple enough: it was the duty of the government to maintain all its currency on a gold basis, entrust to private banks the mission of issuing paper money for discount at their own profit under certain safeguards, and then keep its hands off the running machine. Only one major problem perplexed those who sat safely within the scope of this simple thesis, namely, how to make the currency elastic, how to inflate it to meet the needs of business or contract it as the demand for money slackened.

Those without the gate at the dawn of the twentieth century had other views on the subject. To them the prevailing system, based on the national banking law of 1863 and the gold standard act of 1900, formed a part of the grand mechanism for augmenting the possessions of those to whom much had already been given. According to this hypothesis, the law authorizing private associations to buy federal bonds and issue paper currency on that security merely permitted them to subtract from the annual income of the country the interest collected on the notes placed in circulation; while the gold standard act, restraining the volume of money and holding down the prices of farm commodities, simply compelled debtors to pay their obligations in dollars of rising value. That was only a part of the indictment. The system, it was said, also permitted a concentration of financial power in New York, enabled the large banks to dictate to the small, and encouraged them all to restrict the credit of the petty merchant and manufacturer in the interest of the great corporations that were

drawing the resources of the country within an ever-narrowing circle.

During the controversial years that succeeded 1896, Republicans in the main saw no reason for serious alterations in the currency system. They did enact in 1908 the Vreeland-Aldrich bill which sought to offset in a limited way some of the stringency induced by the gold standard and they appointed a congressional committee which made a monumental report on all aspects of money and banking. On the whole however the Republicans were satisfied. It was the Democrats who kept hammering at the money portals and presenting novel expedients for easing the strain in the interest of planters, farmers, and the people of the middling order in general.

Returning to power on an insurgent wave in 1913, the Democrats took advantage of the opportunity to try their theories by enacting, though not without concessions to redoubtable opponents, a new banking and currency law, establishing what is known as the federal reserve system. Combining Jacksonian hopes with more financial propriety, they put the emission of notes under the supervision of a federal board, divided the country into twelve banking districts, placed a federal reserve bank in each, and authorized the issue of currency on the basis of bonds and commercial paper representing credit and wealth in various forms while retaining the gold basis in theory. With this banking machine they made an attempt to distribute "the money power" throughout the nation, to block the centripetal energies of New York, and to make smoother the way of borrowers by weakening in fact the complete monopoly of gold. The radicals by no means got all they demanded nor even a major part of it but whereas their leader, Bryan, had once advocated what Republicans dubbed a "fifty-cent dollar," they all lived to see, at least for a period, something that approached a thirty-cent dollar, and the note-issuing banks making huge profits.

Having relaxed the currency strain, Jefferson's historic

party turned its attention to improving the lot of the rural debtor. On inquiry the Democrats found that tillers of the soil in the South and West were often paying ten or twelve per cent on borrowed money; and shocked at the discovery they sought to divert a share of the golden stream from the pockets of bondholders to the pockets of the farmers. With this end in view they drove the federal government into the money-lending business by the Farm Loan Act of 1916, placing the financial strength of the nation and the privilege of tax exemption at the service of those laborers on the land who were in need of funds; through a semi-public banking scheme the rate on loans was lowered and economic currents were shifted.

Under the new régime a farmer, who had once been paying one hundred dollars every twelve months in interest on a thousand dollar note, could borrow at six or even five per cent, thus keeping in his own coffers two-fifths or one-half the previous annual tribute to his creditor. Such items, multiplied by the thousands, ran into enormous totals. And this material result was attained by a stroke of state which philosophers of the old school regarded as an artificial interference with the wisdom of Providence made manifest in the distribution of wealth according to merit under natural law. Evidently the honored doctrine of "the less government the better" now had limitations—in the eyes of beneficiaries.

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A government that could deflect golden streams hither and yon by currency, banking, and farm-loan legislation could also bear down on the rich in other ways and ease up on the poor through the exercise of the taxing power. It was no accident therefore that in the movement toward social democracy a deliberate and overt attempt was made to shift a part of the burden of sustaining the federal government from the consuming masses to the possessors of great fortunes. It is true that the Supreme Court had de-

clared the income tax law of 1894 unconstitutional and that citizens who enjoyed large revenues from enterprises and investments imagined themselves securely wrapped in the strong mantle of protective legality. But Bryan and his legions were still active in the field, vociferously demonstrating to farmers and wage earners the justice of a levy on the incomes of the prosperous. In fact at the turn of the century discontent with established practices in taxation—that is, collecting federal revenues from the masses by indirection—was spreading like a virus through the left wings of both political parties, especially in the regions where great estates were few in number.

Already a fever was about to break out when President Roosevelt, in a message to Congress in 1907, frankly advocated taxes on incomes and inheritances with a view to leveling down some of the inequalities of fortune prevailing in the United States. Though to the occupants of high places in the lucrous game, this strange proposal from the White House seemed like a betrayal in their own establishment, it merely showed that a tide was rolling in and that Canute would have to move his chair to safer ground. Acutely sensitive to such tremors, the Democrats, in preparing for the campaign of the next year, cast off the timidity of the last election, renewed their challenge to the plutocracy by demanding an income tax amendment to the Constitution, and nominated Bryan to give point to their argument. The velocity of their propaganda was increasing when, without any warrant from his own party program, the Republican candidate, Taft, after consultation with Roosevelt, personally endorsed a levy on incomes as a fiscal device, "stealing Bryan's thunder." After the election returns were counted a decision on action had to be made.

When Congress assembled in the special session called in 1909, it was found that there were enough insurgent Democrats and fretful Republicans to force an income tax provision into the tariff act—this in spite of what seemed to be the clear mandate from the Supreme Court in 1895

declaring such a tax unconstitutional. Naturally a heated debate on the proposition followed. On their side, sponsors of the proposal were indecorous enough to point out that the decision invalidating the last income tax law had been made by a Court divided five to four, that some of the judges who made it had died, and that as the Stygian River flowed on in its course, the Constitution had really changed in spirit without being altered in letter. To this argument the friends of clean ceremonials made reply that the passage of an act in flagrant defiance of a decision by the Supreme Court would unloose the foundations of the social order. When the debate threatened a storm and the passage of an income tax measure actually became imminent, President Taft threw himself into the breach bearing a compromise, namely, that Congress should put aside the thorny bill and submit to the states an amendment to the Constitution authorizing the collection of taxes on incomes from whatever source derived. With alacrity, this proposal was accepted, since the danger of an income tax was postponed indefinitely while proper respect was paid to the prestige of the Supreme Court.

By a curious turn in political fortunes the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified by the states and became a part of the federal Constitution in 1913, just in time for the triumphant Democrats to make the beginning of a revolution in the national fiscal system by imposing a tax on incomes, with exemptions high enough to avoid offense to the major portion of the rank and file. By such means the way was now cleared for progressive levies that mounted during the war days of 1918 to two-thirds of the incomes enjoyed by the chosen few in the uppermost social ranges. So the "communist march," which Honorable Joseph H. Choate feared and denounced before the Supreme Court in 1895, had eventuated in a vivid realism. If Hanna had not died in 1904, it is hardly possible that he would have survived this shock, especially as Bryan was Secretary of State when the Amendment was put under the great seal.

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To add to the discomfiture of the new burden-bearers, a large part of the national revenue derived from taxes on incomes and excess profits was devoted by devious methods to social purposes which anxious guardians of the American heritage deemed wholly beyond both the spirit and the letter of the Constitution. During the administration of Wilson, leader of the party originally dedicated to states' rights, old appropriations in aid of state agricultural and mechanical colleges were supplemented by astounding departures made in the name of "general welfare." Large sums were voted by Congress for the promotion of forestry in the states, educational work in agriculture, trades, industrial subjects, and home economics, the construction of highways, and the advancement of public health. If there is a national wrong, said a member of Congress, let us provide a remedy for it; if the Supreme Court declares the remedy unconstitutional, then let us devise a constitutional amendment to give effect to our policies.

Accepting the new creed at face value, social reformers pointed out that the number of workers annually injured in industry exceeded the total number of American soldiers wounded during the World War, indicating a problem and the need of action. Yielding to importunities, Congress passed the Industrial Rehabilitation Act of 1920 proffering federal aid to the states in restoring to civil employment the wounded "soldiers of the ploughshare and the hammer." In the same spirit, the reformers, with women predominating, cited figures showing an appalling death rate among mothers and infants due to ignorance with respect to the hygiene of child-birth and Congress answered with gifts of money to carry the light of science to them that sit in darkness here in America now.

In vain was the thaumaturgy of the Constitution invoked by those who viewed with dismay "this awful waste of the taxpayers' hard-earned money." Despite all protests ad-

vanced in the name of precious local autonomy, Congress continued to manifest a resolve to make the existence of poverty, disease, and ignorance in any part of the Union a national question—a determination to create American standards and stimulate the states to action by offering subsidies on specific conditions. And with a swiftness that surprised even the advocates of the new course, the states accepted the federal grants, made appropriations of their own in addition and complied with the requirements imposed in the general interest.

In a thousand other ways the driving spirit of the new century was revealed in attacks upon the aleatory system of acquisition and enjoyment. Among the cardinal notions arising from historic conflicts was one which the early economists had rationalized and made sacred under the term "freedom of contract." According to this concept, practice produced perfect good when employer and employee were at liberty to make any bargain they pleased as to hours, wages, and conditions of labor. No doubt a class less avid and less serious than that which presided over the industrial enterprises of America in 1900 would have been struck by certain quixotic lines in the picture of a single workman with a two days' bread supply in his domestic larder waiting at the gates of a giant factory to negotiate with the management on a basis of equality a contract for entering the employment of the plant.

But captains of industry were resolute in the heroic age and swore gravely by those sections of political economy which seemed reasonable to them. They could not understand the reformers at state capitals and in Washington who kept sapping and mining the foundations of their most excellent order. "Very wealthy people," said President Roosevelt in the midst of this conflict, "usually entirely without meaning it, are singularly callous to the needs, sufferings, and feelings of the great mass of the people. They show this in their attitude toward such a matter as the employers' liability bill. They are simply unable to under-

stand what it means to a working man's family to have the bread winner killed or crippled. . . . Heaven knows how cordially I despise Jefferson, but he did have one virtue which his Federalist opponents lacked—he stood for the plain people whom Abraham Lincoln afterwards represented."

Going far beyond earlier laws restricting the hours of women and children in industry and prescribing certain sanitary standards in plants and shops, leaders in the swing toward social democracy now resorted to bolder projects. In the name of general welfare, they secured state legislation fixing the hours of men in employments that were especially dangerous or involved public health and safety in some peculiar fashion. When once the wedge was driven into freedom of contract, the scope of such legislation was widened until at length Oregon with utter impunity established a maximum of ten hours in all manufacturing plants.

With a similar reference to the public good, even the hallowed wage contract was touched by lawmakers: Massachusetts in 1912 adopted a measure designed to assure a minimum standard to women and children and within a few years one-fourth of the states had followed suit with still more drastic provisions. From the states, as in other cases, the movement for social legislation spread to Washington. In 1908, Congress limited the hours of railway employees engaged as trainmen and telegraph operators on interstate lines, taking away a part of the socialist taint by intimating that the main object of the act was to promote the safety of the traveling public. Eight years later, with the threat of a nation-wide strike impending, Congress, directed by the firm hand of President Wilson, proclaimed a universal eight-hour day for all trainmen on rail lines engaged in interstate commerce—the Adamson law.

In other important relations besides hours and wages, freedom of contract was materially abridged by statutes. A part of the liberty enjoyed by working people was the right to assume practically all the risks of injury and death that inhered in industry. Under the time-sanctioned common

law doctrine, as we have already seen, employers were not liable for such damages except when they were themselves personally responsible, that is, they were not held legally accountable when an accident was due to "unpreventable causes or the carelessness of the employee himself or one of his fellow employees." Moreover damages in any case usually had to be won by a lawsuit that was likely to be long, tedious, expensive, and uncertain of conclusion. If a workman was seriously injured, he and his family often dropped down into poverty, into the ranks of the poor who are always with us; if he was killed, his family frequently drifted into the wreckage at the bottom of the best of all possible civilizations—so eloquently challenged in The Pittsburgh Survey, directed by Paul U. Kellogg.

Having enjoyed this kind of liberty for a century or more industrial workers, aided by reformers, began to insist that business should automatically bear the costs of all injuries not due to willful conduct of employees—a demand which seemed to the possessors of good things just another attempt to confiscate a portion of their property in the interest of those who had nothing. After a long public argument, the trend of opinion began to run clearly in favor of the proposed shift in economic burdens. On the insistence of Roosevelt, Congress in 1906 made common carriers engaged in interstate commerce liable for injuries sustained by working people in their service and when the Supreme Court intervened on technical grounds, the law was reënacted with the unconstitutional features removed.

Subjected to the same influences, the states had by that time taken up the matter. Some of them, sweeping away the old rules of the common law, made employers responsible for injuries arising from the necessary and inherent risks of their industries; while others provided insurance schemes designed to obviate lawsuits and make compensation for accidents simple and automatic. As the result of a hard battle, employers in the leading manufacturing states

were compelled to insure their employees against dangers to life and limb as well as their buildings against fire and cyclone. On second thought, when the revolution had been accomplished, the requirement did not seem so unjust.

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Among the incidents of this long and varied campaign to force *noblesse oblige* upon the third estate, concerning which only hints can be given here, were numerous and fierce collisions with the state and federal judiciary. Relying of necessity upon precedents, the courts looked to the past for guidance; whereas the reformers appealed to the future. No doubt the future was as real as the past, but judges as a general thing did not take cognizance of that theorem in metaphysics. Moreover the ablest lawyers, whose prime function was then as always to protect and enlarge the pecuniary advantages of their clients, as a rule held with Hon. Joseph H. Choate that "the preservation of the rights of private property was the very keystone of the arch upon which all civilized government rests." To seasoned members of the judiciary, this doctrine seemed axiomatic and, in following it, courts invalidated hundreds of legislative acts—laws regulating the hours of labor in bakeshops, providing compensation for people injured in industry, and making other invasions into the ancient practices agreeable to the beneficiaries.

Of course in nullifying social laws, judges confessed to no emotional bias. Instead they usually announced with somber mien that they were merely applying the Constitution, the higher law made by the people, to the statute made by the legislature. It was with tongues of logic, not of fire, that they spoke. Only now and then did a judge let his temper get the better of his rationalizing faculties and express a personal dislike for reformers and all their works. Only occasionally did any of the judicial oracles threaten to disclose the mysteries of the craft to the vulgar; few ventured to follow the example of Mr. Justice Holmes

who, to the consternation of his colleagues no doubt, once allowed his genial wit to melt the frosty verbalism of the law by declaring in a dissenting opinion that "this case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."

But such admissions by connoisseurs in the course of time led the sophisticated to the conclusion that after all the courts were not expounding theorems in mathematics or dealing with mysteries akin to Einstein's doctrine of relativity, unintelligible to laymen possessing no technical apparatus for comprehension. So there arose among the intellectuals the belief that the judges were making the higher law out of their sentiments and intuitions; while the plainer people in the reforming army, especially labor leaders, became convinced, by less devious reasoning, that the courts were simply the bulwarks of those who had acquired and wished to live at peace.

From these and similar convictions sprang the movement to apply the recall to judges and then to judicial decisions. In fact a few western states actually raised before their tribunals the specter of the plebiscite; while others provided that their courts could nullify statutes only by extraordinary majorities—four votes to one or five to two as the case might be. Creeping upward to Congress, the same unrest appeared in the form of various proposals to restrain the power of the federal Supreme Court, such for example as measures requiring the approval of seven judges to invalidate an act or bills empowering Congress to overcome a judicial veto by a special majority in both houses. Less censorious commentators were content with the suggestion that erudite criticisms of judicial opinions would be sufficient to prevent grosser abuses of oracular authority.

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At bottom the wide agitation that ran with the conflict over economic legislation and judicial interference repre-

sented a profound movement of social forces which finally breached the philosophy of "Let us alone." Yet that movement as a whole represented no articulate social theory; the varied measures thrown up by it fitted into no political mosaic.

If a Martian visitor had examined the statutes as they flowed year after year from the legislative bodies of the country, he could not have discovered from their volume and nature that the people were divided into two major parties which were in turn possessed of the power of governing, for the oscillations in the fortunes of parties in presidential elections bore little or no relation to the course of legislative action. Democrats did not repeal Republican measures assuring compensation to workers injured on railways; Republicans did not strike from the book Democratic measures fixing the hours of trainmen.

Indeed not often did the vote at Washington or a state capital on the measures of the new social democracy fall exactly into party lines. Rather did the division of Republican and Democratic forces into right and left wings, already described, account for more law-making than the partisan oratory true to dogma. Roosevelt succeeded McKinley; Taft followed Roosevelt; Wilson enjoyed eight years of power; Harding came into a brief tenure and dying in 1923 bequeathed his honors to Coolidge. With every one of these Presidents are associated legislative acts of one kind or another; and yet it would be difficult to find a single statute which any of them originally conceived in general or in detail and made a party issue before the country. Presidents came and went, governors and legislatures came and went but the movement of social forces that produced this legislation was continuous. It was confined to no party, directed by no single organization, inspired by no overpowering leadership. Such were the processes and products of American democracy when the mind was left free to inquire, to propose, and to champion.

If the story of any particular federal statute is traced

minutely, it ordinarily reveals strange involutions. An individual, often in the beginning obscure, occasionally unknown throughout the procedure, proposes a measure to somebody; discussion follows; perhaps a society is founded to promote the cause. In due time it either commands attention in Congress or becomes entangled in the debates of partisan politics. In some cases it never reaches the political stage but is enacted into law without coming under the party whip.

Take by way of illustration the momentous measure of 1891 which prepared the ground for the permanent public ownership of an immense forest reserve. The historic roots of that provision ramify into fibers that are lost to sight. As early as 1867 an unhonored land-office commissioner suggested such a reservation; six years later a committee of the Association for the Advancement of Science inclined a friendly ear to the idea; in due time the American Forestry Association, under the direction of a handful of enthusiasts, notably Dr. B. E. Fernow and E. A. Bowers, educated the Secretary of the Interior, John W. Noble, in their creed; a few Senators were persuaded and then some members of the lower house; finally Congress, wholly unaware of the implications inherent in the bill, enacted it into law. Cleveland with some hesitation and Roosevelt with characteristic audacity struck out under the authority conferred upon them. The grand result was accomplished before any considerable part of the country was conscious of the play. In the course of time the conservation of natural resources became a fixed concept in the national mind.

In other cases where larger or at least more spectacular interests were drawn into conflict, legislation took a regular political course, originating in obscure quarters, passing through the stage of tense discussion, and finding lodgment at last among accepted things. Indeed nearly all the major propositions that have been written in the federal statute books during the last quarter of a century, such as the regulation of railway rates, employers' liability, the graduated

inheritance tax, the income tax, and popular election of Senators, were first urged upon the public by petty minorities—Greenbackers, Populists, Socialists, and other varieties of restive agitators. In each instance the leading parties at first denounced the suggested innovation, maintained a discreet silence concerning it, or recognized it with a meaningless phrase. But as the leaven of propaganda worked and the necessity for action pressed, political captains in high places espoused the once horrible reform and finally arranged to have it embodied in specific legislation.

By such routes outcast ideas were gradually gathered to the bosom of reputability. "We demand a graduated income tax," declared the Populists in 1892. "The act of Congress which we are impugning before you is communistic in its purposes and tendencies and is here defended upon principles as communistic, socialistic—what shall I call them—populistic as have ever been addressed to any political assembly in the world!" exclaimed the Hon. Joseph H. Choate, that great pillar of the Republican party, in assailing the income tax law of 1894 before the Supreme Court. "A graduated income tax of the proper type would be a desirable feature of federal taxation," suggested Roosevelt in his message of 1907. President Taft who succeeded him had no choice; in 1909, as we have seen, Congress laid before the states a constitutional amendment authorizing federal income taxes. In four short years, during the administration of Wilson, whose party had been afraid to make any avowal on the subject in 1904, Choate's "communistic" tax became a part of the federal fiscal system. Such was the strategy of the "new" democracy.

By a somewhat similar course of gradual seepage was spread abroad the opinion that the whole system of acquisition and enjoyment was really dominated by a few high beneficiaries who under varied forms and phrases ruled the country. "We have witnessed for more than a quarter of a century the struggles of the two great political parties

for power and plunder," cried the Populists in 1892. "We protest against the domination of politics by predatory corporations," wrote Bryan not long afterward. "Behind the ostensible government sits enthroned an invisible government owing no allegiance and acknowledging no responsibility to the people. To destroy this invisible government, to dissolve the unholy alliance between corrupt business and corrupt politics, is the first task of the statesmanship of the day"—so ran the Progressive platform in 1912.

"Suppose you go to Washington and try to get at your government. You will always find that while you are politely listened to, the men really consulted are the men who have the biggest stake—the big bankers, the big manufacturers, the big masters of commerce, the heads of railroad corporations and of steamship corporations. . . . The government of the United States at present is a foster-child of the special interests"—such was the gospel according to the New Freedom preached by Woodrow Wilson, Democratic candidate for President that same year.

Twelve months later, an Ex-President, Professor Taft, looking out upon the world through the academic groves of Yale, declared that he was in no mood "to minimize the critical nature of the conditions which prevailed in politics and business and society after the Spanish War, and which seemed to have crystalized into a rigid control of all by great business combinations. . . . That the occasion for the general alarm was justified, no one who has studied the situation can deny."

Not long afterward the Honorable Elihu Root, who had once been sent by President Roosevelt to inform the voters of the Empire State that "the people rule," exclaimed in the constitutional convention of New York that in point of fact they had been ruled for nearly forty years by "an invisible government" of party bosses. Speaking of modern times, he said: "Mr. Platt ruled the state; for nigh upon twenty years he ruled it. It was not the governor; it was not the legislature; it was Mr. Platt. And the capital was

not here [at Albany]; it was at 49 Broadway; Mr. Platt and his lieutenants. . . . The ruler of the state during the greater part of the forty years of my acquaintance with the state government has not been any man authorized by the constitution or by law." With such strange doctrines falling from the lips of men eminently respectable, it is not astonishing that persons of ruder culture and position began to wonder whether the theory of representative government by mathematical majorities actually functioned in the manner prescribed by the canonical works for the education of the faithful.

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Broadly speaking this was the drift of practice and opinion that produced a schism in the Republican organization in 1912 and an attempt to form a new party consciously dedicated to social politics. Evidently the event had been long in preparation. Though conservative Republicans appeared scatheless in their unchanging world with the banner of prosperity floating proudly above their heads and the symbol of the full dinner pail held firmly in their hands, the very fates were working against them. After the Spanish War, it is true, there was a revival of business enterprise which outran the predictions even of the optimists; in fact it seemed that the mouths of the "calamity howlers" were effectively closed by big loaves and that populism was as dead as Daniel Shays. But in the very hour of invulnerable security, tragedy altered the face of things—in the assassination of President McKinley—transferring the scepter to Theodore Roosevelt whom Senator Platt, "the easy boss" of New York, had intended to bury alive in the office of Vice-President. While the new chief executive tried to calm the directors of his party by announcing at once that he would hold the ship at the old moorings and retain his predecessor's Cabinet, skeptics had their worries.

In almost every respect Roosevelt was a unique figure in the Republican great headquarters. He had not risen

to high position from humble beginnings through the approved stages of party discipline. Springing from a prosperous middle-class family in New York City, Roosevelt was not a conventional self-made man; money had smoothed his path in boyhood, carried him through college, and guaranteed him a competence for life. No pleasing assurance that his success had been accomplished by his own unaided efforts toughened the fiber of his individualism. No hard battle up from the ranks through the system of use and wont, gathering in handsome retainers' fees from the possessors of great riches, gave him the psychology and mannerisms of the successful lawyer. Early discovering indeed that he had no taste for the ethics of the bar, Roosevelt spent many years of uncertainty, tossing about restlessly, dabbling in letters and politics without finding a solid footing anywhere.

In a kind of ambulatory course Roosevelt served as a member of the New York legislature, as police commissioner of the metropolis, as civil service commissioner under Harrison, as assistant secretary of the navy under McKinley, and as colonel in the Spanish War. In the intervals he studied and wrote history always with an eye to fine moral points, praising and condemning with elaborate flourishes. For recreation he rode to the hounds and played tennis. Unlike politicians of the log-cabin or clerical-manse school, he was of the great city, acquainted with its dark alleys, where misery and suffering lurked, as well as with the broad avenues where prosperity laughed and danced. In fact he was full of the insouciance and sentiment that distinguished the man of the world from the hero of Samuel Smiles who climbed the ladder from honest poverty by sheer tenacity. Born and reared in the comfortable middle class, his mind fitted into the philosophy of that order as the hand fits into the glove.

Thus endowed by nature and nurture, Roosevelt did not understand or sympathize with the radical rich man or the radical labor leader. The mighty business organizers with

Napoleonic imaginations who consolidated railways and integrated anarchic industries, amassing millions and more millions in the operation, were to him, as a class, enemies of society and personally objectionable. That beneficent fruits of their achievements, transcending all party politics and all bourgeois morality, might lie beyond the horizon never occurred to him. "I do not dislike but I certainly have no especial respect or admiration for and trust in the typical big moneyed man of my country," he wrote in 1906. "I do not regard them as furnishing sound opinion as regards either foreign or domestic policies." Again a year later: "I neither respect nor admire the huge moneyed men to whom money is the be-all and end-all of existence; to whom the acquisition of untold millions is the supreme goal of life and who are too often utterly indifferent as to how these millions are obtained. . . . I despise him if he does not treat other things as of more importance in his scheme of life than mere money getting; if he does not care for art, or literature, or science, or statecraft, or war craft, or philanthropy."

More than that, Roosevelt was convinced that such big-moneyed men were unfit to govern the country, that they had corrupted politics, and had been responsible in part for "the enormous increase in the Socialistic propangada." If, however, he condemned Edward H. Harriman, the railway magnate, as an "undesirable citizen," he was equally bitter in applying the epithet to Eugene V. Debs, the labor leader and Socialist candidate for President. Without reservation, he declared that men of the Debs school "have done as much to discredit the labor movement as the worst speculative financiers or the most unscrupulous employers of labor and debauchers of legislatures have done to discredit capitalists and fair-dealing business men."

Having grown up naturally in the doctrines of the middle class, Roosevelt adjusted his politics to the acquisitive modes of that order. The idea of basing politics on economics, of course, was not entirely original. Jefferson thought the

republic would endure as long as there was an abundance of free land for farmers—until the people were piled up on one another in cities as in the Old World. Foreseeing a time when the mass of people would be without any kind of property worthy of note, Madison sought to break the force of majority rule by checks and balances in the government. Looking to similar ends, Webster frankly wanted to limit the government to property owners, trusting to a wide distribution of land to save the forms of democracy.

But Roosevelt was the first President of the United States who openly proposed to use the powers of political government for the purpose of affecting the distribution of wealth in the interest of the golden mean. In a letter to the reformer, Jacob Riis, in 1906, he avowed his intention, "so far as it can be done by legislation, to favor the growth of intelligence and the diffusion of wealth in such a manner as will measurably avoid the extreme of swollen fortunes and grinding poverty. This represents the idea toward which I am striving." The very suggestion that such purposes could be accomplished by the state was a heresy of the rankest kind to regular politicians, and Roosevelt himself, apart from proposing the taxation of "swollen inheritances and incomes," never made it very clear just how a political system in which, according to his creed, wealth was so powerful could be turned into an engine for the more equitable distribution of wealth.

Although Roosevelt had made no radical public utterances in his early political days, old and seasoned leaders in the Republican party—men who had made money and appreciated the art—suspected him and never took to him kindly. The potentate of New York, Senator Platt, frankly had no use for him; yet in searching for a man who could carry the state in 1898, he selected the young Colonel fresh from the Spanish War, knowing full well the appeal of a hero to the populace. Indifferent to the purisms of historical research and in no mood to give any heed to the

cloud of dubiety resting on the fame won by Roosevelt at San Juan Hill, the voting public sent him with great acclaim to Albany. From that post, after two years of service, Governor Roosevelt was pushed into the office of Vice-President by Senator Platt with an evident sigh of relief.

This was the man set by fate at the head of the party led by Marcus A. Hanna, Joseph G. Cannon, Nelson B. Aldrich, Boies Penrose, Joseph B. Foraker, and John C. Spooner. Contrary to their expectations, however, the President moved forward with caution. The spirit of his first administration Roosevelt summed up in a single sentence: "We are neither for the rich man as such nor for the poor man as such; we are for the upright man, rich or poor." He expressed the belief that publicity would cure the evils of wicked trusts, that railway rates should be "just to and open to all," that natural resources should be conserved, that the navy should be strengthened, and that combinations which violated the anti-trust law should be prosecuted. In all this there was nothing very extreme. "I cannot say," he remarked afterward, "that I entered the Presidency with any deliberately planned and far-reaching scheme of social betterment." Still, by denouncing "malefactors of great wealth," "reckless agitators," "frauds on the public domain," "corruption in office," and "wrong-doing of every kind" and by vigorous executive declarations that broke into headlines nearly every day, Roosevelt alarmed those who hankered after "subtraction, division, and silence."

Mainly by manners that seemed dangerous to readers of financial papers, Roosevelt convinced the general staff of the Democratic party that it could carry the country in 1904 with a conservative and colorless candidate. So Bryan, the hot-tempered, was cast aside in favor of Alton B. Parker, a calm judge presiding over the highest court in New York; and a platform of avoidance, including an evasion of the income tax issue, was put forth to lure the voters.

On the other hand, if some of the Republican rajahs turned longing eyes backward to older and better days, they had no choice but to nominate Roosevelt to succeed himself. Hanna died before the contest started and there was no other politician strong enough to bend his bow. In the campaign the great corporations with unwonted profusion contributed to the funds of both the major parties, more liberally of course to the Republican chest, yet without failing to remember the needs of the opposing force.

Elected by a huge majority to reign in his own right now, President Roosevelt grew more severe in dealing with the directorate of his party and more precise in his recommendations. His first administration had been almost barren of important legislation; but the second produced some measures of outstanding significance. The powers of the interstate commerce commission were enlarged and it was given authority on application to pass upon the reasonableness of railway rates. Sponsored by Senator Beveridge, laws directed against adulterated and impure food, drugs, and meat were enacted in 1906 with a din that seemed to shake the pillars of heaven. The hours of certain railway employees were reduced and common carriers were compelled to compensate those injured in service.

In the meantime several important prosecutions were commenced against trusts; public land thieves were pursued with surprising energy; and a number of smaller fry guilty of evil deeds were driven from the temple with whips of scorpions. Moreover the volume of presidential messages, interviews, and speeches swelled to impressive proportions. In a nomenclature that frightened those accustomed to the economic patois of the early nineties, Roosevelt freely discussed social questions hitherto ignored in the White House. Income and inheritance taxes were commended, on the startling theory that wealth was not already distributed with justice and mercy; and gentlemen of the robe were shocked to hear a President confess that jurisprudence was not a mathematical science, that there were "some members of

the judicial body who have lagged behind in their understanding of these great and vital changes in the body politic, whose minds have never been opened to the new applications of the old principles made necessary by the new conditions."

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When the political season of 1908 came around, leaders of the Republican right wing indulged in the hope that they might return in safety to the era of the full dinner pail. Every suggestion that he should again be a candidate Roosevelt had resolutely put aside and with him out of the way many things seemed possible. In Ohio, Warren Gamaliel Harding, pledging the loyalty of the Republican League "to that robust Republicanism expounded by its great leaders of the past—John Sherman, Marcus A. Hanna, and William McKinley"—pressed the candidacy of Senator Foraker, distinguished counsel for the Standard Oil Company.

But party masters of this school had not reckoned with their host. Knowing, as he said, that he could not nominate "an extreme progressive or an extreme conservative," Roosevelt chose as his heir-apparent William Howard Taft, his Secretary of War, who had been drafted from the bench to a life of administrative service first in the Philippines and then in Washington. And by the effective use of federal patronage, the President corraled enough delegates to ensure the nomination of his friend. Even the stoutest apostle of regularity knew that, without an endorsement from the White House, no Republican could carry the fermenting West.

Taking note of these activities in the other camp, the grand seigneurs of the Democratic party, having suffered an awful disaster in 1904 by trying to rally under Cleveland's old flag, surrendered again to Bryan. At their national convention in Denver, the Nebraska statesman wrote a radical platform and nominated himself to a chorus of tu-

multuous applause that recalled the dazzling triumph of twelve years before. When the issue was joined in November, however, Bryan went down to defeat for a third time. "I can never forget," wrote Taft to his great patron soon after his inauguration as President, "that the power I now exercise was voluntarily transferred from you to me, and that I am under obligation to see that your judgment in selecting me as your successor shall be vindicated."

"The historical accident," as one trained observer remarked when Roosevelt left Washington in 1909, "is now out of the way." President Taft, a lawyer by preference, a judge by temper, conservative in affiliation and thought, and guided by a firm faith as he said, "in the fixedness of moral principles which we learned at our mother's knee," simply could not spring into the limelight booted and spurred, grinning from ear to ear. Matter-of-fact in outlook and procedure, he thought it was his duty to take stock rather than to drum up trade and keep the public excited every moment.

Nevertheless Taft really induced, or at all events presided over, more legislative activity than his predecessor. He tackled the thorny question of the tariff which Roosevelt had studiously avoided but he assumed no dictatorial rôle. When two gentlemen of the old school, Payne in the House and Aldrich in the Senate, made a revenue bill that reminded the country of 1897, the President stood genially by while his party was rent asunder, ten eminent Senators from the agrarian West voting against the measure. When an income tax bill was pressed in Congress, he went to the aid of the conservatives by urging a constitutional amendment instead. On the other hand, Taft gave his support to a measure establishing a postal savings system, once denounced as socialistic but later discovered to be a help to savings banks—in operation drawing from hiding places a vast sum and placing it at the disposal of private bankers at a low rate of interest. Another "socialistic" proposal, the parcels-post, Taft also endorsed; and

after long resistance on the part of the express companies, it was carried through Congress at last.

In his executive capacity the President pressed a number of lawsuits against great corporations charged with restraining trade, having the satisfaction of winning from the Supreme Court judicial orders which dissolved the American Tobacco Company and the Standard Oil Company into several presumably competitive concerns. But this triumph, if such it was, the Court marred, unfortunately for Taft's political future, by expressing the opinion that only those combinations which "unduly" restrained trade were banned by the law—a dictum which roused the ire of Bryan and all advocates of a relentless war on the trusts.

With respect to the administration of the natural resources, Taft became embroiled in a quarrel between the orthodox school of conservationists and the upholders of ancient liberties. Driven into a corner against his will, he took the side of the latter, dismissing from his post the chief forester, Gifford Pinchot, a close friend of Roosevelt and the inspiration of the conservation movement. During the spectacular newspaper battle over personalities that resulted, the public took little or no notice of two fundamental laws signed by the President in the summer of 1910 —one separating the surface of the agricultural lands on the public domain from the mineral rights beneath and the other withdrawing water power sites from entry.

As a matter of fact, a political storm was now raging; left wing insurgency was lifting its head in the House of Representatives. Early in 1910 a combination of agrarian Republicans and jubilant Democrats concentrated their fire on the Speaker, Joseph Cannon, who for years had manipulated the legislative machine in the interests of the old régime and, after a dramatic contest, ousted him from his place at the head of the rules committee. In the autumn elections of that year, the Democrats carried everything before them, sending a large majority to take possession of the lower chamber. From sea to sea the air was now

charged with the kind of "assaulting" and "assailing" which made big headlines and delighted the people at large.

True to political traditions, the Democrats did all they could to embarrass the President by passing, with the aid of refractory Republicans, various bills reducing the tariff on commodities of general consumption—bills which were promptly vetoed. Plagued by factions, the Senate mangled the arbitration treaties which Taft had negotiated so enthusiastically with England and France, forcing him to abandon his project for advancing the cause of international peace. To cap the climax, after he had driven through Congress a bill providing for reciprocity with Canada, in defiance of many insurgent and regular Republicans, the President was chagrined to have his plans ruined by the defeat of the program in the Canadian parliament. Thus on every side Taft raised up a host of critics without gaining any points of advantage.

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By way of preparation for the opening of the coming presidential campaign, dissenters in the Republican party, adding the prefix "Progressive" to their historic title, began to draw together under the leadership of La Follette. They formed a league for the express purpose of defeating the renomination of Taft, invited Roosevelt to join them in the fray, and, undismayed by his refusal, commenced to urge the candidacy of the Wisconsin Senator.

While these insurgents were incurring the hazards of party rebellion, Roosevelt was watching the battle from afar, and occasionally sending up ammunition in his own way. At strategic points in the country, he made ringing speeches, advocating doctrines that shocked his former colleagues, such as Platt, Aldrich, Barnes, and Cannon, leading them to think that he had completely lost his head. With a high visibility unusual among politicians, he endorsed a strict regulation of the trusts, a graduated income tax, a thoroughgoing conservation program, an elaborate

scheme of labor legislation, direct primaries, the initiative and referendum, the recall of executive officers, and the popular review of judicial decisions involving the constitutionality of social reforms. At length in February, 1912, when seven Republican governors declared that the requirements of good government demanded his candidacy, the indomitable Colonel replied that, if tendered the nomination, he would accept it.

"My hat is in the ring!" shouted Roosevelt with great gusto, making a slogan that appealed to sporting elements in the political game, and sounding the gong for a spirited struggle over the possession of the Republican convention. Pursuing customary methods, President Taft proceeded to capture delegations from the southern states, where the dominant Republicans were federal office-holders, and to use the engine of patronage at other points with skill and discretion. In the chief Republican states of the North, however, especially where the new primary system permitted the voters to express their opinions directly, the two distinguished aspirants were compelled to take the stump—attacking each other from the platform before cheering multitudes.

When the contest was over and the convention assembled, the returns showed that 252 seats were "disputed." With a certain show of judicial calm the national committee, which was controlled by regular Republicans, set about hearing the pleas of the rivals but the conclusion was foregone. After the usual display of legal arguments, the controversies were decided in such a way as to give Taft a safe majority in the convention, causing most of the Roosevelt delegates to withdraw, amid cries of "fraud." As soon as the smoke had cleared away Taft was renominated by the rump parliament in a sincere belief that the country was being saved from a tidal wave of dangerous radicalism.

Having broken from the regular organization, the Progressives, except those loyal to La Follette, went to work to form a new party. In August they assembled their hosts

in Chicago—the strangest political convention that had been called to order by competent directors on this continent since the Republican insurrection of 1856. Typical politicians, seasoned office-holders, and hardened managers of local captains were conspicuous by their absence; reformers, idealists, and members of Roosevelt's "lunatic fringe" filled the seats and packed the committee rooms. Eighteen of the delegates were women and one of the keynote speeches was delivered by Jane Addams of Hull House, the famous social settlement in Chicago.

To complete the picture, Roosevelt was present himself, made a confession of faith, accepted the nomination tendered in thunderous applause, and joined enthusiasts of every school in writing the platform. As finally adopted, the composite profession of faith denounced the old parties as "tools of corrupt interests," approved the political devices of direct government, and endorsed with a precision not ordinarily found in partisan documents a vast array of specific proposals then already in process of realization or at least of exigent agitation. For the first time the major tendencies in American economic legislation that had been pursuing their course beneath the furor of partisan contests for a quarter of a century were brought to a focus in the expressed creed of a political organization.

Meanwhile the Democrats had made the most of their opportunities. On the forty-sixth ballot on the seventh day of their national convention in Baltimore they had nominated Woodrow Wilson, governor of New Jersey, as their candidate for the presidency—a man whose availability was in many respects superb. Wilson had sprung from the clerical middle class of the prosperous hamlet. Born in the village of Staunton, Virginia, he had been reared in Augusta, Georgia, and in Wilmington, North Carolina, under strict Presbyterian auspices. Apart from a brief residence in Baltimore while he attended Johns Hopkins University, his whole life was spent in small towns. Trained in the classics and mathematics at Princeton, he

escaped the more dissolving influence of natural science and the socializing provocations of political economy. But brought up in the South, he was accustomed to using the rhetoric of Jeffersonian democracy as employed by the slave-owning aristocracy and he had himself some of the planter's hatred for the classes that flourished under the protective tariff.

Having found the practice of law in a Georgia country town neither lucrative nor pleasant, Wilson turned to the business of teaching jurisprudence and political science, moving from the woman's college at Bryn Mawr through Wesleyan University at Middletown, Connecticut, to the Princeton faculty. In the course of his academic career he wrote voluminously on law, history, and politics but none of his works betrayed any marked interest in the misery of the great industrial wastes or the contest between the plutocracy and the masses described by Roosevelt.

Judged by his career and his writings, Wilson was everywhere regarded as a conservative Democrat of the old school who detested alike the paternalism of the Republicans and the socialism of the new democracy. Speaking concretely, his philosophy was a concept that pleased southern planters without alarming merchants who imported goods and capital. Indeed it was in the rôle of a Cleveland individualist, stanch and safe, that George Harvey, editor of the North American Review and Harper's Weekly, both approved Morgan publications, presented Wilson to the public as a candidate for the presidency; and not without reason, for in his academic groves the professor had once confidentially expressed the hope that Bryan might in some way be "knocked into a cocked hat."

But for all that, Wilson had made no irreconcilable enemies among the followers of the Nebraska Gracchus by open warfare upon him. If he had passed his fiftieth birthday without endorsing any of the heresies that had been advanced by the Populists, on the other hand he had never been intimately associated, save for a short time as presi-

dent of Princeton, with the masters of great business enterprises—Napoleons of finance and organization. And that slight exception had made a profound impression on Wilson's psychology. When for instance he had tried, in the interest of scholarship, to break down the system of exclusive clubs maintained by rich students at Princeton, he had been battered and beaten by the men of money who acted as the beneficiaries of the institution and dictators in the case.

While enjoying the popularity that flowed from this Princeton contest, Wilson was nominated for governor of New Jersey by old-line Democratic bosses who felt that local unrest at the moment called for a candidate known as a good man rather than a veteran of political wars. Once safely installed in office, to the dismay of his backers Wilson struck out on a new course. He pressed through the legislature a direct primary law, a workmen's compensation bill, and a plan for regulating public utilities, all symbols of the progressive dispensation. On a western tour, he visited Bryan to pay his respects to the skillful warrior who held the balance of power within his party. About the same time he declared himself in favor of the initiative and referendum and gave other signs of sympathy for insurgent advocates of direct government. If the conservatives felt they could trust a man who had steered a safe course in his youth and through his middle period, backers tinged with radicalism could now point to the cautious scholar made progressive by experience; and his managers could employ either chapter in his history according to the requirements of the occasion.

Immediately after his nomination for the presidency, Wilson embarked on a campaign that displayed a mastery of tactics. In speeches of great oratorical power, he stated that the national government had long been dominated by captains of industry and announced that the time had come for the "new freedom," that is, for a restoration of the lower middle class, hard pressed farmers, and working

people of the cities to their rightful authority in Washington. When asked for his bill of particulars, Wilson replied that he was not discussing "measures or programs" but expressing "the new spirit of our politics."

There was strength in this procedure: progressives were assured by the blows struck at the "interests" and timid conservatives were not aroused by terrifying specifications of the Bryan type. There was weakness in it also—as the elections revealed—for, while Wilson's popular vote on that plea was greater than Parker had received, it fell below the standard reached by Bryan in every one of his sensational campaigns and two million below the combined total of his opponents. In fact he did not win a majority of the ballots in any of the industrial states. Beyond question it was the internecine strife in the Republican party, not the mere appeal of his program, which enabled Wilson to win an overwhelming number of the presidential electors and to restore the party of Jefferson and Jackson to the direction of the federal government. So after trying radical and conservative candidates in vain and wandering for sixteen lean years in the desert, the Democrats accidentally rode into power as a minority group amid the whirlwind of national confusion.

As soon as he was inaugurated, President Wilson put an iron hand upon his party in Congress and, before he laid down his office, gave the country the implications of his theories in the most remarkable program of national legislation enacted within the same length of time since the stirring epoch of the Civil War—legislation conceived principally in the interests of "small folk," planters, farmers, and organized labor. For the first time in half a century, the tariff was materially reduced, awakening ancient memories. The currency and banking system was overhauled in a spirit somewhat Jacksonian with a view to securing greater flexibility, a wider distribution of financial power, and a broader basis than that given by gold alone. An anti-trust law, the Clayton Act, containing prolix specifications, was hurled at

gigantic corporations and a federal trade commission was instituted to prevent unfair business practices. Labor received an installment in La Follette's Seamen's Act, in a measure purporting to exempt trade unions from the operation of the anti-trust laws, and in an eight-hour day for trainmen. To farmers the portion allotted included many tariff favors and the Farm Loan Act giving them the aid of the government in bearing down the rate of interest. "We found our country hampered by special privilege, a vicious tariff, obsolete banking laws and an inelastic currency. Our foreign affairs were dominated by commercial interests for their selfish ends. . . . Under our administration, under a leadership that has never faltered, these abuses have been corrected and our people freed therefrom." This was the triumphant note sounded in 1916 by the Democrats, reviewing the achievements of their redoubtable President.

# CHAPTER XXVIII

## *America in the Balance of Power*

WITH flaming headlines newspapers announced on a quiet summer day in 1914 that the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife had been murdered in Serajevo by Serbian conspirators, giving a violent shock to the balance of power and raising in every European capital the specter of War. All through the month of July the world watched with bated breath while the diplomats of Germany and Austria-Hungary on one side and the diplomats of England, France, Russia, and Serbia on the other haggled over the incident, offering slight concessions to propriety but doing nothing substantial to prevent the recourse to arms.

At noon on July 28, Austria declared war on Serbia. Two days later, the Tsar of Russia ordered a general mobilization—an action which, according to understandings with the government of France, meant an armed challenge to the German Empire. On August 1, Germany replied by declaring war on Russia. Confronted by a refusal of England to remain out of the fray even on condition that

the neutrality of Belgium, the unity of France, and the integrity of the French colonies be fully respected, the German government announced to the King of the Belgians, on August 2, its preparations for the invasion of his realm on the route to Paris. That very morning, Great Britain, anxiously besought by the French government, promised the aid of the British navy in case German warships made hostile demonstrations in the Channel. August 3, Germany declared war on France. The following day after demanding unconditional respect for Belgian neutrality and receiving a negative answer, the English government broke off diplomatic relations and cleared for action. The storm now broke with pitiless fury—the Central Powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary, arrayed in deadly combat against the Entente Allies, Russia, France, England, and Serbia with Italy waiting on the course of events to decide her rôle in the struggle. Soon the hurricane was spread around the world.

For the State Department in Washington, the culmination of age-long rivalries in this terrible calamity was by no means a complete surprise; it was familiar with the questions big with national destiny that the war raised. Under the administrations of McKinley and Roosevelt, there had been a deep and lively interest on the part of the American government in the bitter contest of the great industrial nations for trade, territories, and concessions; with reasoned consistency the doctrine of the balance of power had been followed by the directors of foreign affairs. As we have seen, at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, Roosevelt notified Germany and France that, if they took the part of Russia, he would "promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length necessary on her behalf"; and when that struggle drew to a close, he deliberately sought to prevent a knockout blow, "so that each may have a moderative influence on the other." Three years previous to the outbreak of the World War, Roosevelt, in giving his private opinion on American foreign policy, stated

that, if England failed to keep the scales level, "the United States would be obliged to step in at least temporarily, in order to reëstablish the balance of power in Europe, never mind against which country or group of countries our efforts may have to be directed. In fact we ourselves are becoming, owing to our strength and geographical situation, more and more the balance of power of the whole globe." If William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State in 1914, did not thoroughly appreciate this point of view, certainly his distinguished chief, President Wilson did, for he said to Colonel E. M. House on August 30, 1914, in effect, "that if Germany won, it would change the course of our civilization and make the United States a military nation."

In keeping with this historic anxiety, the President had realized, several weeks before the tragedy at Serajevo, that Europe was a powder house which might blow up any time with fateful consequences for the United States. With an idea of forestalling disaster, he had sent Colonel House to Europe for the purpose of forming some kind of general entente cordiale capable of preventing the war that loomed on the horizon. If the President's views at the time were vague, they were soon given precision by a letter from his emissary, dated May 29, 1914, warning him that "the situation is extraordinary. It is militarism run stark mad. Unless some one acting for you can bring about a different understanding, there is some day to be an awful cataclysm. No one in Europe can do it. There is too much hatred, too many jealousies. Whenever England consents, France and Russia will close in on Germany and Austria. England does not want Germany wholly crushed, for she would then have to reckon alone with her ancient enemy, Russia, but if Germany insists upon an ever increasing navy, then England will have no choice."

Besides being admonished about the imminence of war, Wilson was specifically informed by Colonel House on June 26, that, as all the world knew, the competition of the "money-lending and developing nations" was responsible for

"much of the international friction." When the war did break, the Colonel gave the President his solemn judgment that "there is no good outcome to look forward to. If the Allies win, it means largely the domination of Russia on the Continent of Europe; and if Germany wins, it means the unspeakable tyranny of militarism for generations to come. . . . Germany's success will ultimately mean trouble for us." These opinions Wilson apparently shared. At all events in the early stages of the European struggle, while he deplored the invasion of Belgium and was indignant about the reported version of Bethmann-Hollweg's reference to the Belgian treaty as "a scrap of paper," he viewed the European War rather neutrally, regarding it as another of the hate-born conflicts that had plagued the Old World for two thousand years and of significance to America mainly in the possible destruction of the balance of power.

But the mass of the people of the United States had no such direct warning and no particular philosophy of foreign affairs as a background for understanding the outbreak of war. Though some Americans knew that the governments of the embattled nations had long been preparing for a trial at arms, the great majority seemed secure in the faith that business would go on as usual for time without end. As previously indicated, no cause was more prominently before the public or more widely endorsed by high respectability than international peace.

Even the political parties had thought the peace movement significant enough to receive a benediction. Only two years before, both the Republicans and the Progressives had approved the pacific settlement of international controversies. The latter, going up to Armageddon under the leadership of Colonel Roosevelt and Jane Addams, had deplored "the survival in our civilization of the barbaric system of warfare among nations" and favored the substitution of civil means for settling disputes.

In those piping days of innocence and peace, few there were who looked with fear and dread upon the German Em-

pire as a huge war machine prepared for "the Day." On the contrary the closest ties of friendship existed between the upper classes of Germany and prominent American citizens. German-Americans who had wrung money from beer or pork or sugar found no trouble in breaking into the court at Berlin and many Americans of native stock, sated with the culture of the local bourgeoisie, got thrills in the presence of His Imperial and Royal Majesty at Potsdam. Dinners in select New York circles were enlivened by choice bits of gossip straight from the entourage of the "All Highest." Professors were exchanged with much ceremonial. Prussian decorations of the second and third class were bestowed with lavish, yet thoughtful, care upon a chosen regiment of American celebrities. Presentation to the Kaiser became as much an event as presentation to Edward VII or George V.

No less a personage than President Roosevelt, when preparing for a European trip, fished for an invitation to Germany, caught the coveted prize, and thoroughly enjoyed the hospitality extended to him by William II, especially the opportunity to review the German army from the back of a mettlesome charger, with the Kaiser on his left. With transparent glee, Roosevelt reproduced in his autobiography, issued in 1913, the famous cartoon of Punch portraying His Imperial Majesty and himself as apostles of the strenuous life. In an outburst of enthusiasm, a distinguished university president, deeply impressed by the gracious beneficence of William, declared that, if Germany were a republic, the people would unanimously elect the splendid Hohenzollern president. Of course a few radicals laughed at the Kaiser's speeches studded with references to God and himself and regarded William II as the greatest menace to democracy outside St. Petersburg; but the sober, respectable part of the American nation knew little about German politics and thought that little good as the great shadow fell athwart the eastern horizon.

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With England also relations had been increasingly cordial. The open hand which the English ruling classes extended in welcoming the United States as a recruit to the conquering and imperial nations of the earth in 1898 had caused the country to forget many old wounds. Whether, as Henry Adams said, it was the fear of the German specter that produced the change of heart in London, it made little difference to the American public not given to the study of diplomatic history. The fact of England's friendly support during the Spanish-American War stood in plain view.

And the ties thus woven were strengthened by King Edward VII, chief architect of the Anglo-French understanding which brought England and France into the war together against Germany. While engaged in perfecting that continental adjustment, in February, 1905, the King approached President Roosevelt on his own motion saying: "You, Mr. President, and I have been called upon to superintend the destinies of the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race and this trust should in my opinion alone suffice to bring us together."

The personal friendship thus opened by correspondence was deepened by later communications. In 1905, the secret understanding which Roosevelt reached with Japan and England with respect to Anglo-Japanese-American coöperation in the Orient was fortified by Senator Lodge's visit to King Edward with instructions to inform the King "that we intend to have the United States and England work together [in Europe] just as we are now working together in the Far East." Indeed such communications had gone so far that in 1913 an American historian of undoubted competence, Roland G. Usher, declared that a secret agreement had been reached, binding the United States to come to the aid of England and France in case of a war against Pan-Germanism. While this allegation was officially denied, there was unquestionably substantial reality behind it. At any rate the way had evidently been so carefully smoothed

that there was no possibility of a serious irritation between England and the United States in the summer of 1914.

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Given this state of affairs at the opening of the great war it seemed perfectly natural for President Wilson—awaiting clearer intimations as to the outcome—to proclaim American neutrality in the language and form sanctioned by custom from the days of Washington down to his own time; and this solemn ceremony he supplemented on August 18 by a warning to his fellow-citizens to be impartial in thought as well as action. Reinforcing this official position Ex-President Roosevelt, then communicating to the country regularly through the columns of The Outlook, endorsed Wilson's policy of non-intervention, in an article published on September 23; for he was not taken by surprise even by the invasion of Belgium or hurried into premature judgment. Three years before, he had written to Senator Lodge that "the German war plans contemplate, as I happen to know personally, as possible courses of action, flank marches through Belgium and Switzerland"; and in his Outlook article he confessed that "very probably nothing that we could have done would have helped Belgium. We have not the smallest responsibility for what has befallen her." In general Roosevelt urged American neutrality, gave thanks that the United States had been "free from the working of the causes which have produced the bitter and vindictive hatred among the great military Powers of the Old World," and declared significantly that "nothing but urgent need would warrant breaking our neutrality and taking sides one way or the other." Reversing himself impatiently in a few weeks, however, Roosevelt repudiated his doctrine of evasion and his theory respecting Belgium, swinging violently over to the English view of the crisis.

If a former President, long intimate with the inner gyrations of diplomacy, could entertain directly opposite opin-

ions within such a short time, it is no wonder that among the people at large there was much confusion in thought. In truth impartial judgments were hard to reach or maintain, for the country was deafened at once with the clamor of propaganda, which steadily increased in volume and intensity. Among Americans of German descent, moved by inherited sentiments of affection for their Fatherland, there was a frank sympathy with the Central Powers; while among Americans of Irish ancestry who recalled in bitterness the long struggle of their people against British dominion, there was an equally frank expression of hope that England's doom had come at last—sources of pro-German opinion which were openly and secretly stimulated by the governments of the Central Powers. On the other hand thousands of citizens of English and Canadian origin were no less zealous in whipping up fervor for the Entente Allies—actively supported by the English government in the business of drenching America with propaganda giving its official syllabus of the war. If Americans of the old stock who had no immediate connections with any of the belligerents, either by blood or by trade, resented the frantic cries of partisans for war, they were seldom heard above the roar of the factional controversy which raged over the merits of the European belligerents.

In their work of "educating the United States" the propagandists soon discovered that the American people were more easily moved by stories of atrocities than by the folios of Red, White and Yellow books packed with carefully selected diplomatic documents, issued by the belligerents in their own defense. On this score the Germans had laid themselves especially open to attack by their invasion of Belgium whose neutrality, including the British guarantee, was as Delphic mysteries to a nation that found high entertainment in the comic sections of Sunday newspapers. Taking advantage of this psychology, the British government made a master stroke by inducing James Bryce, so widely esteemed in America, to sign its report on German "fright-

fulness" in Belgium—a weighty state paper of dubious contents and worse propriety but none the less a horrible tale that sent shivers through the spines of those who read the newspaper headlines purporting to summarize it. Though the balance sheet of offenses against American intelligence committed by both belligerents in the days of President Wilson's neutrality cannot now be struck for want of totals, the slight revelations already made show how desperate were the designs pursued and how venomous was the poison fed to the public by interested partisans.

With a view to perfecting the technique of Entente propaganda a complete official thesis was evolved for the guidance of those who needed a creed to support their emotions. It ran in the following form. Germany and Austria, under autocratic war lords, had long been plotting and preparing for the day when they could overwhelm their neighbors and make themselves masters of the world. England, France, and Russia, on the other hand, all unsuspecting, had pursued ways of innocence, had sincerely desired peace, and made no adequate preparations for a great cataclysm. When England and France were trying to preserve equal rights for all in Morocco, Germany had rattled the sword and now, taking advantage of the controversy over the assassination of the Austrian archduke, the Central Powers had leaped like tigers upon their guileless victims.

To further their ends, the story for babes continued, the Germans had hacked their way through Belgium, a small and helpless country whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the powers in their fond desire to safeguard the rights of little countries; and in cutting their way through this defenseless kingdom, the Germans had committed nameless and shocking deeds, crimes against humanity, offenses not justifiable in the name of war, horrors not usually incident to armed conflicts. To crown their infamy, so ran the Entente articles of faith, the Germans did what no other Christian people would do, namely, employed the submarine, a new instrument of warfare, against unarmed mer-

chant vessels, sending cargo, crew, and passengers alike to the bottom of the sea. Embellished in many details, embroidered with rumors and ghastly stories, this Entente war creed was pressed upon the people of the United States with such reiteration and zeal that in wide and powerful circles it became as fixed as the law of the Medes and Persians. To question any part of it in those spheres was to set one's self down as a boor and a "Hun" and, after 1917, as a traitor to America besides.

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If American property and lives and the balance of power had not become involved in the European conflagration, the battle of propaganda might have ended in words. But something more than words was at stake. As at the time of the Napoleonic conflict, the right of Americans to trade with belligerents and neutrals on land and sea, besides being limited by the laws of war, was frequently flouted by both parties to the struggle. Naturally, since oceanic commerce was the substance of the business, England, mistress of the seas, following the general practice of dominant governments in all times, had evolved the rules of international law which took into account her own requirements. Indeed the law of the sea, in spite of the repeated protests of land powers, was what England permitted and little more.

Among the principles of that law established by long usage were three of special pertinence for the quarrel now raging. First, it was generally agreed that a belligerent might blockade the ports of his enemy, but a blockade to be legal had to be effective, that is, maintained by a close patrol of the coast line by ships of war—a patrol which the menace of the submarine made impossible for all the warring powers. A second rule of law provided that contraband of war, that is, materials of utility in armed conflicts and the ships carrying such goods were liable to seizure on the sea—a doctrine applied with terrific force by the Entente Allies in destroying German trade. Exercising her undoubted

powers as a belligerent, England steadily widened the list of goods marked contraband, until it included almost every conceivable commodity of importance, smashing in this way the entire direct sea trade of the Germans.

But that was not enough. Owing to her geographical position—her proximity to neutral powers, the Scandinavian countries, Holland, Switzerland, and Italy—Germany could purchase supplies from neighbors that could in turn buy from countries whose goods came safely by the sea lanes. So in the third place, the Entente Allies, using a precedent set by the United States during its Civil War, made the final destination of cargoes, rather than the port to which they were shipped, the test of ownership and purpose, in applying the contraband rule. In this widely stretched net the trade of the whole world was caught and, by whatever obscuring subtleties of the law defended, was subjected to such treatment as England, the principal sea power, thought conducive to her interest.

Finding that the submarine made it dangerous for captors to stand by and search ships at sea, in accordance with old practices, English commanders, under orders, adopted the custom of carrying merchantmen into port where they were sometimes held for months before their fate was officially determined. In this operation mails, packages, and boxes were searched and seized; the correspondence of American merchants with their factors abroad was ransacked; checks and money orders were impounded; and business secrets were explored. Moreover, though the high sea was nominally open to all powers, England, alleging that the Germans had sown deadly contact mines in the North Sea, proclaimed this entire area a military zone on November 2, 1914, and three days later ordered ships bound for Scandinavian countries to take the northern route, through her lanes of search and seizure. When the German government in January, 1915, nationalized food stocks, except shipments from the United States, English authorities declared grain and flour destined to Germany conditional contraband.

At this juncture Berlin, after asserting that the Wilson administration had failed to enforce American rights against England, declared the waters around the British Islands a theater of war, announced its intention to destroy enemy merchant ships wherever bound, and warned neutrals that, since English captains often flew false flags, the vessels of all countries were in peril. As a matter of fact the United States itself had protested emphatically and repeatedly against infractions of the rules of war by England—so strongly and so frequently indeed that Walter Hines Page, American Ambassador in London, who boasted that he was no neutral in thought or in fact, fairly apologized when he presented the notes from Washington to the English government.

Without undertaking to bargain between Great Britain and Germany in an effort to maintain the laws of war, however, President Wilson quickly and firmly warned Berlin that the government of the United States would hold the Imperial German authorities strictly accountable for the destruction of American lives and property. To this admonition Germany replied that, if England would pass food supplies through the blockade, the submarine campaign would be dropped. Adhering to his original position the President still refused to bargain.

Evidently every element in the situation was delicate. The submarine, invented by an American, was a new instrument of warfare and no rules for its use had been devised. Accepted law, evolved before its advent, held that whenever a warship overhauled a merchant vessel liable to seizure and destruction, provisions must be made for the safety of passengers and crew. Since the operation of that law ran in favor of England, she saw no reason for modifying it; all the more because in its ancient form, it had the merit of humanism which was in the circumstances gratifying to the English people. On the other hand Germany, being strangled by the blockade, sought to legislate for novel conditions and her new law threatened to bring to the civilian

population of her enemies primarily and to neutrals incidentally the horrors of trench and battlefield. Undoubtedly moral sentiments in the United States ran heavily against the Germans in their contentions, even though many American naval experts, foreseeing the possible need for the submarine in future wars and anticipating the ultimate extension to non-combatants of destruction by bombs, fire, and gas, thought the German precedent an example not to be lightly rejected.

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A test of fact soon made a decision unavoidable. Having failed in their effort to relax the British grip through American pressure, the Germans began operations against merchant vessels in accordance with their threats. As anticipated, American ships, passengers, and sailors became involved in these maneuvers from time to time, each new incident increasing the tension. The strain was already great when on the morning of May 1, 1915, there appeared in American newspapers an advertisement signed by the German Embassy at Washington, which warned American citizens against the dangers of the war zone and especially against the perils of sailing on British ships. On that very day the British steamer, Lusitania, an auxiliary war craft, heavily laden with ammunition and carrying a large list of passengers, dropped down the Hudson River and steered for the open sea. Six days later without receiving any warning, the ship was struck by two torpedoes and in a few minutes sank by the bow, taking to a watery grave more than a thousand people including over one hundred Americans.

When the news reached this country, a shudder of horror ran through the nation followed by instant cries for vengeance. A few editors and publicists, it is true, argued that the victims of the disaster, duly admonished of the peril, had taken the risks voluntarily, that American lives had already been destroyed by British mines unlawfully

sown in the North Sea, that the captain of the Lusitania had invited destruction by steaming slowly, and that the calamity, deplorable and awful as it was, constituted only one of the numerous ghastly phases of the war. But President Wilson took no such view of the matter. As soon as the facts were in his possession, he dispatched a note to Berlin, calling upon the German government to disavow the act, make reparations, and prevent the recurrence of such a deed. Then, solemnly, as if pronouncing a doom, he stated that his government would not "omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."

At that moment the die was cast. In reply Germany temporized and again sought to make a bargain by offering in effect to respect American rights if England would do the same. Against this trading policy, Wilson set his face like flint, driving the Secretary of State, Bryan, who indignantly resented this refusal to bargain, to resign from the Cabinet, protesting privately that he could not see the fairness of coercing the German government which was willing to arbitrate while dealing gently with the English government which stood resolute on its interests. Finally, after weeks of haggling, Germany agreed on September 1, 1915, not to sink liners without warning and without providing for the safety of non-combatants. "It is a triumph not only of diplomacy but of reason, of humanity, of justice, of truth!" exclaimed the New York Times on hearing the news. Yet it marked a truce, not peace.

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Reverberations of the desperate conflict in Europe, the constant thrumming of propaganda, fears of investors who had bought Anglo-French bonds and of manufacturers who had sold enormous quantities of supplies to the Entente Powers, the continuous insistence of citizens who genuinely

feared the menace of a German victory, and the strained tension of diplomatic relations—all combined to beat the domestic politics of the United States into a boisterous storm. Advocates of "preparedness" were given an impressive theme and hearing. The National Security League, organized in December, 1914, mainly with the support of eastern capitalists, joined the old Navy League in demanding a more adequate equipment for fighting; when the combination failed to denounce Democratic congressmen with sufficient force, the American Defense Society came to the rescue. Then the American Rights Committee rushed upon the stage with a demand for immediate war on the Central Powers. On the other side of the line, peace propaganda began to drift into the control of extremists who imagined that pacifism could be urged with safety when war was imminent, in their temerity redoubling the fury of the party bent on war.

Being in power, the Democrats naturally had to endure the assaults of all factions, their leader, President Wilson, bearing the brunt of the shock. Busy with negotiations among the nations looking to a fair peace, hoping in vain that a proposal to England suggesting an equitable settlement would bring the conflict to a close, the President long resisted all demands for additional military equipment—until 1916 when, for reasons not made public in specific form, he made concessions in that direction without going far on the way to adequate preparation for actual war. Probably more as a gesture than an act of defiance, Congress passed in that year four special measures strengthening the forces of the country. One enlarged the regular army and the national guard; another authorized the construction of ten dreadnoughts and six battle cruisers within three years; a third established a council of national defense; a fourth, the Shipping Board Act, provided for the creation of a mercantile marine at public expense.

By this time the country was in the throes of another presidential campaign. Putting aside their former grudges

in a common opposition to Wilson, Republicans and Progressives united in calling Charles Evans Hughes from the Supreme Bench to be their candidate. "We desire peace, the peace of justice and right," ran the Republican platform, "and we believe in maintaining a straight and honest neutrality between the belligerents in the Great War in Europe. We must perform all our duties and insist upon all our rights as neutrals without fear or favor." With so much judicial skill was this lofty sentiment reiterated by Hughes in his campaign speeches that active supporters of the Entente powers and equally active Irish and German elements in the electorate found no difficulty in uniting under his banner. By some means, however, he gave the impression that his election meant war—war on Germany; at all events, he captured the imagination of the industrial and financial sections already deeply involved in the fate of the Entente.

Fearing that the election of Hughes meant the triumph of capitalistic imperialism, radicals and pacifists of all schools turned to Wilson as the best hope for continued peace. Nor did the Democrats reject these recruits or deny the pacifist implications of such support. Nominating Wilson by acclamation, they reviewed the party's legislative achievements with the customary pride and commended "the splendid diplomatic victories of our great President who has preserved the vital interests of our government and kept us out of war." On the issue of peace a special appeal was made to enfranchized women of the West. Frightened by the rush of militant suffragists to Hughes after the latter's declaration in favor of the national amendment, Wilson sent the "spellbinder," Dudley Field Malone, to the Pacific Coast with a commission to rally the women, to promise peace in exchange for votes, and to offset by other pledges the known hostility of the President to modern feminism—a strategy that proved exceedingly effective. Turning the scales by a few hundred votes, California assured the re-election of Wilson.

Generally speaking, the West and South, agrarian states that had been the bulwark of the Jacksonian party, returned Democratic majorities whereas the eastern centers of industrial and financial power went to Hughes in a landslide. Even the Socialist vote fell heavily as party members rushed to the pacific camp of the President, acting perhaps on the advice of the Socialist candidate, Allan Benson, who frankly declared that Wilson should be the second choice of all good comrades. Though the Democratic victory in the electoral college was narrow, the popular majority in favor of Wilson was decisive.

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Taking the mandate as a verdict in support of conciliatory policies, President Wilson, soon after the election was over, addressed open notes to the belligerent powers proposing a negotiated settlement and asking them to state the terms upon which the war might be brought to an end—an action in keeping with the negotiations which he had long been carrying on with the belligerents through the agency of Colonel House. Early in 1916 he had approached the Entente powers with a peace project which savored of democratic theories and contemplated no imperialist gains of great magnitude for any party, even going so far as to indicate that he might take the United States into the war on their side if Germany proved recalcitrant. But, having experienced on that occasion a chilling rebuff from the masters of England and France who, without his knowledge, had already divided the spoils of war in advance by secret treaties with Russia, Italy, and Japan and did not then want any military aid from the United States, at least on pacifist principles, Wilson decided in December, 1916, to make his bid for a negotiated peace open to all the world. In reply to his manifesto the Central Powers, then enjoying the better of the fight, stated that they were ready for a conference while the Entente Allies laid down

drastic conditions as the price of their acceptance, bringing to naught the effort at mediation.

Not discouraged by the results of his previous attempts, Wilson returned to the theme on January 22, 1917, declaring in a speech before the Senate that it was the duty of the United States to take part in restoring international harmony on the basis of certain principles. These he enumerated in a short form: "peace without victory," the right of nationalities to liberty and self-government, independence of Poland, freedom of the seas, reduction of armaments, and abolition of entangling alliances. If no new factors had entered the contest, the program suggested by Wilson might have provided the only solution of the peace problem for, while his terms were abhorrent to the war party in each belligerent country, the long conflict now promised a stalemate, causing the peoples of Europe to be sick at heart and augmenting social unrest in every quarter. But events decreed another fate, making a break in the long monody with startling suddenness on January 31, when the German Ambassador at Washington, Count von Bernstorff, announced the purpose of his government to renew the submarine campaign. Within three months after that the United States was involved with the Entente Allies in the war on the German Empire.

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What was running through Wilson's mind in those harrowing times when he was engrossed in "waging neutrality" —how did he view the conflict that was shaking the world? Obviously the answer to this question is not to be found in biographies and eulogies written after Wilson carried the United States into the war. Neither can it be discovered from his own writings for his intimate papers revealing the trend of his thinking during the first years of the struggle in Europe have not yet been laid before the country. Nevertheless the mystery is not completely sealed; for in

the correspondence of Walter Hines Page, American Ambassador in London, in the papers of Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior, written between 1914 and 1917, fortunately, if indiscreetly, made public, and in the letters of Colonel House, can be caught illuminating glimpses of the President's thought as it developed before the measures of the German imperial government, coupled with the pitiless beat of propaganda and the ceaseless din of war voices, bore him into the fray.

In these records it seems to be made plain that, until the United States entered the war, Wilson, in spite of fluctuations in his temper, looked rather coldly on the pretentions of both the embattled forces, being inclined to regard the conflict as a war of commercial powers over the spoils of empire. "The President," complained Page, "started out with the idea that it was a war brought on by many obscure causes—economic and the like. . . . Thus we have failed to render help to the side of Liberalism and Democracy which are at stake in the world."

When the Ambassador came back to America in 1916 to impress Wilson with the righteousness of the English case, he found his chief rather frigid as he presented that particular appeal. According to Page, Wilson, on this occasion, "described the war as a result of many causes, some of long origin. He spoke of England's having the earth and Germany's wanting it. Of course, he said, the German system is directly opposed to everything American. But I do not gather that he thought that this carried any very great moral responsibility." Such apparently was the position of President Wilson at the end of two years of the war although, as Page records in another place, "when the war began he and all the men he met were in hearty sympathy with the Entente Allies."

In the letters of Lane, the opinion expressed by Page is amply confirmed. As late as February 2, 1917, even after news had come that Germany would renew her submarine warfare, Wilson was asked at a Cabinet meeting

which side he wished to see victorious in the European conflict. Without equivocation, he replied that "he didn't wish to see either side win—for both had been equally indifferent to the rights of neutrals—though Germany had been brutal in taking life and England only in taking property."

A little later Wilson added that "the country was not willing that we should take any risks of war." When Lane, holding the opposite view, reasserted that, if the people knew about the treatment of American consuls' wives in Germany, there would be no question as to public sentiment, the President resented this "as a suggestion that we should work up a propaganda of hatred against Germany." Seeing three other members of the Cabinet, McAdoo, Houston, and Redfield, join Lane in the contention that the people were entitled to know the "facts," "the President turned on them bitterly, especially on McAdoo, and reproached all of us with appealing to the spirit of the Code Duello."

After this passage at arms, Lane wrote with a touch of bitterness: "I don't know whether the President is an internationalist or a pacifist; he seems to be very mildly national—his patriotism is covered over with a film of philosophic humanitarianism that certainly doesn't make for 'punch' at such a time as this." When, at last, the die was cast Lane recorded on April 1 that the President was "for recognizing war and taking hold of the situation in such a fashion as will eventually lead to an Allies' victory over Germany. But he goes unwillingly. . . . We can stand Germany's insolence and murderous policy no longer."

During this period of American neutrality Wilson's public utterances were fairly in accord with the private opinions so recorded. Evidently he believed that the unconditional triumph of either party would be undesirable. In a speech delivered on May 27, 1916, he expressed the conviction that this country was not concerned "with the causes and objects of the war." In his peace communication to the contending powers, in December of the same year, he took "the liberty

of calling attention to the fact that the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world." No doubt he knew that such a declaration would make a painful impression in England and indeed it did. According to Page, Lord Northcliffe blurted out: "Everybody is mad as hell . . . The King, expressing his surprise and dismay that Mr. Wilson should think that Englishmen were fighting for the same things in this war as the Germans, broke down;" while Lord Robert Cecil was "deeply hurt."

If such objections were communicated to Wilson, they had little effect on his views, for he continued to use similar language in public and in private. Even after he took the United States into the conflict, he adhered to his conviction that the primary interest of Great Britain in the war was commercial and imperialistic. With that in mind, he objected to a proposal to send Ex-President Taft to England in December, 1917, as a messenger of good will to cement the ties of the two powers then aligned side by side on the battlefields of France; saying bluntly that the United States should not be "in a position of seeming in any way to be involved with British policy." To clinch his argument, he cited as proof one of the secret treaties, made public by the Bolsheviki, by which the Entente Allies had divided the spoils of war in advance of victory. From no record at present available does it appear that Wilson ever surrendered his personal conviction that, as far as the causes and objects of the war were concerned, there was no ground for assuming that either party to the conflict had any special merit of righteousness to be accepted at face value.

What then eventually turned the scale in Wilson's mind and within two months changed him from a man who "didn't wish either side to win" into an ardent advocate of war "without stint" against Germany. No easy answer is forthcoming, if indeed the psychological process of human deci-

sion is fathomable at all; but many of the factors that profoundly influenced him were patent to every one. First among them certainly was Germany's announcement of a general submarine campaign practically without let or hindrance, followed shortly by the destruction of six American vessels, in a majority of cases without warning, three of them carrying American citizens to death. Unless the President was to repudiate his previous position on that issue and now accept submarine warfare with all its consequences as approved by the laws of combat, there was no other choice than an appeal to arms. In any event, this was the official thesis for, when Wilson called upon Congress for the fateful war resolution, he declared that the German imperial government had in fact driven the United States into the position of a belligerent, that the nation had no alternative except a reply by force—a judgment which he confirmed in defending the postponement of hostilities against Austria, saying "We enter this war only where we are clearly forced into it because there are no other means of defending our rights." Such even was the verdict of the German Ambassador in Washington for he attributed to the action of his own government the rupture of relations adding that, in his opinion, affairs were not only distinctly favorable to Germany at the moment but moving, under the President's policy, in the direction of a fair peace.

There were of course other forces that helped to form the President's crucial decision. It was clear by the spring of 1917 that without American aid the Entente Allies could hardly hope for anything more than a stalemate if indeed they could escape defeat at the hands of the German war machine which for nearly three years had held its lines against astounding odds. At best, American investors who had staked money on the Anglo-French side, munition makers who had accepted the paper of London and Paris in return for supplies, merchants and manufacturers who had huge Entente credits on their books were placed in a serious dilemma; they were in danger of immense losses unless the

United States government came to their rescue. No doubt the war dirge raised by these selfish factions was adequately financed, astutely managed, and effectively carried into strange out-of-the-way places as well as into the main highways.

Encouraged by this interested domestic support, the Canadian, British, and French propagandists increased their drive, going to such lengths indeed that President Wilson, angry at their insistence, was at last moved to exclaim that there were too many Englishmen pushing their cause in America and to ask the British Ambassador late in 1917 to send some of them home. In addition to the professional profiteers and propagandists engaged in fomenting the war fever was a large body of Americans of English stock who felt bound to England by ties of blood and affection and who urged upon Wilson a war in the name of kinship.

Finally a considerable number of people, who looked upon the intrinsic merits of the European quarrel with relative indifference, believed that the United States had a genuine reason to fear the triumph of the German military caste in the Old World. As a distinguished professor of European history phrased it in unacademic mode: "England is a retired old sea robber in possession of immense imperial spoils, more interested in keeping peace with America than the young German pirate at the beginning of his career; for the latter can only hope to win his place in the sun by a general dislocation in the present distribution of the world's booty." That was the philosophy of some practical Americans who begged the President to make war on the German imperial government.

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While the evolution of Wilson's opinion respecting the war in Europe may be traced according to the above design from the letters and papers of his contemporaries, it cannot be denied that there is authentic evidence for another view

of the case, namely, that the President, having come practically to the end of his rope as regards domestic policies—offerings to planters, farmers, and trade unionists, as he himself confessed to Colonel House on September 28, 1914—reached the conviction in 1915 or early in 1916 that he could play a masterful rôle on the international stage by taking the United States into the war on the side of the Entente Allies, irrespective of German submarine tactics. The support of this hypothesis is twofold.

First, there is convincing proof that sometime late in February, 1916, Wilson called into conference at the White House certain leaders of his party in Congress and intimated to them, to use the language of Hon. Thomas P. Gore, in a speech delivered in the Senate on March 2, 1916, that "if Germany insisted upon her position the United States would insist upon her position; that it would result probably in a breach of diplomatic relations; that a breach of diplomatic relations would be probably followed by a state of war; that a state of war might not be of itself and of necessity an evil, but that the United States by entering the war now might be able to bring it to a conclusion by midsummer and thus render a great service to civilization." In other words, in February, 1916, the President was contemplating war and sounded out his party in Congress to see whether his project was acceptable.

That he did at the time also sound the Entente Allies and suggest taking the United States into the war is conclusively demonstrated in the memoirs of Sir Edward Grey and Colonel House. Early in February, 1916, Wilson undertook, through the mediation of House, "on hearing from France and England that the moment was opportune," to propose a conference to end the war, and in case the Allies accepted and Berlin refused, "probably" to direct the United States into the struggle against Germany—all on the understanding that there was to be a fair settlement, including the restoration of Belgium, the transfer of Alsace-Lorraine to France, the assurance of a sea-outlet to Russia,

and compensation to Germany by "concessions to her in other places outside Europe."

But England and France, having already agreed with their associates on a different division of the spoils and still confident that they could win without American aid and American interference at the peace table, declined to accede to the project for such a conference, thus taking upon themselves full responsibility for putting off American support in men, metal, and money until defeat threatened them. Again and again House and Wilson tried to get England to agree to action on the part of the President under the terms of this secret protocol, without avail until the renewal of the submarine warfare by Germany in 1917 and the peril of disaster at last made such coöperation imperative. In the light of these facts—which by the way illuminate all the ethical questions of the peace settlement and the debts—it cannot be denied that while "waging peace," President Wilson was revolving in his mind the question of his leadership and mission in world affairs, and kept revolving it until he finally broke with the German Empire.

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On the opposing side the most cogent argument against the declaration of war was delivered by Senator La Follette of Wisconsin, one of the little group branded by Wilson as "willful" obstructionists. Considered in the large, the Senator's plea for peace fell into three general divisions. First in his bill of indictment was the contention that the administration had not pursued an impartial policy in dealing with Germany and England. The latter, he asserted, had begun the violation of American rights by unlawful orders, searches and seizures and by closing the open waters of the North Sea with deadly mines. Out of the illegal practices of England, German submarine tactics had sprung inevitably—even Germany's subsequent promises to abstain from sinking merchant ships without warning being

based on the assumption that the United States would fetch England to book for her unlawful decrees and unlawful destruction of neutral trade.

Instead of bringing pressure upon the first wrongdoer, the President, continued the Senator, had departed from the traditions of America and from the path of justice by insisting that one of the belligerents should obey the rules of international justice while the other refused to be bound by them. It followed, therefore, that Germany was within her rights in resorting to retaliatory measures after failing to enforce upon England obedience to recognized law. But it was said that Germany had taken lives while England had merely stolen and destroyed property. The plea was specious, the Senator replied, because England, by sowing deadly contact mines in the open sea, had raised a menace as terrible as the submarine and had in fact destroyed American ships and American lives. Was the life of a sailor on a merchant vessel less precious than the life of a tourist or merchant or financier traveling in luxury on the Lusitania? So in spirit and in reality, La Follette declared, England as the original miscreant was even a greater offender than Germany against the law of nations and the rights of neutrals.

The second count in the Senator's argument pertained to the thesis that we were about to take up arms in a war to make the world safe for democracy against Prussian autocracy. What about England with its hereditary monarchy, its hereditary House of Lords, its hereditary landed system, its grinding poverty for wage workers, its dominion over Ireland, Egypt and India? asked the orator. Would we refuse to go to war if Russia were still ruled by a Tsar? What about the autocratic institutions of Japan, Italy, and the lesser European powers arrayed with us in this democratic crusade?

Passing, finally, from the ethics and embellishments of the case, La Follette declared that the people of the United States had never by their votes given the slightest counte-

nance to the idea of plunging into the European conflict, that if the supporters of the war resolution dared to submit the issue to a referendum they would be defeated by a vote of ten to one. "The espionage bills, the conscription bills, and other forcible military measures which we understand are being ground out of the war machine in this country," urged the Senator, "are complete proof that those responsible for this war fear that it has no popular support and that armies sufficient to satisfy the demands of the entente allies cannot be recruited by voluntary enlistments." Such in brief was the case against the war filed in the court of opinion by the leading champion of peace in the Congress of the United States.

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When hostilities were once declared gigantic economic and military tasks had to be undertaken. Nations were embattled, not simply armies of volunteers and mercenaries; before the war was over more than 3,700,000 American soldiers, including the marines, were under arms while not less than ten million adults were engaged in sustaining them on the firing line. "It is not an army that we must shape and train for war," said the President, "it is a nation."

And Congress gave Wilson power with a lavish hand, outlining statutes in broad terms and leaving him free to fill in the details at his own pleasure. In a series of the most remarkable laws ever enacted in Washington the whole economic system of the country was placed at his command. Under their provisions, the President was authorized to requisition supplies for the army without stint, to fix the prices of commodities so commanded, arrange a guarantee price for wheat, take possession of mines, factories, packing house, railways, steamships, and all means of communication and operate them through public agencies, and license the importation, manufacture, storage, and distribution of all necessities. For the actual exercise of these powers, many agencies were specifically established by Congress but the

President was authorized to consolidate, abolish, and establish bureaus, offices, and divisions in any fashion demanded by the exigencies of war. "We might as well abdicate and make the President a king," lamented a member of the Senate, but his wail changed no votes.

The dictatorial powers thus conferred on the President were extensively employed. Wheat was fixed at a figure far below the relative prices of the manufactured goods which the farmer had to buy. Railway, telegraph, telephone, and cable lines, express companies, and coastwise and high seas shipping were taken over by the government, and an Emergency Fleet Corporation was created to mobilize the ship-building forces of the country; the stocks of common carriers, long suffering under a drag, rebounding quickly in the hope of generous terms during occupancy. But cotton went free to catch the favors of a swelling market and the South was happy beyond measure, counting this boon from a Democratic President some atonement for fifty years of Republican high protection. To assume the new functions, innumerable agencies were organized; and hundreds of captains of industry flocked to Washington to serve their country at the rate of one dollar a year.

In mobilizing men and materials for war, a sincere effort was made to avoid the scandals which had marred previous armed conflicts: numerous contracts for supplies were made on the basis of cost plus a reasonable commission, an idea alluring but expensive. Although the type of fraud that had been perpetrated in earlier days when contracts were let on the lump-sum principle was thus avoided, other evils scarcely less distressing were called into being. Under the cost-plus system no one was interested in economy; if the producer of raw materials raised his prices, the war contractor could smile and pass on the extra charge with an increase in his commission. If a trade union struck for higher wages, the manufacture could grant the demand with a friendly shrug for the additional expense meant a larger commission garnered from the beneficent government. Only

the wheat growers suffered severely in this procedure, their commodity being held down to a low level whereas the prices of nearly all other essentials went shooting to the sky. So the war led by a Democratic President strengthened his opposition by making several thousand millionaires in the course of two years and by pouring out billions in extra dividends frequently in the form of stock, thereby avoiding the taxes on income and profits. Only the stanchest patriots could restrain their emotions as they contemplated the possibilities of the economic scene.

In only one respect, namely taxation, did the beneficiaries of war prosperity suffer grave disappointment. If former practices had been followed, the bills incurred by such lavish expenditures would have been met from the sale of bonds bearing a high rate of interest and discharged at last by indirect taxes on consumption. This had been in the main the fiscal procedure adopted by the directors of the federal government at the time of the Civil War and the Spanish-American struggle; but during the populist surge of the intervening years, political manners had changed. In radical quarters the demand was now pressed for "the conscription of money as well as men." Indeed it was frankly urged that the entire cost of the war should be charged up to possessors of large fortunes and that all the special gains and benefits accruing from war business should be taken from profiteers by taxation.

Although extreme counsels did not prevail, Congress laid heavy, progressive taxes on incomes and inheritances and burdensome levies upon the excess profits of corporations and partnerships. In spite of the fact that many marvelous schemes were devised by lawyers and accountants for absorbing the shock, including the ingenious device of issuing new stock in lieu of dividends, a weight of taxation that would have seemed revolutionary to the age of Lincoln fell upon the rich and the comfortable during the war for democracy. "This," exclaimed the leading authority on the subject, Professor Edwin R. A. Seligman, speaking of the

upper range of the tax structure, "is the high water mark thus far reached in the history of taxation. Never before in the history of civilization has an attempt been made to take as much as two-thirds of a man's income by taxation."

The levy was not only serious; it was prophetic, foretelling a day not far distant when both the great political parties would endorse the demand of the American Legion for a universal draft act "to place at the disposal of the government, without profit to any one person, the men, money, and material resources of the nation." If the radicals did not have their way in 1917 they flung a dash of bitters into the cup of industrial and financial barons, by showing how in a crisis the sacred right of private property to collect all the revenues the traffic can bear might disappear in a wave of nationalization.

In the sacrificial ardor of 1917, however, all profits were not lost, for the major portion of the current expenses during the war years was met by the sale of interest-bearing securities—not by direct levies on accumulated and accumulating fortunes. Counting the Victory Loan of April, 1919, five great blocks of bonds were floated, making a total of $21,448,120,300, each of them on severe terms that would have astounded the bankers of the Civil War period. Only the first of these issues, the smallest in amount, conceded the sweeping exemption from taxation which had been customary in national loans; the others, while granting favors to small holders, carried liabilities for federal taxes under specific rules. Moreover the bonds were not sold through syndicates on a generous commission basis, but "over the counter" with specific compensation for financiers.

In the popular "drives" the whole nation was invited to share—and recalcitrants were compelled to join. To float the loans, every engine of social control was brought into play: banks, churches, industrial plants, theaters, moving picture shows, associations and societies of every type, as well as public-spirited individuals, sales agents, and organizers. All the vociferous advertising methods so characteristic

of American business in general were mobilized to force each issue "over the top." Not a latent sentiment of loyalty, fear, love, or hate was left unstirred. Immense posters bearing the imprint of a bloody hand and carrying the legend, "The Hun, his Mark. Blot it out with Liberty Bonds," were flung upon the hoardings to move one type of investor. Streamers bearing the inscription, "Ask his Mother How Many Bonds You Should Buy," appealed to another class.

No person, native born, naturalized, or alien, escaped the universal dragnet. Workmen in factories, farmers in fields, clerks in stores, members of lodges, children in school, bank depositors, government employees, travelers on trains, pedestrians in the streets, were all invited, besieged, and belabored to "buy until it hurts." Whoever refused to answer the call was liable to be blacklisted by his neighbors or associates and enrolled in the Doom Book in the Department of Justice as a potential traitor to his country. The sovereignty of the war passion admitted no exceptions. Nationalism was in full flower.

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These material activities were merely a phase of the general mobilization of the whole people in a conflict which, until April 6, 1917, had been stanchly opposed by a large part of them. About one week after the declaration of war, President Wilson organized a committee on public information for the purpose of "selling the war to America." At the head of this agency, he placed George Creel, a versatile journalist of socialist affiliations, well fitted accordingly to reach critics and malcontents. Under Creel's directions, masters of the printed word, adepts in advertising, university professors, facile magazine writers, and popular novelists were enrolled in regimented ranks assigned to "educating" the United States and in turn deluging the world with American propaganda.

To the necessities of this campaign, trained historians bent their supple discipline while the sciences and arts rendered their full tribute to the cause. With the higher mental order thus arranged, the entire school system of the country was easily brought into line with mechanical precision, subduing even the minds of tender children to the official thesis concerning the origins and merits of the contest. Bulletins, tracts, leaflets, and flyers in all languages by the billions were poured out in unending streams. Heavy, documented articles were devised by men of learning for the intellectuals; pungent sayings and slogans were invented to supply substance for the less sophisticated.

Never before in history had such a campaign of education been organized; never before had American citizens realized how thoroughly, how irresistibly a modern government could impose its ideas upon the whole nation and, under a barrage of publicity, stifle dissent with declarations, assertions, official versions, and reiteration. Organized to sell the war to a divided and confused nation, the committee on public information succeeded beyond all expectations.

With adversaries who were not convinced or cowed by its publicity campaign, the government dealt mercilessly under drastic statutes. In June, 1917, Congress passed the Espionage Act, laying heavy penalties on all persons who interfered in any way with the effective mobilization of the military and naval forces of the nation. Not content with the sweeping provisions of this law, the President asked and received from Congress a still more severe measure, the Sedition Act of May, 1918, a statute which in effect made any criticism of the Wilson administration illegal.

Though this measure surpassed in violence the Sedition Law of 1798, so hotly denounced by Thomas Jefferson, it was enacted without difficulty. It is true that twenty-four Republicans and two Democrats voted against it in the Senate; it is true also that a few independent Senators, such as William E. Borah and Hiram Johnson, condemned it as unconstitutional and unnecessary; but the pressure of the

administration could not be stayed. An attempt was likewise made to lay on the press the iron hand of an official censorship but associated editors, unlike unorganized and inert citizens, were able to defeat that design. Yet theirs was a bootless victory as practice showed, for under the general terms of the Espionage and Sedition acts, newspapers were continually silenced by orders and prosecutions. Individual critics of the war and the Wilson program were rounded up by the government, often without warrants of arrest, hustled to jail, held incommunicado without bail, tried in courts where the atmosphere was heavily charged with passion, lectured by irate judges, and sent to prison for long terms—in one case an adolescent girl for twenty years.

Armed with the elastic provisions of the penal statutes, the various branches of government, national and state, that could find a color of justification, set in motion machines of inquiry and arraignment. The Departments of War, Navy, State, and the Post Office created "intelligence" agencies which directed professional and amateur detectives in collecting and filing information of every kind concerning citizens of every class, ranging from radical members of the Industrial Workers of the World to simple-minded professors who entertained philosophic doubts about the plenary authenticity of the canon delivered to President Wilson. Under the direction of A. S. Burleson of Austin, Texas, the Postoffice Department found the defeat of the censorship bill no bar to the suppression of newspapers that failed to measure up to its standards of propriety and taste. In the War Department an army of clerks and investigators assembled mountains of "data" bearing on the opinions of private persons; a swivel-chair chauvinist, thrown up from obscurity for an hour and drawing a dollar a year for his services, gave to the press under the color of dubious official authority a long list of citizens branded as traitors in his own patriotic eyes.

Naturally the great burden of work under the Espionage

and Sedition acts fell upon the Department of Justice, a small bureau of investigation, erected in Roosevelt's administration, being transformed into a nation-wide spy system, with millions of money and thousands of employees at its service. Judging by its official reports, the main business of the Department was not the apprehension of the people who gave aid and comfort to the Central Powers with which the country was at war but rather the supervision of American citizens suspected of radical opinions about the perfection and perpetuity of the capitalist system of economy at home. According to authentic evidence, every practice dear to the Russian police of the old régime was employed by federal agents: provocative "tools" were "planted" among organizations of humble working people, supposed to have dangerous tendencies, and were instructed to incite them to unlawful acts; meeting places of such associations were raided without proper warrant, property was destroyed, papers seized, innocent bystanders beaten, and persons guilty of no offense at all rushed off to jail, subjected to police torture, held without bail, and released without recourse.

To the official army of the grand inquest was added a still greater force of more than two hundred thousand private citizens enrolled by the Department of Justice in the work of watching neighbors. To these volunteers no test of intelligence or efficiency was applied; any person, man or woman, willing to play the rôle of informer was admitted to the fellowship. So in offices, factories, mines, mills, churches, homes, schools, restaurants, trains, ships, ferries, and stores, government watchers could be found listening to conversations, insinuating and suggesting, noting prattle and tattle, and reporting "findings" to Washington to be filed in huge dossiers of "information"—recalling the fateful days of 1692 in Salem.

Private associations and societies conformed to the prevailing mood of the bureaucracy. From institutions of higher learning, professors were expelled, frequently on

evidence that would not convict a notorious cut-purse in normal times, Columbia University leading off in this kind of "purification." "It is very difficult to discharge professors once employed," wrote A. Barton Hepburn, the banker-philanthrophist on its board of trustees. "They make common cause and howl about academic freedom. We have had trouble along this line in Columbia where they taught sedition and disloyalty and that enabled us to get rid of eight or ten at the time." Clergymen were unfrocked and sent to prison for overemphasizing the Sermon on the Mount. Members of clubs were ostracized for failure to conform.

And yet when all these immense inquisitorial activities were sifted down to the very bottom, only two conclusions of significance remained. The first is that not a single first-class German spy or revolutionary workingman was caught and convicted of an overt act designed to give direct aid or comfort to the enemy. The second is that, as in England during the period of the French Revolution, the occasion of the war which called for patriotic duties was seized by emotional conservatives as an opportunity to blacken the character of persons whose opinions they feared and hated.

Undoubtedly the great body of citizens would have given the Wilson war administration unstinted support without the whip of coercion. Even in the ranks of labor, where hostility to the doctrines of the established order is usually most marked, opponents of the war gained few recruits. No doubt, the proletarian revolution in Russia in November, 1917, caused a flurry in radical circles and alarmed old ladies and gentlemen at their tea and cakes but it made no perceptible drag on the mobilization of national forces for the war. Hitherto pacifist in profession, the Socialists split asunder and grew more and more impotent as the days lengthened into the months; a small faction, adhering to the Marxian creed, denounced the conflict as a capitalist quarrel but an equally able group of leaders lent their pens and

voices to the government in the prosecution of "the war for democracy to end war." At all events, organized labor stood firmly behind the President. Speaking in the name of the American Federation, Samuel Gompers declared that "this is labor's war," pleading for the undivided support of all the bodies under his jurisdiction.

In return, union labor was given a high position in national affairs. Besides being granted representation on important boards and commissions in charge of industrial relations, its standards for hours and wages were generally accepted and widely applied. While the Department of Labor, headed by a trade unionist, spared no efforts in stimulating the loyalty of workers in mills, mines, and factories, their demands for higher wages to meet the mounting costs of living were granted with an alacrity that amazed the veterans of stubborn battles, who could recall the scenes at Homestead and Pullman. As labor became more revolutionary in Europe, during the course of the war, the importance of conciliating it temporarily in America loomed especially large in the minds of government officials and industrial captains.

In this war of arms, industry, and politics, the women of the nation, like the men, were completely absorbed. As in Napoleon's time, as we have seen, the bayonet had been thrust into the hands of the common man together with the ballot, making war democratic and national, so in the age of industry and equal suffrage, the age of belligerent economic titans, all services short of fighting in the trenches fell to the lot of women and were radiantly accepted by them. In the Civil War they had served as nurses, organized hospital relief, furnished supplies for the wounded, flocked to the factories that made war materials, labored on the farms, and participated in charity drives.

In the World War, they did all these things and more. Now organized in clubs and associations of a thousand varieties, they were easily drawn individually and collectively into the main war currents. They established all-

women hospital units; they acted as doctors, nurses, ambulance drivers, camouflage artists, propagandists, entertainers, hostesses at canteens and dance halls, spies at home and abroad, members of government defense and war committees of all kinds, and informers under the Sedition Act—in short in every capacity save that of the soldier at the battle front, foreshadowing, perhaps, the day when equal opportunity will have no limitations or exceptions even there.

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While capital, materials, opinion, labor, and women were mobilizing for the gigantic struggle, the army and navy were being organized to carry the weight of the United States to the battle lines of Europe. At the outbreak of the war, the general public was in doubt about the best method for providing man power for the front. Although Old World experience pointed to universal service as the inexorable solution of the problem, American tradition ran against military compulsion as an aid to patriotism. Only as a last resort had conscription been accepted during the Civil War and the enforcement of the draft at that time had been the occasion for desperate rioting in New York City and bitter opposition in other quarters.

If, however, any one high in authority felt inclined to appeal to history in the spring of 1917, he was quickly overruled. President Wilson immediately crystalized vague and fluid ideas by declaring in favor of conscription; all the more readily because volunteering for the regular army did not proceed with expected rapidity and the grim business ahead as unfolded by daily bulletins admitted of no temporizing. "The whole nation," said the President, "must be a team in which each man shall play the part for which he is best fitted." Under his direction Congress, by an act of May 18, 1917, provided that the military and naval forces for the war should be recruited by lot from among the adult males of the land, excluding alien enemies, between

the ages of twenty-one and thirty inclusive—limits which were extended the next year to eighteen and forty-five. This decree, calling the entire manhood of the country to the colors, was accepted by the people of every section and so smoothly administered that it surprised all prophets of adversity.

Effective coöperation with the Associated Powers, the great goal for which national energies were being mobilized, was facilitated by expert assistance. As soon as the proprieties admitted, Allied commissions appeared in Washington with the Rt. Hon. Arthur James Balfour and General Joffre as the most impressive leaders. The former with the quiet dignity of an English gentleman captivated those members of the public who had the privilege of meeting him personally; when he turned aside from diplomacy to confess his faith in a personal God, the efficacy of prayer, and the immortality of the soul, he linked himself with hooks of steel to the great heart of America. He was cheered to the echo when he declared at the Chamber of Commerce in New York City that "since August, 1914, the fight has been for the highest spiritual advantages of mankind and without a petty thought or ambition." His colleague, General Joffre, hero of the Marne, though reserved, paternal, circumspect, and given to silence on momentous matters, was also received with tumultuous acclaim by the masses for his martial glory.

In quiet conferences with President Wilson, these commissioners described the desperate plight of the Entente Allies and demonstrated the imperative need for immediate help with money, supplies, and men at the front. In response, loans running into the billions were granted with alacrity, and provisions made for united action in controlling world trade and pouring an unbroken stream of materials into the Allied countries, in spite of the submarine menace, then growing deadlier every hour.

"Send us American soldiers!" was the universal cry from the Associates of the United States. "Let the American

flag be unfurled on the fields of France and let the tramp of American armies thrill anew the worn spirits of those who have borne the brunt of battle for three long years." So it was decided to dispatch at the earliest possible moment contingents from the regular army and the state militia mustered into national service.

Resolutely putting aside a plea that Colonel Roosevelt be placed at the head of an advance guard of soldiers, Wilson chose as commander of the American expeditionary forces, General John J. Pershing, who had seen service in the Philippines and had directed the recent punitive invasion into Mexico. In June, General Pershing went to France to prepare the way for the coming hosts, followed in a few days by the first units of the regular forces which marched through the streets of Paris as a pledge of America's determination. Until the draft army was ready, of course, the transport of forces was inevitably slow, but in the opening weeks of 1918 the tiny current became a torrent; by July a million American soldiers were on the scene of action. When at last in November the curtain was rung down on the world tragedy, the number had doubled, belieing the contemptuous prophecies of German critics and astounding the world by the miracle wrought through the transformation of America into a fighting machine.

Naturally the posture of military affairs decided the disposition of American forces along the front. The English held the western section near their base of supplies; the heart of France was concentrated on the defense of Paris; accordingly the most tranquil section toward the east was first assigned to the American associates. With incredible swiftness a huge American war mechanism was created on the basis of this arrangement, with its chief port of entry at Bordeaux and its headquarters at Chaumont, below Verdun. Slowly the regular soldiers, forerunners of the draft army, as soon as their elementary instruction in the arts of local warfare permitted, were filtered into the trenches. By October, 1917, a few of them were on the firing line;

in November they had their first severe clash with the enemy.

After a winter of such cautious preparations, General Pershing, now strengthened by increasing forces from America, was ready to work effectively with General Foch in breaking the shock of the mighty German offensive launched in March. Again in the summer when General Ludendorf's last desperate drive threw the French and Allied forces back upon the Marne, American soldiers at Château-Thierry, Belleau Wood, and other points along the flaming line played well their part in the awful fighting that turned the tide of battle. In September, with French assistance, they wiped out the German salient at Saint Mihiel and then joined in the fierce surge from the mountains to the Channel that burst wide the gates of victory.

On the ocean, American coöperation with the Allied powers, though less spectacular, proceeded with equal resolve. Already aware that the crash was imminent, President Wilson, in March, 1917, sent Admiral Sims, whose English descent on his mother's side made him peculiarly acceptable, across the sea to prepare the way for united action and on May 4 American destroyers steamed into Queenstown. Meanwhile the manufacture of submarine chasers and scout cruisers was hastened in American shipyards; recruiting and training of the naval forces were carried on with high speed; and new types of deadly contact-mines were turned out by the shipload. In protecting the American coast, in patrolling the war zones for submarines, in sowing mines through the North Sea, in bombing submarine bases, and in convoying troop ships, the American navy rose to the requirements of the combat. When at length the long conflict was over and the armistice was proclaimed on November 11, 1918, more than three hundred American war vessels and seventy-five thousand sailors were operating in European waters.

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Besides economic might and military power, new social and intellectual forces were thrown into the balance. In days of old when kings made war with mercenary armies, no grand proclamation of aims and purposes was required; the royal will was made known and good subjects obeyed. That was the state of affairs when the French Revolution altered the face of politics, thrusting the ballot and the bayonet into the hands of peasants, hairdressers, and carters, and making it expedient, on summoning them to arms, to accompany the call by a declaration of principles answering to their moral aspirations. In this service the resourcefulness of the human mind never failed. Napoleon was past-master of the publicity art and his successors imitated him at a distance. When the statesmen of Europe blindly blundered into war in the summer of 1914, as Lloyd George, who sat at the council table of the great, bluntly described the tragedy in after years, belligerent managers on both sides engaged an army of philosophers and scribes to formulate convincing reasons for each turn in affairs, manufacturing in this fashion a literature that was immense and imaginative.

In addition to designing moral patterns for popular use, European statesmen in charge of the war had also to agree upon more substantial objectives. Of course there was little doubt about the character of the settlement that the German militarists would have imposed upon the world if victory had perched upon their banners; out of their historic past and out of their mouths they stood confessed—the treaty of Brest-Litovsk forced on Russia revealing in drastic terms in 1918 the range of their ambitions. It was not even necessary for the Central Powers to enter into secret understandings as to the division of the booty to be acquired; they formed a solid bloc under German dominion.

But the case of the Entente Allies was different in that no single power was dominant. Italy, for example, had been brought into the war only by heroic bargaining which

resulted in a secret treaty stating exactly what her reward was to be; and all the Associates were afraid of defections induced by favorable offers from the enemy. To make sure of their unity, therefore, the diplomats of France, England, Russia, and Japan in 1915 set projects for distributing the spoils, on the fine old Roman principle of "Woe to the Vanquished!" If the Bolsheviki had not torn open the secret archives of Petrograd and flung the documents in the face of mankind in December, 1917, these plighted war aims of the Entente Allies would have remained unknown perhaps forever and their official hypothesis would have been questioned only by the cynical at home or abroad. But the Russian Revolution made the facts public property, enabling the generation that fought the war to get its sources and origins straight from authentic records. This was a novel chapter in the story of diplomacy.

To these European understandings America had been no party. President Wilson privately believed that both embattled hosts were fighting for the same thing, namely, to relieve historic grudges and gain material advantages. It was this conviction, as we have said, founded on no mean knowledge, that kept him aloof in the early years of the war while hysterical compatriots raged around the White House.

But, as he watched the smoke and flames of burning Europe month after month, the President came to certain general conclusions relative to the kind of settlement that ought to be made—long before he threw the American sword into the scales. These conclusions he expounded in a peace address before the Senate in January, 1917: recognition of the rights of small nations, independence of Poland, government by consent of the governed, freedom of the seas, outlets to water for landlocked countries, and a concert of powers to preserve the peace of the world. By the managers of Europe this address, in which lay the germs of the President's later program, was greeted with doubts and derision. The thundering editor of the London Daily

Mail laughed loud and long at this "abstract pontifical statement of a future international morality."

Yet water flowed swiftly under the bridge. In less than a year, while the decision on the battle fronts still hung in the balance, the Russian Revolution of November, 1917, shook the social order of Europe to its very foundations, making the whole earth vibrate with the tramp of the proletariat and tremble at the most daring call for a universal uprising against governments issued to mankind since the French Declaration of Rights in 1789. At once it became evident that Russia could be held in line and the war morale of Germany undermined only by liberal statements of a democratic policy flatly contradicting the imperialistic aims hidden in the secret treaties of the Allied Powers.

It was then that President Wilson, renewing his former professions, came to the rescue of his hard-pressed associates of little faith. In the tempestuous days of January, 1918, when the Bolsheviki were staggering before the harsh terms proposed by the imperial governments of Germany and Austria at Brest-Litovsk, Edgar Sisson, representative of the American committee on public information at Petrograd, cabled to George Creel, its director in Washington, a request that the President "restate the anti-imperialistic war aims and democratic peace requisites of America, thousand words or less, short, almost placard paragraphs, short sentences." If the President would do this, Sisson added, he could "get it fed into Germany in great quantities in German translation and utilize Russian version potently in army and everywhere." Five days later Wilson went before Congress and proclaimed his Fourteen Points in ringing periods that flew on the wings of lightning to the remote corners of the earth, even into Korea, Cambodia, Siam, India, the Philippines, and the Islands of the South Seas—wherever subject peoples were ruled by imperial powers.

Briefly digested these articles of political faith embraced the following items: open diplomacy, freedom of the seas, removal of hampering trade barriers among nations, reduc-

tion of armaments, adjustment of colonial claims in the interests of the populations involved, fair treatment for Russia, restoration of Belgium, righting the wrong done to France in 1871, adjustment of Italian frontiers on principles of nationalism, more autonomy for the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian empire, restoration of Rumania and Serbia, an independent Poland, reorganization of the Turkish empire, and finally an association of nations to uphold a peaceful world order.

Such was the American creed formulated by the spokesman for the nation and received with a shout of approval from coast to coast, except in conservative and radical circles where such lofty sentiments were viewed with equal suspicion. Like drowning men grasping at straws, responsible statesmen among the Entente Allies gave their sanction to the Wilsonian formulas "in principle"—privately subject to discreet and appropriate reservations. With revolutionary doctrines thus phrased and approved, the people of the Central Powers, soldiers and civilians, were drenched in a propaganda for liberty and democracy, warning them that they were fighting for imperialist masters against governments that offered them a peace of justice and freedom. Assailed by Bolshevik propaganda from the East, filtering into the army by fraternization, and by no less effective propaganda from the West, the flame of German ardor was slowly dampened down.

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Yet it would be a mistake to lay too much stress on the achievements of this indoctrination. It was the weight of materials rather than of words that defeated Germany and Austria. On August 14, 1918, Ludendorf, according to secret papers now unfolded, confessed to his imperial master that the great game was over, that German armies were beaten, and that the one remaining task was to wring from the victors the best possible terms.

At first the discomfited directors of the German government thought of sounding out the Entente powers through the good offices of some neutral country but, as days wore on and the raging hail of steel and fire and gas beat on their western front with increasing severity, they conceived the idea of appealing directly to Wilson in the language of his Fourteen Points. By way of preparation, they admitted a large number of the Socialists to their council, introduced the English parliamentary system of government, and called a mild liberal, Prince Max of Baden, to the imperial chancellorship. Now, they said, since the German people rule in place of an autocracy, let us have an armistice followed by a peace fashioned after the doctrines of liberty and democracy laid down by the President of the United States. In a startling call sent to Wilson through the mediation of Switzerland, on October 5, 1918, the new German government asked him to take steps to end the war because, forsooth, the principles proclaimed by him were in accord with the "general ideas cherished by the new German government and with it the overwhelming majority of our people." Prince Max afterwards admitted that he had no faith in Wilson's ability to fulfill his pledges but he thought that the opportunity for embarrassing the great pacificator was not to be missed.

Amid trying circumstances Wilson faced the test of his hypothesis. In formulating American moral principles into linguistic patterns, he was his own master but on the field of battle the army of the United States was only one among many. Moreover, when it came to laying down the exact conditions of an armistice, political theories had to descend to concrete realities: there had to be precision in terms of men, money, munitions, and movements of troops. In this sphere it was General Foch, responsible head of the Allied and associated armies, who was the natural master of ceremonies. Now this seasoned soldier, who did not take the Fourteen Points at face value, showed no signs of a hurried belief in German conversion to democracy and certainly

wanted no revolution across the Rhine anyway. So for more than a month the discussion of provisional conditions for peace went on while the German armies in France crumbled before the relentless drive of the Allied and associated forces.

On all sides, in fact, the Central Powers were revealing a fatal weakness. At the end of September, Bulgaria had surrendered unconditionally. Late in October, Austria, after suffering ruinous reverses on the Italian front, begged for peace, and on November 3 laid down her arms. Two days later President Wilson transmitted draconian armistice terms, drawn by military men, to the authorities in Berlin where revolution had already raised its red specter.

In this crisis, the German Kaiser, still undefeated in his ambitions, proposed to use his soldiers on the wavering civilians in the rear, only to find that even his choicest men had no stomach for such an enterprise. Confronted by an implacable foe and deserted by his weary nation, he laid down the insignia of his imperial office and fled with the Crown Prince to personal safety in Holland. On the morning of November 11, at eleven o'clock, the armistice went into effect and the roll of guns that had thundered along the front for four agonizing years died away. A tumult of thanksgiving surged throughout the world, even the Germans finding crumbs of comfort in the fact that there was to be no triumphal march of victors into Berlin.

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Wilson now had to meet the greatest crisis of his life—and without the support of a united country. At the congressional elections held a few days before the armistice the American voters, spurning his appeal for a Democratic House of Representatives to sustain his hand in negotiating peace on his avowed principles, had returned a majority of Republicans after a savage campaign in which many outstanding leaders had demanded the unconditional surrender

of Germany, a Spartan peace for the vanquished, and the utter rejection of the proposed league of nations. "In no other free country in the world today would Mr. Wilson be in office," was the taunt flung at the President on the eve of his departure for the peace conference in France, a taunt taken up with glee by the imperialist press of London and Paris.

On his arrival in Europe to realize the dream of his Fourteen Points, President Wilson was, therefore, a broken instrument compelled by fate to engage in high diplomatic combat with the most astute politicians thrown to the top in the volcanic upheaval of the war, everyone sustained by powerful chauvinistic passions at home. To them it made little difference if the President was acclaimed by the radical masses everywhere as the Moses of the new day who was to lead them away from the bloody sands of the European desert to the promised land of peace or if, on his journey through England, France, and Italy with Mrs. Wilson at his side, he received a triumphal ovation that would have turned the head of a Cæsar or a Napoleon.

When Wilson reached Paris in the early days of December with a veritable army of American experts in history, geography, economics, and diplomacy, and four commismissioners chosen by him to serve as his aides, he found his Entente associates—Lloyd George of England, Clemenceau of France, and Orlando of Italy—unready for immediate action, while the manager of the Japanese delegation was engrossed in reading French novels. Knowing that the singing masses would soon lose their fervor and shift to new attractions, these experienced statesmen played safely for delay. As a result of this strategy more than a month was allowed to elapse before the plenary peace council of the thirty-two victorious belligerents met formally, on January 18—to receive the information that all important business would be transacted by a supreme council composed of the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan.

When eventually the diplomats got down to determining boundaries and distributing goods, a contest of wits commenced—a contest held behind closed doors at Wilson's request, with the ready acquiescence of his colleagues. As time passed and the antagonisms around the council table grew sharper, the supreme council narrowed down still further. Assured in the matter of Shantung, Japan dropped out; and Orlando, angered by Wilson's flat refusal to yield to Italy's intransigent demands, withdrew amid the cheers of his countrymen. So in the end, "the big three"—Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Wilson—in their private chambers shaped the significant clauses for the voluminous treaty of peace, including the section putting the responsibility for starting the war on the Central Powers. The German delegation, on June 28, 1919, having filed vigorous protests, entered the Hall of Mirrors in the palace of Versailles, the scene of the Hohenzollern triumph in 1871, to sign on the dotted line. In due course Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey were also brought to book.

The details of the grand settlement were spread over many pages but the principles of historic importance were few and simple. Like all such human arrangements, the outcome was in some respects a compromise. Certain elements of the Fourteen Points were realized: for example, nine independent states, most of them in eastern Europe, were called into being under the principle of self-determination and Alsace-Lorraine was restored to France. The boundaries of Italy, Greece, Rumania, Serbia, Belgium, and Denmark were enlarged on the theory of nationality, with many glaring violations of the creed. Germany was reduced in size and power and Austria-Hungary broken up. While conforming in some respects to the Wilsonian doctrines, these arrangements added to the security and strength of France without jeopardizing, at least immediately, any British interests.

In the distribution of imperial spoils slight concessions were made to Wilson's feelings. Germany's former col-

onies in all parts of the world were transferred to the victors, merely as mandates to be held under the League of Nations as "a sacred trust for civilization." The Saar Valley, purely German in population but possessed of rich coal fields, was assigned to France simply for temporary exploitation. Shantung, wrested from Germany by Japan, was won by the diplomats of Tokyo, against the loud protests of the Peking delegation, only under a promise of ultimate return to China, later carried out to the letter under interesting circumstances. But in the main and substantially, the arrangement of boundaries and the division of booty outlined in the famous Secret Treaties of 1915 were realized in the Versailles treaty—with a noteworthy exception. Russia, given no voice in the council chamber at Paris, did not receive the share originally allotted to her; on the contrary the territory of the old Russian Empire was cut and carved at will by the mapmakers of the supreme council. Subject to these limitations, the proceedings at Paris ran true to careful plans and immemorial usage.

Nothing was omitted that promised to break the power of Germany as a competitor in the markets of the world. Her navy was turned over to the victors. Her army was reduced to a negligible figure. She was deprived of her colonies, her merchant marine, her property in foreign lands, and her trading bases and banks in all parts of the world. Under the guise of reparations, including the cost of pensions for the veterans of the Allied armies and their families, the Germans were forced to pledge themselves to payments totaling in the end about thirty-three billion gold dollars, a staggering sum that made the punitive indemnities of earlier settlements seem pitiably small.

In short, the law of vengeance was to be applied. By way of preliminary, Lloyd George had said: "In substance the Allies have one common principle which I once set forth thus: 'Germany must pay up to the last farthing of her power,'" a prophecy that neatly foretold the re-

sults of the peace conference on the point. Finally, to complete the picture the Germans were compelled to acknowledge that on the Central Powers rested the full responsibility for bringing upon humanity the curse of the World War—a solemn declaration that must have brought an exquisite smile to the lips of Lloyd George and Clemenceau as they thought of the secret archives in London and Paris.

In this great bargain President Wilson got no indemnities and no territory for the United States, nothing comparable to McKinley's winnings in 1898. In fulfillment of his principles, he sought no national gains. Looking to the long future, he labored rather with unbending will and great stress of spirit to secure agreement on a plan for a League of Nations, counting all temporary provisions as minor matters to be adjusted in the coming Parliament of Man. Keeping always before him that more distant ideal—suggested to him by Sir Edward Grey through the instrumentality of Colonel House—the President contested every inch of the ground in Paris, once even going so far as to threaten a rupture of negotiations by ordering his steamer to make ready for departure. Undoubtedly his perplexity was deep. If he had defiantly refused to make any prime concessions to the diplomacy of historic subtraction and division, he would have pleased a little band of faithful liberals at home, but by the same token he would have brought down upon his head the wrath of an army of Republicans bent on the ruin of Germany and the recovery of power at Washington. So in the end, the President made his choice and completed the treaty, reckoning the settlement with the Central Powers, however open to criticism, as lighter in the balance than a pledge of perpetual peace. Weltgeschichte, as the Germans say, ist Weltgericht; and long after all now living are in their graves the far judgment of destiny may be rendered on this man.

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The Covenant of the League of Nations incorporated in the structure of the treaty and brought home by the Presi-

dent provided for the creation of three permanent international agencies: a Secretariat, finally located at Geneva; an Assembly consisting of one deputy from each nation, dominion, and self-governing colony; and a grand Council composed of representatives from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan and four other representatives selected from time to time by the assembly. Numerous and weighty were the duties imposed on the League and the obligations accepted by its members. All the associated powers bound themselves to respect one another's territorial integrity and to coöperate in preserving it against external aggression. They agreed to submit to arbitration or inquiry by the Council every dispute that could not be adjusted by diplomacy; on no account were they to resort to arms until three months after the decision of that tribunal and in case the verdict was unanimous they were bound to abide by it. If any member declined to observe its covenants, drastic retaliation could be lawfully invoked; the refusal was to be viewed as an act of war against the League, the trade of the offending member could be cut off, and the Council after deliberation could recommend to the associated governments the military measures to be adopted. At last a World Parliament, so celebrated in prose and poetry, seemed within a measurable distance of realization.

On submitting this program to the judgment of the American people, champions of the new order encountered a hostility which dazed those who thought the war had been waged to end war. During the longdrawn proceedings at Paris the air had been filled with discordant notes and when the treaty finally appeared, the forces of opposition, conservative and radical, coalesced in shouting a mighty negative. With grim determination Wilson's adversaries carried their battle into the Senate, now in Republican hands, where under the Constitution a two-thirds vote was necessary to the ratification of the Versailles document.

Inevitably, therefore, the affections and hatreds of domestic partisanship were injected into the discussion of the

great international issue; and according to time-honored custom, opinions on the merits of the treaty were scattered along the political line from right to left. A small group of "irreconcilables," mainly Republicans, would have nothing but quick and unqualified rejection; a body of Democrats, closely marshaled under Wilson's rule of unquestioning obedience, demanded ratification without material change; while between these two uncompromising regiments were strung at varying intervals the advocates of ratification subject to amendments, reservations, or interpretations. Some of the moderates were prominent Republicans like Elihu Root, William Howard Taft, and George W. Wickersham, well-known advocates of peace; others were Democrats entertaining doubts.

With political forces so divided there was bound to be a long and bitter contest and it came with a startling impact. From every angle the Versailles settlement was assailed. German sympathizers attacked it for the severe terms imposed upon the vanquished. Irish sympathizers advanced upon it because it gave representation to the self-governing dominions of Great Britain while offering no sign of recognition to Ireland, then deep in her struggle for independence. On the other hand, if some thought the burdens laid upon Germany too heavy, or the claims of Ireland shamefully neglected, perhaps as many were discontented because the rights of America and American citizens had received too little attention in the gathering up of the fragments at Paris.

But the heaviest barrage of fire was concentrated on the Covenant of the League of Nations by those who clung to the American doctrine of isolation. The project, ran the argument of this party, would involve America in European entanglements, by binding the government to coöperate with other powers in maintaining the independence and integrity of all members associated in the League; it would erect a super-state that might invade the domestic interests of the United States, such for example, as the control of immigra-

tion; it would impose a moral obligation on our government to take part "in the disturbances, conflicts, settlements, and wars of Europe and Asia"; it would lay the same obligation on other countries to concern themselves in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere.

Nor did the personal tactics pursued by President Wilson from the beginning have a mollifying effect on political passions. Departing from all precedents, he had gone to the Paris conference himself, taking no member of the Senate, not even one of the Republican majority, with him to the peace table. He had practically ignored the four men who did accompany him, with the possible exception of Colonel House, and had assumed the whole burden of responsibility for the final settlement, in effect inviting his enemies to transfer to his handiwork the full brunt of their animosity against him and his domestic policies.

Moreover, during the negotiation of the treaty, the Senate itself had been neglected, receiving from Wilson no conciliatory messages. Worse than that; on the completion of the document, copies of it found their way into the hands of bankers and journalists before the Senators were given a glimpse of the text, an ominous incident; and as if to increase partisan tension, already high, Wilson addressed Senators in reference to the treaty with an air of finality not calculated to soothe the opposition. "The stage is set," he said; "the destiny disclosed. It has come about by no plan of our conceiving, but by the hand of God who led us into this war." Though willing to allow "interpretations" of particular clauses, the President would accept no essential changes in the great structure he had helped to erect. He now endeavored, it is true, to disarm his critics in the Senate by personal conferences but his efforts in that direction were too late and too evidently marred by appearances of awkwardness and restraint.

Fearing defeat in the end the harassed President, taking the stump in September, made a grand tour to the Pacific Coast appealing to the American people at large over the

heads of the recalcitrant Senators in Washington. But the effort was too much for him. While engaged in this battle for his treaty, Wilson became desperately ill and was taken back to the capital broken in body if not in spirit. Save for occasional hours of feverish activity, he never recovered his power. During the remainder of his term the affairs of his administration drifted; his Cabinet fell to pieces with resignations and dismissals; and Congress, dominated by Republicans, devoted itself in accordance with canonical party custom to the politics of obstruction and recrimination preparatory to the coming election. Unable to agree on reservations and worn by the long debates, the Senate, on March 19, 1920, definitely rejected the treaty by announcing that the constitutional majority could not be obtained. The campaign being now at hand, Wilson insisted that the people should hold "a solemn referendum" upon the League of Nations. His desire was gratified.



# CHAPTER XXIX

## *The Quest for Normalcy*

FINANCIAL feudalism died in the United States when Woodrow Wilson took the oath of office as President. . . . Mr. Hanna and Mr. Morgan both believed that the country should be governed by property and that the power over both property and Government should be centralized. . . . Hannaism died a lingering death, but it died, root, branch, and twig. With the election of Woodrow Wilson to the presidency in 1912, the last spark of life had vanished. Outside the select circle of Privilege, there were no mourners. . . . The new Banking and Currency law has destroyed the conditions under which a Morgan was possible." Thus, in language that recalled the celebration of Jefferson's great revolution in 1800 and, long afterward, Jackson's triumph of 1832, the editor of the New York World tersely presented a popular view of the economic result achieved by Wilson's election.

Both the style and the form of the argument were beyond reproach; but a large part of the country did not approve either the diagnosis or the announcement of the cure.

"America's present need is not heroics but healing; not nostrums but normalcy; not revolution but restoration; . . . not surgery but serenity." In these brief phrases, delivered to an audience of responsive captains of industrial enterprise in Boston, in May, 1920, Senator Warren Gamaliel Harding, of Ohio, expressed another opinion of Wilson's services to American society. Though the word "normalcy" was not in the household dictionary, it was caught up with enthusiasm, especially by applauding business men, as the symbol of their poignant yearning for a return, how far no one could tell, upon the route along which they had been carried by Wilson. No political manometer registered the exact degree of pressure.

With reference to foreign affairs, any program of healing, restoration, and serenity implied a repudiation of Wilson's high internationalism including its tenderness for subject races, a reliance upon the safeguards offered by the balance of power, a revival of the Webster-Seward-Hay policy in the Pacific Ocean, the hard-headed promotion of foreign trade by the engines of state, the development of the Navy as the forerunner and defender of commerce, and firmness in the government of imperial provinces. Equally realistic, essentially economic, were the insinuations of normalcy in domestic politics.

There was, of course, some grumbling about the popular election of United States Senators, the direct primary, woman suffrage, the initiative and referendum, and the other instruments of the new democracy, but they were more easily manipulated than destroyed. After all none of them had made any serious dislocations in the system of use and wont—for example, by distributing their votes among the parties largely in accordance with their social groupings women placed no insuperable obstacles in the way of Harding's renaissance. There was also a great deal of smothered conversation about the juristic process of healing and serenity; the Supreme Court under the influence of liberal members picked by Roosevelt and Wilson had showed a

tendency to relax the rigidity of the Constitution as read in the era of the full dinner pail and to tolerate legislation thrown up in the sweep of social democracy. If Phœnix was to get clear of the ashes a number of discreet judicial appointments would have to be made.

But all this was by way of preliminary and incident; the real bill of exigent particulars presented by those who demanded a general retreat to the old régime referred primarily to economic legislation touching the distribution of wealth. To them the revival of McKinley's learning signified a repeal of the taxes on incomes, inheritances, and excess profits, especially the higher schedules, and a shift of the burden of federal support from wealth enjoyed by the rich to goods consumed by the masses. It likewise involved a fair recovery of the Hamilton-Webster-McKinley system of tariffs, subsidies, and bounties for the owners of industries and merchant vessels. Apart from such paternal assistance, it meant, as the phrase ran current, "no government interference with business"—no official meddling with mergers, combinations, and stock issues, no resort to harsh price-fixing or regulatory schemes, and a release of the tense pressure exerted upon railways. Finally, normalcy implied the immediate opening of the remaining fragments of the national domain to rapid development; if not by outright gift or easy sale, then by a generous exercise of the leasing powers recently conferred upon the executive department by acts of Congress. Other specifications similar in character were included in extreme projects for normalcy; some champions of recession proposing to go the full length to a logical conclusion, defying time and flood.

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The ladies and gentlemen who pined for a recovery of the Hamilton-Webster-McKinley system had valid reasons for desiring to turn their backs upon the policies of Woodrow Wilson. Early in his first administration, he had openly

warned the masters of business enterprise that their grip on the federal government would be broken and, except during the urgent years of the war, including its aftermath, he had been cold to their pleas and threats. Indeed he had, in their eyes, violated the rules of the political game by denouncing the lobbyists in the corridors of Congress and by stating baldly that capitalist interests were trying to drive him into a war with Mexico. Few of the schedules in his tariff bill of 1913 had pleased leaders in great industries. None of his subsequent laws, except perhaps the Federal Reserve Act, had exactly met their requirements.

Moreover, Wilson had gathered around him in his official family several liberals approved only by farmers and industrial workers. He had permitted, if not encouraged, high talk about a grand "reconstruction of the existing order" on the return to peace—giving a kind of second-hand benediction to those philosophers of social inclinations who contended that the extraordinary productivity which resulted from the intense coöperative effort of the war had proved the soundness of their theories. During his administrations, and with presidential blessings, organized labor had rapidly extended its membership and attained a power both in private industry and in public affairs most disconcerting to men brought up in the liberty of the gilded age. Under the patronage of Wilson's indulgent government in the years of the war, at a time when labor was scarce and profits high, when labor costs could be shifted to a complacent public or to generous taxpayers, demands for wage increases had been granted with unusual urbanity and trade unions had been distinctly favored in their efforts to get a strong grip on the manufacturing processes. The phrase "industrial democracy" leaped into popular conversation. Under the stimulus of federal action, it became the fashion to talk about shop committees, personnel administration, and self-government in industry, as if the echoes of the Russian Revolution and socialistic Germany were to be heard tolerantly in America. All this was bitter medicine for business men

desirous of managing their own affairs in their own way, of shutting off dictation by labor and by government.

Examining the ground when the tumult and the shouting of war died away, they found reasons for indulging in expectations. After all, the opulence which Roosevelt disliked and Wilson snubbed had not been dissipated in the era of the new freedom. On the contrary, at the head of the list of rich men paying taxes on annual incomes of more than a million dollars in 1920 were the old leaders reporting augmented estates and a great many fortunes had been added to the original roll, the four years of the war for democracy alone making more millionaires in America than a whole decade of aleatory peace. In spite of everything Roosevelt and Wilson had said or done, the captains of business enterprise were still in the arena; they were conscious of no wrong-doing such as had been ascribed to them in the tempestuous days of 1912 and they were not convinced that the drift in politics since the close of McKinley's era had been either just or inherently necessary.

In fact they could find some support for the belief that the course of recent events had been wholly fortuitous. Neither Roosevelt nor Wilson had ever received a favorable verdict on his program of domestic economy. The former had been elevated to the presidency in the first place by an accident, the tragic death of McKinley; when the public elected him in his own right in 1904, the salient features of his philosophy had not yet been disclosed; and he had been emphatically repudiated eight years later when he offered his well-articulated Progressive program.

Nor was Wilson's case much better. He too had been rejected by the popular vote in the election of 1912 that made him President—the majority against him was more than two million; he had not won a majority in a single industrial state, in any state in fact outside the solid South; coldly stated, he owed his election simply to divisions among his opponents. The circumstances of his reëlection had also been abnormal: at that time the storm of a World War

was beating against the doors of America and no decision on controversies over domestic issues could be obtained.

Moreover opponents of Wilson could assert with some show of authority that nothing but the World War had prevented the country from reaping a harvest of economic ruin under his policies. Certainly, business depression had begun early in his first administration; the construction of railways had been practically stopped by the rate-making and wage-regulating measures of the government; and industrial enterprise, harried by prosecutions and new anti-trust legislation, had slowed down its rate of progress.

Relying upon facts of this class, critics who resented the progressive upheaval under both Roosevelt and Wilson felt justified in saying that only the prosperity won by the sale of supplies to the Entente Allies at enormous profits enabled the people to escape gathering the "bitter fruits of fanaticism." So all in all, it could be urged with some display of reason that the majority of the people had never approved "the war on business" and that the attempt of planters, mechanics, debt-burdened farmers, and importing merchants to govern the country had been intrinsically a failure. These were the conditions that gave heart to the masters of machine economy who buoyantly made ready in 1920 to restore Warren Gamaliel Harding's normalcy and serenity.

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To their designs the general state of the Wilson régime was distinctly favorable. Immediately after the armistice, the administration commenced to disintegrate. Patriotic dollar-a-year men, who had hurried to Washington to serve during the war, rushed home at its close with equal speed to attend to their private affairs. Departments and bureaus fell into disorder as secretaries and chiefs withdrew from the sinking ship to recoup losses incurred during their arduous public services or to enjoy returns amassed during their absence.

While the federal machine was falling apart, President Wilson was engrossed in the work of the peace conference and in the realization of his project for a League of Nations. Then to cap the climax, just at the hour when domestic leadership was more imperative than ever, the President, worn out by long and trying labors, became desperately ill and was never able to resume his former empire over the course of party affairs. It is true that when Robert Lansing, his Secretary of State, undertook to keep the vessel up against the wind by holding Cabinet meetings on his own authority, Wilson, hearing of these sessions behind his back, roused himself from his sick-bed and dismissed his active Secretary with a haughty gesture of contempt; but that was a temporary flare. Physical weakness had, in fact, stripped from him the grand manner of earlier days. Besides he had been repudiated at the congressional election held near the close of the war in 1918 and political custom made a third-term out of the question.

Even if circumstances had permitted Wilson to remain in his former vigor at the helm, it is not certain that more changes of a radical character would have been made in the American system of acquisition and enjoyment. It does not appear that he had in mind after 1918 any material additions to his program of economic legislation; at all events, if he had, he did not exhibit them to the public. Indeed he admitted to Colonel House that he had exhausted his armory by 1914. In any case, one incident indicated the direction of his thinking. In October, 1919, when his conference representing capital, labor, and the public, called to consider the state of industrial democracy, was thrown into confusion by hopeless diversity of opinion, Wilson accepted the outcome with seeming apathy.

In truth, by long training and sincere belief Wilson was an economist of the Manchester School. No deep-rooted conviction therefore urged him to maintain any part of the special control over transportation and industry which had been built up during the war. With logical consistency, he

declined to accede to the request of William G. McAdoo, director of the railways, for a test of government operation in time of peace and made no strong objection when Congress, in Republican hands, returned the lines by the Transportation Act of 1920 to their former owners on terms more favorable than they had reason to expect. Though the prices of commodities continued to rise above the highest war levels, federal control in this sphere was likewise dissipated by judicial decisions, administrative action, and congressional repeal. As a matter of fact, since most of the emergency statutes providing for federal supervision over private economy were general in character, leaving the details, as well as the enforcement of the law, to presidential discretion, it was easy for the executive department to relax the rigor of such legislation before Congress found time to remove it from the books. Thus the country was already drifting rapidly into normalcy when Harding made his plea in Boston for a return to the good old days.

In only one relation did the Wilson administration persist in exercising unsparing control over private affairs once justified by the demands of the war, namely, in the suppression of critical opinion. To the petition for a general amnesty and oblivion which circulated soon after the armistice, the President turned a face of steel. With his approval, the Postmaster General, Burleson, continued to exercise a stringent supervision over the press and the mails. With the same high benediction, the Attorney General, A. Mitchell Palmer, candidate for the Democratic nomination, kept himself in the public eye by a hot "war on the Reds," arresting suspected persons wholesale, permitting the use of provocative agents to stir up "seditious meetings," insisting on the deportation of aliens rounded up by detectives from the Department of Justice, and tolerating if not authorizing constant resort to the third degree, that is, the physical abuse of accused persons.

Indeed the inquisitorial activities of the Wilson administration after the close of the "war to make the world safe

for democracy" became so vehement that a committee of prominent lawyers filed a memorandum of remonstrance. In the name of constitutional rights, Charles E. Hughes, a man given to measured language, warmly protested in an address delivered in the summer of 1920 before the Harvard law alumni, speaking with deep concern about inflammatory appeals to prejudice made by district attorneys and about the browbeating of witnesses during trial by judges in every kind of court and in every part of the country. "We may well wonder, in view of the precedents now established," exclaimed the former Justice of the Supreme Court, "whether constitutional government as heretofore maintained in this republic could survive another great war even victoriously waged." It was only by the most strenuous efforts that persons of liberal tendencies were able to prevent Congress from passing, in days of peace, a new sedition bill more drastic than the measure enacted ostensibly for martial purposes; and in spite of their efforts many war statutes affecting civil liberties were retained in force long after the close of the European conflict.

By many hands, therefore, the stage was set for a strong reaction against everything that had a Wilsonian flavor. Business men could not forgive him for the tariff act, the Adamson law fixing an eight hour day for trainmen, his Mexican policy, his indifference to many appeals for favors, and the heavy taxes laid on private and corporate incomes—to mention some of a hundred items. German-Americans were resentful because he had helped to effect the downfall of the German Empire. Irish-Americans were furious about the aid rendered to Great Britain. Liberals fumed over "his surrender to British and French imperialism at Paris," his blunt refusal to approve a general amnesty for political offenders, and his continued prosecution of persons accused of harboring radical opinions. Republican statesmen who had endured and even ostentatiously approved Wilson's lofty sentiments about the objects of the war now felt free to deny the official hypothesis, assail it violently, and sub-

stitute for it the simple and less seraphic reason that we had taken up arms "to save our skins."

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In fact on all sides the canonical creed of the war, the enthralling idealism with which Wilson had sustained his grand crusade, was now attacked with relentless analysis—much to the amazement of the Socialists in jail for the objections they had so recently put on record in the court of opinion against the official hypothesis. At the origin of the conflict, the European belligerents later associated with the United States in that high enterprise had not made professions directly contrary to their real sentiments incorporated in the Secret Treaties, and in the hour of distress they had accepted Wilson's ethical flourishes merely as a garnish to the substantial aid that accompanied them. Once safely over the hazards of war and in secure possession of the fruits of a draconian peace, they indulgently allowed critical writers to turn heavy batteries upon the most elaborate of their former defense mechanisms.

With an unconcern that astounded the generality, Sir Philip Gibbs now characterized the Belgian atrocity stories as pure war myths and portrayed the Allied leaders as cynical and contemptuous gamblers in the lives of boys. Freed from official censorship this brilliant journalist, whose livid etchings of the war had thrilled millions during the tragic years and had given the Allied leaders heroic proportions, angrily dubbed the patriot statesmen of the war for democracy "the Gang." In vitriolic language, he condemned the "hard materialist outlook" of Balfour, Law, Curzon, and Carson in his own country.

Then after exclaiming contemptuously "Is there any soul in England who believes in the wisdom of Winston Churchill?" Gibbs laughed at Clemenceau, "the indomitable Tiger of French victory," declaring that "he looked more like a walrus than a tiger, a poor old walrus in a traveling circus."

Having thrown Clemenceau from his pedestal, the indignant journalist paid his respects to that "peerless champion of liberty and the right," Raymond Poincaré, M. le Président de Bordeaux, "with plump waxen face, expressionless and, I thought, merely stupid." Through with them as individuals, Gibbs rendered a collective judgment: "The old politicians who had played the game of politics before the war, gambling with the lives of men for territories, privileged markets, oil fields, native races, coaling stations, and imperial prestige, grabbed the pool which the German gamblers had lost when their last bluff was called and quarrelled over its distribution."

To the confessions of once-muzzled journalists were added more impressive documents. When Russian, German, and Austrian archives were torn open by revolution, the secret negotiations, conversations, agreements, and treaties by which the Entente Powers had planned to break Germany and divide the spoils of war according to the ancient rules were exposed to the public gaze. In all its naked horror the sordid and grimy diplomacy which had precipitated the bloody conflict was revealed; and by way of supplement memoirs, papers, treatises, and articles on the background of the war began to flow from the presses. Though cautious editors long ignored the researches of scholars, though aged club men and embattled women continued to fight the war along canonical lines, the task of keeping alive the old reverie was far beyond their powers.

And after a while misgivings leaked into the very Senate of the United States. In the chamber that three short years before had carried the war resolution in a tempest of enthusiasm, the question was now calmly asked: "Why after all did we enter the war?" To most Democrats this inquiry was worse than indecent; it was profane. But Republicans pressed it and Senator Harding answered. Referring to the preamble of the measure declaring hostilities against Germany, he recited the acts of violence committed by the German government against the people of the United States.

Then he closed laconically: "There is the whole story. Nothing there especially proclaiming democracy and humanity." This he said in no captious mood; at bottom it expressed his mature conviction. A little later in his speech accepting the presidential nomination, Harding took pains to state formally that "we asked the sons of this republic to defend our national rights" rather than to "purge the Old World of the accumulated ills of rivalry and greed." So the politicians seemed to blow mists of doubt athwart the sunlight that streamed down on the poppies in Flanders fields, bringing anguish to those who felt with Wilson that the heart of humanity would break if the United States did not enter the League of Nations.

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By the spring of 1920 the spell of the war to end war was shattered. "Any good Republican can be nominated for President and can defeat any Democrat," remarked Boies Penrose, grand seigneur of the Republican machine in Pennsylvania, encouraging many of his colleagues to offer themselves to their party for consideration. A hero of Belgian relief, Herbert Hoover, seemed to command the practical skill required by the age of "reconstruction," but he made little headway among political experts. Gathering about him Roosevelt's mantle and well sustained by funds from the heir to a famous soap establishment, General Leonard Wood opened a hopeful campaign of generous proportions in the way of publicity. In the Valley of Democracy, Governor Frank Lowden, of Illinois, who attracted national attention as an administrator and was deeply interested in agriculture, entered the lists with great prospect of victory. Far away on the Pacific coast, Hiram Johnson, of California, who had run for the vice-presidency with Roosevelt eight years before but had been sobered by recent contact with public affairs, forged to the front with his customary confidence.

In due form all these candidates and some minor lay figures in politics submitted their respective merits to the judgment of their party, without obtaining any decisive verdict at the primaries. Receiving thus no explicit mandate from the rank and file, the leaders of the Republican national convention at Chicago, after days of hard wrestling, broke the deadlock by selecting a "Dark Horse," Warren Gamaliel Harding, the apostle of normalcy and serenity.

From many points of view, Senator Harding, like General William Henry Harrison in 1840, was admirably qualified for the business of leading the Republican party out of the wilderness in which it had been wandering since the advent of Roosevelt. From his youth the Senator had been a faithful and unwavering member of the party organization, never attempting to exalt himself above its operations, to thrust his opinions upon its managers, or to ignore its decrees. Publicly avowing his loyalty to the McKinley-Hanna-Foraker school of political economy, in spite of the fact that Hanna had distrusted his methods, Harding said with an air of tenderness that he loved "the good old times when the Republican protective tariff policy filled the treasury and at the same time gave that protection to American industry which stimulated the development which had made our record a matchless one in the story of the world." He favored subsidies to private companies engaged in building up the merchant marine. He knew the ways of Ohio politics—ways so vividly illustrated in the careers of Hanna and Foraker—and party workers felt sure that they would receive appropriate recognition at his hands. In the crisis of 1912 he had remained faithful to the covenants of the organization, opposing the heresies of Roosevelt without pushing anything to the point of extremes. To complete his record of availability, Harding had served a term in the Senate, without making enemies by pressing any particular piece of legislation or delivering any speeches that excited severe criticism east of the Hudson River.

Above everything, Harding was specially qualified for

making an appeal to the Middle West and leading it back into the party fold. His home was in the Valley of Democracy that had once voted for Andrew Jackson and afterward furnished so many distinguished Republican Presidents. The brand of the prosperous corporation lawyer was not upon him; far from it; he was merely the editor of a country paper at Marion, Ohio. In the language of journalism, Harding was "an average American," a boon companion; as one of his neighbors remarked, "the best fellow in the world to play poker with all Saturday night." No one loved the common people more sincerely or understood them better or had less of Wilson's penchant for "the moral overstrain."

Proud of being just a plain citizen among the folks of an ordinary community, Harding avoided the pretensions of urbanity. In one of his most popular addresses, he sang the praise of the small town, recording how the village "bruiser" was tamed and became the head of the local bank; how a carpenter's son became a Chicago captain of industry at twenty-five thousand a year; how a grocer's offspring developed into one of the great lawyers of Ohio; and how "the brightest boy of the class," the teacher's pride, became the janitor of his village lodge and "the happiest one of the lot." Then came his peroration: "What is the greatest thing in life, my countrymen? Happiness. And there is more happiness in the American village than in any other place on the face of the earth." Such sentiments struck home; for more than half the people of the United States lived on farms or in villages of less than twenty-five hundred inhabitants.

With his sincere democratic simplicity, Harding combined a religious nature. He spoke from the bottom of his heart when he said soon after his election: "It will help if we have a revival of religion. . . . I don't think any government can be just if it does not have somehow a contact with Omnipotent God. . . . It might interest you to know that while I have always been a great reader of the Bible, I have

never read it as closely as in the last weeks when my mind has been bent upon the work that I must shortly take up. I have obtained a good deal of inspiration from the Psalms of David and from many passages of the four Gospels, and there is still wisdom in the sayings of Old Solomon. . . . I don't mind saying that I gladly go to God Almighty for guidance and strength in the responsibilities that are coming to me." He confessed that he was disturbed because "in the conception of Versailles there was no recognition of God Almighty." And yet Harding was no Puritan; he enjoyed life, its amenities, and its pleasures. It was not without reason that the people in offices, shops, Pullman smokers, and moving picture palaces felt that the Ohio Senator was near to the great throbbings of American humanity.

In a quiet campaign conducted on his front porch in Marion, Harding continued to broadcast the issue of normalcy throughout the country; while the Democratic nominee, James M. Cox, with equal insistence urged on the stump the issues presented by the League of Nations, advocating an immediate ratification of the Peace Treaty without any reservations impairing its efficiency. The League question, of course, made some difficulites for the Republican candidate because he had to conciliate extremists, such as Senators Johnson, McCormick, and Brandegee, men absolutely opposed to ratification in any form or manner whatsoever, and to keep in the same step strong supporters of an international union, such as George W. Wickersham, Charles E. Hughes, A. Lawrence Lowell, and William H. Taft. But if the task had its perils, Harding adroitly surmounted them by condemning the League of Nations devised at Paris and proposing instead "a free association of nations." There he cautiously stopped, declining to make it clear just what kind of association he had in mind or how it was to be brought into existence.

In the confusion that arose, one wing of Harding's political army could appeal for votes on the ground that he was in favor of the League while another wing could assure its

friends that under his direction the nation would maintain its splendid isolation. This looked like a contradiction but in the hurry of the campaign only a few dialecticians of the Wilson school seemed disturbed by the evident dichotomy in Harding's logic. Indeed, the precaution was after all unnecessary as the election returns proved; for the repudiation of the Democratic party was staggering even to the coldest observer. Cox did not carry a single northern state; even Tennessee went Republican. Besides a popular plurality of seven millions, Harding received 404 out of 531 electoral votes.

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Although there were many agrarians and progressives among the Republican majority returned to both houses of Congress, Harding naturally felt authorized to direct the upper range of the federal system with what he once called "loyalty to that robust Republicanism expounded by its great leaders of the past—John Sherman, Marcus A. Hanna, and William McKinley; and as advocated to day by their able and distinguished successor in leadership, Joseph B. Foraker." In choosing his Cabinet, he completely ignored even those Progressives who stood repentant in sackcloth and ashes at the gates. As if in contempt, he picked for three important posts men especially objectionable to practitioners of the Roosevelt school: for the Treasury, Andrew Mellon, one of the richest men in the Cameron-Penrose wing of the Republican organization in Pennsylvania; for the Interior, Albert Fall, sworn foe of all liberal opinion, vigorous manipulator in oil and advocate of war on Mexico; for the Department of Justice, Harry M. Daugherty, a prominent politician of Ohio who, to say the least, had long been associated with the conservative forces of his party in that commonwealth. Likewise, in making selections for the Supreme Court, Harding returned to the course from which Roosevelt and Wilson had departed upon occasion. His four appointees, Taft, Sutherland, Butler, and Sanford, were all apostles of the Hamilton-Webster-Mc-

Kinley school and on mounting the bench they tipped the scales of justice once more on the side of normalcy.

The nature of the recoil in the upper range of the federal system was soon made apparent in various particulars. For example, normalcy meant no special tenderness to radicals from the fringe of the labor movement who had been sent to prison during Wilson's era of the new freedom. It is true that President Harding extended executive clemency to Eugene V. Debs, former candidate for the presidency on the Socialist ticket, but he refused to grant a broad pardon to political prisoners. Having appointed his old friend and gay companion, Harry Daugherty, to the office of Attorney General, he gave his official sanction to a continued prosecution of radicals by the agencies of the federal government.

Assisted by William J. Burns, a prominent private detective, who, after serving the German government in the early days of the World War, had turned his versatile powers to "running down Reds," Daugherty devoted great energies to "stamping out Bolshevism." To facilitate their designs these two champions of the moral order employed all the methods and tactics which Charles E. Hughes had found so dangerous when used by the Wilson administration. In dealing with striking workmen, the Attorney General was equally vehement; when in 1922 railway shopmen, after demanding wage increases commensurate with the rising cost of living, laid down their tools and therewith disrupted the railway service, Daugherty sought and obtained from the federal district court in Chicago the most sweeping injunction ever issued in the history of labor disputes in America. By its terms practically all activities on the part of trade union officials were forbidden—even communications by telephone or telegrams encouraging persons to leave their employment. Drastic as this action appeared, it was sustained in the courts on appeal by the unions and greeted by manufacturers' associations as calculated to "end the labor menace."

On other occasions the wheel also responded to the compass. In the leasing of federal oil lands for exploitation, for instance, there was a return to the more sympathetic policy of earlier days. Recent acts of Congress dealing with the subject were not repealed; the public domain reserved since the act of 1891 was not parceled out; but hard bargains were avoided by the Hon. Albert B. Fall when he turned over certain large oil pools to the Doheny and Sinclair interests. On jurisprudence, the effect of the new drift was also observable. The Constitution stood as of yore but the judicial decisions rendered on labor issues and social legislation carried the minds of lawyers back to the times of McKinley. Indeed in one case under the new dispensation, Chief Justice Taft, who sometimes tempered the angularity of his logic with humanity and good humor, felt compelled to file a dissenting opinion.

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With respect to foreign policies, Harding had reason for feeling that the verdict of the election permitted the repudiation of Wilson's internationalism and a return to the more aggressive ways of Webster, Seward, Hay, and Knox. And yet while the mandate at the polls was overwhelming, there was some uncertainty as to just what had been decided in the matter of the Versailles treaty. Responding vaguely to that ambiguity, Harding seemed inclined at first to look favorably on some indefinite form of coöperation with the powers of the world. "I have every faith that our nation will take its fitting place in an association of nations for world peace," he said one day after his election, "and I believe that we are going to be able to do it without the surrender of anything we hold dear as a heritage of the American people."

But gradually the idea faded out of Harding's mind, or at all events, any thought of acting upon it was abandoned. Once safely installed in the White House, he flatly refused

to revive the Versailles treaty and eventually he came to the conclusion that the American people had settled this issue forever. To invite the other countries of the world already bound together in the League to join the United States in forming another "association of nations" on a new American model, as he had suggested during the campaign, was evidently out of the question, if not whimsical.

Having finally arrived at an adverse conclusion, the Harding administration placed the Versailles pact in the official wastebasket and Congress, hearing news of this action in the White House, by a joint resolution, signed by the President on July 2, 1921, declared the war with the late Central Empires at an end—expressly reserving to the United States and its citizens all the rights and privileges to which they were entitled under the armistice and the final settlement. Thereupon separate treaties of peace were negotiated with Germany, Austria, and Hungary and duly ratified by the Senate. Thus in an unexpected fashion "the war to end war" was formally brought to a close, as far as the United States was concerned, nearly three years after the fighting ceased on the battlefield.

Annoyed by the lag in events, a few critics felt impelled to suggest that there was something wrong with a constitutional system which kept the country in the iron grip of a political deadlock for two years; and they offered a remedy in the form of a constitutional amendment permitting the ratification of treaties by a bare majority of the Senate. To the vestal virgins guarding the sacred fire, this proposal savored of sacrilege but any fears on that score were unjustified. There was little likelihood that many of the Senators would vote for an amendment that promised to deprive them of any prerogatives. The general public was indifferent. The cloud blew over.

Having come to terms with the governments of the Central Powers, the Harding administration took up in a pragmatic fashion those international questions which appeared to be of practical concern to the United States and its cit-

izens. It declined to participate officially in any of the numerous European conferences summoned for the purpose of settling the troubled estate of the Old World but it did remind the several constituent powers of the dangers arising from association with Bolshevik Russia and it did give attention to all matters of moment to substantial interests in America. It continued the policy, inaugurated under the Wilson administration, of protesting whenever foreign governments tried to deprive any American company of the right to drill oil wells in their territories and dependencies, especially if held "in sacred trust for humanity" under the League of Nations. It gave the former associated powers to understand that, while the United States did not propose to ratify the Versailles treaty, it would surrender none of its legitimate claims upon the former German colonies, notably the island of Yap, a strategic cable station in the Pacific, assigned as a mandate to Japan. Gently intimating to Tokyo its displeasure about Japanese occupation of Siberia, it assumed a certain "moral responsibility" for that part of Russia, while refusing to consider a mandate for Armenia.

To speak summarily, in negotiations over Dutch Sumatra, Mesopotamia, the Near East generally, Russia, the Mid-Pacific, Siberia, and China, the Harding administration took all necessary and appropriate steps to protect and advance the claims of American business enterprise to goods of a ponderable character. In the Caribbean and in Latin-America generally, as already noted, it followed the policies of the Wilson administration. To preserve the integrity of the American empire in the Philippines, it hoisted once more the pennant of William McKinley. "Let the internationalist dream and the Bolshevist destroy," intoned President Harding. "God pity him 'for whom no minstrel raptures swell.' In the spirit of the republic, we proclaim Americanism and acclaim America!"

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Peace with Germany and Austria having been restored and the diplomacy of economic opportunism renewed, the next major question of foreign concern before the Harding administration was a readjustment in that strategic theater of American commercial and naval ambition, the Pacific Ocean. After eight years of neglect and uncertainty, threads of policy spun by Secretary Webster and Commodore Perry, by Secretary Seward and Admiral Dewey were taken up anew. In language harmonizing with their traditions, President Harding made the nature of the business perfectly clear to the country. "We have seen the eyes of the world," he said, "turned to the Pacific. With Europe prostrate and penitent, none feared the likelihood of early conflict there. But the Pacific had its menaces and they deeply concerned us. Our territorial interests are larger there. Its waters are not strange seas to us, its further shores are not unknown to our citizens. . . . We covet the possessions of no other power in the Far East and we know for ourselves that we crave no further or greater governmental or territorial responsibility there. Contemplating what is admittedly ours and mindful of a long-time and reciprocal friendship with China, we do wish the opportunity to continue the development of our trade peacefully and on equality with other nations." Stripped of all embellishments there was the crux of the matter: "The Pacific had its menaces and they deeply concerned us."

And there was no doubt about the sources of these menaces. Russia, long a chief engineer of high intrigue in China and the Far East, was temporarily paralyzed. Neither France with her Indo-Chinese possessions nor Holland with her East Indian dominions offered any serious challenge. Germany, flat on her back, was unable to make even a commercial stab at American prestige in the Orient. There remained England and Japan closely united by a treaty of alliance—a pact useful to England in checking the pretensions of Russia and Germany and keeping order in her Indian empire but the object of constant criticism in Australia

and Canada where fear of Japanese power was a psychic factor of moment. Besides being caught between these two fires, the British foreign office dreaded the coming naval supremacy of the United States: it wanted the security of the Japanese alliance without its galling yoke. In the eyes of English experts, a triple adjustment seemed to be the only possible way out of the dilemma.

Though reluctant to dissolve the dual arrangement, Tokyo was not lacking in discernment. Under the ægis of the alliance and during British preoccupation in the World War, Japan had strengthened and extended the net of her economic hegemony in the Orient. In August, 1914, with a show of assistance from England, she seized the German province of Shantung in China. When President Wilson relaxed somewhat the aggressive economic policy pursued by McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft in the Far East, the business men of Nippon made the most of the commercial opportunities afforded by the circumstance.

Indeed with England distracted by the war, Russia paralyzed, Germany eliminated, and the United States less watchful, Japan developed a local Monroe Doctrine and Caribbean policy of her own: declaring in effect a kind of protectorate over neighboring lands and waters. In 1915 she made her famous, or notorious, Twenty-one Demands on China which promised to give her the substance of sovereignty over that distracted country, and immediately sent her merchants, capitalists, and army officers swarming into the new preserves in search of trade and privileges.

Before the uproar over the Twenty-one Demands had died away, President Wilson permitted Secretary Lansing to exchange notes with Viscount Ishii, the Japanese Ambassador, acknowledging the obvious fact that the Island Empire had special interests in China. The very next year, namely, 1918, Japan made another strategic advance by joining the United States and the associated powers in occupying Eastern Siberia, "to protect supplies and steady efforts at self-government" as the phrase ran. And once

firmly installed in that desirable section of the mainland, so alluring to concession hunters, the Tokyo militarists declined to withdraw their forces when the other countries recalled their troops. Then came the crowning bargain at Paris—where Wilson, eager to win the support of the Japanese delegation for his League of Nations, let Japan have Shantung on a promise of ultimate restoration to China and allowed her to take over the German island of Yap as a mandate, without objection.

Not unnaturally these events in the Orient caused intensified agitation in the United States, raising a great outcry against Japanese imperialism. Among American liberals such assumption of rights, titles, privileges, and property, unaccompanied by any mitigating ethical pretentions, was regarded as positively shocking. Distressed for other reasons, stanch advocates of the American forward policy in the Caribbean and the Philippines joined the humanists in denouncing the machinations of Tokyo; while American merchants and capitalists interested in the development of China composed a threnody on rights and prospects threatened by the closure of the open door. On the Pacific Coast, the immigration question was again stirred into flame; and among Christian missionaries in China and their supporters at home voices calling for a holy war on "Pagan Japan" were heard. In Congress baiting Tokyo became popular. Looking upon himself as a sort of heir-apparent to Webster's throne and being in fact a tuneful mouthpiece for cotton spinners hunting for Oriental markets, Senator Lodge hurled one philippic after another against Japan, striking at President Wilson and the Versailles treaty through the flowing robes of the Samurai.

Consequently when Harding began in 1921 to apply the Seward-McKinley policy once more, a real crisis in Far Eastern affairs was precipitated, bringing forward the grave question whether Japan could be forced to drop her new harvest fruits without disturbing the imperial holdings of America or England in the Orient; by peaceful methods,

if possible; by war if certain energetic men in the Navy Department and Hearst's editorial rooms could have their way. And ethical reasons for coercion were not wanting. To break the grip of the Japanese on the mainland would be to uphold the grand principle of the open door: equal opportunity for the commercial interests of all countries. To come to the rescue of China would be to protect a weak and defenseless republic of four hundred million people against a haughty empire of sixty millions. There was something in the proposal that appealed to the heart of American humanity.

In this agitation against Japan, England was inevitably caught. Her people, groaning under a mountain of war taxation, were begging for relief and yet no deliverance could be granted while preparations were being made for a great fight in the Pacific, with the United States building battleships at a breakneck speed that promised to wrest the trident from the Mistress of the Seas within five years. In the book of fate it was clearly written that England could not stand idly by and allow any single power to become supreme in an ocean where her imperial interests were so exigent. But her choice was not to be made easily. Her nationals would benefit, of course, from any reduction of Japanese trade in China, even though they already had a major portion of the business in that dissolving republic and held most of the strategic centers for new operations. Moreover, the opposition of Canada and Australia to English coöperation with Japan in case of a war with the United States was so intense that it could not be ignored in London without grave peril to the Empire.

Meanwhile forces undeniably strong were pulling in the other direction. Pledged to friendship and aid by the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the English ministry shrank from offending the cabinet of Tokyo by any unfriendly action; such ties were not to be lightly snapped. The Japanese navy had helped to check the Indian revolution during the World War; the conquest of Shantung, effected by Anglo-Japanese

coöperation, had been sealed by a secret treaty; England held Hong Kong and Wei Hai Wei on conditions similar in moral obligation to those on which Japan rested her claims to valuable concessions; and if any punitive expeditions were to be undertaken against China, assistance seemed more likely to be forthcoming from Tokyo than from Washington—from a military empire rather than from a government harassed by pacific sentiments, and often timid about making predatory raids in distant lands without high ethical attachments.

Altogether the situation was delicate for Downing Street; but prudence clearly suggested some kind of alliance or agreement that would reduce the burdens of the English taxpayers, prevent the navy of the United States from outstripping the strength of Britannia, shake Japan's grip on the trade and resources of China, assure the three powers the continued possession of the imperial dominions they had already gathered unto themselves, and in the process preserve all the suavity of friendly intercourse. England, Japan, and the United States had once come to a secret understanding, in Roosevelt's administration, and a renewal of the pledges might be more effective in open covenants openly arrived at.

In the circumstances, Japan, threatened by isolation and vexed by taxes that bowed her peasantry to the earth, had little to choose. To the most ardent Japanese imperialist, fighting both the United States and England seemed to be quixotic, if desirable; so responsible statesmen in Tokyo were prepared by necessity to accept a proposal for an exchange of opinions relative to the "menaces of the Pacific." "The divine winds" had long favored the Island Empire and they might not fail even in Washington. All signs, therefore, pointed to a new adjustment of forces.

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An international conference was evidently in order and the idea admirably fitted the temper of the United States

at the moment, for a certain amount of interest in peace as an ideal had survived the insinuations of the recent political campaign. Neither Wilson's passionate plea for the League of Nations, placing the stamp of high authority on the outlawry of war, nor his fierce indictment of militarism had been wholly forgotten in the clash of politics; and after the angry tumult of the presidential contest died away, many who had once cheered his lofty sentiments of humanity returned to their former emotions. Peace associations began to show their heads above the clouds of suspicion spread abroad by the War and Navy Departments and by private societies for the promotion of "adequate defense." For a time, at least, that portion of the American populace which loved combat for its glory, rank, profits, emoluments, promotions, and decorations had been sated; while business men, disquieted by heavy taxation on incomes and profits and by the rumblings of the Bolshevist revolution, were in no mood for more heroics.

Nor was this all a matter of speculation. With an alacrity that astonished all super-patriots, the country at large repudiated the efforts of General Pershing and other army officers, supported by active propaganda on the part of civic associations, to establish universal military service as a permanent phase of American culture. Even General Leonard Wood, one of the chief advocates of that Napoleonic remedy for weakness, on sounding the ground in his presidential campaign, found it expedient to disclaim with scurrying haste any intention of forcing any such program on the people. In fact, the army of the United States was quickly reduced to 125,000 men and the ultimate reliance for national defense was once more placed on a citizen soldiery. The time was ripe for some dramatic move in the direction of peace.

Senator Borah was the first responsible statesman to announce the play, at least in the open, by securing from the Senate the adoption of a resolution requesting the President to call an international conference on the reduction

of armaments. In the summer of 1921, it was made known that Harding had asked Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan to take part in such a convention, and that he had invited China, Belgium, Holland, and Portugal to share in the deliberations pertaining to the Far East and the Pacific. With expressions of pleasure, all the powers answered the appeal and sent their shrewdest diplomats to sit at the council table.

On November 12, President Harding, in a felicitous speech, opened this pageant in Washington. Immediately afterwards, Secretary Hughes, coming to the heart of the business with breath-taking directness, proposed that Japan, Great Britain, and the United States stop building capital ships, reduce their sea power, and proclaim a naval holiday—a clear and ringing call for specific action that transfixed the conference. According to the Japanese journalist, Kawakami, a falling pin could have been heard as the Secretary moved from point to point in his great argument. All over the country, peace enthusiasts saw the dawning of a new day, the beginning of general disarmament and the furling of flags in the Parliament of Man. Nor were they entirely squelched when Harding quickly warned them that there was nothing chimerical in his designs, that he had in view a reduction in the cost of preparedness, relief for the taxpayers, and the settlement of concrete matters which threatened to cause serious friction among certain great powers.

The substantial results of the Washington conference, including those embodied in treaties and those effected by amicable conversations, may be summed up under three heads. First of all was the substitution of the four-power compact for the Anglo-Japanese alliance; England, Japan, France, and the United States agreed to respect one another's insular possessions in the Pacific and to settle all disputes growing out of Pacific issues by conciliatory negotiations. Was this an alliance? If not, what was it? Some of the United States Senators insisted upon regarding it as

a union guaranteeing to the four signatories the undisturbed tenure of their imperial holdings in the Pacific—peace among themselves and a solid front against other ambitious nations.

But President Harding opposed this view, saying to the Senate that "nothing in any of these treaties commits the United States to any kind of alliance, entanglement, or envolvement." If no commitments had been made, what then had been accomplished? Harding sought to resolve this difficulty by adding: "It has been said, if this is true, these are meaningless treaties and therefore valueless. Let us accept no such doctrine of despair as that."

The second result of the conference, ultimately effected with the aid of some quiet coercion on the part of the United States, was the withdrawal of Japan from Shantung, the surrender of that province to China, and finally, the evacuation of Siberia by the Japanese troops. In this relation also may be cited the treaties binding the high contracting parties to respect the principle of "the open door" in China, as defined anew in various particulars, and pledging them to confer in due time on an increase in Chinese customs duties and on the abrogation of extra-territorial rights enjoyed by foreigners in that republic. Apart from ousting Japan from Shantung and Siberia, the conference, by its several solemn agreements, made little actual change in the affairs of Asia. It is true that Secretary Hughes soon afterwards announced the end of the Lansing-Ishii understanding which recognized Japan's special interests on the mainland, but that return to normalcy was a transaction in paper rather than an economic fact.

Crowning the work of the Washington conference was the five-power treaty in which Italy, France, England, the United States, and Japan agreed to limit their capital battleships to a fixed ratio for ten years. The truly significant feature of this project was the establishment of equality between the two Anglo-Saxon nations and the allotment to Japan of a tonnage equal to three-fifths that assigned to

each of the major partners. In this way, the construction of capital ships was effectively stopped.

Attempts were also made to limit the submarine and to relax the tension in other branches of naval competition; but without avail. Indeed many naval experts took the view that sea warfare in the future would be mainly under the water and in the air, and that dreadnoughts and super-dreadnoughts, as obsolete as wooden hulks, could be scrapped with perfect safety. At any rate, the Washington conference effected great savings in capital ships, tacitly approved the unrestrained construction of other war craft, and gave experts a breathing space in which to study the respective merits of the various engines for fighting on the sea.

The last formal session of the Washington conference was held on February 6, 1922. By that date the negotiations, or at least the discussions known to the public, had demonstrated that the diplomats assembled at the national capital were practical men bent on substantial results, not dreamers wrestling with the task of creating a new order. With this understanding, England and Japan quickly ratified the agreements and the Senate of the United States, after a mild reservation in the case of the four-power compact, set its seal of acceptance on the entire program of commitments. By these approaches the strain was unquestionably reduced in the Pacific. Every one of the high contracting parties could point to some material benefits gained at the council table; and yet none was pledged to any kind of pact that forbade taking up arms at any time in defense of national interests and national honor.

Encouraged by the success of the conference, the Harding administration began to show a more lively interest in other projects for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Though it continued to assume that the national verdict of 1920 had condemned the League of Nations for all time, it watched with peculiar interest the proceedings of the Permanent Court of International Justice, established under

the auspices of the League and opened for business at The Hague, in February, 1922. In a little while faint movements in its direction were observed in Washington. Secretary Hughes made a declaration in favor of a world tribunal standing on an independent basis. That was a concession but as nearly all the nations of the earth were operating under the League court, there was a distinct air of hauteur in an American call for another institution of international justice.

Perceiving this paradox, perhaps, Harding himself then indicated a desire to participate in the existing World Court if it could be so constituted "as to appear and to be, in theory and practice, in form and substance, beyond the shadow of a doubt a world court and not a League court"—adding specific conditions designed to assure the equality of the United States with other powers and to guarantee American independence of action in all circumstances. In a word, the benefits of international coöperation were to be sought, without incurring any of the attendant entanglements. Yet even that quest raised domestic vexations. Though supported by many League advocates, both Republicans and Democrats, Harding encountered on the threshold of his undertaking the old relentless hostility of the isolationists. His message to the Senate in 1923 urging coöperation with the tribunal at The Hague was received with chilling formality.

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In Congress where the multitudinous voices of the masses were more potent in driving and checking, the effects of the mandate delivered in the election of 1920 were not as striking as in the executive and judicial departments. By the popular election of Senators the upper chamber had been brought nearer to the level of the House of Representatives and under the constitutional rule two-thirds of the old members had survived the cataclysm that shook down the Wilsonian edifice. Though it is true that the Republicans

won a majority in both branches, agrarians in their ranks and among their Democratic neighbors were so powerful that Harding had to pick his way with cautious realism.

Nor were things made any easier for him in the congressional election of 1922. On the contrary it reduced the Republican majority in the Senate as well as the House, ousting in the procedure two reliable party Senators from the Northwest in favor of a Farmer-Labor candidate and a champion of the Non-Partisan League, a radical farmers' organization that had taken up the scepter of Populism. As a matter of fact, agriculture was passing through another ruinous depression, the prices of produce had fallen to an alarming degree, and the Republican union formed at Chicago in 1860 showed signs of cracking again.

Owing to these circumstances the doctors of the McKinley school in Congress were in a genuine quandary during the opening years of the quest for normalcy. Only by remarkable concessions to left-wing Republicans and Democrats, organized in a vociferous Farm Bloc, concessions in the shape of high duties on raw materials and agricultural produce, were they able to enact tariff bills restoring the system of protection for manufacturers—an emergency law followed by the Fordney-McCumber Act of September 21, 1922. On several important issues, especially ship subsidies and taxation, the instructors in normalcy were utterly routed.

For many years the question of bounties for private companies engaged in operating merchant ships had been warmly agitated. Once such aid had been a part of the Hamilton-Webster system, but the Democrats had brusquely withdrawn it on the eve of the Civil War, and the captains of business enterprise in the Republican party had never been able to bring the agricultural wing around to supporting a restoration of the practice. That was the state of affairs when the outbreak of the World War played havoc with shipping, making it impossible to find enough bottoms to carry to the Entente powers the munitions and food sold to

them at good stiff prices. At last the shoe pinched corn and cotton growers as well as the makers of steel and gunpowder. In these circumstances, the farmer-labor-planting representatives aligned on Wilson's side, though still unwilling to grant subsidies to private capitalists, agreed that they must all have ships. Accordingly in 1916, Congress passed the Shipping Board bill providing for the purchase, lease, and operation of merchant ships by the federal government.

To this pass things had been brought when the skies began to brighten for healing and normalcy. Responding to the cry of industrial barons, "Get the government out of business," President Harding now proposed that the government vessels be turned over to private companies on generous terms and that substantial appropriations be voted to help them operate on a comfortable margin. With surprising vehemence the project was rejected by Congress under the drive of the Farm Bloc.

Undeterred by defeats in this connection, the Harding administration made a demand for the reduction of direct taxes on the more fortunate diners at the table of acquisition and enjoyment. Beyond all question, the collectivist principle embodied in taxes on incomes, inheritances, and excess profits was contrary to the historic policy of the Republican party. That great association had financed the Civil War and the Spanish War largely on bond sales and had sustained the government in times of peace principally by indirect taxes imposed on goods consumed by the masses. Moreover it had shown no disposition to disturb by drastic levies any of the high profits made by masters of business during the wars managed under its auspices.

Nothing was, therefore, more natural than for the prophets of normalcy on coming to power to expect, if not a revolution in the Wilsonian program of taxation, at least a radical modification of its harshest terms. Finding approximately one-half the federal revenues derived from income and inheritance taxes, they insisted on immediate

relief. By way of concrete suggestion, Secretary Mellon, praised in eastern circles as the greatest financier since Alexander Hamilton, urged slashing cuts, especially in the upper brackets—cuts lowering the surtax on the highest incomes from sixty-five to twenty-five per cent. But the insurgents in Congress refused to accept the proposal and in the revenue law of 1921 kept the supreme surtax levy at fifty per cent, causing much bitterness in the hearts of those who paid the bill.

Besides rejecting a downward revision of taxes on the rich, Congress declined to abandon the centralizing and socializing program built up in the drive toward social democracy. In fact, not a single one of the great statutes enacted under this head was completely repealed after the Republican victory in the congressional election of 1918. While continuing federal grants in aid of highway construction and education, Congress made new excursions in the field of social work. An Industrial Rehabilitation Act passed in 1920 set the stamp of national approval upon the idea of community responsibility for industrial accidents, by offering federal funds to states to assist in restoring to civil employment persons injured in industry or any legitimate occupation. An equally novel departure was made the next year when Congress appropriated money for the purpose of safeguarding the welfare of mothers and infants at the time of childbirth. Forced upon the consideration of Congress by women's civic societies, this project raised great outcries in the name of states' rights and sacred individualism; but without avail. Defeated in the national legislature, opponents appealed to the Supreme Court where they likewise received a rebuff.

With a kind of grim determination, the apostles of general improvement by collective action moved forward. Blocked twice by the Supreme Court in their efforts to restrict child labor by federal legislation—once by regulating interstate commerce and once by taxation—they promptly proposed an amendment to the Constitution per-

mitting the specific enactment of national child labor laws. Again great lamentation was heard among the guardians of the covenant; but Congress in 1924 passed the resolution authorizing that form of federal intervention in labor conditions throughout the Union. While the amendment met a frigid reception in the states, that was no fault of Congress.

In its halls the collectivist principle continued to be invoked. The Wilson organization for furnishing federal aid to agriculture was not only kept intact; it was enlarged by new laws extending rural credits, encouraging farmers to form coöperative societies, and spreading federal control over stockyards and speculation in grain. Similarly, in dealing with two great national industries, railways and coal mining, Congress refused to rely solely upon the beneficent working of competition and private enterprise; no matter how savagely Attorney General Daughtery might be prosecuting advocates of socialistic creeds. When the railways were returned to their owners by the Esch-Cummins act of 1920, no attempt was made to break up great systems and stimulate competitive strife; on the contrary, the interstate commerce commission was authorized and instructed to plan for new consolidations among existing carriers. Going beyond this provision, Congress sought to make the strong roads carry the weak by ordering them to pay half of their earnings above a fixed percentage into a national fund for common railway financing. Though this project was denounced in tribunals of law as a scheme for seizing private property in the general interest, it was sustained by the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Taft rendering the opinion.

Even in a sphere rather remote from interstate commerce, responsible politicians resorted to the principle of collective action. Alarmed by a coal strike which began in the spring of 1922, Congress enlarged the powers of the interstate commerce commission, authorized it to control coal shipments during the emergency, empowered it to beat down "unjust prices," provided for the appointment of a federal

coal director, and created an agency to investigate the industry. In the course of time, this agency reported that coal mining, formerly regarded by sound thinkers as a branch of private enterprise solely within the jurisdiction of the states, was not only "affected with public interest," but was also a proper subject for federal regulation and control by governmental agencies. Evidently, in the opinion of Congress, the country did not want a restoration of all the great customs and usages of the McKinley era. In matters of national legislation, Harding was still far from the goal of normalcy when death overcame him at San Francisco in August, 1923.

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Harding's successor, Calvin Coolidge, of Massachusetts, Daniel Webster's state, had just the training, temper and opinions required to promote the administrative policies of restoration and healing. Coolidge had likewise come up through the great American school of village politics to high places by cautious steps always in line with the measured tread of his organization leaders. He had long served his party, rising from membership in the town council of Northampton through the offices of city solicitor and clerk of the court to the state legislature, passing on to the post of lieutenant-governor and finally reaching the governor's chair. Never in all his career had he shocked his neighbors by advocating strange things prematurely; neither had he been the last of the faithful to appear upon the scene in appropriate armor. Conciliation and prudence had been his watchwords; patience and simplicity his symbols of life.

Only one action among his varied local achievements had excited national interest. In 1919, while he was still governor, the policemen of Boston, who were affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, made a plea for a wage adjustment to meet the rising cost of living and, failing to

secure it, went on strike, leaving the city for a few days without protection. After disorder and looting had occurred and the air had become tense with strife and passion, Governor Coolidge called out the state militia and wrote a ringing note to Samuel Gompers informing him that "there is no right to strike against the public safety, by anybody, anywhere, any time." The language was so decisive that President Wilson congratulated the Governor on his stand and a friendly press began to praise him as the silent man of iron, afraid of nothing.

In critical circles, however, the idea of Coolidge as a figure of heroic proportions was ridiculed and attempts were made to show that, far from doing his duty promptly and courageously, he had in truth evaded his responsibilities as long as possible, had refused to act until the mayor of Boston, aided by the police commissioner, had got the situation well in hand, and had moved at last only when he could come upon the stage in a burst of red fire, with full political safety. On these allegations there was a long and acrimonious debate; though it was not necessary for any one who wanted to know the facts to remain in darkness. In words that admitted of no double interpretation, Governor Coolidge himself told directly and simply just what happened; and he did this in a speech delivered at the Republican state convention in 1919 before the incident became obscured by partisan dispute. "Some urged me," he said, "to remove the [Police] Commissioner, some to request him to alter his course. To all these I had to reply that I had no authority over his actions and could not lawfully interfere with him. . . . To restore order, I at once and by pre-arrangement with him and the Commissioner offered to the Mayor to call out the State Guard. At his request I did so." There in the plain, unaffected language appropriate to the man was the record over which journalists and campaign managers worked up such a fierce debate.

Called by his favorable press a silent and restrained states-

man, Coolidge was in truth a facile and versatile speaker and writer. His collected orations and addresses in two or three volumes, as well as numerous public letters and articles, bore witness to his genius for expressing opinions on a wide range of topics, resounding with a native shrewdness and an open sincerity that reminded his friends of Lincoln. In one series of speeches, historical and philosophical in character, tracing the evolution of political economy in America, Coolidge revealed a firm grasp on the nature of the partisan battles that had raged from the days of Washington down to his own time. With bold strokes he sketched the system of Hamilton and the policies of the organizations which had held the inheritance intact. "The party now in power in this country," he said in 1922, "through its present declaration of principles, through the traditions which it inherited from its predecessors, the Federalists and Whigs, through their achievements and its own, is representative of those policies which were adopted under the lead of Alexander Hamilton,"

Growing more specific in his bill of particulars, Coolidge frankly expressed the belief that manufacturing was the motive power of American civilization. "The driving force of American progress," he declared, "has been her industries. They have created the wealth that has wrought our national development. . . . Without them the great force of agriculture would now be where it was in the eighteenth century." In keeping with this view, he saw in William McKinley, that outspoken champion of industries, a successor to Alexander Hamilton, Washington's famous Secretary of the Treasury. The Ohio statesman, he said, had taken up "the work of Hamilton and Clay . . . reëstablished their principles, and under his leadership the government re-adopted their policies."

And yet Coolidge was not oblivious to the charges brought by Roosevelt and Wilson against the leaders of business enterprise; he agreed that there had been "growing up an attempt to exercise an improper control over the affairs

of the government." Speaking in 1921, he said that "this condition culminated about twenty years ago." But the evil had been overcome. Roosevelt, he declared, "broke the menace of monopoly. He made the sovereignty of the people supreme. . . . He was . . . the defender of the republic. He found it menaced and he left it free." The conclusion was inevitable; there was nothing to do but to move forward along the lines marked out by Hamilton, Clay, and McKinley now that the ogre of "special privilege" had been destroyed by Roosevelt.

Though laying great stress upon economic forces in the evolution of American society, Coolidge by no means looked upon the acquisition and enjoyment of wealth as ends in themselves. His system of political economy was suffused with a moral glow. "If society lacks learning and virtue," he said, "it will perish. . . . The classic of all classics is the Bible. . . . Civilization depends not only upon the knowledge of the people but upon the use they make of it. . . . The nation with the greatest moral power will win." When dealing directly with politics and economics he spoke in the same vein: "What we need is thrift and industry . . . Let everybody keep at work . . . We have come to our present high estate through toil and suffering and sacrifice . . . Not by revolution but by evolution has man worked out his destiny . . . The man who builds a factory builds a temple, the man who works there worships there, and to each is due not scorn and blame, but reverence and praise . . . We are all members of one body . . . Industry cannot flourish if labor languish. Transportation cannot prosper if manufactures decline . . . Large profits mean large payrolls . . . Politics is not an end, but a means . . . It is the art of government . . . In Massachusetts we are citizens before we are partisans . . . We do not need more government, we need more culture . . . Abraham Lincoln was not a radical, but a conservative. He never sought to waste, but always to save . . . Democracy is not a tearing down; it is a building up . . . Man's

nature drives him ever onward . . . McKinley was the 'advance agent of prosperity' that he might be the prophet of the intellectual and moral forces of mankind."

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President Coolidge's practical program, based upon this combination of economic and ethical philosophy, was transparent in its simplicity. Taxes were to be reduced—not indeed on goods consumed by the masses but certainly on the incomes of those who sat highest at the American feast. This was to be done, he urged, with a view to leaving more money in the hands of the rich for investment, so that the opportunities of the poor to gain profitable employment might be multiplied. Correlatively, there was to be less interference with business through administrative orders and through the prosecution of trusts before the courts; for Roosevelt had destroyed the threat of monopoly. With genuflections in the same direction, the practice of taxing the industrial East and distributing the revenue all over the country in the form of subsidies for roads, health, education, and other social purposes was to be discountenanced as a violation of the sacred creed of states' rights so long honored by the Democrats.

Invoking the same economical spirit, Coolidge condemned the use of the government's financial strength and organized power to aid the farmers in offsetting, by price-control devices, the menacing lag between the selling values of agricultural produce and the cost of manufactures protected by the tariff. Harmonizing with this tenderness for the treasury and the taxpayer was the President's refusal to endorse the idea of a huge appropriation in the form of a bonus to the soldiers in the late war for democracy. Finally, the ship of state which Hamilton launched, which Clay, Webster, and McKinley had steered successfully on its course, was not to be disturbed by minor scandals below decks; the wicked were to be punished but eyes were to be fastened on the stars.

As long as the Senate and the House of Representatives, left over from the previous régime, held power, Coolidge found it hard to cut his way through the entanglements thrown up by the backwash of recent years. He opposed a bonus for the soldiers; Congress passed it over his vote. He demanded a heavy cut in the surtaxes; Congress in the revenue act of 1924 fixed the surtax on incomes of over $500,000 at forty per cent and even voted that the amount returned by all income taxpayers should be made public. To the legislation already enacted for the farmers were added new laws and new forms of financial assistance. An effort to get a man of "constructive economic imagination" into the department of justice was defeated by insurgency in the Republican ranks, for a large number of agrarian congressmen wearing the Republican label were now coöperating with the Democrats rather than with the Coolidge administration. In short, the healing and restoration promised by Harding in 1920, after long and arduous labors, had not been effected to the satisfaction of the Republican high command.

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Convinced that still larger areas of normalcy could be recovered by a frontal assault, the managers of the Republican organization renominated Coolidge by acclamation in 1924 and in keynote speeches and platform planks flouted and repudiated the Republican congressional program. Confronted by formidable opponents in partisan array with this standard of healing and serenity floating high overhead, the Democrats, amid great confusion, tried to prepare for the tourney. For many weary days, in convention assembled, they tossed about in a raging fever while William G. McAdoo, champion of the radicals, and Governor Alfred Smith, spokesman of the moderates, wrestled for mastery within the party.

When at length the deadlock was broken, the palm went

to a third contestant who aroused no great enthusiasm save on the right wing—John W. Davis, of West Virginia and New York. No doubt Davis was a gentleman of taste with a flair for good form; his deportment during his service under Wilson in the department of justice and as ambassador to Great Britain had been impeccable; but he lacked the warmth of Bryan, had none of the oratorical suppleness of Wilson, and was handicapped by his connections with the banking house of J. P. Morgan and Company. Moreover his platform, if it seemed good in the sight of importing merchants, was lacking in appeal to the American Federation of Labor and the agrarian battalions of the Great Commoner.

There was evidently room for an insurgent candidate and all signs pointed to Senator Robert M. La Follette as the logical man for the rôle. Author of luminous pages in the statute books of progressive democracy and leader of the fight in Congress against the hosts of normalcy, he could not consistently support either Coolidge or Davis. Having announced his nonconformity in an unmistakable manner, the Wisconsin Senator was nominated for the presidency at a hastily assembled convention composed largely of delegates representing farmer and labor elements, supported by progressive sympathizers among whom were many women. Even the Socialists endorsed him, leaving to a few intransigent Communists the business of working for an overturn of capitalism root and branch. Treated with scanter courtesy than usual by the directors of the two major parties, the American Federation of Labor also gave its official benediction to La Follette, leading unseasoned politicians to imagine that the great economic combination had been made at last.

A triangular battle was now fought to a finish. Coolidge stood fast by "normalcy and common sense"—the Constitution and the wisdom of the Fathers. Davis bore down heartily on the revelations of corruption and malfeasance in office laid at the door of the Republican directorate by

congressional investigations. La Follette sought to unite agrarians and industrial workers in a frontal assault on trusts and monopolies, on the Supreme Court as the defender of current use and wont, and on the policy of imperial advance in the Caribbean and the Orient. Again the verdict at the polls was decisive: Coolidge was given a clean majority of more than two millions over the combined vote of his opponents and a Republican Congress more effectively attuned to normalcy was returned.

In the new intellectual climate the policy of the administration was consistent with the election returns. Income taxes were reduced and projects for cutting the rates of the upper brackets were now accepted by Congress. Though legal action was begun against one of the fresh crop of industrial mergers, the general policy of non-interference with business was pursued. Discarding the precedent set by Roosevelt in the coal strike of 1902, Coolidge allowed the anthracite operators and miners to wear themselves out in a long battle extending from September, 1925, into February of the following year. Thus, it was made manifest that economic enterprise was not to be harried or hampered by prosecutions. And the prosperity that spread throughout the industrial states lent color to the claim that at least temporarily the application of the Hamilton-Webster-Clay-McKinley-Coolidge principles brought a greater abundance of good things to the masses than either the régime of progressive democracy or the program of the new freedom. To them that had labored hard for a recovery of normalcy, this was a sufficient reward.

With reference to foreign affairs, the Coolidge administration moved forward cautiously after the election of 1924. The broad way was, of course, as clear as it had been in the days when the Republican party formally inaugurated the second stage in its advance policy with the Spanish War. Indeed, those economic forces that had driven the country out upon the seven seas were more powerful and more insistent than ever: investments and trade abroad had multi-

plied many fold and the swelling industrial equipment, especially stimulated by the World War, needed ever wider markets for its increasing stream of goods.

Tersely and neatly the new situation was summarized by the Secretary of the Navy, Curtis Wilbur, in a speech before the Connecticut Chamber of Commerce on May 7, 1925, about two months after the inauguration of Coolidge: "Americans have over twenty millions of tons of merchant shipping to carry the commerce of the world, worth three billion dollars. We have loans and property abroad, exclusive of government loans, of over ten billions of dollars. If we add to this the volume of exports and imports for a single year—about ten billion dollars—we have an amount almost equal to the entire property of the United States in 1868 and if we add to this the eight billion dollars due us from foreign governments, we have a total of $31,000,000,000, being about equal to the total wealth of the nation in 1878 . . . These vast interests must be considered when we talk of defending the flag . . . We fought not because Germany invaded or threatened to invade America but because she struck at our commerce on the North Sea and denied to our citizens on the high seas the protection of our flag . . . To defend America we must be prepared to defend its interests and our flag in every corner of the globe . . . An American child crying on the banks of the Yangtse a thousand miles from the coast can summon the ships of the American navy up that river to protect it from unjust assault."

Immense as were the diplomatic requirements of this economic strain, they were met by President Coolidge with pragmatic realism. First of all, the problem of the debts owed by European powers to the government of the United States had to be handled with regard for both domestic opinion and foreign relations. A majority of the American taxpayers evidently thought they were entitled to relief by a recovery of the total amount lent to friendly belligerents during the World War. But to American bankers the

matter had other aspects; drastic efforts to collect the foreign debts would make it more difficult for them to float additional loans abroad, public and private, and would check the gathering of rich commissions from that form of enterprise. If the banking and investing interests could get a reduction in their heavy income taxes and could then shift to consumers the burden of paying off the federal bonds issued to provide the money originally lent to the Entente powers, they could count themselves doubly fortunate in having the debts canceled and the decks cleared for new foreign financing under their management.

Among American manufacturers enjoying the benefits of the protective tariff similar reasons prevailed for tenderness with respect to the obligations incurred in the common war for democracy. If the debts were paid, of necessity payment would have to be made in goods, starting a heavy influx of foreign commodities—exactly the thing they did not want. Besides, there were pleas for compassion on the score of comradeship in "the great humanitarian crusade," poignant longings for European affection, and touching appeals from the citizens of the debtor nations. Hence a widespread propaganda was begun in favor of canceling the debts. Crowning it all were obvious difficulties in collection and payment; though none of the debtor countries ventured to defend on simple confiscatory grounds a repudiation far greater than the Bolsheviki had made in Russia.

Between the general taxpayers on the one hand and parties to the case on the other, the federal government had to steer a ticklish course, tacking rather in the popular direction. The Harding administration negotiated a settlement with Great Britain on terms which seemed severe to the British though they fell short of the amount written in the bond. Swinging over to the view of the investing fraternity, the Coolidge administration granted more generous terms to France, Belgium, and Italy and showed no disposition to be harsh or too urgent. How much of the grand total would ever be collected or whether in fact col-

lection was possible at all, was still uncertain a decade after the United States entered the World War.

Entangled with the debt question was the issue of European relations as a whole. While bitter critics of the League of Nations continued to oppose joining that fellowship for adjusting international disputes, it was becoming increasingly manifest that, as Secretary Wilbur indicated, the practical stake of American investors in European countries called for coöperation of some kind. If the federal government could not take part in European conferences, American bankers could participate in the councils of European financiers. As a matter of fact, they gave material strength to the movement which put into effect the Dawes plan for stabilizing the economic system of Germany, and for collecting at least a part of the reparations. Moreover, they floated in the United States, naturally on terms advantageous to themselves, a huge German loan issued to give support to the new order of things.

From economic coöperation it was but a step to political or at least juristic coöperation. So many who favored the former joined the Wilsonian idealists in promoting the latter. After all, the arbitration of international controversies had long been a prominent feature of American theory and, as the country was already a member of the international tribunal established by the Hague conference of 1899, it seemed no radical departure to join the World Court set up by the League of Nations. Following the example of his predecessor, President Coolidge, accordingly, gave the project his blessing; and in 1926 the Senate, with abundant reservations and conditions, assented—provided the other powers would accept the stipulations laid down by America as the price of her affiliation. Though a great deal of feeling was displayed in the controversy over this cautious action, the degree of commitment involved in it was not serious, especially as compared with the entanglements implicit in pledges already made in Hague conventions and arbitration treaties. Indeed, it was so slight that

the leading nations associated with the League took steps which amounted to a rejection of the American terms.

Viewed in the large, the proposed entrance of the United States into the World Court seemed to be a part of general plans for assuring international concord. Like Cleveland, McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, President Coolidge boldly proclaimed himself an advocate of peace. He openly repudiated those spokesmen of the navy and air defense interests who rattled the sword when appropriation bills were pending in Congress and on one occasion he went in person to tell the graduating class at Annapolis that in this country the civil branch of the government was supreme over the naval and military divisions. For the purpose of preserving friendly relations with Japan, Coolidge opposed the provision of the act of 1924 which expressly excluded Japanese immigrants from the United States—adding that, had it not been incorporated in the body of the bill, he would have applied his veto. "In peace," he said, "there lies the greatest opportunity for relief from burdensome taxation."

Yet when American property rights or claims were jeopardized within the borders of any minor country, President Coolidge let it be known that neither love of peace nor desire for normalcy would prevent the use of military engines in the protection of vested interests. On the occasion of renewed disturbances in Nicaragua in 1927, marines were again employed in that tiny republic, and when civil war in China interfered with American operations, large naval forces were dispatched to the scene to await eventualities. Taking advantage of the furor over Nicaragua and the continuation of the contest with Mexico over the application of her land laws to American owners and lessees, the President bluntly declared through the White House spokesman that the whole issue could be "boiled down to the simple question, 'Shall the property of American citizens in Mexico be confiscated without being paid for?'" And when the Senate unanimously voted in favor of arbi-

trating the Mexican controversy, saving American rights, the President did not commit himself to that platonic proposition but by innuendo implied that the United States was prepared to defend the claims of its citizens in certain countries, to define them on its own authority, and to enforce them by arms if necessary—this even though a claims commission for the adjustment of Mexican difficulties had been provided by negotiation and officials of the Mexican government asserted that only one-seventh of the oil companies representing about one-twentieth of the property involved, especially the so-called Doheny and Mellon interests, had declined to comply with the land laws in question. Perhaps Coolidge was screwed up to this firm resolve by alarmist reports from the State Department hinting that Bolsheviki were lurking around every corner.

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Surveying the ground after ten years of labor for restoration and healing, the warriors of normalcy, in spite of their overwhelming victory in 1924 and the reduction in the taxes on the rich, could not feel sure that ultimately they were to be transported all the way back to the era of the full dinner pail. As a matter of disconcerting fact the economic world in which they moved and the intellectual climate on which they relied for ideas and phraseology were not the same as in the piping days of McKinley and Hanna. If organized labor was less intransigent—more intimately associated with capitalist methods and philosophy on account of high wages, labor banks, huge accumulations of funds, and wide investments in every form of business enterprise—the setting for capitalist operations had been radically altered by the economic events of the past fifty years and by the transformation of Europe in peace and war.

In the good old days, American money lenders had practically nothing invested abroad and American manufacturers

made goods almost entirely for a home market that was rapidly expanding with the development of virgin soil in the West. While that condition prevailed, American bankers were on the whole sympathetically allied with the captains of industry whom they helped to finance; and the state of European civilization made relatively little difference to those who owned forges in Pennsylvania or spindles in North Carolina.

But in the new age when heroic efforts were being made for a recovery of serenity, the face of the wide world had been transformed. American manufacturers, always multiplying their facilities in the hope of larger profits, had pushed out into the markets of South America, Asia, and Africa—on which England, France, Italy, and Germany were trying to thrive—and even into the very shops of London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo. Moreover American bankers, glutted with profits and savings won from business enterprise, had lent billions abroad and were lending more millions every year—billions on which constant returns had to be made to the United States in interest and principal installments, inevitably bound to take the form of manufactured goods, raw materials, and agricultural produce, at least in the main, unless of course canceled in Europe's next cataclysmic upheaval. At this very juncture, the great nations of the Old World whose growing industries had once made enormous demands for American farm produce were suffering from the devastating effects of the World War, were heavily in debt to the United States, and were fated either to repudiate their bonds flatly or in some respectable manner or to send huge exports to America with which to discharge their obligations.

Considered realistically, therefore, the era of normalcy was an age of paradox. Could the United States continue to supply unlimited streams of farm produce and manufactures to the world except in the guise of credits? And if in the form of credits, would there not come a time when the burden of interest and installment payments must result

either in imports ruinous to American business and agriculture or in repudiations ruinous to American investors? Furthermore in this seemingly inexorable flow of things was there not bound to arise sooner or later a terrific struggle between the American banking interests engaged in foreign financing on the one side and American businessmen engaged in manufacturing on the other? Indeed the financial columns of the newspapers reflected every day flashes from the conflict between the advance guards of these now opposing forces—never more signally than in October, 1926, when J. P. Morgan announced himself in favor of free trade for Europe. If the light seemed to shine brightly on the pathway of normalcy, shadows lurked there also.

On the left flank the new agricultural forces had to be taken into the reckoning. Led by the cotton planters and the corn-belt farmers, agrarians were now more versed in the ways of the world than Daniel Shays, Andrew Jackson, or Jerry Simpson had ever been. By recent legislation it was absolutely demonstrated that they had put aside the simple gospel of inflation in favor of something more substantial and it was further evident that they were in no complacent mood. Caught between organized capital and organized labor sustaining prices of manufactures on one side and the relative decline in the European market for their produce on the other, the farmers were in something of a panic. With land values blown up to the bursting point and the wages of farm labor at urban levels, they faced more than losses on current crops. They saw ahead the possibility that a large part of their property might be confiscated through an increasing disparity between income and outlay spread over a long period of years.

Respecting the political arts, agrarians had more elaborate views than in 1860 or 1896 and they now had the support of a few competent statesmen who looked upon the salvation of the native farming population as more important than multiplying urban industrial centers peopled by im-

ported aliens or swelling the profits of manufacturers already rich. If the engines of state—diplomats, gunboats, marines, and armies—could be used at great cost to protect and promote banking and industry at the ends of the earth, why not a public service no less energetic on behalf of agriculture, they inquired. If manufacturers closely organized in combinations could charge high prices for their goods at home and dump their surplus abroad at heavy discounts, charging the differential, if any, to domestic consumers, why should the federal government not accomplish the same legerdemain for the farmers? With such queries in mind, agrarians cried out: "Protection for all or none." Or as a philosopher given to lightning summaries stated it, "If we can't all sit at the table, let's kick the legs out from under the table and all sit together on the ground." While there was nothing revolutionary in this slogan, it implied trouble for the apostles of serenity and it meant that their problems of statecraft were not as simple as those so easily solved by the political school of William McKinley and Marcus A. Hanna—whose banner Harding tried to hoist again over the White House.

# CHAPTER XXX

## *The Machine Age*

THE cumulative forces of machine industry, which began to dissolve the agricultural order of the Fathers in the days of Jacksonian Democracy, swept the nation into and through the holocaust of the Second Revolution, and assured the supremacy of business enterprise in the gilded age, widened in range and increased in momentum during the opening decades of the twentieth century. These forces made a steady growth in the volume and velocity of mass production the outstanding feature of American economy, with correlative influences on American slants of thought, modes of living, manners, and æsthetic expression. Year by year new mechanical inventions encroached on the area occupied by hand workers: ingenuity gave a pneumatic drill to the miner underground, electric appliances to the woman in the kitchen, a tractor to the farmer, and a radio to the child. At length the day arrived when in all the land save in out-of-the-way places, there could be found none but machine-made objects, duplicated by the ton, impersonal, standardized according to patterns

adapted to fingers of steel, and circulated by publicity drives.

Measured in money value the manufactured products of the United States reported by the census bureau amounted in round numbers to one billion dollars in 1849, eleven billions in 1899, and sixty-one billions in 1923. The variety of the mass was even more astounding than its size, whether revealed by a comparison of the encyclopedic catalogue issued from a great mail order house in 1926 with an industrial inventory of 1880 or by a study of the multitude of things presented at the Sesquicentennial Exposition at Philadelphia in 1926 contrasted with those shown in 1876.

More fraught with social destiny than this mass production of things in dazzling variety were the radical departures effected in technology by electrical devices, the internal combustion engine, wireless transmission of power, the radio, and the airplane—changes more momentous even than those wrought by invention in the age of Watt and Fulton. In that earlier industrial revolution the steam engine, associated with a fixed kind of social apparatus, gloomy and depressing, had furnished the motive power for industry and transportation. Now the steam engine was big and heavy; it was as a rule attached to a definite spot or driven along metal rails. When used in manufacturing, it promoted concentration in the cities, thereby sharpening the line between town and country. It was expensive to install, moreover, and ordinarily every increase in the size of the plant added to the economy and profits of the business built around it. At best it was cumbersome and crude. While augmenting enormously the output of goods, the steam engine marred landscapes, defied æsthetics, filled the air with smoke and gases, and became the center of dull, dreary, dispiriting wastes of railroad yards, warehouses, and slums.

However, just at the moment when the belching smokestack seemed finally accepted as the symbol of western civilization, new motive forces and new instruments began to rearrange the American social pattern that had apparently

crystallized around steam economy. Though their full import for the generations to come could hardly be foretold, certain of their tendencies were obvious. By distributing power in any quantity to shop, forge, house, or highway, electricity and the gas engine offered to emancipate mankind from utter dependence on the fixed plant and railway. They quickened travel and transportation, spread new arteries for the distribution of goods, and brought backward places within the grasp of urban modes and manners. Through the agency of the automobile the normal cruising radius of the average family, limited to four or five miles in the days of horse-drawn vehicles, was widened to forty or fifty miles. To farmers as well as villagers, the moving picture machine made manufactured amusement and urban mental patter swiftly available; while the radio carried the ideas and noises of the city to every nook and cranny of the country as if on the wings of the wind.

Almost immediately these new inventions began to break down the barriers recently erected between city and country by the steam engine, checking the rate of concentration in the great municipalities and strengthening the economy of the small town. By carrying into the family circle labor-saving machines, "canned" information, and sterotyped mental excitements, they invaded every relation of life, business, and society, spreading urban standards, values, and types of conduct over the whole nation. In comparison the effects of the steam engine on the civilization of the stagecoach and hand loom were grossly material and superficial. It could not be denied that the influence of the new motors and machines was as subtle as the electricity that turned the wheel, lighted the film, and carried the song.

In swiftness and variation their processes were such as to defy all efforts at logical representation. An illustration merely illuminates the edge of the vortex. When the first quarter of the twentieth century had closed, there were over twenty million automobiles in a nation of approximately twenty-five million families; there were more than fifteen

million telephones and at least three million radio sets. It was then established that the average daily attendance at the moving picture houses was about twenty-five millions—equivalent to one person a day for every family in the land.

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The effect of mass production on class arrangements was more measurable than the subtler social bearings of gas and electrical technology. For example, there was no doubt that the number of millionaires had been augmented with the volume of commodity output. On every side the families of the older plutocracy established by heroic efforts in railroading, mining, ranching, lumbering, and manufacturing during the gilded age were now surrounded by fresh nabobs who had made money out of automobiles and accessories, electrical appliances, moving pictures, and other standardized goods of the day. Between 1914 and 1919, the number of persons in the United States returning taxable incomes ranging from $30,000 to $40,000 a year increased from 6,000 to 15,400 and the number returning between $50,000 and $100,000 per annum rose from 5,000 to 13,000, in round figures. Reckoning as millionaires all persons reporting $30,000 a year or more in 1919—and this seems conservative in view of tax exemptions, stock dividends, and other technicalities—there were 42,554 millionaires in America at the close of the war for democracy. Those who thought that the age of great fortunes had passed when the simple exploitation of natural resources had about come to a close were dazed by the immense facility of business enterprise, perhaps capable of indefinite expansion.

In fact the accumulations of the machine age made those of the gilded age seem slow and pitiful by contrast, outrunning in rapidity and force all calculations and defeating all attempts to establish levels and barriers, while the pace of lavish spending and lavish giving set by the older plutocracy seemed like the movement of a snail. At the close of the World War millionaires were almost as common

in Detroit, Toledo, Indianapolis, Cincinnati, Denver, and Seattle as they had been in Boston and New York in the age of McKinley. In the single year of 1925, the income of private persons from rent, interest, and dividends, reported for tax purposes, showed a jump from $5,900,000,000 to $8,200,000,000—the mere increase alone amounting to more than twenty-five times the national debt in Washington's day.

While a new plutocracy was continually boiling up from below, the older families of that order were growing into maturity. Children of the second and third generations were enjoying fortunes acquired by pioneering fathers untrained in the schools and innocent of the restraints imposed by the graces of the drawing-room. As a rule they could boast of a college education with its peculiar manners and codes, which occasionally softened the fine assurances inherited from acquisitive ancestors and sometimes corroded by philosophic doubts transmitted views of government, economy, and social values—if indeed it did not supplant ancient anarchy by constructive proposals. Under the satire directed against raw plutocracy by novelists and essayists of their own and other countries, these educated possessors of seasoned estates writhed and twisted, casting about for more respectable mantles of security and atonement. Pelted by criticism and stormed by appeals they came to imagine that wealth, after all, owed obligations to society or at least that it was more pleasing in the eyes of democracy, especially the middle classes so potent in matters of opinion, if it was tinctured by the spirit of *noblesse oblige*.

In short, by 1925, a whole generation of men and women who had inherited fortunes reeking with the odors of the market place had been to college and had gone abroad on the grand tour. Lincoln was the last of the true log-cabin presidents of the United States—though others made high pretensions to such honors. After Cleveland, there was no occupant of the presidency who could conjure the masses with the magic of an education won in the university of

hard knocks. Harvard, Yale, and Princeton in succession sent sons to the White House and then Amherst sent Calvin Coolidge. Even the chief executive of the United States Steel Corporation, Judge Gary, could hang a college diploma on his office wall. The world of books and trade had touched.

As the stream of commodities flowing from the factories broke every barrier, the business of selling goods employed an ever larger army of commercial officers and privates, swelling the ranks of the middle classes with recruits of the mercantile color. Huge areas of American social power were now occupied by huckstering shock troops who, with a technique and a verbiage all their own, concentrated on ogling, stimulating, and inveigling the public into purchases. By raising the business of advertising to the intensity of a crusading religion, embattled vendors gained an almost sovereign sway over newspapers and journals, as they pushed goods, desirable and noxious alike, upon a docile herd that took its codes from big type and colored plates.

Under this economic drive the psychology of the salesman—as distinguished from that of the warrior, organizing capitalist, and creative inventor—became the dominant spirit of an immense array of persons who, in the view of "thoughtful editors," constituted the "sound heart of the nation." In this intellectual climate, trades which the landed gentry had formerly scorned as vulgar were crowned with respectability: real estate agents became realtors, undertakers assumed the rôle of morticians, and clerks expanded into salesladies. When the second census of the twentieth century was compiled there were seen to be at least four million people engaged in trade, including retailers, sales agents, and collateral forces under this general head.

With these increases and changes in commodity production and selling, the older professions—law, medicine, preaching, and teaching—engaged ever-growing armies of recruits. At the taking of the last census there were in the United States 200,000 physicians and dentists, 122,000

lawyers and judges, 785,000 teachers, 127,000 clergymen, and more than 1,000,000 public servants in addition to those employed in the public schools.

To summarize in consolidated figures, allowing a wide margin for error, the number of Americans engaged in trade and in professions in 1920, including of course their families —the substantial bulk of the middle class—was about equal to the entire population of the northern states in 1860 when the election of Abraham Lincoln marked the transition from an agricultural to an industrial civilization. The number of persons returning taxable incomes ranging from $2,000 to $10,000 in 1919 was 3,189,080.

Moreover through investments in odd lots and baby bonds, through stock-owning and profit-sharing schemes, through savings banks and insurance companies, this large middle class had become part owners, usually absentee, of the enterprises managed by captains of finance. By this unforeseen development the Marxian prediction that the middle class would be ground to pieces between the plutocracy and the proletariat was so far unrealized in the United States. Unquestionably, President Coolidge expressed a widespread conviction when he stated that the prosperity of the middling and lower orders depended upon the good fortunes and light taxes of the rich.

Deep down into the laboring and farming groups ran the filaments of interest and enjoyment which connected the plutocracy and the middle class. It appears from the best of estimates that American workmen received a real increase of wages between the opening of the World War and the flood tide of normalcy and that the farmers, while they suffered terrible reverses after the collapse of inflated prices, did not exactly return to their former standard of life. By the millions, cheap automobiles, new and second-hand, telephones, radios, labor-saving implements and other commodities, classed in more sparing societies as luxuries, found their way into the possession of those who labored with their hands at plow or forge. Whereas the proletariat

of older cultures, Rome for instance, had to be amused with circuses and supplied with free bread, the industrial multitudes of the United States, like the middle class, paid for their own diversions and bought their own loaves. To their prosperity labor banks, labor investment enterprises, insurance schemes, and housing programs bore convincing testimony while the rise of whole trades, such as the garment workers, from low standards of living based on sweatshop labor, demonstrated an economic resilience that seemed to discredit the iron law of wages. No doubt there were dark sides to the picture—shadows blacker and more depressing than the comfortable trading and professional classes liked to admit; but the area of grueling poverty was relatively so limited that revolutionary calls to working people to shed their chains met with no wholesale response.

If there was any danger in the social order it seemed to lie in the possibilities of a breakdown from prolonged war or a Malthusian crisis that would snatch from a nation accustomed to luxury surplus goods and pleasures deeply embedded in national psychology as indispensable necessities. Indeed biologists warned the nation that, under prevailing standards of agriculture, the country could support only one hundred sixty-six million people whereas at the current rate of increase the population would be two hundred fourteen millions in 1964. But little heed was paid in the street to such predictions and, besides, some leading scientists argued that there was no limit in sight to the potentialities of agricultural and machine production. Whether the age of acquisition and enjoyment had reached its apogee or had centuries to run with increasing measure remained merely a matter for alluring speculation.

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Apart from their effect on the structure and prosperity of classes, the extension of mass production and the achievements of the new technology brought complicated influences

to bear on the American family, especially on women and children. The multiplication and subdivision of trades, professions, arts, and crafts, and the development of training schools of every kind enlarged the routes by which women could gain that coveted "economic independence" so celebrated by Charlotte Perkins Gilman in the last years of the gilded age. It is true that there was no marked growth in the relative number of women wage earners between 1899 and 1909; the proportion of females over sixteen employed in the standard industries of the country as compared with the males stood still; and in the next decade the proportion of women gainfully occupied, considered in relation to the female population of the country ten years of age and over, actually declined from 23.4 to 21.1 per cent.

But in absolute figures the number of women in trade and mechanical industries increased materially, certainly the number in trade between 1910 and 1920. Moreover the accumulations of the middle classes, schemes of insurance, and the laws of inheritance giving women larger, if not always equal, shares in parental estates, helped to lift thousands of them out of the necessity of working for a living. These factors, coupled with the introduction of labor-saving tools and the growth of coöperative living in apartment houses with their central heating, lighting, and cleaning systems—if not in every case with a common dining service —gave to American women an amount of economic power and leisure that was the envy of their sisters in every other land.

Immediately reflected in the activities of women, this expansion of the middle class hurried forward the club movement which had been such an innovation in the gilded age. By 1926, the General Federation of Women's Clubs boasted of a membership running almost to three millions, making it "the largest organization of women in the world." With the numerical growth and national enfranchisement went a widening of the intellectual horizon; literary yearnings, originally so predominant, sank into the background

before the work of eight grand departments fostered by the Federation: American citizenship, the American home, applied education, fine arts, international relations, legislation, press, and publicity.

More directly political in its emphasis was the National League of Women Voters formed by leaders in the suffrage movement immediately after the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. A federation of state and local associations of women from both parties, it gave its attention to the study and promotion of specific legislative measures. Though it brought the general range of politics within its purview, it took special pains to interest its membership in laws pertaining to social welfare, the election and appointment of qualified women to office, and international relations. In order to draw all the feminine concerns to a focus, and to profit by the strength of unity while eliminating duplication, there was formed in 1920 a Women's Joint Congressional Committee representing more than twenty national societies and speaking for over four million members, dedicated to the advancement, in a non-partisan fashion, of a legislative program formulated at annual conferences.

Individually and collectively, as wage earners, members of clubs and professions, housewives, politicians, and heiresses, American women now assumed an unquestioned rôle in shaping the production of goods, material, humanistic, literary, and artistic. They were the chief spenders of money: while accurate figures could not be obtained, it was estimated that they bought personally at least seven-tenths of all the manufactured commodities sold each year in the country. Books, magazines, newspapers, and moving pictures were modeled to suit their purses and their fancies. Lines of automobiles and plans of houses were drawn to please their imagination. Objects of domestic adornment—rugs, wall papers, lamps, chairs, tables, curtains, and pictures—had to conform more and more to their standards of taste. Since they were the great consumers of fiction

also, romance was chiefly pitched to their key. Music and drama tallied with their requirements, real or assumed. Possessors of leisure as well as money, women forged rapidly to the front as leaders and patrons in education, charity, social work, and civic affairs in general.

Already potent by that time, their influence in politics was immensely enlarged when the ballot was placed in their hands. Besides sharing offices and party jobs with women, the politicians now had to tread more warily as they threaded their various ways among their constituents. Having the means to buy and to command, education to guide them, and freedom to superintend, women became powerful arbiters in all matters of taste, morals, and thinking. In short, they called the tunes to which captains of industry, men of letters, educators, and artists now principally danced.

Without avail did alarmists of the old school cry out as Cato had done that those things which tended to effeminacy were signs of national decay. In vain did European critics from other societies where male tastes predominated offer dire forebodings—usually to audiences of the American women themselves—at large fees from beaded bags. It was difficult to discover how, in a machine age devoted chiefly to making, selling, and enjoying material goods, the martial virtues of feudalism and primitive society or the ethereal speculations of aristocratic leisure founded on other modes of economic exploitation could be exalted to pristine excellence. Indeed in the eyes of the true soldier, the merchant had always been the contemptible promoter of comfort and luxury; so officers of the American army and navy often repeated the historic protest against an effeminacy that tended to encourage pacifism.

Far from producing contentment with the conjugal yoke, the ease of life and opportunities for personal adventure steadily augmented dissatisfaction with all the offices of matrimony. The economic independence of women and the coöperative living, which hopeful feminists often had heralded as signs of a better day in marital relations, were

in reality accompanied by an increasing weakness in the nuptial bond and all it implied. In 1900, the ratio of divorces to marriages was one to twelve; in 1916, one to nine; in 1924, one to seven. Equally impressive was the fact that the major portion of the applicants were women.

Even to the light-hearted this record was startling; while to those accustomed to measure morality in marital terms it was appalling. Though the purveyors of remedies ascribed the tendency to the facilities afforded by lenient divorce laws, the case was not so simply stated. It is true that a number of states, especially in the West, dissolved marriages on slight grounds, such as incompatibility of temper, but others were almost mediæval in their severity. South Carolina for instance forbade divorce absolutely and New York granted it only in circumstances that covered one or both parties with scandal and shame.

The disintegration of the colonial family régime marked by the increasing freedom of divorce was no doubt hastened by the expansion of woman's authority over her children. Under the old law of England which was generally binding in America, the father could assign a guardian to his children under age to take charge of them in the event of his death; only when no such guardian was appointed could the mother act in that capacity. Under the common law too, as transplanted, when parties were divorced the father retained possession of the children, even though he had been the offender whose conduct gave grounds for the separation. While in the early course of American development, divorce was being made easier and traditional patterns of law were being altered in many respects, the disabilities imposed on women in matters of guardianship were long retained in whole or in part.

But naturally with the rising tide of feminism, sprang up a lively demand for a new adjustment of rights over children as well as property, an adjustment generally covered in the terminology of propaganda by the phrase, "equal guardianship." By the constant sapping of state

legislation, man's inherited prestige in this matter underwent radical modification until in the high noontide of the machine age it seemed that this phase of the old régime was also doomed. Over law and precedent piled on law and precedent, women advanced steadily toward the goal of equal rights in their children.

Having won the ballot, enlarged economic opportunities, freedom to bob their hair, wear men's clothes, smoke and swear, and extensive powers in the domestic relation, women looked for new fields of enterprise. At this point a group of the more intransigent demanded "absolute and unconditional equal opportunity" in every sphere. To give effect to their doctrines, they proposed an amendment to the federal Constitution providing that there should be no discriminations against women on account of sex in any national or state legislation.

If the full import of this demand was difficult to grasp, its implications in many details were readily defined. Certainly the more extreme of this feminist school called for a repeal of all protective legislation not applicable also to men, such as laws limiting the hours of women workers and closing to the sex the heavier and more dangerous trades such as mining and brickmaking. In other words they asserted in effect the physical equality of the sexes and insisted upon freedom to compete with men on the same footing all along the line. Thus by one of the curious ironies of history they were seeking the overthrow of factory legislation just at the moment when young industrial nations like Japan, long accustomed to equal rights in the hardest and most degrading labor, were trying to create "enlightened" codes to safeguard the health of women and home life. However it is necessary to add that among the advocates of equal opportunity were those who looked forward to a day when industry would be regulated, if at all, on the basis of the common interests of men and women, whatever those might be.

The dissolution of patriarchal authority indicated by the

rising power of women was no less evident in the relations of parents and children. That ancient law which placed the father at the head of the family and the mother and children below him in the firmament represented with fair accuracy a stage of military and economic facts. In a sentence Edmund Clarence Stedman summarized it when he told how his grandfather rebuked a clergyman who prayed for the "united head" of the house, exclaiming: "Sir, there is but one head of the house, and I am the head; a united head would be a monster."

In those far-off times, the father read the Bible, said the prayers, and asked the blessing on his family while the regimen of work and play for the entire group was adjusted to his purse and convenience with such deference to the wishes of the mother as time, her will, and circumstances permitted—by no means always slight. "It was an accepted tenet," wrote Henry Cabot Lodge of his boyhood days, "that children not only ought to honor their father and mother, but that they owed them a great debt and were bound to respect it, to help them, to sympathize with them, and, if need be, to care for them."

No doubt such morals fitted very well into the system of economy prevailing in Lodge's youth but the machine age altered the scene for the management of the family by its male head. In the new order prodigal members of the plutocracy set standards of reckless expenditure and high living which spread like a virus among all ranks of society, making the spending of money a national mania and casting the stigma of contempt on previous virtues of thrift, toil, and moderation. The public schools which gave boys and girls of the middle and working classes an education, together with the business enterprise which offered them employment beyond the hearth, made them both increasingly independent of the chief breadwinner. Under the drive of profit-making or of well-subsidized philanthropy, the multiplication of boarding schools, summer camps, organizations for supervised amusements, dance halls, vaudeville

houses, cabarets, moving picture theaters, and public eating places, to say nothing of the automobile, young people were weaned from the restricted living-rooms of their urban homes during the leisure hours left by the school or factory. They now played as well as worked and studied outside the home, for the most part. Finally the dress of youth in the machine age, modeled for life in public places, cheap and flaunting, or costly and dazzling, was another sign of contempt for parental restraint. So the home, especially in the larger towns, became little more than a place for sleeping and an occasional meal, the decline of domestic authority paralleling the velocity of mass production and publicity. "The present view seems to be," wrote Lodge in 1913, "that parents owe an unlimited debt to children because they brought them into the world and are bound to defer to them in all possible ways."

Consequently the father, in losing his prerogatives, lost few of his obligations; indeed they were multiplied rather than diminished, especially for the male of the upper classes. Ever more relentlessly the increase in the number of things that could be bought with money and the rising standard of life drove him to the task of acquiring wealth. And his wife, besides defying and divorcing him, could still secure alimony if he possessed an estate or any earning capacity. The "lord of creation" appeared to be on the verge of an eclipse.

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The whole scheme of American life, as well as the structure of classes and the economy of the family, felt the impress of the changing machine process as mass production and the vivid selling operations which attended it scattered the same commodities and identical ideas over the entire country. Even distant lands were being transformed by an Americanization on the pattern which Matthew Arnold had so dreaded fifty years before, their more ancient arts and moralities also corroding under the invasion of

technology and standardized wares. Queens on thrones were soon endorsing American facial creams, for a price, and ex-premiers approving American cigarettes. With all his energies every great manufacturer in the United States strove to capture at least the national market. Makers of phrases also wrought for a continent. The slogans and catchwords of advertising sped from sea to sea on the morning of their publication—photographs and designs eventually flying as quickly as words on the wings of electricity.

Within the week of their announcement the modes of New York, Boston, and Chicago became the modes of Winesburg, Gopher Prairie, and Centerville and swept on without delay into remote mountain fastnesses. Thus the technology of interchangeable parts was reflected in the clothing, sports, amusements, literature, architecture, manners, and speech of the multitude. The curious stamp of uniformity which had arrested the attention of James Bryce at the dawn of the machine age sank deeper and deeper into every phase of national life—material and spiritual. Even those who bent their energies to varieties of social reform, to the improvement of education, the management of drives for benevolence, the distribution of knowledge, and the advancement of public health brought the nation within their purview and utilized the advertising courage of the marketplace. And all these tendencies, springing naturally out of the whirl of business, were encouraged by the conscious struggle for efficiency in every domain, by the discovery and application of the most economical apparatus for the accomplishment of given ends.

Under the remorseless hammering of the machine was effected a standardization of American society that daily increased in precision and completeness. Nothing escaped its iron strokes. Those who apparently directed and those who labored became one in the routine. "It is the age of the machine triumphant," wrote a contemporary journalist. "We are but ants in the machines; the wheels revolve and

we revolve with them. Can any man look at the subway rush and then speak of those jammed midges as 'lords of creation'? Alarm clocks, time tables, factory whistles, ordinances, rules, the lock step of industrialism—the lock step of paternalism!" Plastic youths who sought education found it graded and measured by "points." Adults who turned to the libraries for wisdom were offered "handy guides" to reading which laid out by foot rules the paths to culture or a knowledge of business enterprise. Like the professions the great departments of business and industry, aided by the schools, worked persistently at perfecting uniformity in methods and practices, codifying trade and professional ethics.

When work was laid aside for amusement, the masses listened passively to manufactured music, watched moving pictures portray with endless reiteration identical plots and farcical acts, sat on the bleachers at games, in vicarious playing, to cheer their favorite teams. When they gratified their thirst for the open country, they did so in standardized automobiles wheeling along standardized highways, past standardized signboards and standardized "soft-drink" huts, to conventional places of entertainment packed with masses of their kind, to the White Mountains, Florida, or the Yellowstone Park where business enterprise offered the comforts of metropolitan hotels or of camps serving tinned milk and biscuits. The towering climax seemed reached in 1925 when Bruce Barton, a rich advertising agent and proud member of the Republican party, presented Jesus Christ to his countrymen as The Man Nobody Knows—a joyous, ripping good fellow, the perfect image of a "go getter" from the Jazztown Rotary Club—an effusion which the historian, Hendrik Willem Van Loon, limned in a cartoon showing God as at last worthy of being naturalized into American citizenship.

To artists of a classical bent and to spectators of a soulful temper the pageant in its deadly uniformity was no doubt rather agonizing. But neither could explain how an

age of machinery might by any magic retain the flexibility inherent in a system of handicrafts. Indeed that older flexibility had itself been exaggerated in the imaginations of the modern philosophers who knew it not at first hand. As a matter of chill reality all previous societies had been standardized at some level of poverty or wealth, none more rigidly, save for a fortunate few, than those of the ancient world or of modern China. The slaves who rowed the quinquiremes of Nineveh bowed their scarred backs in mechanical unison and the chant of Oriental coolies bearing horses' burdens had the monotony of the shuttle's steady clangor.

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Paralleling the extension of manufacturing and selling which gave uniformity to life from one end of the continent to the other was a multiplication in the number of associations for profit, pleasure, diversion, and improvement. The tendency of Americans to unite with their fellows for varied purposes—a tendency noted a hundred years earlier by de Tocqueville—now became a general mania as the means of communication and the routine of economic activity grew to be national in scope. Thousands of new organizations were founded on trades, professions, and the many subdivisions of lucrative enterprise. For instance, in towns and cities business men united in boards of trade or chambers of commerce; local units were in turn knit together in state federations; and finally the whole complex was crowned by a central combination—the United States Chamber of Commerce—whose agencies were housed in an imposing structure in Washington where they could keep in touch with political affairs.

In addition to organizations primarily for mutual advantage, new types of fraternal societies were created, distinct from the established orders like the Masons, Odd Fellows, and Knights of Pythias. Business and professional men now flocked to Rotary Clubs, Kiwanis Clubs,

Lions' Clubs, and a score of other associations where they listened to speeches without number, gave dinners to dignitaries, raised money for worthy causes, and played pranks on their comrades. In strange mixture they combined what one of their leaders called "fun, fellowship, profit, and service," setting the hallmark of symmetry on the liverymen of trade. Drawn into the same vortex, business and professional women formed their leagues and strove for power and place on standardized levels. As if to aid the course of nature, rapidly multiplying business schools, with a scholastic passion for system, devised schemes of economic thought and disseminated knowledge about uniform standards that were good for trade or gave a better position to those that followed them.

In other spheres than the economic, enthusiasm for organization also produced a bewildering number of clubs, orders, and societies—political, social, benevolent, religious, and reform. The directory of charitable enterprises in New York City alone in 1925 embraced more than 345 pages of fine print. It was a rare American who was not a member of four or five societies. Every person who evolved a new idea or a variant on an existing doctrine strove at once to found a fellowship for propaganda and promotion. Any citizen who refused to affiliate with one or more associations became an object of curiosity, if not of suspicion. If he isolated himself, he could hardly hope to succeed in any trade, business, or profession, no matter how great his talents. Moreover the opportunity to attend conventions in distant cities, wear highly colored uniforms, and participate in festivities offered both to men and women diverting releases from the routine of employment and domesticity—freedom which they seized with avidity since they could pay for it. This longing for diversion and this herd distinct, quite as much as hatred for Catholics, Jews, and Negroes, was no doubt responsible for the revival of the Ku Klux Klan with its weird ritual and hooded regalia, its parades, and its outbursts of violence.

When social philosophers tried to unearth the roots of the ardor for association in the United States, they could not advance far beyond the explanation offered by de Tocqueville, namely, that in a democracy which professes equality, the individual without special titles, riches, distinctions, or gifts feels an oppressive sense of weakness alone in a vast mass of general averages; and thus bewildered he seeks strength and confidence in an affiliation with kindred spirits. Unquestionably the leveling modes of democracy, intensified by the technology of standardization in mass production and distribution, accounted for a large part of the federations and super-federations which knit the American nation into a crisscross of a thousand unities.

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Another motive for collective enterprise, sometimes infused with economic designs, was certainly the passion for governing which Jefferson noted as a source of tyranny—that hot desire to force ideas and moral standards on one's fellowmen. It was under this head that the critics of prohibition usually classed the associated effort which abolished, nominally at least, the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor as a beverage. Their assignment, however, is not altogether exact. It is true that since the middle of the nineteenth century there had been a well-organized temperance movement in America, inspired by moral fervor, and that it was given a decided impetus by the Woman's Christian Temperance Union founded in 1874 with Frances Willard as a dominant leader. It is true also that the Prohibition Party, which nominated its first candidate for the presidency in 1872 and continued its agitation with unabated zeal, was largely supported by religious ardor. But while these movements flourished, the liquor business likewise flourished.

It was not until the Anti-Saloon League, founded at Oberlin, Ohio, commenced its nation-wide campaign in 1895 that war on the traffic took on a formidable aspect. Now

the Anti-Saloon League which bent its energies to abolishing the saloon in villages, towns, counties, and states in a piecemeal fashion no doubt made an appeal to the moral elements of the population—particularly the Methodists—but it had also practical ends in view. It did not ask its members to take the total abstinence pledge; rather did it summon them to battle against the saloon, the workingman's club. In the South, the League was strongly supported by business men who saw in the abolition of the "dram shop" an increase in the sobriety and regularity of their colored personnel. In other parts of the country, especially in the West, employees of labor in quest of efficiency gave money and support to the new crusade, for drunken workmen were a danger as well as an economic loss to machine industry. Moreover, it must not be forgotten, the saloon and liquor dealers were frequently in politics—Democratic politics at that—and as a rule engaged in activities of no marked benefit to the business community. So under the influence of forces not merely moral in purpose, the work of extinguishing the saloon was expedited during the opening years of the twentieth century. Then came the World War, a life and death struggle, calling for the conservation of grain as a food supply, a vital element in sustaining the military machine and its civilian auxiliaries and resulting in the temporary suppression of the saloon.

These were factors often overlooked or minimized by critics who imagined that a tyrannical minority of Puritans suddenly compelled Congress in 1917 to submit to the states the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor as a beverage and then browbeat local legislatures into ratifying it within two years. The operation was by no means a stampede. As a matter of fact as early as 1914 a prohibition amendment had received a majority in the House of Representatives then dominated by Democrats under southern leadership. Furthermore at the time the Eighteenth Amendment went into effect, namely, on January 16, 1920, two-

thirds of the states had already adopted prohibition by popular vote, about ninety per cent of the land area was at least theoretically dry, and nearly seventy per cent of the American people nominally lived under a dry regimen.

It is a fact that none of the populous industrial commonwealths had as yet adopted state-wide prohibition and that a large portion of their inhabitants, especially organized labor, were emphatically opposed to it. Nor can it be denied that astonishment reigned in many quarters when Congress passed the resolution of amendment in December, 1917. But in view of the history of the preceding twenty years and the economic factors operating in the war on the saloon, the adoption of prohibition could not be called with accuracy, as it was, "a trick played upon an indulgent nation by a belligerent minority of moral fanatics working in underground passages."

Probably many supporters of the Anti-Saloon League were amazed when they discovered that the total abolition of the saloon implied the extreme doctrine of unconditional prohibition. Even as things turned out, the middle and upper classes with money to spare could always get good liquor of any kind, in any quantity, for a price. Therefore, from one point of view it was possible to say that, while prohibition was a failure, the abolition of the old-fashioned saloon was fairly successful. At all events, ascribing prohibition to nationalized Puritanism betrayed a forgetfulness of leading features characterizing colonial life, for the old Puritan loved fine liquor, mild and strong, and none of the original Puritan states was dry when the Eighteenth Amendment went into effect. It was safe to venture a guess that the desire of business men for efficiency and safety in labor was as potent in bringing about the new régime as the wanton lust of moralists determined to impose their own standards upon the nation.

The same economic factor was also effective in the promotion of another type of routine requirement—the intense nationalism which followed the participation of the United

States in the World War. By the strife in Europe the American people were made acutely aware of the alien races in their midst and aroused to the perils of a dual allegiance in the case of wars affecting the interests of this country. In addition, the proletarian revolution in Europe which had repercussions among the working classes of America, though exaggerated in significance in all probability, gave timorous employers of labor even more concern than did the corner saloon which made for drunkenness and inefficiency. For these and other reasons there arose at the close of the World War a crusade for "Americanization"—a movement organized to force certain patterns of thought, linguistic performances, and professions of loyalty upon the population from Maine to California.

While the program of this movement was often noble in conception, if nebulous and vague in details, the net result was usually to exalt uniformity and discourage all inquiry disturbing to those who sat high at the table of enjoyment. In concrete effect it produced numerous state statutes intended to purge historical works of all doubts about the immaculate character of American government and policy, to impose on teachers newly-devised allegiance tests, and to compel the dissemination of purified doctrines of patriotism as understood by chauvinists in good standing.

Distrusting the efficiency of the government they praised, private associations of "minute men" and other self-appointed guardians of American morals undertook to supplement the efforts of public authorities in forcing conformity to type—adding the terrors of private vengeance to the rigors of official justice. Inspired and financed, an army of writers poured out a flood of literature praising the conservative Nordic elements in the national stock and inveighing against Latin, Hebraic, and Slavic contributions to American civilization. Pageants were directed and moving pictures produced to create a correct doctrinal thesis. Prizes were given to school orators who celebrated the perfection of the American Constitution. Even an "authentic" history

of the nation was prepared under the ægis of patriotic societies to transmit to the youth of the land an authoritative canon, claiming the intimate favors of God from first to last. The utility of all these things became quickly apparent to the directors of Manifest Destiny.

Connected with this intensification of the nationalist spirit and the agitation of the American Federation of Labor against competition and communism was a series of federal laws restricting immigration. In 1903 anarchists were expressly excluded and four years later the bar was put up against persons suffering from physical and mental defects. In 1917 organized labor won a thirty-year battle in the passage of a bill over President Wilson's veto, excluding all aliens over sixteen years of age "physically capable of reading, who cannot read the English language or some other language or dialect, including Hebrew or Yiddish." Not content with this restriction, which in fact made no very great reduction in immigration, Congress adopted a new rule in 1921, limiting the number of aliens admitted from most countries to a certain percentage of their citizens already in the United States in 1910. Advancing beyond this very effective slash, Congress in 1924 abolished the Gentlemen's Agreement with Japan and cut the number of immigrants to be admitted to "two per cent of the number of foreign born individuals of any nationality resident in continental United States, as determined by the census of 1890, with a minimum quota of one hundred, subject to certain exceptions." It furthermore provided "that the annual quota of any nationality for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1927, and for each fiscal year thereafter, shall be the number which bears the same ratio to 150,000 as the number of individuals of continental United States in 1920, having that national origin, bears to the number of inhabitants of continental United States in 1920," with a minimum quota of one hundred. The undoubted design of all these later acts, taken with the measures respecting Asiatic immigration already considered, was to reduce the

immigration from Asia and from southern and eastern Europe for the purpose of preserving the racial balance and keeping out radical ideas. As one member of Congress put the matter: "Now asylum ends. The melting pot is to have a rest. The nation must be as completely unified as any nation in Europe or Asia."

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If such standardized processes making for mechanical uniformity of mind and manners seemed to have a metallic ring, they were in fact associated with a general affability and tenderness of feeling, respecting other matters, not usually found in any feudal society. In accordance perhaps with the law of contrasts, which appears to govern human affairs, a nation thoroughly absorbed in the mass production of material goods at the same time displayed a spirit of charity, generosity, and benevolence astounding in its fruits. In two words the humanistic keynote of the new century was summed up, "uplift and service," words which though soon tarnished by vulgar usage none the less expressed a prevailing American mode almost as engrossing as national sports. From the topmost pinnacles of society, the plutocracy showered millions on universities, hospitals, churches, foundations, and other institutions not conducted for immediate gain. In the twenty-five years that followed the opening of the century, more than two billion dollars were given for benevolent purposes. No human interest seemed overlooked: knowledge, health, welfare, peace, and comfort were to be promoted by lavish monetary endowments. Lest time produce unforeseen developments and new needs be neglected, givers of great wealth established permanent foundations and community funds from which directors were to make appropriations to meet the requirements of coming generations.

By this enthusiasm for the general welfare all classes of American society were stirred to action. Associations of

business men, though rigorously observing the rules of their callings, grew ashamed of any program that did not include some elements of "civic improvement." The women's clubs, which in the early nineties had been absorbed in Shakespeare and Browning, turned from mere self-development to public service and social uplift. Drives for hospitals and charitable institutions swept city, town, and countryside producing sums of money that ran into incredible totals. If leading citizens tarred and feathered and outlawed obstreperous members of the Industrial Workers of the World and Communists, they showed equal zeal in providing institutions for dependent orphans and the feeble-minded. If southern gentlemen sometimes administered bitter medicine to Negroes who tried to ride in Pullman cars, they also gave large sums to schools for the education of colored children in the manual arts.

Paradoxical as it seemed there was perhaps some justification in the exclamation of a visitor from a foreign country, which had received great largess from the United States in the form of charitable relief, to the effect that "the American people have the softest hearts and hardest heads of any race on earth," combining under one mental roof "pep, thrift, and service." Nor was it without warrant that an American critic, W. J. Ghent, coined the phrase "benevolent feudalism" to characterize exactly the peculiar union of ruthless business methods with lavish benefactions for humane purposes. In any case the phenomenon was not easily explained. It found no parallel in Roman society of the Cæsars or in English society of the Victorian capitalism. While all the original content of the Latin word *religio*—awe and propitiation of the gods—was not lost in the course of centuries, the human implications of those deepseated emotions in the America of Calvin Coolidge were quite different from the same manifestations in the Rome of Cicero.

Certainly it cannot be proved that those ancient factors in charity, the satisfaction of conscience or the fear of the gods, played any important part in the new benevolence.

Perhaps some old-fashioned pietists hoped that the poor would always be with us so that the rich could display their virtues, but in fact the keynote of American generosity in the period of mass production was no longer charity or *noblesse oblige*; in that realistic age it became prevention. No doubt there was a notable improvement in the institutions for the care of defectives and dependents; millions of dollars were given annually for hospitals and other eleemosynary institutions; these things revealed humanism at work.

Far more significant, however, was the opening of the attack on the roots of poverty and distress, the program of social legislation devised to reduce the need for asylums and poor houses, the construction of "daylight" factories giving air and sunshine to the workers, and the persistent effort in every direction to get at the causes of human suffering and provide effective therapeutics. It was a sign of the new times that schools of philanthropy changed their names to prove that social work rather than charity was their main concern, that the immense endowment of the Rockefeller Medical Board was dedicated not to the relief of suffering but to the eradication of diseases, that the Russell Sage Foundation, created from the fortune of a close-fisted banker, and the Commonwealth Fund, established by the Harkness family a few years later, were both devoted to the humanities, and in practical operation made generous contributions to the war on sickness and misery and to community planning in the large.

Under the stimulus of such preventive ideals, the social settlement, that novel humanistic experiment of the gilded age, found its mission and its outlook subjected to severe tests. On the one side, many of the evils against which it had originally inveighed were removed by collective action while several of its experimental functions were now assumed by public and private agencies. On the other side, its educational work among the middle classes and the plutocracy was largely taken over by college departments of economics and sociology. In these circumstances, one of the

leaders in the movement felt impelled to say at a great international conference in 1926 that "settlement work has shifted from the question of community welfare to the broader field of social education."

The outward-reaching community sentiment which inspired benevolence and social legislation touched at last the fringes of the perplexing racial question, North and South. For a time at the turn of the century the increase in collisions and lynchings seemed to betray the smoldering passions of a coming race war; but the development of more constructive enterprises on the part of Negro leaders, the labors of the American Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the exodus of colored workers from the cotton belt to northern industries, and the scientific study of race relations gave another direction to thought and practice in this sphere. Moreover, in the long and painful way from 1865, the formation of the Interracial Commission in 1920 marked an unmistakable milestone. Providing for direct and friendly coöperation between the leaders of the white race and the black, this Commission undertook to substitute for historic prejudice and suspicion mutual help in searching for a path out of common difficulties. Carrying the same spirit into scientific inquiry more than sixty southern colleges undertook to give courses of instruction in the race question, thereby recognizing its importance and seeking a more impartial approach to its troublesome involutions.

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As if to accentuate a paradox already great, in the general emphasis on the utilities of benefactions and the practical ends of humane endeavors, æsthetics for the multitude, pure science, and polite letters were patronized by hard-headed men of trade. Throughout the gilded age the possessors of great wealth ransacked the galleries, palaces, private collections, and auction rooms of the Old World, purchased objects of art at fabulous prices, and brought home

their harvests for their private enjoyment. Now in the machine age, with increasing frequency, these great hoardings were presented to the public in the spirit of generosity. In 1897 J. P. Morgan made the first of his lavish gifts to the Metropolitan Museum, and in 1924, the splendid Morgan collection of books, manuscripts, paintings, tapestries, and the beautiful building in which they were housed were turned over by his son to a board of trustees for the benefit of the commonalty. About the same time, H. C. Frick, the steel magnate, gave to the public in New York City, subject to certain restrictions, the treasury of paintings he had assembled. In 1925, the collection of the copper king, W. A. Clarke, went to the Corcoran Gallery in Washington, and within twelve months the entire fortune of Frank Munsey passed to the Metropolitan Museum in New York.

All over the country, in fact, the artistic riches of Midas were being given to "the folks," California vying with New York for honors. When the cynics laughed at money, steel, and copper barons despoiling Europe of her treasures, they were reminded by historians that textiles, metals, spices, and banking had supported most of the original owners under whose benign pleasure the precious objects had been created in the Old World. But what effect Rembrandt, Holbein, Fragonard, Turner, and Chavannes would ultimately have on a race of salesagents and on American taste in general remained in the lap of the gods.

Besides the facilities for conventional æsthetic study and appreciation afforded by benevolence in the machine age, the opportunities for people who wished to pursue intellectual careers, gross or subtle, were multiplied many fold by the creation of foundations, by an increase in the scientific activities of governments, federal, state, and municipal, by the establishment of new professorships in every field, by the development of special institutions for research, and by the endowment of fellowships. Biologists could boast that Woods Hole had been expanded to "the largest and best equipped marine laboratory in the world." The Rockefeller

Institute in New York supplied all the favorable conditions for medical research that wealth could buy or the art of man conceive.

Whereas amateurs, such as Lyell, Wallace, and Darwin, men of modest but sufficient competence, had pioneered English science in the nineteenth century, the direction of science in America was now assumed by a corps of professionals, trained according to the formulæ of the schools, and solemnly dedicated to teaching and inquiry. If occasionally some undiscovered genius was born to waste his powers on the desert air, it certainly could be said that, by and large, careers were open to talent in America. Indeed those who had occasion to fill professorships constantly lamented the dearth of first-rate candidates and those charged with administering fellowships frequently found themselves required by the terms of benevolences to endow mediocrity. If free tuition and wide gateways to colleges and universities, research laboratories and institutions, could have made a nation of intellectual supermen, the America of the new century should have led the world.

Keeping pace with the multiplying institutions which furnished support for brain workers were expanding markets for ideas which could be transmuted into commodities or technological improvements and for literary products, high and low. Day and night, leaders in business enterprise clamored for novelties to make and for unique devices to promote selling. New magazines, trade, fiction, cult, special organs and general, jostled for place on the stands. Printing and publishing became one of the major branches of capitalist undertaking, ranking not far behind lumber, iron, and steel in the value of the annual output. If, in this trade, fiction, short and long, brought the greatest rewards, still it could be said that the more serious products of the mind enjoyed a respectable buying public and showed signs of steady gain.

While a few aspiring authors insisted that they could not find appreciation for their genius and were thwarted by a

lack of sympathy or opportunity, a still larger number gave thanks for a generous nation that bought books, magazines, and newspapers with the same prodigality as chewing gum and theater tickets. Taken all in all, if it is safe to generalize about a matter not capable of mathematical measurement, it would appear that America of the machine age offered material subsistance for a life of the mind more varied and more lucrative, both relatively and absolutely, than any nation that had flourished since the beginnings of civilization in the Nile Valley.

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Before the machine age had advanced very far, intellectual modes carried from Europe to America by ever multiplying lines of contact brought disruptive shocks to the patterns of culture inherited from the era of the full dinner pail. At the dawn of the twentieth century the main streams of European interest seemed to be running true to definite forms. Darwinism, elaborated by testimony from biology, anthropology, and sociology, had apparently triumphed beyond all question. Political democracy, especially the parliamentary institutions evolved by England, promised to conquer all the capitals of the earth, including St. Petersburg and Tokyo. According to the election returns from England and the Continent, Socialism marched from victory to victory, presaging a transformation of the capitalistic system, the substitution of coöperation for war and competition. Those who did not get the gospel straight from Karl Marx received it in a diluted state from the writings of Tolstoy, Anatole France, and George Bernard Shaw. With perfect confidence anti-clericals, inspired by emotions born of an age-long conflict, continued their bombardment of the Catholic Church, effecting in 1905 a separation of state and religion in France which caused great trepidation in Rome. If the bourgeois who ruled western Europe did not approve radical creeds in any guise, they

looked upon the future with apprehension, and proclaimed their benevolence by offering an improvement in the lot of the people as the goal of industry, business, and government. "Peace, Science, Democracy, and Progress"—such was the grand slogan blazoned on the banners of the liberals and accepted by the conservatives, perhaps a bit ruefully, as inescapable prescriptions of the modern epoch.

Under the surface of things, however, were flowing deeper currents of inquiry and speculation which were destined to put new aspects on the outlook of the world before the lapse of many years. By minute researches into the problems set by Darwin a generation of scientists completely shattered the simple mechanistic ideas, such as the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest, offered as the keys to the riddle of the universe; and under the leadership of Hugo de Vries reintroduced into man's concept of the creative process inexplicable cataclysmic doctrines—sudden and swerving transformations not to be explained by any simple chain of material causation. In short, in the light of the new biology, the neat creed of evolution received from the Victorians appeared about as inadequate to the requirements of science as the epic contained in the Book of Genesis.

To the disconcerting effects of biologic researches were added startling discoveries in the department of physics. Indeed it was this branch of learning rather than biology that now occupied the center of intellectual interest, resuming its old empire while presenting novel phases. From the age of Newton that noble science had been largely dominated by a mechanistic view of the universe; and its early doctrines had been formidably buttressed by the first law of dynamics, known as the conservation of energy and the indestructibility of matter, expounded in the nineteenth century, and by the Darwinian hypothesis advanced in the same period.

But long before the turning of the century, the solid mechanistic structure of physics received terrific jolts in the house of its friends. From the laboratory of Lord Kelvin came

a manifesto denying the validity of the earlier law of dynamics and substituting for that doctrine an equally confident assertion "that all nature's energies were slowly converting themselves into heat and vanishing in space, until, at last, nothing would be left except a dead level of energy at its lowest possible level. . . . incapable of doing any work." Many years later, to be exact, in 1898, from the laboratory of the Curies was hurled a "metaphysical bomb" in the form of radio activity. A new era was at hand. Within twenty-five years, the philosopher, Alfred N. Whitehead, could say: "Science is taking on a new aspect which is neither purely physical, nor purely biological. It is becoming a study of organisms. Biology is the study of the larger organisms; whereas physics is the study of smaller organisms."

To make a complicated matter simpler than science really permits, earlier concepts of matter and force, which had once been set forth in the physics books as firmly as the laws of the Medes and Persians in the jurisprudence of the ancients, were thrown into the discard. The foundations of confident materialism were dissolved; in place of the old dogmas was offered a curious combination of physics and biology for which philosophers could find no better word than "organic mechanism." Even the certitudes of logic were shaken. When the distinguished French mathematician, Poincaré, asked whether Euclidean geometry was true, he answered himself by saying that the question had no sense: "Euclidean geometry is and still remains the most convenient." When Haeckel, with Teutonic thoroughness, dared the riddle of the universe, he broke down at the crucial point and confessed that the "proper essence of substance appeared to him more and more marvelous and enigmatic as he penetrated further into the knowledge of its attributes." No less revolutionary for the Victorian outlook were the explorations of the new psychology, particularly researches into the nature and functions of the subconscious life, the rôle of defense mechanisms in thinking,

real and feigned, and the wider implications of sex for the expression of life in all its forms.

While the masters of microscope and test tube were penetrating deeper into the substance of all things, the World War took the direction of affairs out of the hands of debaters and placed them in charge of primitive force. As every student of war foresaw, the conflict produced convulsive results wholly outside its mere range of death and destruction. With frightful emphasis the fragile character of "law and order" was demonstrated by ruthless violations of "international comity" on every side, and by domestic upheavals against accredited governments. After preaching the coming "revolution" with religious fervor for a whole generation, Marxian Socialists of the chair were startled into frenzy by the sight of mass energy ripping up the old Tsarist régime and enthroning Bolshevism or a proletarian despotism as a working scheme of politics. On all scores this was distressing enough to orthodox believers in parliamentary institutions and democratic apparatus for counting heads, but they had scarcely got their attack on the Soviet dictatorship in working form when they were invited to stop and applaud dictatorships in Italy, Hungary, and Spain established in the interest of property, not against it —putting yet another aspect on political ethics.

Then, in the aftermath of the war, in the period of reaction and dismay that always follows such volcanic efforts of mankind, pessimists, unable to endure the necessary strain of the age, led by Oswald Spengler in Germany, announced the doom of western civilization. It was gravely asked whether science, the great god of the nineteenth century, was not to be the destroying Frankenstein of the twentieth century. To this challenge the optimists could only answer by promising a return to the old course of "peace and progress."

And they too had some justification; for when the vapors sank down around Russian Bolshevism and Italian Fascism, it was seen that the goal set by the statesmen of the Soviet

Republic and the dictator in Rome, whatever their ethics and verbal flourishes, was mechanical comfort and prosperity for the masses. With the rapid erosion of the feudal orders in England and on the Continent by the extension of peasant proprietorship, the taxation of landed estates, or the destruction of monarchical houses, all European society was more nearly assimilated in substantial matters to that of the United States. The process of civilianizing, which had been transforming the world since the age of exploration and discovery, had broken down even the oldest feudo-clerical structures and promised, at the moment, to make all mankind akin in its economic machinery and corresponding tastes.

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On intellectual pursuits in America the primitive manifestations of the World War and the forward sweep of the machine process sustained by natural science wielded influences both gross and subtle. In terms of religion and theological speculation they were manifest in forms ponderable and imponderable. Churches of every denomination were enriched in buildings and funds by gifts from the swelling patrimonies of the plutocracy and the middle classes. Social fear, the spirit of sacrifice, and reasoned belief conspired to enlarge the golden streams poured into the treasuries of the ecclesiastics. A Nordic Protestant, James J. Hill, and a Semitic skeptic, Max Pam, gave generous sums to the Catholic hierarchy for the avowed purpose of helping to spread discipline over the restive working classes of the land. A school of journalism in a Catholic University, endowed by a Jew, showed how far the machine age had moved from the time of Thomas Aquinas, Abelard, and Saint Francis of Assisi. In the old home of Puritan dissent, Massachusetts, the estate of the Episcopal Church became so large that Bishop Lawrence, member of an old mercantile family, felt constrained to lay aside the purely spiritual functions of his holy office for the practical business of financial administration.

When the first quarter of the century had closed, all denominations reported a combined annual income of over half a billion dollars, the Methodists leading with at least a fourth of the total. In material equipment and capital investments, yearly gains were made that would have startled the bishops, trustees, and deacons of the middle period. Indeed, there were statisticians adventurous enough to estimate that in time the American clergy would enjoy a material power relatively as great as that which fell to the lot of the mediæval church before it was despoiled by the legislation and confiscation of the bourgeois. But such historical prophecies called for caution as well as rejoicing.

The age of machinery which gave wealth to the clergy, being also an age of democracy, intellectual strife, feminism, and associative enterprise among the laity, was marked by an increasing emphasis among all the sects on organizations and institutional arrangements for holding the rank and file in line. Among the Protestant denominations, societies of various kinds, such as the Young Men's Christian Association and its counterpart the Young Women's Christian Association, put aside insistence upon specific creeds, and sought to attract youth by providing social life, lodgings, gymnasiums, entertainment, travel, and instruction in such practical matters as bond selling, real-estate promotion, and elementary technology. Taking their suggestion from such undertakings, pastors in great cities often resorted to similar expedients in their attempts to retain within the fold a membership increasingly distracted by the clangor of industrial life and the flashing amusements offered by commercial agencies.

Even the Catholic Church, which deviated less from historic formulæ and surrendered fewer of the powers possessed by the hierarchy, could not wholly resist the pressure of the age. On no reckoning could the associative temper of its laymen, who in secular life flocked to trade unions and Rotary clubs, be ignored or schemes for attracting their interest be disdained. So the Knights of Columbus came to

play in Catholic circles a rôle similar to that assumed by the Christian Associations in the Protestant sphere, offering assistance in obtaining employment and instruction in technical, business, and civic subjects. It was no accident that "the leading Catholic laymen's organization in the world" was founded in the chief business empire of the world and that it rose to power in the Church of the machine age. Nor did the Jews, professing a still more ancient faith keep aloof from the stream. Among them also lay organizations paralleled the associations of the Christian churches.

As the several denominations reached out for the laymen and sought to make religious applications fitted to their needs, social questions, already in evidence in the gilded age, assumed a larger place in clerical discussions. While Christian Socialism apparently gained little in numerical strength, the interest of the clergy in theories of that character varied directly with the intensity of the controversies in the realm of labor and capital. At the close of the World War when industrial unrest was sweeping through all western civilization, Catholics established a National Welfare Council devoted to scientific and humane inquiries into the pressing economic problems of the day. And Protestants, in addition to setting up a bewildering array of similar agencies, attempted federations looking toward unity and common community programs. As an evidence of a practical resolve, one of these agencies made a survey of the steel industry, producing findings which traversed the assertions of the proprietors and condemned the hours and working conditions in the mills. On certain aspects of the wages problem, the Young Women's Christian Association took such an advanced position that one of its heaviest financial supporters was definitely alienated. Though strong forces made for conservatism, the upward push of the laity into religious activities carried the discontents of secular life, such as there were, into that sphere.

Yet with all the efforts, clerical and lay, to hold the masses to some form of ecclesiastical connection, the fact re-

mained that in 1926 more than one-half the Gentile population and nine-tenths of the Jews were outside the pale of organized religion. When it was pointed out that this estimate of nominal membership, based on statistical reports made by the clergy, included a large proportion of children, the width of the breach in the church universal became all the more striking.

Besides the drive of secular concerns competing for the attention of the masses more and more absorbed in the machine process, the clergy of every sect had to reckon with all kinds of intellectual currents running against orthodoxy in thought. Without interruption the skeptical Deism of the early republic, the growing Unitarianism of the middle period, and the higher criticism of the gilded age, though they resulted in no great congregations of the faithful, continued to make inroads upon established systems of theological opinion. All the while a great army of geologists, biologists, astronomers, physicists, and historians poured out into the streets through books, magazines, and newspapers sensational and disturbing ideas that did not square with the cosmogony and chronology of the Bible, raising a cloud of queries and doubts in the minds of laymen and suggesting to theologians that explanations, modifications, or counterblasts were in order.

Frankly accepting the stubborn facts of science and higher criticism, one school, calling themselves Modernists, tried to meet the situation by restating the substance of Christianity in terms compatible with modern knowledge. The thinker of this type, to use the language of Harry Emerson Fosdick, simply could not "take in earnest the man-sized representations of God on which, it may be, he was brought up—a god walking in a garden in the cool of the day, making woman from man's rib, confounding men's speech lest they build a tower too high, decreeing a flood to drown humanity, trying to slay a man at a wayside inn because his child was not circumcised, showing his back but not his face to a man upon a mountain top, or ordering the massacre of

his chosen people's enemies, men, women, and children, without mercy. He is in revolt against all that." From such "old literalism" the Modernist demanded "intellectual liberation"—emancipation to expound "Christ's imperishable Gospel freed from its entanglements, the Shekinah distinguished from the shrine, to be preached with a liberty, a reasonableness, an immediate application to our own age such as no generation of preachers in the church's history ever had the privilege of knowing before."

Far from surrendering to the iconoclasm of modern science, theologians of an opposite tendency, known as "Fundamentalists," clung with unshaken loyalty to what they were pleased to call "the old faith"—their own selected essentials of Biblical theology. In a strict sense, of course, the Catholic Church, though occasionally disturbed by the writings of Modernists within its own fold, was pre-fundamentalist in doctrine, claiming, as it did, an unchanging and unchangeable creed of invariables which embraced contentions quite as difficult for natural science as Virgin Birth. But it was the conservatives of the Protestant persuasion who started the new vogue in dogmatism. Picking out a few tenets deemed necessary for salvation, they rejected the validity of scientific methods in theological criticism and declared war on freethinking of every type. In general they agreed on four or five points as tests for separating the sheep and the goats; such, for example, as the verbal inerrancy and inspiration of the Bible, a literal interpretation of its crucial passages, the fall of man, Virgin Birth, the scheme of atonement and salvation through the crucifixion, and the resurrection of Christ.

Lest there be uncertainty as to their position, Fundamentalists proclaimed their views in unmistakable language. The Baptists, for instance, at their northern convention in 1922, specifically resolved "that the Bible was written by men supernaturally inspired; that it has truth without any admixture of error for its matter; that as originally written it is both scientifically and historically true and correct; and

therefore is and shall remain to the end of the ages the only complete and final revelation of the will of God to man; the true center of Christian union and the supreme standard by which all human conduct, creeds, and opinions should be tried." This broad and emphatic profession was followed by eight additional declarations pertaining to the Trinity, the acceptance of the Genesis account of creation "literally not allegorically or figuratively," Virgin Birth, atonement for sin, grace in the new creation, the mission of the Church, immersion, the resurrection and second coming of Christ, and the condemnation of evolutionary doctrines. Affirming its faith in dogmas similar in character, the Presbyterian Church at its general assembly in 1923 prefaced its bill of particulars with the assertion that "it is an essential doctrine of the Word of God and our standards that the Holy Spirit did so inspire, guide, and move the writers of the Holy Scriptures as to keep them from error." Whatever criticisms could be levelled against the Fundamentalists, it was admitted that they left no doubt as to the verbal forms of their beliefs.

By competent authorities the origins of the Fundamentalist movement have been traced to Bible institutes founded in various parts of the country for the purpose of training religious workers whose preliminary education did not, as a rule, qualify them for the theological schools tinctured by scientific and historical methods. It was in essence a popular movement, showing its greatest strength in rural districts where the machine process had as yet made little impression. Unquestionably, it was highly organized, well-financed, and resolute.

Not content with making war on the Modernists in theology, Fundamentalist leaders strove to get possession of state legislatures and force the enactment of statutes forbidding the teaching of evolution in schools supported either in whole or in part by public funds. With comparative ease, they accomplished this object in Tennessee, precipitating in the summer of 1925 a spectacular battle in the trial and con-

viction of a young teacher accused of imparting to his pupils the doctrine of evolution in violation of the law.

Among the freethinkers of two continents, especially among those who looked neither around nor back, the Tennessee case aroused amusement at the expense of the American hinterland, but undisturbed by scorn from such quarters, the Fundamentalists announced that they intended to carry on their campaign—preaching their gospel and forcing legislatures to pass bills against evolution until they had made their creed the faith of the American nation. And while the doubters scoffed, the straight sect of literalists, in their warfare on science, received hearty encouragement from theologians in England, Scotland, and Europe who were themselves put in similar jeopardy by the inroads which modern learning was making upon their own domain.

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According to what seemed to be destiny American science in the machine age made its great contributions in the form of utilitarian applications rather than in pure speculation. At Menlo Park, Thomas Edison continued to work his witchery with a vitality undiminished by age. Until the close of his threescore and fifteen years in 1922, Alexander Graham Bell maintained his interest in the improvement of telephonic communications; and a number of other leaders from the older generation labored with unabated zeal through the opening decades of the twentieth century. To the long list of celebrated inventors who had given distinction to the previous period were added names full worthy of the forerunners—Michael Pupin in the extension of telephone and telegraph circuits, Charles P. Steinmetz in the field of general electricity, the Wright Brothers in aeronautics, Lee De Forest in radio transmission, and countless workers hardly less adroit in interpreting the ways and moods of nature.

Though the advance in technology had carried the

frontiers of inquiry far away from the dominion ruled by thumb and had pushed scientific problems deep into the mysteries of the new physics and chemistry, ingenuity seemed to keep pace with the most exacting requirements. No branch of applied mechanics was ignored; no demands of progressive industry went unheeded. As in the gilded age, every year brought forth its amazing achievements until a sated public could be scarcely moved by the most breath-taking revelation. In 1903 the first flight of more than five hundred feet was made by an airplane; in 1902 the first wireless message was carried across the Atlantic from Cornwall to Cape Cod; in 1915 the sound of the human voice sped from New York to San Francisco by telephone; in 1927 from New York to London by wireless.

When near the turn of the quarter a comparative study of the world's mechanical achievements was made, the United States led all the nations of the earth in the number of patents registered, having 1,397,000 against 645,000 for France; 594,000 for Great Britain; and 365,000 for Germany. With good reason could Secretary Hoover say in 1925: "We have in recent years developed our industrial research upon a scale hitherto unparalleled in history."

From the workshop the spirit of practical application radiated in every direction. If, as Spengler suggests, chiming clocks in church towers could give to renaissance Europe a fateful time sense unknown to the ancients, then it is not surprising to find that the clanging machinery of American civilization gave a utilitarian bent to the oldest sciences born of magic and necromancy. Having prefixed "industrial" to their title, chemists, whose forerunners once sought the philosopher's stone, now vied with one another in discovering new commercial substances or in turning old elements to novel uses in the manufacture of commodities, the increase of agricultural produce, or the destruction of diseases. From vexatious disputes with preachers over Mosaic cosmogony—from the long contest between the bourgeois and clerical estates which had opened in the six-

teenth century—geologists swerved over to mundane affairs, taking pride in inquiries that yielded economic advantages.

In keeping with the spirit of the age, biology shifted its center of gravity. Once it had furnished the materials for the furious Darwinian battle, giving special attention to the theological implications of its researches. In the machine age, however, biology, besides branching out in all directions, assumed a more earthly guise, busying itself with improvements in the breeds of plants and animals, wars on disease, eugenics, population and the food supply, the relation of organic functions to mind and conduct, and theories of race, not overlooking the great conflict between the Nordics and their rivals. With a kindred indifference to theology, psychologists veered off from monastic introspection to the study of the human animal as a going concern in a world of physical and chemical reactions, venturing into the social bearings of their subject, deigning to serve employers in the search for efficient labor, merchants eager to sell more goods by alluring advertisements, and physicians concerned with healing.

By the predominance of practical considerations a decided stimulus was given to the popularization of science. New technical magazines designed for general and special publics packed the newsstalls. Books making clear the mysteries of advanced researches, such for example as Edwin D. Slosson's Creative Chemistry published in 1919, took their place with novels among the best sellers. In colleges and universities scientific courses multiplied; while societies for the promotion of scientific interests flourished. And Science Service, established in 1920, broke into the columns of the daily press. State and federal support for scientific work and endowments for research, notably the Carnegie Institution and the Rockefeller Institute, proved that science commanded the respect both of taxpaying masses and the possessors of great riches.

And the downward thrust of exact science into the commonalties of life continued unabated. Through a thous-

and channels its spirit poured into the nooks and crannies of American life, save in the remote hinterlands. With the expansion of machine processes, it covered an ever larger area of industry; with the growth of cities, municipal technology occupied spacious regions once dominated by political vagaries; owing to the agricultural revolution, work on the farm became as realistic as the moving parts of a steam engine. In the guise of labor saving devices, in the formula of balanced diets and domestic hygiene, science invaded the household, tilting at ancient practices based on rule of thumb and flouting old wives' prescriptions for the care and feeding of infants. If social opinion lagged behind the flow of scientific interests, the tendency of thought was as exigent as the kinematics of the sun.

In the higher realms of speculation and dialectics, similarly cumbered with the verbal patterns of former civilizations, the spirit and method of science also wrought transformations with respect to strategy and objectives. Whatever their practices, historians of the new century made solemn vows to truth, declaring that it was not their business to praise or condemn, pronounce ethical judgments, serve the cause of party, or play the rôle of chauvinist, but rather to ascertain the facts of particular situations, order them systematically, and draw from them only the deductions warranted by the evidence. Economists and sociologists in turn paid tribute to science; if they apologized for protective tariffs and ship subsidies, gave aid and comfort to organized labor, or forwarded the course of social legislation, they at least decorated their arguments with the gauds of the laboratory. In education, the quantitative measurements of physics and chemistry were paralleled by mechanical tests of intelligence, which gave pain to idealists of the old school who continued to imagine that there was something qualitative about character, capacity, and pedagogy. Though forty of the leading scientists of the country, including men as eminent as R. A. Millikan and Henry Fairfield Osborn, united in proclaiming that there

was no real conflict between science and religion, Fundamentalists refused to be comforted, persisting in their distress over the conquest and subjugation of the mysterious by the critical method.

And yet, notwithstanding the swift advance of applied and popular science, in pure science—the disinterested search for truth—the United States lagged far behind the leading European nations. It is true that in the course of the machine age, the Nobel Prize was awarded four times to American scholars, to A. A. Michelson and R. A. Millikan in physics; to T. W. Richards in chemistry; and to Alexis Carrel in medicine. But there was no doubt that America on the whole held a subordinate position as a promoter of chivalric inquiries into the subtler mysteries of nature.

It was the recognition of this disconcerting fact that led a committee of distinguished citizens, headed by Secretary Hoover, to begin in 1926 the quest for a twenty million dollar endowment fund with a view to raising the United States in the scale of scientific accomplishment, evidently on the assumption that better material equipment and more leisure would automatically produce Darwins, Roentgens, Curies, Kelvins, and Einsteins. Though the project was greeted with a chorus of approval in academic circles as marking a turn in the history of American thought, all through the appeals for subscriptions ran the obtruding note that in the end even the most remote and abstract search for truth would pay dividends to business enterprise.

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Bounded on the one side by machine industry and on the other by scientific research, humanistic studies took on the tone of the "temporal modalities." In philosophy the trend was unmistakable; the substitution of laymen trained in professional schools for seasoned clergymen had been practically completed by the opening of the period and had

already commenced to bear fruit. Though no little cosmic anguish was transferred when speculative thought was separated from religious offices and emoluments, the provocations of hard, practical business in American culture could not be escaped. Attempts to offset native speculation by importing such restorers of historic vitalism as Henri Bergson merely made transitory flurries, confirming local authorities in their vernacular convictions.

In his later years, William James went entirely over to the devastating pragmatism of Charles Peirce—a curious combination of chance, love, and law, hospitable to all pertinent ideas, trusting somewhat naïvely in the general good and the general run; never was James more whimsically dangerous to "old absolutism" than at the close of his rich and versatile life in 1910. Nor was his colleague at Harvard, Josiah Royce, more consoling to intimates of Providence who thought that they could stand fast where they were. While Royce belonged essentially to the earlier period of American history, his attenuated Christian scheme left little room for special creation, the fall of man, and salvation by mere faith.

With complete frankness, the other outstanding thinker of the generation, John Dewey, broke with all fixed schemes and imagery, shifted the center of his speculation to naturalistic grounds, waited assiduously on the new revelations of science, listened to the changing voices of psychology, and gave to his thought the semblance of vitality and motion that accompanied the flow of all things. In his hands a branch of wisdom once deemed esoteric acquired a practical ring; in fact it conformed very closely to the requirements of an age committed to machine production, science, and progressive endeavor.

As a matter of course, this tendency in American opinion shocked æsthetes of a softer and thinner temper, especially those who found solace in the philosophies of less prosperous civilizations baffled in the quest for material abundance and content to find in speculation a comforting substitute.

After enriching American opinion with sparkling fancies and noble apologies for the mystic view, one of the most brilliant writers of this bent, George Santayana, fled from the scene to a haven in an older culture where the grime of economic subvention was not so evident or at least worked no such havoc in the pleasures of inward calm. Certainly it was difficult to reconcile what the Germans called Fordismus with anything that savored of Nirvana.

For dogmatic economics as for the philosophies of absolutism the veering weather of the machine age was not at all propitious. No one was strong enough, or at least no one attempted, to bend the bow which John Bates Clark had used with such effect at the close of the gilded age in defending a capitalistic system which distributed wealth according to deserts, particularly after Thorstein Veblen illuminated Clark's paradoxes in the most consummate piece of academic irony ever produced on this continent. It is true that many professors continued to write textbooks wearing the aspects of rotundity, but capitalism shifted its ground with such rapidity that it was no longer possible to reproduce the assurance of Adam Smith, Ricardo, and Nassau Senior. As far as they possessed unity of pattern, these texts at bottom were usually apologies for the prevailing modes of production and distribution; but even their unity was more specious than real.

Indeed the drive of technology was so remorseless that younger economists, like their brethren in physics and biology, turned from philosophy to research, pushing ever deeper into the currents of detail, historical and practical, thereby losing foothold on the banks of infallibility. Those with an inclination for profitable realism swung over to business schools or became advisers to banks; those with a temper for service gave thought to labor problems and humane legislation; others with a passion for exactness applied to such fragments of the economic world as were susceptible of measurement the methods of mathematics, with fruitful results in limited areas. By these and similar

maneuvers, the spirit of science and inquiry harbored in the universities became mingled with the conduct of business, the direction of industry, and the conflicts of capital and labor.

Before the machine age had got into full swing, a new kind of approach called "institutional economics" was announced in the schools. According to this creed, the prime business of the economist was to "get the facts," observe the tendencies, examine the factors that conditioned particular situations, and possibly coöperate intelligently in realizing temporarily relevant policies. Perhaps the spirit of the age was voiced with fair accuracy by a distinguished professor of this direction when he declared in 1923 that his science could not be scientific if it served either capital or labor as mere apologetics and that a middle ground of mediation and interpretation was the only alternative to impossible dogmatizing. While to tough-minded men bent on higher profits or increased wages at all costs, the pronouncement seemed cold and unpromising, it was highly significant; the age of crude protective coloration was vanishing.

Caught in the same realistic tendencies, political science in its turn underwent a kindred transformation. In the hands of men trained in the verbalism of jurisprudence, it had long remained austere, aloof from use and wont. At the opening of the twentieth century nearly all the books dealing with government were tables of constitutional rules —rules that gave little or no clue to practice—or they were speculative treatises on the logic of an elusive abstraction called "the state," usually conceived more or less consciously in the interest of some party or faction. But that façade could not escape the scrutiny of curious minds.

In time doubts as to the value of this juristic formalism led to an inquiry into the nature and operations of political parties, those powerful organs of government as a going concern—an inquiry stimulated in 1902 by the publication in English of M. Ostrogorski's remarkable work on Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, which carried into

greater minutiæ the investigation made by James Bryce several years earlier. Once the juristic wall was breached, a search began for the springs of motive that induced individuals and groups to take part in the governing process and for efficient causes determining the functions of politics. As fitted the machine age in which the making and selling of material goods were the supreme activities of society, the search for such origins opened a way into the realm of economic enterprise. When that departure was made, no sanctum could elude intruders; no department of government, legislative, executive, or judicial, could avoid the light of scientific criticism.

While this invasion was taking place, political theory was subjected to pressure from another quarter, namely from the Taylorian practitioners of industrial efficiency. As national, state, and municipal budgets mounted and the functions of government expanded, nothing seemed more natural than to apply to the transaction of public business the modes of organization and the procedures found successful in corporate affairs. On one wing of political science, therefore, the quest for methods of economy in planning and executing public work became a dominant interest in research, resulting as in economics in the rise of an institutional school, concerned primarily with observing the state playing its historic rôle and with helping to perfect the technique of government in discharging the duties thrust upon it by the drive of parties and factions. Thus interpretation crowded dogma aside and practical studies, chiefly directed by bureaus of governmental research, took the place of hair-splitting analyses of political concepts.

Lagging somewhat in the rear came jurisprudence as a science, heavily handicapped by the load of professionalism carried on its back. Like theology, with which it was long associated in Western Europe, civil law, its vigilant guardians averred, was a mysterious substance discovered in the realm of abstract justice by adepts at the business. The mastery of the subject was to be attained mainly by a study

of the words of lawgivers. On such verbal nutriment, generations of practising attorneys were brought to maturity and conviction, and, as long as they were able to keep their domain isolated from the inquiries of the profane, their authority was secure.

But under the all-penetrating searchlight of modern science it was impossible to maintain this cabalistic spell, especially as law now had to climb down to the market place. The action of legislatures in covering an ever larger area of legal rules with statutory enactments opened whole segments of jurisprudence to examination with reference to the nature and motives of legislative majorities. Contests over the political appointment of judges also made it manifest that there were human factors in judge-made law which could not be hidden from those concerned with the social sciences. Studies in the psychology of prejudice and rationalization shot damascus blades into the prestige of judicial logic. Battles among judges themselves, eventuating in dissenting opinions, revealed to an observant public the more esoteric magic of judicial determinations. "This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. . . . General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise," genially remarked Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court in 1907 when taking issue with his colleagues on the validity of a labor statute—as it were, anticipating the advent of Louis D. Brandeis.

To an ever-increasing audience it became apparent that the law was merely a form of social and economic expression, changing with the technology and processes of society and to be understood in connection with the living tissue of which it was a part. In these circumstances, to the consternation of jurists brought up on the common law and "the eternal principles of justice," there rose and flourished a new faith covered by the lugubrious phrase "sociological jurisprudence," and promulgated by an authority no less dis-

tinguished than Roscoe Pound, dean of the Harvard Law School. Under this dispensation, it became fitting for students to inquire into the economic and psychological motives of those who made and interpreted the law, into the "actual social effects of legal institutions and doctrines," and into the social forces that had produced the existing order and were bearing lawmakers, lawyers, and judges from timeless formalism into an endless development.

More remote from the transactions of the market place and court room, the historians of the machine age, primarily concerned with the past rather than the intimate nature of the world process, were not as deeply involved in the practical currents of the time as were the economists, political scientists, and lawyers. Though Henry Adams, as president of the Historical Association and an elder statesman, besought his colleagues to attempt a science of history, he excited no hearty response. "Historians," he lamented, "turned to the collection of facts as the geologist turned to the collection of fossils."

Perhaps an explanation for this nonchalance was to be found in a colloquy arranged by Adams himself. "What shape," he once asked, "can be given to any science of history that will not shake to its foundation some prodigious interest?" Then he answered the query by saying that anything more than a superficial chronicle or tale of a local episode was bound to run counter to at least one of the immense forces dominant in the modern world, namely, the church, government, property, or organized labor. To this suggestion the historians listened respectfully and then went on their way as usual collecting, annotating, editing, and framing well-documented surveys of significant events, either because they thought no science of history possible, or had come to the conclusion with Adams himself that after all "silence is best."

Hence there was written in the machine age no romantic history explaining the wonder-working providence of God in the United States after the fashion of Bancroft, no large

philosophic view of America in a world setting after the style of Hegel, no interpretation of American intellect in terms of material circumstance according to the formula of Buckle. And yet it could not be doubted that immense gains were made in the period. The Doctors of Philosophy who acted as masters of ceremonies, if they felt unable to emulate Kant or Aristotle, at least cleared the ground of huge piles of naïve prejudices masquerading as "facts;" by the collection and analysis of genuine historical sources they prepared the way for a more accurate and more realistic description of the movement of social forces in the United States.

And they did more than that. Frederick Jackson Turner, followed by many disciples, made clear for the first time the deep influence of the western frontier on the course of American affairs. The drive of commercial interests in bringing the American Revolution to pass was fully revealed in the heavily documented writing of Charles M. Andrews, Allan Nevins, O. M. Dickerson, and Arthur Meier Schlesinger; while by William E. Dodd the curtain of mythology was raised on the Old South. At last in 1926 an artist's sketch was made for a synthetic view of American origins when J. Franklin Jameson published his lectures on the American Revolution considered as a social movement. The monopoly of the political chronicle was coming to a close. Moreover under the leadership of James Harvey Robinson the narrow confines of Clio's kingdom were widened to include the history of the intellectual classes and the rôle of intelligence in the drama of mankind. It could be truly said that the histories of the United States available for schools and general purposes were fully equal in scholarship, range, outlook, and fairness, to kindred works in any country of the world. If to lovers of romance their visibility seemed low, that fact had to be ascribed perhaps to the critical spirit, not to any lack of appreciation for creative powers.

§

If natural science gave a metallic ring to intellectual life in general, it did not entirely crush the fancies of those who labored at imaginative literature and criticism. It is true that for a time after the opening of the century, it seemed as if the culture of mercantilism was to swing in its orbit undisputed. Established journals transmitted by the gilded age, enriched by more extensive advertising, unfurled few sails to new breezes. After flourishing for a time on muck-raking, the popular magazines returned rather contritely to the eternal triangle, current gossip, and the heroes of Samuel Smiles; while the historic monthlies of respectability, which had never strayed from the straight and narrow path, continued to follow traditional middle-class standards, though occasionally one or another shocked subscribers from the list by an aberrant article on sex or labor.

But in due course several significant departures were made. A number of metropolitan newspapers found it worth while to enlarge their book-review columns or to issue special sections devoted to literary comment; and an independent critical weekly, The Saturday Review of Literature, was founded by Henry Seidel Canby, an editor of catholic and discriminating taste. Evidently it paid—in appreciation, pride, or book advertising; in any case the fact was noteworthy. Still more impressive were novel adventures in the journalism of opinion. In 1914, Herbert Croly, whose Promise of American Life had won for him a distinct place in the history of American political thought, established the New Republic dedicated frankly to liberalism in politics and letters. Four years later The Nation, which had been sputtering around in a desert, started to wage battles for liberty under the direction of Oswald Garrison Villard. About the same time The Freeman, under the authority of Albert Jay Nock, began to scatter acid on many a sacred convention, keeping up the practice for three crowded years. Frightened by such obliquities, a few conservatives levied tribute on men of substance and launched The Review to check, as they said, "unthinking radicalism";

only to flounder soon in a devouring calm. Equally discontented with liberalism and the common run of ideas, Henry L. Mencken and George Jean Nathan, departing from the Smart Set, found hospitable shelter with the publisher, Alfred Knopf, from whose office they discharged the American Mercury, a monthly magazine of smashing, stinging audacity addressed to "the civilized minority," to which Henry Holt had earlier directed his short-lived Unpopular Review.

On the basis of their underlying assumptions, modes, and nuances the literary commodities that flowed haphazard from the pens of American writers admitted of some tabulation; for after all nothing essentially new appeared under the smoky industrial sky. Classification was possible even though it was true that one critic remarked: "Our distinctive note was to have no distinctive note, to be a conglomeration of sharply divergent entities, all on practically the same plane of importance."

Above the flood were highly visible those contented writers who saw or thought they saw in the American order —if turbulent change could be called an order—a tangible unity that was precious, praiseworthy, and deserving of linguistic approval. In its unrestrained exuberance this view of American culture took the form of an incorrigible romanticism, continuously represented in the stories published by magazines for women and in the novels of Harold Bell Wright and Gene Stratton Porter.

In its higher manipulation this creed appeared in a more learned and civilized garb, illustrated by the writings of Stuart P. Sherman. Finding in the United States "a national genius animated by an incomparably profound moral idealism," this eminent critic and essayist desired above all things to see "Americanism vital, devout, and affectionate"; he prayed that art and letters might be serviceable to democracy, energizing and giving permanency to national morals, making Puritanism beautiful—all to the glorious end that right reason and the will of God might prevail. For those

who spoke contemptuously of the bourgeois, Sherman evinced a hearty dislike and he shrank from the grosser forms of sex display, except when, as in the case of Brigham Young, they were associated with industry, sobriety, thrift, and morality. Though Sherman used the language of Matthew Arnold, he appealed in fact to the sound heart of the great middle class—that class which his English mentor had harshly characterized by the phrase "Philistine."

On the other side of propriety but also above the flood flourished a school of writers who accepted Sherman's assumption that there was a cultural unity in America, essentially Puritan and middle class in its modes, but denounced its ethical pretensions as hypocrisies disguising the ideals of advertising agents. This school likewise ran true to historic form. Its ablest spokesmen, Jack London, Upton Sinclair, and W. E. Woodward, sardonically trouncing the culture of the bourgeoisie, threatened it with the unity of socialism, inspired, they alleged, by the ideals of science and the proletariat.

In a novel defiantly called Revolution, London described "the day" for American capitalism. With Biblical warmth, Sinclair damned the American order in gross and in detail. In The Jungle, he exposed conditions of life and labor in the Chicago stockyards, striking resounding blows that for the traditional nine days shocked the conscience of the nation, reverberated through the White House, and carried rumors of pork ethics all the way to the steppes of Siberia. In other studies, fiction, and essays, he assailed with the same energy what he called capitalist journalism, lock-step education from kindergarten through college, and the art of Mammon worship. More intimately acquainted with the practical aspects of money-making and the "jargon" of the market place than either London or Sinclair, Woodward, in his trenchant novel, called Lottery, pitched into the pieties and pretentions of business enterprise, declaring chance and vulgarity to be the great factors in the game of acquisition.

Revealing a similar skepticism with reference to the finality and virtues of mercantile culture, if showing less certainty about any possible or desirable substitute, were the works of Theodore Dreiser, Sinclair Lewis, and Sherwood Anderson, who led a school of writers that flayed with merciless portrayal the conventions of "the sound middle-class," the small town, the plutocracy, and the high priests at the American altar of success. In other words, by a perfect deluge of novels and poems, grave doubts were cast upon the authenticity of Stuart P. Sherman's national genius "animated by an incomparably moral idealism."

Scattered along the line between Harold Bell Wright and Upton Sinclair was an army of literary photographers, etchers, and artists who disavowed interest in cosmic schemes, whether naïve or sophisticated, and, oblivious to the metaphysical implications of their lightest words, wrote novels for the entertainment of those who would buy and read. But these writers who professed an air of detachment from the zeal of bard and critic were either drawn in their search for themes to the substance of American life in the machine age or were caught in the tragic sense of necessity that encompassed the production of commodities. By this time feudalism was so far gone in Europe that no Henry James or F. Marion Crawford seemed inclined to flee from the land of prosperity for the purpose of sketching the etiquette of dying ages. By this time the business man occupied the center of all western civilization and no effort of the imagination could cover him with the embroidered coat of King Arthur.

Certainly no one who dealt with America of the machine era could fail to see the pivot on which its civilization turned —neither Edith Wharton artistically analyzing seasoned generations trying to ward off climbers from the new gold coast and captains of industry expressing benevolence in welfare work; nor Frank Norris colorfully painting the successful iron man oppressed by the futility of a mere victory in dollars. With the same clank, the note of the

counting house ran through the sectional fiction of "the new South." In James Branch Cabell's first novel the upstanding figure was a financial wizard who "had sent more men into bankruptcy and more missionaries into Africa than any other philanthropist in the country." The battle reflected in Ellen Glasgow's pages was between the decaying respectability of the old plantation and the dynamic aspirations of science and business enterprise. If it was not the business man who always occupied the center of the stage it was his wife or daughters—or the independent woman with a career created of the new economy and given a code of manners and morals appropriate to the order. Fainting heroines all died in the era of the full dinner pail.

If perchance the scene drawn was intensely local, the same atmosphere of fatality, adapted to the numerical epoch, hung over the characters and the play. Through the eyes of Edith Wharton, though thoroughly urban, could be seen the destiny of a New England farmer, Ethan Frome, chiseled out of cold, gray granite by a hand as remorseless as that which shaped the end of Agamemnon. On the canvas of Theodore Dreiser's American Tragedy, the sportive chance that by a trivial turn sent a luckless youth to the gallows instead of a respectable bank president's post, was as pitiless as Clytemnestra's furious revenge. Just as naturally the inevitable aspirations of the emancipated Negro, fed by popular education and economic opportunity, flamed up in Walter F. White's Fire in the Flint. In literature as in art irreverent science and feminine intransigence encouraged "the pursuit of the nude." The age of miracles, crusades, and knightly vigils seemed far removed from the epoch of business enterprise.

And yet it could not be maintained that machinery had completely destroyed sentiment, for not long after Marcus A. Hanna assumed the rôle of Warwick and the United States Steel Corporation was organized, a flock of poets began to sing. Like the novelists on the left, Edgar Lee Masters and Carl Sandburg, making no concealment of

democratic sympathies, assailed the sublimated idealism of commonplace morality (often observed in the breach) and celebrated the heroes of the unusual. For Venice, "a dream of soft waters," Sandburg offered Chicago as "independent as a hog on ice."

Like all the skeptics on the right, Edwin Arlington Robinson, spoke more softly of respectable things, but betrayed an awful suspicion that

> It's all Nothing.
> It's all a world where bugs and emperors
> Go singularly back to the same dust.

Taking a lesson from men of science and efficiency experts, Amy Lowell and the imagists, casting off the cosmic longings of dreamers, drew little pictures of little things with a penetrating exactness that seemed to fit an age of interchangeable parts.

Whether it was nothing, as Robinson hinted, or composed of tiny fragments that could be accurately grasped, as Amy Lowell suggested, other poets did not care a fig. Edna St. Vincent Millay just "laughed and laughed into the sky," while Vachel Lindsay, beating his thunderous tom-tom, held a jubilee over General Booth, Abraham Lincoln, and cakewalk princes from the Congo.

Rich as the age was in fiction, poetry, and essays it produced only one or two humorists of power. In 1910, Mark Twain left on his long journey, full of honors and bitterness; and about the same time Mr. Dooley passed into the eclipse of silence. None seemed able to conjure up again the joyous specter of great laughter, although it had to be conceded that Will Rogers was a necromancer of no small merit. With the cultural nonchalance of a genial cowboy, Rogers threw his lariat over many a storied urn and animated bust and yanked it from its pedestal; occasionally he thrust a piercing rapier into the thick hide of the Philistine; sometimes he dissolved a pompous political show in a hearty uproar.

While the prevention of war was being bandied about by statesmen, Rogers suggested the drafting of money as well as men. "When the Wall Street Millionaire knows that you are not only going to come into his office and take his Secretary and Clerks but that you come in to take his Dough, say Boy, there wouldn't be any war. You will hear the question: 'Yes, but how could you do it?' . . . No, it will never get anywhere. The rich will say it ain't practical, and the poor will never get a chance to find out if it is or not." Calling Senator Lodge "the Confucius of Nahant," Rogers placed in that aristocratic scholar's mouth these words about President Coolidge: "I have known him ever since he got prominent enough for me to know. In the eight months that I have known him, I have found him to be patient, honest, and a Man who would not knowingly rob a single Filipino of his Liberty."

Reviewing the oil scandal, Rogers made one of the Senators ask, on hearing that President Coolidge would not give independence to the Philippines: "What's the matter? Have they struck oil, too?" In this spirit, Rogers surveyed the machine age, bringing within the range of his philosophic patter everything from chewing gum to foreign affairs—carefully avoiding the temptation to put too many plums into any single pudding. There was novelty and daring in his performance, if not genius—the spirit of the frontier revived.

Hovering around the circle of creative artists working at letters was a swarm of critics, more numerous perhaps than in any other country. The multiplication of book reviews and the clamor of printers for copy to fill space, while calling forth some essayists of penetrating power, gave employment to a motley assembly of writers who in less prosperous lands would have been relegated to the mechanical trades. In this general drift, much of the business of literary evaluation passed into the hands of professors trained in the forms of letters rather than learned in the substance of the civilization that produced them. No small

part of the appraising that escaped the professors was done by amateurs recruited from journalism, who, if they had a college training at all, were unschooled in any discipline either classical or modern. So between those who brought academic arts to bear on beautiful letters and those who relied on nimble wits and clever newspaper tricks, literary criticism became mainly a craft of the higher verbalism.

When members of the reviewing gild stopped to examine the little logical rafts on which they cruised around in the chaos of the sensuous, they found their science in hopeless disorder—to which bore pathetic witness a little volume of collected confessions made public in 1924 under the title Criticism in America. Judging from that and kindred performances, critics who thought Europe had made the sibylline guess were evidently in a state no less parlous than the school of right reason. Certainly only a few of them betrayed any consciousness of the fact that there might be a vital relation between letters and the motive forces of social evolution.

Among those who worked at the literary craft the ancient dispute over the power of American civilization to bring forth and nourish artistic genius was continued with the same basic division of opinion. It was still maintained in some quarters that America was provincial in taste, thin in culture, unable to appreciate genuine talent, devoted to the commonplace, puritanical in temper, cold to creative art, engrossed in the collection of dollars. Sensitive souls that approved this indictment fled as before to retreats in older communities; while harder hearts of the same conviction, proposed reliefs and remedies—such as projects for raising a sanitary cordon between writers and the leveling masses, affording to genius the protection of a self-appointed intellectual aristocracy.

On the opposite side of the fence were critics and artists of equal merit who averred, certainly with more justification than their forerunners in the middle period, that America was in fact receptive to the arts, possessed more

connoisseurs than any European country, offered themes to anybody possessing insight, interfered seriously with few books that were not æsthetically indecent, and on the whole provided materials and the opportunity to all who could imagine that letters were related to life. "In no country," defiantly answered one editor, George Jean Nathan, "are the first-rate author's lecture fees so high and do so many stockbrokers and automobile salesmen wish to take a look at him." Those who watched the battle of the bookmakers and commentators from the side lines found it hard to render any verdict; for there was no higher law to which the pleas were subject and the phraseology used by the contestants was as slippery as electricity.

In another respect the literary criticism of the machine age conformed to tradition. Through all the discussion of letters flickered the same plaintive eagerness for British approval on the one side and the same old contempt for that high court of judgment on the other. As in the days of Emerson and Whitman wistfulness was usually answered in familiar terms by genial patronage and contempt by flourishes in kind. One thing was certain: English novels sold in America by the million and American novels in England by the thousand. American magazines poured golden streams into the chests of English authors while English magazines returned the merest driblets to American writers. Since art, whether good or bad, then as always bore a vital relation to the culture that produced it and could be appreciated only in that relation, no one could tell in what proportions the literary judgments of England were to be ascribed to the weakness of the province or to the insularity of the metropolis. No formula could remove the dilemma. In any case, it was not certain whether the brusque and breezy style of American writers did not merely represent the transition from classical proprieties to a modern vernacular appropriate to the higher velocity of living.

Be that as it may, Americans of the machine age were certainly greedy to hear the latest word from Europe.

They brought over the seas for observation at first hand nearly all the literary and scientific lions; they rushed in mobs to hear Henri Bergson, the philosopher, Albert Einstein, the high priest of relativity, H. G. Wells, Chesterton, Coué, and a host of enlighteners, doctors, and entertainers great and small. Save Bernard Shaw, none of Europe's verbal heroes was apparently unwilling to exhibit himself to the American public for a consideration—and some of them, continuing the manners of the nineteenth century, after counting the gate receipts, betrayed their motives, by sneering at the United States as a "dollar democracy" and by belittling its natural curiosity.

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However varied and excellent American letters in general might be, the influence of business enterprise upon the drama in particular betrayed a tendency to uniformity and banality. The conquest of the theater by commerce in the gilded age was followed by the mass production of plays in the machine age—all "made in the U. S. A." For the strings of theaters that now stretched from coast to coast under central management, a ceaseless flow of standardized entertainment was provided—all tuned to the simple tastes of a polyglot population that had money to spend on amusement and looked to business corporations to furnish it with the same facility with which they turned out bathtubs, shoes, hats, and underwear.

Owing to the financial considerations involved in this extensive trade, it was expedient to put forth play goods that could be sold to the largest public with the least possible friction. And apparently manufacturers were at no loss to find for their pattern-making departments heads capable of producing the required quantity and quality to order. Occasionally when genius could not create just the lines desired for the Great White Way, clever managers were able to cut and carve to suit the commonalty. Their course was

made plainer by the competition of moving picture concerns which reached deeper still into social layers, almost driving traveling companies from the road and helping to spread uniformity of culture from sea to sea. Appropriately enough, the mechanics of gorgeous lighting, scenic displays, and whirlwind motion fitted to the age of the higher physics tended to thrust the human stars off the stage and the cold glow of ideas into the background, absorbing audience and players more and more in a kind of electronic storm.

With respect to subject-matter, the drama of the commercial theater conformed literally to the psychic requirements of the people who bought seats and paid for them—business men and their families in the overwhelming majority—just as the grand operas and heavy tragedies of the Old World fitted the tastes and ideals of their patrons. For the American males absorbed in the making and selling of goods, who spent their days in adventures as colorful as directors' meetings or as tuneful as the clack of adding machines could make them, varied only by an occasional flirtation with a stenographer, there were endless offerings precisely congruous. Served up to the ambitious, with a proper sauce of sentiment and profit-making ferocity, were the antics of Get-Rich-Quick Wallingfords giving practical examples of "lucky strikes" in acquiring fortunes overnight by robbing "boobs." For the fairly satisfied cog in the machine, "the little man," were the diversions offered by George M. Cohan; with the deliberation of a surgeon, that money-making entertainer analyzed the emotions of his ticket purchasers under three heads "(1) tears, (2) laughs, (3) thrills," and then frankly worked those primary emotions with the rhythmic thump of a hydraulic pump, reaching a masterful triumph in his interpretation of Winchell Smith's It Pays to Advertise.

For lighter and gayer hours there were the "vaudeville shows," unfailing sources of box-office receipts, repeating with the unbroken clatter of the rivetting hammer the same jokes, acrobatic acts, and dances to a race of people

that could sit or stand with the same contentment in a factory watching the remorseless stamp of a box-making machine or in an office dictating letters, "Yours of the 3rd instant, received." Then to crown it all was the musical comedy. In the machine age the Paris can-can, which had delighted the lower orders of the gilded age, was refurbished and given the savors of modern spices assorted for the modern palates. To the ancient modes of the harem were now added still more gorgeous costuming, lighting, exotic dancing, and bizarre music—as one weird critic expressed it, new garnishings of parsley to the well-known meat. Action, like the production of goods, was speeded up; long waits for scenes were cut out so that in a whirr of tone and color the routine of turning out collars, shirts, candy, and tooth paste or selling stocks and bonds could be forgotten for an hour or two. In accordance with the machine principle of economy and efficiency, actresses approached as near to nudity as the statutes on public decency or the police conscience would permit and all classes of society were invited to witness spectacles which in puritanic days were not even offered in the slums to the lowest strata of society. Whether it was a temporary reaction such as swept over England in the age of the Stuart restoration or a triumph of nature over convention akin to that described by Juvenal could not be determined from the tangent of the thing.

To the feminine portion of the business community, given leisure by prosperity in the land of liberty, eager to be amused by matinée idols, were made special offerings graciously fitted to its spiritual needs. As women dominated taste in music, art, and letters, so they ruled with a rod of iron huge principalities in the dramatic realm—calling for precious things, mild emotions, nothing raucous with the broad laugh of the musical show or the hearty guffaw of the melodrama, risky but pure, dubious but fundamentally correct—themes of little men and little women faced with somewhat trying responsibilities and situations, novel but not revolutionary, all handled "with sympathy and understand-

ing," that is, the sympathy and understanding of comfortable people. Not without appeal to women as well as to trade psychology were the many sentimental dramas dealing with Jews, Irish, Germans, and other racial stocks in the American Babel and the numerous plots built on "social climbing" in a volatile world.

Fairly on a level with the drama of the meglapolitan was the moving picture business. When the industry reached a high stage of perfection in the third decade of the century the production of a single gorgeous spectacle sometimes called for such an immense outlay of money that, according to estimates, it required at least nine million purchasers of tickets to meet the expenses of the undertaking and yield the "legitimate profits." Inexorably the common denominator of conceptions that attracted so many buyers set the tone and taste for the trade. Any doubts about the matter could be resolved by observing the periods of time allowed for reading captions reduced to simplest terms—periods that readily indicated the intelligence quotient of the multitudinous observers.

Given these conditions, it was inevitable that the supreme artists in visual and verbal mass production should concentrate on simple themes, mechanics, and dramatic technique. It is true that some of the great plays which had thrilled the cultured classes of all countries were adapted with more or less success to the requirements of the Great White Way; that science, exploration, and travel also received a respectful, if slight, consideration in the same quarter. But one thing was unmistakable: "serious stuff" that was not followed by a cowboy, melodramatic, or custard-pie romance—the lowest common denominator—as a reward for waiting brought scant returns to the management. What was to happen when inventors united the moving picture with the parlor radio remained among the mysteries of higher speculation.

If the uniformity of the machine smoothed out in a few set designs the drama supported by business men and their

families and leveled the moving pictures provided for the lowest average box-office visitors, there were here and there signs of unrest and revolt—paralleling the course of economic discontent. During the years just preceding Roosevelt's charge at Armageddon, for example, the poignant fringe of the middle class that lent countenance to the progressive and liberal reforms of social democracy was accorded frequent recognition. In Charles Klein's Lion and the Mouse, presented in 1906, was portrayed the ruthless might of "big business," that monster of the little man, and in Edward Sheldon's The Boss, offered in 1911, was vividly illuminated the raw struggle of capital and labor. For the Christian Socialist, uneasy in his comfort, a pleasing emotional outlet was afforded by Charles Rann Kennedy's The Servant in the House, decorously received in 1908; while for the social workers who cheered the Progressives marching to the tune of "Onward Christian Soldiers," a doleful picture of the slums was drawn by Charles Kenyon, in Kindling, played during the year 1911. But the defeat of the Progressives and the decline of Socialism were followed by a relaxation of such moral overstrains and a general return to more conventional standards.

Only here and there on the side lines were there experiments in the unusual. Percy Mackaye, for instance, sought to revive in modern social form within the limits set by American democracy, the unity and ritual inherent in the Greek drama. A classical scholar, a child of the theater, a close student of his art, a profound believer in the high destiny of his country, and a tireless worker, Mackaye sought for a synthesis on which to found the structure of enduring plays. As sometimes hinted, he was too much of an ancient in spirit and too confused in his sense of direction to grasp the American process. Nevertheless he accomplished positive results: he broadened theatrical practices by the use of the allied arts of painting, sculpture, and music to enrich dramatic action—though he sometimes ran the risk of being conquered by his allies—and he carried the theater into

the open community by the production of masques and pageants built on local themes drawn from fiction and history.

Reflecting a kindred revolt without discernible direction or vortical relation was the protest made by the "little theater movement" striving for variation, freshness, and freedom from the grind of making and selling. In some cases little theaters were operated by actor-guilds, in others by communities, sometimes by individuals wealthy enough to experiment or willing to take risks, now and then by a traveling playwright-producer with his own stage of portmanteau size. So promising were the tangible results of these efforts that many of the leading colleges began to aid the art by adding dramatics to their curricula. At Pittsburgh the Carnegie Institute of Technology early in its career established a special department of the drama and by 1925 almost a hundred institutions of higher learning were seeking to encourage the production of plays that did not fit exactly the machine mold of metropolitan managers. A prophecy of better work ahead was made in that year when Yale University called from Harvard, Professor George P. Baker, who had been successful in inspiring originality among his students, and gave him adequate facilities for the promotion of creative undertakings. In fact the little theater movement had then grown to such proportions that a national conference on the drama held at Pittsburgh, the first in a series, brought together the representatives of ninety universities and forty little theaters, besides numerous patrons of independent ventures. On the flanks the Drama League, founded in 1910, at Evanston, Illinois, strove to widen the horizon of theater-goers, stimulate the reading of plays, and enlarge the imagination of school children by providing material especially adapted to their years.

But most striking of all was the insurrection against complacent smugness and reasoned revolt represented in the emotional storms let loose by Eugene O'Neill, Maxwell Anderson, and Laurence Stallings. The first of these play-

wrights, O'Neill, after a season at Princeton, a year at Harvard, and a varied career as gold hunter, sailor, actor, and reporter, startled hardened buyers of actors and plays by a series of explosions that could not be exactly located or classified. Casting aside old pleasantries and stereotyped forms, O'Neill went straight to the task of presenting agony, frustration, and defeat among the common people, without offering any explanation—theological, social, or moral—of the curse that befuddles the inhabitants of Moronia. After rich adventures in that mode, represented in The Hairy Ape, Emperor Jones, and Anna Christie, O'Neill did the same thing for business enterprise and its human fruitage—in Marco Millions, introducing, as it were, Marco Polo of Venice at a Tuesday luncheon of the Zenith Lions' Club. In a tumultuous uproar, O'Neill was greeted by intellectuals as the great American dramatic genius so long awaited. On other grounds and with good reason, a wider audience paid honor to Stallings and Anderson whose What Price Glory brought the filth and agony of imperialism and war under the microscope—to the eyes of civilians who had waved flags along the lines of marching heroes and fought battles over teacups and cocktails. Evidently the country was not completely and permanently conquered by the standardization of the Great White Way and there were omens of more significant things to come in the land of Fordismus.

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A kindred protean spirit entered the realm of the plastic arts in the second decade of the new century. The Academy still flourished of course; and the great museums added more traditional favorites. Good work that passed the censorship of classical critics was done by a host of American artists—work so excellent in technique that one connoisseur confessed himself unable to tell any more whether a salon picture had been painted in Madrid, Paris, Berlin, or Indianapolis. Sargent, Whistler, La Farge, and Blashfield con-

tinued to labor in lines already set during the gilded age and younger artists of similar aspiration were hanging correct canvases in exhibitions beside the offerings of the masters. In 1925, it was estimated that more than twenty thousand men and women were making a living of some kind by brush, pencil, or chisel in New York City alone. Even sculpture so long neglected in America was beginning to come into its own.

But under the surface of things were rumblings of discontent. The protest begun in the gilded age against rigid canons of taste was now developing into a revolution under the direction of equally dogmatic leaders who declared that there could be no compromise between the art appropriate to an age of science and machinery and the art fit for an age of agriculture, mysticism, hand labor, and feudalism. Decrying the art of "truth and purity," the art of "photographic painting and sculpture, sentiment, charm, polish, and mere technique," the exponents of the new school tried to express by brush and chisel the dynamics, sciences, colors, forms, materials, motions, and mathematical abstractions of the era of mass production by machinery.

In Europe, where this revolt originated, it flourished under various names: Cubism in France owing to its extreme use of geometric forms, Futurism in Italy on account of its prophecy of development, Vorticism in England in response to the insistence that art must live near the center of things if it is to be creative once more. In its most reasoned form it was an effort to relate art to the vibrant life and the current ideas of the industrial epoch. "The world to-day," urged the modernist, Duchamp-Villon, "translates its thought in terms of the machine which with its power and speed, the dominant interests of the period, penetrates our whole conception of it." Or to put the matter in the language of an American exponent: "The life of our time has its more obvious expression in the size of buildings, the swiftness of vehicles, and the quantity of manufactures. But such things, by the very weight they lay on the imagina-

tion, make it seek more eagerly for an expression dealing with the essentials of our experience, not as they exist as expressed by typography, light, avoirdupois, and the yard-stick, but as we know them in their assimilation into our thought and through the form and colors which so define them."

Art could no more escape the impact of such drives than religion and politics could refuse to deal with the fruits of technology, and in course of time all the vogues which had set Europe agog appeared in the United States. In 1913, American radicals of pencil, brush, and chisel made bold to exhibit their canvases and casts in New York City, supplementing their work by samples from the Old World. From that year onward, the circle of American art-heretics grew in numbers, in confidence, and in power. In 1920, a small but resolute band of rebels in New York organized the Société Anonyme for the purpose of proclaiming openly the revolution which America had begun to accept in the guise of "Modern Art"—a revolution that rejected the smooth, biologic, sensuous lines and surfaces of neo-classicism and accepted whole-heartedly the machine age with its hard, angular strokes and its metal planes all vibrant with dynamic force. How, they asked in effect, can the allegories of the Arthurian legend or ancient mythology find living expression in an age of electronic physics and mass production?

Fortunately for the thesis of modernism, few of its exponents did more than claim that a new era in art had dawned; the most cautious rested their case on the realities of the contemporary age and on the possibilities of the long future—on the changes wrought by science and machinery in the stuff of life and thought, changes which shook traditions and opened new avenues for the play of mind and imagination. Their argument moreover received support, more or less indirectly, from artists by no means identified with the rebellion, who grew increasingly interested in the essence of the machine society.

Joseph Pennell's urban and industrial etchings, wreathed

in steam and smudged with smoke, for example, blared forth a new emphasis on materials, making strange contrasts in galleries of Greek nudes and their imitations; while the commercial and industrial arts, forced into sharp competition with European manufacturers for a world market, showed marked tendencies away from historic elegance in the direction of adjustments to the exigencies of the machine age. If the upper crust remained intact, there were minor canvases and bronzes which revealed the thrust of American strength —pieces that made no great stir in the critical forum, but betrayed the coming of new energies and capacities, preparations for genius on another twist of the ever-turning spiral.

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Stemming perhaps from the same emotional trunk was a synchronous foliation in American music. Just at the moment when, by diligent and devoted labors under the guidance of Europe's best musicians and teachers, American students of music began to perform and compose in a spirit somewhat akin to that of the masters, strange notes, up from the soil, began to strike American ears. As the gilded age drew to a close, a few radicals in composition, such as McDowell, had presented innovations superimposed on the classics, following the moods of the musical insurgents of Europe who had modified the traditions of tone just as artists had questioned the canons of form and color. There had also been earlier experiments with the chants of the Red Man and with Negro spirituals in efforts to create American operas and other musical forms.

But the new notes which the rising generation in America was beating out with hands and feet were akin to none of these variants. This music had the syncopated rhythm of the jungle in it—a rhythm which the young at first called "rag time," a slang name derived, it seems, from its Negro creators, who sang and shuffled to it as they "ragged" for funds to support their church or other racial

enterprises. It gave vent to feelings allied to the passions that had edged their way up into European art from the primitive life of Gauguin's South Seas.

Yet expressed in pulsating groans, long wails, and fitful shrieks, the new music seemed a counterpart of the cacophonous uproar of manufacturing industries and urban life, so foreign to the smooth sophistication of a Liszt, a Haydn, or a Brahms. By giving supremacy to wind instruments, notably the saxophone with its opalescent notes, it stirred emotions ever near to the surface, emotions which classical music had overlaid with higher learning, and at the same time rode triumphantly on nerves clashing with the ceaseless din of the market place.

Though greeted at first by established musicians as a passing freak—the counterpart of the tom-tom—jazz music, as it was eventually called, showed both vitality and flexibility. It could run the whole gamut from purely primitive notes to mild modifications of ancient themes touched with the spirit of the new freedom. It could be divorced from the dance and made to give fresh tonal qualities to older musical forms, thus lending itself to creative composition and direction in the sphere of orchestration. Both simple and complex it made meteoric headway in popular favor in spite of increasing endowments for symphony orchestras.

Then came a triumphal march into Europe. Played by bands of Negro soldiers—the jazz bands of the World War—it made a similar appeal to the subcutaneous culture of old and mellow societies. According to press reports, even staid Queen Mary, at a ball given to her servants, forsook the waltz for the tango just as her forbears had forsaken the stately minuet for the waltz. From Europe jazz music passed round the world until it was heard in the hotels of Cairo, Singapore, Soerabaia, Shanghai, and Tokyo. The grave Japanese samurai, whose fierce fighting temper had long been subdued to the low and slow notes of the Noh, felt his sword leap once more from its scabbard as he heard the

mournful cry of the saxophone calling across the deep but narrow chasm that separates all civilization from the dawn.

In such circumstances the moralists of the whole world were puzzled. Some saw in the new music nothing but a noisy shout for ears attuned to the riotous sounds of the forge and the market place; others looked upon it as only one of the passing manias induced by the shell shock of the World War or one more of the innumerable American inanities that were being distributed over the earth. But a few, as open and hospitable to the doings of the fates as Emerson and Whitman had been in their time, thought that jazz could be wedded to noble harmonies and made to invigorate the smooth and elegant texture of traditional symphonies. When in the winter of 1926, Walter Damrosch was reproached by some of the old families of New York for introducing the new muse into the sacred precincts of the Symphony Orchestra, he replied: "I would not encourage such efforts if I did not really believe in their truly great importance toward developing an American music in the higher sense of the word. After all, we are only following in the footsteps of Europe whose greatest masters have founded their art on the folk songs and dances of their country."

Whether jazz was a mere expression of a democracy engaged in mass production or not, there was no doubt that science and machines made a revolution in the distribution of music. The necessity of enlivening the silent moving picture with congruous notes gave to the pleasure-seeking multitudes that attended screen palaces more music, good and bad, than any generation had ever heard. Moreover the piano-player, the phonograph, and the radio carried into homes in town and country, far and wide, the noblest and best music of the past as well as the bars of the passing show, permitting buyers to choose according to their tastes. Millions who had never heard a good orchestra in their lives now discovered hidden deeps in their natures.

The creation like the distribution of music came under the

spell of the machine. Through the work of Russian and other experimenters, it was found that the piano-player could be used to produce types of composition unknown to past ages; the human player with but two hands and ten fingers was of necessity limited but the machine under his direction could multiply sounds and vary pressures, thus interposing unheard-of harmonies and dissonances at the pleasure of the composer.

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As far as they were distinctive and not derivative, the achievements of American architects also sprang from a frank acceptance of exigent circumstances. Early designers, oppressed by the angular ugliness of business structures—men like Henry Hobson Richardson, Richard Morris Hunt, and Stanford White—had sought an escape by introducing alien decorations, chiefly façades, more appropriate to Florence and Ravenna than to Pittsburgh and Madison Square. If occasionally fitting, the result was often pathetic and sometimes absurd; at best it was exotic. Although the pressure of rising ground values, the congestion of population, the requirements of business economy, and the development of steel and concrete made imperative and practical giant business structures in the cities of the first rank, American architects long labored under the thraldom and disabilities of the schools, trying to deceive the eye in matters of height and form. Having confined their studies to temples, palaces, and political buildings, they were hampered by repressions that unfitted them to design for the money changers and mass producers of the machine age.

For good or evil, perhaps beyond both, in any case inexorably, the spirit of American business enterprise was not reverent, shrinking, or benign; it was the spirit of power, crude and ruthless, rash to the point of peril, defiant of all petty material limitations, given to action too swift for meters. When called upon to serve this spirit, architects for a long time came hobbling in the restraints of the acad-

emies; they deprecated it, scorned it, or if they took commissions tried to crush it. Many an artistic head was shaken when, in 1880, Darius O. Mill, taking to New York a fortune made on the Pacific coast, engaged Colonel George B. Post to build him a "skyscraper" one hundred and twenty feet high housing twelve hundred tenants. Despite the laments of the wiseacres the monument was built and President Cleveland retiring from the White House at the close of his first term was delighted to find an office in it. By the opening of the twentieth century the perfection of steel construction and the elevator made far more imperial designs feasible. In 1902, the Flatiron Building, the first real skyscraper in the world since the days of Babylon, rose on Twenty-third Street, to be followed in quick succession by other buildings, higher and higher, until in 1913 the nickels and dimes of the five and ten cent stores raised to Woolworth, the mogul of retail business, not a pyramid but a tower of steel and stone sixty stories above the sidewalks of New York.

As if by sheer accident, almost at that moment municipal policy gave to business architecture a new and amazing direction. In the interest of light and air, the city of New York, in 1916, forbade the erection of structures on narrow streets in straight lines to indefinite heights, and required builders to "step back" their skyscrapers after reaching a certain altitude. On architecture the effect of this ordinance was revolutionary. Huge citadels, sheathed in zoning envelopes and staggered with turrets, now shot upward in anarchic and bewildering profusion above the dynamic energy and uproarious chatter of feverish business, symbols of egotistic competition. Hotels, apartment houses, and civic buildings, clothing cubist dreams in metal and concrete, overwhelmed beholders with the sense of power and Gargantuan beauty made manifest in them.

Very soon the economy and the fervor that gave rise to these new giants made an impress on ecclesiastical architecture. In the wilderness of business mountains, cathedrals

that once had dominated the landscape with their domes and spires were lost to view; but instead of giving up the battle for place the builders of churches climbed Alpine heights themselves. In New York and Chicago they erected vast temples of the monolithic style in which they tried to combine the grace of later Gothic with the economy of the factory and office structures—providing housing and business places as well as institutional facilities and meeting places for congregations. One of these new churches, begun in New York in 1925, included in its plans a large auditorium on the ground floor flanked by two apartment houses, topped by a towering hotel, and crowned by a flaming cross of Jesus Christ more than seven hundred feet above tidewater. Almost simultaneously the University of Pittsburgh published plans for a "cathedral of learning," a massive college building to rise fifty-two stories above the forges, markets, offices, and factories of that kingdom of steel.

At last the measureless energy of American life had been discovered and accepted, save by a few artists who hoped that time and tide might be turned back and that the spirit of Chicago might yet be bodied forth in the delicate refinements of Renaissance Gothic. In 1914, an English critic, Clive Bell, declared that American architecture seemed on the verge of a revival worthy of Florence but after the World War he began to think it was to be more like that of Augustan Rome. Naturally the future in 1927, as in every other time, was a closed book. Perhaps there was no more limit to architectural power than to the energy of the suns; perhaps it was subject to the same law of degradation. Possibly the steel frames and towering domes of business enterprise triumphant might grovel in the dust with the baths of Caracalla and the palaces of the Cæsars. Possibly the sweet agonies of saints might stand forth again in the austere loveliness of a new Sainte Chapelle. But that revolution if it was ever to come could only follow the ruin of the machine and its social processes. And one thing was certain; history does not exactly repeat itself.

Whatever their goal or limits the economic pressures and impulses of power which found an outlet in the architecture of mass were evidently anarchic in their manifestations. The new structures lunged forward and shot upward without reference to community symmetry, design, or convenience. They made all the more imperative, therefore, the rise of city planning, that art so sadly neglected in America since the days when L'Enfant laid the groundwork for the national capital. Slowly the deficiency was recognized by people of affairs as well as by artists.

At the opening of the century no general planning authority existed in any American city. Within twenty-five years more than two hundred cities had erected planning agencies, at least of an advisory character, while a number of municipalities had begun the execution of designs drawn by competent hands. In the meantime, the profession of city planning had become a recognized branch of community engineering; a national organization of that interest had come into being; an immense body of constructive legislation had been placed on the law books; an attack had been made on the skyscraper as a source of congestion; and the American literature of the new science had grown to respectable proportions.

No doubt the achievements seemed pitiable enough when viewed in the large but the surprising thing was the existence of the movement in a country still so individualistic in its life and work. In various ways it was hampered by difficulties peculiar to America. It was clearly one thing to plan for a fairly static community like Paris or London and quite another matter to plan for dynamic communities like New York and Chicago where permanent streets and civic buildings were likely to block imperative movements of business and population. In short, the flux of things made agreement upon fixed patterns very hard to reach. Nevertheless the art of municipal designing, humanistic and æsthetic, was high on the horizon of American thought before the machine age had grown very old.

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Resting directly on technology, appealing to multitudes engaged in mass production, and driven by the profit-making impulses of capitalism, the press gathered swifter momentum in the machine age. Like the manufacturers of automobiles and hats, publishers of books with huge plants and selling agencies on their hands, had to print or perish—in last resort anything that "would pay its way." So between the egoism of aspiring authors and the zeal of publishers for business, the number of books and magazines rose like a flood, inexorable, inundating the market with mediocrities which in a less prosperous civilization would never have seen the light of day. With the steady growth in advertising it became possible for the proprietors of popular journals, such as The Saturday Evening Post, to sell their wares from coast to coast at a mere trifle, creating a uniform magazine audience of colossal magnitude. Responding to the mechanistic drive that carried standardized goods into every mountain hamlet and gave the same garb to flappers in Kennebunkport, Seattle, and Athens, American journalism, now aided by professional training, distributed the same models, tones, and verbal patter all over the land. By way of reënforcement, the economy of syndicated articles, comic strips, and editorials, the streams of "publicity matter" poured upon the desks of editors by "interests" of every kind, the "chain" newspaper system, the growing practice among dignitaries of handing out specially prepared "tabloid" interviews, the penalties imposed by the high priests of uniformity upon versatile and ingenious reporting likely "to rock the boat," the conquest of the news services by one or two great agencies, and a hundred other factors conspired to subdue journalism like everything else to the general régime of interchangeable parts.

Somewhat dazed by the universal tendency, critical writers, led by Upton Sinclair, declared that the newspaper business was now simply the rhetorical defense mechanism

for the capitalist order, but they could not show that journalism would have been more accurate, varied, or piquant if the readers instead of the advertisers had stood on guard at the sanctum door. Perhaps the Chicago reporter who said that the editor like the merchant must put the right kind of goods in his window or perish sensed the situation with more penetration. At all events in the machine age, spectators of independent opinion were inclined to regard the metropolitan editor as a fixed planet rather than a vagrant comet and to classify the opinions of editorial columns with other products of multitudinous industry.

Harmonizing with the extension of the machine system throughout the publishing world was a downward thrust of quantity production in the search for more purchasers. To reach ever larger areas of the populace it was necessary to strike lower into the successive strata of general ignorance —and with the progressive development of cheap engraving, this delving process became easier and more profitable. In fact, the experiments of the illustrated magazines, the applause that greeted cartoonists, the effect of pictures and sketches on the circulation of the older newspapers hinted at an innovation that was bound to come—as inevitable as democracy itself. When at length, in 1918, the Illustrated Daily News appeared on the streets of New York, the new era was opened in journalism—one no less striking than that inaugurated by Hearst and Pulitzer in the gilded age. With paralyzing strokes the invader cut into the prosperity of the regular papers, not sparing the "yellow" sheets that had thriven on poster headlines, cartoons, comics, and other forms of picture-writing. However reluctantly, the gravest of traditional editors had to modify their strategy.

Equipped with the latest instruments, editorial manufacturers could now present to masses hitherto unreached at least that part of the day's news which called for no abstract thought or background of knowledge; at last, multitudes who could not vie with stable boys and kitchen maids in stumbling through giant headlines were permitted to

join "the reading public." More than that; millions who spoke foreign tongues could grasp the illustrations, at least dimly, spell their way through picture captions, and gain some notion, true or false, of events taking place in the world about them. If they could not understand President Coolidge's political economy, they could at least see his face. What relation pictures could bear to the educative process or the educative process to national destiny, neither the psychologist nor the physicist could decide with any degree of satisfaction. In any case it could hardly be said that the patterns created by tabloid pictures were less authentic or more inimical to intelligent citizenship than the substance of the more reputable papers—the vast flood of political speeches and innumerable Associated Press dispatches masquerading as "news" on the authority of "some one near the President," or on the basis of "it is said," or on no foundation at all except the secret inspiration of some interested official or powerful individual, unnamed in the text, or of some partisan reporter.

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Resting at bottom on the wide distribution of minute knowledge and producing large surpluses for social uses, machine industry strengthened all the tendencies of American education which had risen to the surface in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. The public schools, founded in the middle period and nourished in the gilded age were now given better houses, more magnificent equipment, more thoroughly disciplined teachers, more perfect furniture in general, and a crowning organization in the National Education Association—which took the place of the National Teachers Association in 1871. And the spirit of science so vital to industry crept steadily through the whole structure of learning, spreading its passion for measurements, standards, and precision.

Aptly enough in this age the mobilizing movement reached its acme in intelligence tests which, belligerent spon-

sors averred, permitted automatic and certain gradings of the huge mass of children annually ground into the educational system. If employees in factories from day laborers to expert technicians could be classified, why not the raw materials in the schools? To be sure, individuals who loved the faint aroma which still hung over from the days when Aristophanes and Vergil were read in the colleges made vehement protest and were not without support. But the iron law of circumstance was against them: on the military regimen imported earlier from Prussia was imposed the time-clock regimen of the machine era, making an inquiry whether mankind could be happier and more comfortable under a system of handicrafts and emotional liberty as irrelevant as an examination into the naval efficiency of wooden hulks.

However, in the wake of the standardizing process came its antithesis of criticism. It was said by way of objection that in their effort to raise levels through increased supervision, educational mechanicians had turned the schools over to administrators, show managers, who, besides being engrossed in red tape and report sheets, were ever engaged in the politics of promoting themselves to more lucrative positions. By the same operation, ran the lament, the teacher, though primarily concerned with the human material and the content of courses, was continually subjected to the rigors of administrative routine, thus transferring the control and art of education to a half-commercial bureaucracy. Moreover as the principals of the schools formed the bond of contact with the business men and the politicians on boards of education, another article was added to the bill of indictment, namely, that the school system, besides losing its humanity, had been made a cog in the mill of economic enterprise. In his customary style, Upton Sinclair tried to reduce the whole business of education to the caption, The Goose-Step.

To this arraignment the administrators replied that a complex of rules and regulations was necessary to the en-

forcement of higher standards, especially as long as the facilities for training teachers did not keep pace either with the growth of the population or the multiplying demands made upon the school system. On their part teachers, while alive to the perils of the machine routine, also offered a rejoinder in the form of a long list of novel experiments associated with such names as Dewey, Gary, Montessori, and Dalton—experiments in the segregation of the feeble-minded, in special opportunities for the brilliant, and in the breaking down of the rigidity of the lock step. Though conceding the dangers of the machine age, they claimed for it a freedom, range, and flexibility in education, even a humanity, never before enjoyed in America. And it was a blind critic who could see no truth in the paradox.

In the colleges and universities this dualism was even more apparent than in the lower schools. By the close of the first quarter of the century business men had elbowed aside nearly all the clergymen in the boards of trustees that governed the higher learning—whether patronized by democratic taxpayers or sustained by rich benefactors. Meanwhile with the growth of educational plants and budgets, the old gray-haired parson, wearing a white necktie and dressed in rusty black, disappeared from groves that now belonged to bond salesmen and corporation lawyers rather than to sacrificial preachers, missionaries, and teachers. In his place came the efficient high director who presided over push buttons, filing cases, telephones, and board meetings.

Learning itself, always subdued more or less to the major concerns of its age, bent like a reed before new demands as the curricula of colleges underwent changes adapted to an age of industry. With noteworthy fitness, business, law, medical, and other professional schools were given a hearty welcome by university corporations, and scientific laboratories overtopped halls dedicated to the liberal arts, making utility the watchword of the study and lecture room. Courses of instruction were divided and subdivided, dissolving earlier philosophies of life and practice and multi-

plying academic goods almost as rapidly as inventors multiplied material commodities. If the old titles, such as science, the arts, letters, economics, politics, still appeared in the announcements, the custom of listing subjects alphabetically, after the fashion of hardware catalogues, from art to zymotic diseases, followed by some institutions, more nearly expressed the inward spiritual state of which academic offerings were an outward symbol.

In one other significant respect the course of higher learning was true to form. As the major portion of the students attending collegiate institutions veered toward industrial, financial, and selling functions after graduation, it was both natural and appropriate that the great outdoor diversion of the business world, namely, sports, should be made one of the prime concerns of the colleges. In keeping with this development, directors of athletics were now paid salaries higher than the professors of literature and the fine arts; while the promotion of academic games became a form of business enterprise sometimes accompanied by professionalism, scandals, and corruption. When a popular film described a college as a small school attached to a vast stadium, it was greeted with rejoicing that was authoritative in its heartiness.

And yet they were right who claimed that learning in the American colleges of the machine age was more diverse, bolder, and more speculative, freer in spirit and more enlivened by the saving grace of humor than the same learning in earlier ages. It had to be conceded that schools of art, drama, and music flourished as never before. Certainly the whole process of education was subjected to a more searching analysis than in any previous period. Departing from all precedents, Thorstein Veblen raked the field of higher learning with the galling fire of his pungent irony while the popular magazines were packed with educational inquests.

Occasionally some of the students became alert enough to ask questions of their superiors, in this respect re-

sembling that caustic critic of distant days, Harrison Gray Otis, who took his Alma Mater severely to task for pedantry and for failing to educate him to his taste. At Dartmouth College, the undergraduates were invited by the administration to survey the offerings of their elders — a thing that would have scandalized the wise perfectionists of earlier days. At Indiana University, discontented occupants of benches took stenographic notes of the worst lectures in the institution, and published them to the world as illustrations of the futility against which youth had a right to protest. On every hand doubts were expressed about the entire academic routine, raising the question whether it was not ruinous to creative intelligence and damaging to productive genius. Nothing hitherto deemed sacred was left intact. According to all calculators more students drank deeply of the springs of wisdom than in the gilded age; if the minority were submerged by the flood of the new bourgeois who went to see and to cheer and not to learn, that outcome was to be expected in a nation dedicated to mass production and given to buying culture in five-foot lengths.

As if in rebellion against the hard decrees of the machine age and to insist upon the capacity of democracy to master its own intellectual destiny, innumerable projects for the continuous promotion of knowledge and taste among the masses—projects generally covered by the blanket title of adult education—were floated in the new century with bewildering profusion. Through such efforts, the appeal made and the courses offered by the older lyceum, Chautauqua, and university-extension movements were widened—in the end leaving no interest untouched in the diffusion and "humanizing" of learning.

The passion for economic advancement supported hundreds of correspondence schools and institutions for technical training, which taught everything from salesmanship and cartooning to cooking and bonnet-making. Wholly apart from such utilitarian ends, a sheer quest for wisdom

evoked thousands of lectures, either free or at nominal cost, and whole libraries of easy guides and handbooks. Responding to the call of laymen, religious associations, Catholic and Protestant alike, organized courses of instruction, practical and cultural, for members desirous of prolonging the years of learning beyond the span of school and college. Finding educational centers springing up spontaneously under the auspices of local trade unions, the American Federation of Labor set the seal of its official approval upon this popular movement among the rank and file, by recommending in 1924 a levy on members to promote such experiments under the general direction of the Workers' Education Bureau. Alive to all these activities, public libraries and museums, once supposed to be the asylums of contented leisure, took on the character of community educational agencies, offering besides the most efficient facilities to be found anywhere in the world, regular guidance to the growing array of citizens in search of learning.

So striking were the vitality and promise of this movement that the Carnegie Corporation in 1925 announced its purpose to devote a material part of its great endowment to the encouragement of adult education. Without exaggeration it could be said that "the race between mind and matter" had become a major concern of those who took thought about the nature of American society and its future. Nothing was more evident in the midst of this intellectual ferment than the fact that the nation was turning fiercely upon itself, scrutinizing old values, inquiring whether under the clatter of the machine age there was a prophetic meaning not yet divined by idolators, critics, or singers.

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In all the seasons of the modern epoch, especially since the rise of the concept of progress, thinkers have made attempts to force the iron gates of their own future. Of necessity statesmen have tried, with more or less success, to

understand and direct the destiny in which they fain would work as dynamic factors. Though not so immediately concerned with the practical decisions of politics, theologians have likewise formed moral concepts with reference to the effect of faith and conduct on the mission of nations. With perhaps less sense of responsibility, speculative minds, reviewing the long trail of mankind away from barbarism, with its undulating curves, have sought to pierce the veil hiding the stretches beyond their living present. Only the most case-hardened scientist has been able to escape an inquiry as to whether the work of mankind was merely an aspect of physics and subject to the second law of thermodynamics, namely, the progressive degradation of force to the level of death.

It is true that the modern historian shrinks from the business of prophecy himself knowing, as he does, that often in the development of society, as in the case of the Protestant Revolt, what seem to be the invincible tendencies of centuries have been reversed by sharp antithetical processes. But bound by the duties of his office to notice intellectual currents as well as mass, number, velocity, and energy, he cannot ignore an expression of a life force or divine power which represents the striving of mind to get hold of the helm.

Now it happened that the machine age in America was particularly rich in criticisms, appraisals, and prophecies. Perhaps those who worked at polite letters were more given to the practice of these arts than any other special group. Certainly with constant repetition they asked whether American civilization had not reached its zenith, and made the downward turn toward an order hopelessly mechanical in spirit, devoid of intrinsic capacity for the appreciation of the fine arts, poverty-stricken in creative genius, rough in manner, and overbearing in conceit. In the mood of Matthew Arnold, they wondered whether it would not be better to have again peasant villages, manor houses, and Gothic churches, whether middle-class persons of moderate

incomes were not crushed in aspirations by prosperous mechanics and dictatorial servants, whether the fairly good peaches and apples and autos available to working people atoned for the lack of the finest wines found on the best tables in Europe. Some of them thought they saw all American society sucked into the vortex of the machine process endlessly whirling to the tune of numbers. If these dire prophets despaired utterly of general improvement, they fell back with a kind of satisfied smile on the notion that, whatever was wrong with the mob, they could take comfort in associating with "the civilized minority"—a new kind of established church.

The economists, scientists, and publicists who made adventures in prophecies produced results as varied as their tempers. One of this school saw the nation settling down content under the servile régime of a "benevolent feudalism." A whole flock of geomancers cried out against what they called "the rising tide of color," auguring the destruction of civilization unless forsooth the white races could unite against Africa and Asia. Another horoscope represented the Anglo-Saxons—Nordics as the new term ran—in mortal peril of conquest by immigrant Latin and Semitic stocks and American civilization in danger of being carried down amid the wreck of matter and crash of worlds. A variant on that augury was a warning against the slow but resistless upward march of the mulatto.

With less evangelical fervor, scientists who felt dubious about the days ahead voiced the conviction that unless the American mind could be made over by fearless research and by a baptism of freedom, it could never catch up with the industrial machine and tame to ordered designs its huge organizations, its mass movements, its international belligerency; ruin being the alternative to a more desperate effort at thinking. After gazing long and intently into the crystal, that profound scholar, Henry Adams, saw on the scroll of destiny four frightful choices: the pessimism of Europe's dying civilization, the tyranny of labor or capital, a reaction

to mysticism and clerical dominion, or the ceaseless reiteration of the old processes under new guises at a monotonous level, subject perhaps to the Law of Entropy.

If the generality of opinion, as distinguished from that of poignant specialists, was taken into account, there was no doubt about the nature of the future in America. The most common note of assurance was belief in unlimited progress —the continuous fulfillment of the historic idea which had slowly risen through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to a position of commanding authority. Concretely it meant an invulnerable faith in democracy, in the ability of the undistinguished masses, as contrasted with heroes and classes, to meet by reasonably competent methods the issues raised in the flow of time—a faith in the efficacy of that new and mysterious instrument of the modern mind, "the invention of invention," moving from one technological triumph to another, overcoming the exhaustion of crude natural resources and energies, effecting an ever wider distribution of the blessings of civilization—health, security, material goods, knowledge, leisure, and æsthetic appreciation, and through the cumulative forces of intellectual and artistic reactions, conjuring from the vasty deeps of the nameless and unknown creative imagination of the noblest order, subduing physical things to the empire of the spirit—doubting not the capacity of the Power that had summoned into being all patterns of the past and present, living and dead, to fulfill its endless destiny.

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If so, it is the dawn, not the dusk, of the gods.

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

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

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